On Consciousness

[Beelzebuddy]

By any definition I've ever heard, this indicates two separate consciousnesses.

By what definition of consciousness could one reach a different conclusion?

By Pixy's definition (SNIFL or whatever), they've always been two separate consciousnesseses, just kept in sync with a callosal bridge.

By my definition, "what the brain does," they're only mostly separate. Mostly separate is partly together. With all separate there's usually only one thing you can do:

Be your own best friend

 

[dlorde]

By Pixy's definition (SNIFL or whatever), they've always been two separate consciousnesseses, just kept in sync with a callosal bridge.

My interpretation of the implications of that definition is that there would be a number of consciousnesses of varying complexity (I would have called them 'sub-consciousnesses' but that might have been confusing ) coordinated in each hemisphere to produce two compound hemispherical(?) consciousnesses linked by a callosal bridge. Since they develop sharing much of the information and feedback, the two hemispheres work together in synchrony to form a greater single consciousness (much as do their component consciousnesses), and their separate potentialities only become obvious (apparent) on callosal separation. The individual component consciousnesses would be limited by the requirements of their areas of functional specialisation, and it would be tricky to devise ways to demonstrate such limited forms of conscious awareness in vivo (and presumably unethical in vitro )

I suppose this model could be seen as a 'hive mind'

 

[Dancing David]

I didn't mean to put words in your mouth. Since you seem to object to any suggestion that there are two consciousnesses in a split brain patient, I naturally infer you believe there's only one.

Did you really look at the aroma experiment graphic I posted? (below)

The right brain smells a rose through the right nostril and the left hand (controlled by the right brain) picks up a rose on the table. At the same time, the left brain does not smell the rose because the left nostril is blocked (unlike other senses, nasal signals do not cross on their way to the brain) and the left brain denies verbally that a rose was smelled.

So, if the right brain is conscious of the rose smell, and the left brain is unconscious of it, this manifests the separate consciousnesses of the split halves. IOW each side is unconscious of what the other is conscious of.

(results are similar with sight, hearing, and touch experiments)

By any definition I've ever heard, this indicates two separate consciousnesses.

By what definition of consciousness could one reach a different conclusion?

[qimg]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/imagehosting/6736501729ae49b9e.gif[/qimg]

And again you over state what I did not say, in my statements. I did not object to two consciousnesses, I stated that we should be cautious without clearer definitions of which specific behaviors we are talking about and that there may be some more rigorous testing to rule out cross communication.

And again there may be ways of phrasing 'consciousness' that would make that case true. However, without specific testing to see what emotions and memories the individual may experience in response to the stimuli and other testing there could be communication.

Who was that patient and what were the specifics of the case?



And no, it does not meet the criteria of two separate 'consciousness' if we look at levels of arousal and then look at levels of awareness. Technically it would indicate that yes, the person was not aware of the olfactory stimulus, however, there is more to the definition of consciousness then that.

Again it is important to look at which behavior under the rubric of consciousness you are using. Strangely I think I have presented something similar recently, there is no unified entity referred to as consciousness.

Most correctly the individual was unable to verbalize the nature of the olfactory stimulus presented, now did they ask them to draw a picture with the left hand or to express memories at the time? Perhaps picture matching as well? (These are the ways to see what other cross communication might be occurring)

So yes if you want to say that 'consciousness' is merely the ability to express verbally (for the left hemisphere), you have different forms of awareness and two separate areas that do not communicate sufficiently to express a verbal concept related to the olfactory stimulus presented to the other hemisphere.

So if you wish to define consciousness so narrowly, then you could say that the left hemisphere was unable to verbalize the awareness in the right hemisphere. But I am not sure that says there are two separate consciousnesses.

However, as stated there could be other ways to see if the midbrain is sending information from the right hemisphere to the left.

My main objection is that the term consciousness include many different behaviors and there one should be careful in describing which behaviors are being referred to.

My pedantic point is overdrawn.

 

[Jeff Corey]

No it ain't David. It be right on.
And by the whey, me car had a split brane moment when the ABS went all silly wid the GPS.

 

[Mr. Scott]

Consciousness produces the brain, the brain does not produce consciousness.

Disprove that statement someone, if you would be so kind.

Can you answer my question instead this time please?

That's not a question, it's an imperative statement. I can no more disprove that consciousness produces the brain than you can disprove there's a pink unicorn in my garage. Do you understand the analogy?

Is there any evidence that consciousness produces the brain? If not, then the suggestion that it does is worthless, and disproving worthless suggestions is pointless. Is that clear?

But, I'll play so I can give you a chance to make your point. I can't disprove consciousness produces the brain. I await your response.

 

[Zeuzzz]

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.
Epigenetic inheritance infers that states of mind such as severe stress, diet and other things can alter gene methylation and also histone modifications (which are the primary components of chromatin responsible for forming DNA that makes up chromosomes) can change gene expression.
The effects of psychedelics produce a reality so different from what consciousness normally experiences you have to wonder if the brain of the person is in-fact merely the material mechanism through which they see the world. If the brain precludes consciousness then I find it very hard to see how anyone can remain lucid and return to normal brain function when reality has just dissolved in front of their eyes.

Ultimately, it's completely possible to keep studying the brain the same way it's been studied. The direction of causation of effects almost comes secondary in this; you either study the brain and say it produces these states of consciousness, or you study the brain and say this is the way consciousness manifests via the brain.

 

[PixyMisa]

Consciousness produces the brain, the brain does not produce consciousness.

Disprove that statement someone, if you would be so kind.

If we remove your consciousness, the brain remains.

If we remove your brain, consciousness goes with it.

It's about as wrong as it's possible to be while still meaning something.

 

[PixyMisa]

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.

Sorry, but that's incoherent. I'm not sure what you're trying to say.

The effects of psychedelics produce a reality so different from what consciousness normally experiences you have to wonder if the brain of the person is in-fact merely the material mechanism through which they see the world.

No.

 

[dlorde]

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.

This is a dualist misconception (assuming 'preclude' is a typo - if not, it's incoherent). Brain function is biochemical; synaptic transmission is biochemical (or bio-electrical); the 'psyche' that has somatic effects is a biological process involving synaptic transmission.

Epigenetic inheritance infers that states of mind such as severe stress, diet and other things can alter gene methylation and also histone modifications (which are the primary components of chromatin responsible for forming DNA that makes up chromosomes) can change gene expression.

Diet isn't a state of mind.

Stress is a physiological condition that may involve brain mediated hormonal contributions. Brain function is biochemical, as above. States of mind are biochemical & bioelectrical patterns of brain activity. There is nothing mysterious or surprising about the brain influencing somatic biochemical homeostasis - that's part of its function.

These things only become confusing or mysterious if you treat the mind as somehow separate from or independent if the biological brain; It isn't. The mind is the brain in operation.

 

[Belz...]

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.

That makes no sense. I assume you mean that these effects preclude a physical basis for consciousness. If so, it's funny that you don't realise that infers the exact opposite. If consciousness was not generated by the brain, drugs would have no effect on it.

The effects of psychedelics produce a reality so different from what consciousness normally experiences you have to wonder if the brain of the person is in-fact merely the material mechanism through which they see the world.

Non sequitur. Also, your hypothesis is untestable and unfalsifiable, making it useless for several reasons, not the least of which is that it makes no difference.

 

[Zeuzzz]

That makes no sense. I assume you mean that these effects preclude a physical basis for consciousness.

Or they show the way that consciousness manifests?

so, it's funny that you don't realise that infers the exact opposite. If consciousness was not generated by the brain, drugs would have no effect on it.

If the brain is the conduit through which consciousness gains its materialistic form, the lens through which it see's the physical world, drugs would severely alter the way in which the world is seen.

A previous thread I started might be relevant. (http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=127812)

this talk is on the exact subject of mirror neurons.

Joan Roughgarden - Neuroscience of creativity on the brain

 

[Belz...]

Or they show the way that consciousness manifests?

Again, untestable and irrelevant. The more simple explanation is that the brain generates consciousness, given the impact of drugs and physical damage on consciousness.

If the brain is the conduit through which consciousness gains its materialistic form, the lens through which it see's the physical world, drugs would severely alter the way in which the world is seen.

Again, untestable and irrelevant.

 

[calebprime]

Psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals infer that states of mind preclude the physical basis for brain.


[Evidence from our observations of] [the] psychosomatic effects on biological endo-chemicals [of belief systems] infers implies that the physical brain cannot be the basis for mind.

[evidence ensues]

 

[Jeff Corey]

So called psychosomatic effects involve respondent and operant conditioning procedures, which are clearly based in this material world, so you are wrong.

 

[Clive]

I've laid it out, in detail. I've pointed people to Godel, Escher, Bach, which lays it out in six hundred pages of detail. What exactly do you want?

Running a few searches shows that you may have posted about 6000 times to threads related to consciousness. How about pointing out a handful of those (or single one if that exists) which best summarise the details of your hypothesis? Others have asked you to do something similar previously but I recall that your response was along the lines that it wasn't your job to do that for them. However I don't think it's reasonable to expect someone to trawl through thousands of posts trying to find the definitive few (if they exist at all) that might be what you refer to when you say "I've laid it out, in detail".

With respect, is there anything significant in the "SRIP hypothesis" that is uniquely yours, or are you just using "Consciousness is SRIP" as a kind of shorthand for what Douglas Hofstadter has said in GEB? I have my own (first edition) copy of GEB, showing its age npw, but still open on the coffee table about a meter from where I sit. That edition has well over 700 pages, and I'm pretty sure I've read more or less all of them, most in an initial attempt to read the whole from from start to finish when I first bought it, and then in many partial re-reads subsequently.

Finally, although my own searching (both within JREF and elsewhere) didn't turn up the kind of detailed all-in-one-place description of the "Consciousness is SRIP hypothesis" that I was trying to find, I did find one article that appears to possibly be the source of some of your ideas:

Gaia Gains Consciousness ABS

 

[PixyMisa]

Running a few searches shows that you may have posted about 6000 times to threads related to consciousness. How about pointing a handful of those (or single one if that exists) which best summarise the details of your hypothesis? Others have asked you to do something similar previously but I recall that your response was along the lines that it wasn't your job to do that for them.

Those responses are to people who are asking for explanations already provided repeatedly in that very thread.

With respect, is there anything significant in the "SRIP hypothesis" that is uniquely yours

No; I've pointed that out repeatedly as well. This is not my idea, only my phrasing. If you've read GEB, you should have most of it. Dennett and I Am a Strange Loop will fill in most of the rest.

Short summary of the facts, yet again:

1. The brain is a computer. (Empirically.)
2. Consciousness is informational. (By definition / usage.)
3. Consciousness is an ongoing process, not a state (and certainly not an object). (By definition / usage.)
4. Consciousness is a function of the brain. (Empirically.)
5. When we speak of consciousness, we are speaking of something self-referential. See Descartes' cogito: I think is self-referential.
6. The Universe is quantised. (At least effectively, see Planck's constant.)
7. There is no model of computation more powerful than the Universal Turing Machine that does not rely on performing infinite amounts of work in finite time. (Church-Turing Thesis, hypercomputation.)
8. It is physically impossible to perform infinite amounts of work in finite time. (Thermodynamics.)

Short summary of the conclusions we can draw from these facts:

1. Consciousness is self-referential information processing.
2. The brain cannot possibly be more powerful than a Universal Turing Machine.
3. Consciousness can be implemented on any Turing-equivalent computer, and human consciousness can be implemented on any sufficiently large Turing-equivalent computer, given appropriate data.

Finally, although my own searching (both within JREF and elsewhere) didn't turn up the kind of detailed all-in-one-place description of the "Consciousness is SRIP hypothesis" that I was trying to find, I did find one article that appears to possibly be the source of some of your ideas:

No.

 

[Mr. Scott]

I'm starting to think the Blue Brain Project is for wimps. Simulating the brain at a molecular level? Has it been shown that there's computation at that level? That would be like simulating a computer but simulating each transistor at a molecular level. There isn't any computation going on at that level. Why would we think there is in the brain? I'd think that a functional simulation of neurons would be sufficient.

 

[Fudbucker]

Those responses are to people who are asking for explanations already provided repeatedly in that very thread.


No; I've pointed that out repeatedly as well. This is not my idea, only my phrasing. If you've read GEB, you should have most of it. Dennett and I Am a Strange Loop will fill in most of the rest.

Short summary of the facts, yet again:

1. The brain is a computer. (Empirically.)
2. Consciousness is informational. (By definition / usage.)
3. Consciousness is an ongoing process, not a state (and certainly not an object). (By definition / usage.)
4. Consciousness is a function of the brain. (Empirically.)
5. When we speak of consciousness, we are speaking of something self-referential. See Descartes' cogito: I think is self-referential.
6. The Universe is quantised. (At least effectively, see Planck's constant.)
7. There is no model of computation more powerful than the Universal Turing Machine that does not rely on performing infinite amounts of work in finite time. (Church-Turing Thesis, hypercomputation.)
8. It is physically impossible to perform infinite amounts of work in finite time. (Thermodynamics.)

Short summary of the conclusions we can draw from these facts:

1. Consciousness is self-referential information processing.
2. The brain cannot possibly be more powerful than a Universal Turing Machine.
3. Consciousness can be implemented on any Turing-equivalent computer, and human consciousness can be implemented on any sufficiently large Turing-equivalent computer, given appropriate data.


No.

I don't see how conclusion (1) follows. At best you've listed necessary conditions for consciousness. It's like saying if you've got flour, yeast, and water, you've got bread.

If consciousness is SRIP (and vice-versa), then all instances of SRIP should be instances of consciousness. They aren't, so it isn't.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

I'm starting to think the Blue Brain Project is for wimps. Simulating the brain at a molecular level? Has it been shown that there's computation at that level? That would be like simulating a computer but simulating each transistor at a molecular level. There isn't any computation going on at that level. Why would we think there is in the brain? I'd think that a functional simulation of neurons would be sufficient.

The Blue Brain isn't at the molecular level, it's at the compartment level. It's a fairly significant abstraction which encompasses the minimum detail needed to capture all the observed brain function we know to be important. Any less and you're deliberately introducing dysfunction for simplicity and efficiency's sake.

If consciousness is SRIP (and vice-versa), then all instances of SRIP should be instances of consciousness. They aren't, so it isn't.

Are too, by Pixy's definition.

 

[Roboramma]

If consciousness is SRIP (and vice-versa), then all instances of SRIP should be instances of consciousness. They aren't, so it isn't.

Evidence for the highlighted part?