On Consciousness

Is consciousness physical or metaphysical?


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Since we can test for color blindness we have a scientific way to determine what red is perceived as by humans.

Not really. The test tells whether a particular human can discriminate between certain visible wavelengths when apparent brightness is controlled for. It completely relies on the measurement of observable behavior and can be accomplished in nonverbal animals such as the pigeon..
 
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I won't be, the scientists will find the physical basis and then the comp position will seem like the unscientific and nutty position it is to most everyone.

Wait, wait. That's the part of my post you chose to answer ?

This latest post of yours, containing not arguments or evidence but rhetoric and, amazingly, a prediction of the future where you will be vindicated, is very sad.

Computation in nature is ubiquitous.

And yet it's been explained to you numerous times what kind of computation we're talking about.

An EM field based phenomena.

An EM field is conscious ? How does that make more sense ? Because it sounds more science-fictiony ?

Since I am not an admin I will not have much to say about it either.

What if you were an admin ? Would you ban words you don't like ?

You are stuck in your own abstractions PixyMisa.

And you are stuck in your common sense.
 
The configuration of the EM field inside a Faraday cage will determine what is experienced.
First, the brain is not a Faraday cage.

Second, how does that make any sense at all?

You are stuck in your own abstractions PixyMisa.
Nope, just reality.

It is a hypothesis that computation leads to consciousness (my version, not yours, in your version you must do computation of some kind, I agree).
Nope. It's a conclusion, for the reasons I just stated, and which you just ignored.

I love this one. So I guess you have not heard of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS).
Yes. And guess what? TMS is many orders of magnitude stronger than the EM field of the brain. That's what it takes to make a change.

The electric field of a fluorescent light at a distance of a metre will overwhelm the brain's EM field. And guess what happens to your consciousness when you walk past a fluorescent light?

Absolutely nothing.

The above is not a valid argument for anything.
That's my point: You are not presenting an argument, just waving your hands about.

The spin of an electron is not behavior.
Yes it is.

The mass of a watermelon is not behavior.
Yes it is.

Your consciousness is not behavior.
Yes it is.

The very word consciousness itself is not a verb word (behavior), it is an adjective word (property).
Wow. No. No, you are so very wrong.

Consciousness looks like a noun, not an adjective, but it's a process and not an object or event, so it is not only a verb, but an infinitive. In short, it's a gerundWP.

A computer is a system that is Turing Complete. Does not change anything.
It shows that your early objection is entirely irrelevant.

If you were correct then cognitive neuroscientists would study running computer programs to help figure out how consciousness works.
Well, first, they do, and second, no. A neural network is a computer. A brain is a computer. Studying the operation of a brain at the signalling and switching level is mathematically identical to studying the operation of a program in a Von Neumann architecture computer.

Until you grasp that point, nothing you say on the subject can be taken seriously.

They would do this because it should not matter whether they study running programs or the brain, as the brain and the computer running the program would only be different in terms of complexity (why am I repeating your own position back to you?).
It doesn't matter in terms of mathematical identity. It does matter for a variety of practical reasons.

Since they do not
They do.

nothing in the argument is invalidated as such.
Except that, of course, you are entirely wrong from beginning to end.
 
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Just answer the question if you can please, or answer why specifically you finding it boggling.
I find it boggling because it makes no sense at all. It reminds me of Lewis Carroll's 'Why is a raven like a writing desk?'.

You presumably meant something by it that failed to make it into the post. Care to explain?
 
... everything is computational when looked at properly. Plus, computation really is of a different kind than what experience of sensation is.
So, by your own logic, either everything isn't computational when looked at properly, or you're not looking at the experience of sensation properly. Which is it?

ETA or perhaps it's the unsupported assertion that there is a proper way to look at things that makes them computational...
 
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I don't, therefore I can't, huh?
The fact is, you didn't.

I was in the middle of starting a story
No, you said you could tell a story.

I just realized it would probably be pointless, just like this forum thread.
So why mention it at all? why continue posting? "I could tell a story to show you're wrong, but it would be pointless" - how lame do you think that looks?

Yeah, and if I made a bunch of arguments for Special Relativity and someone does not get it, then I say "oh well, I guess you need insight" the response will look pretty similar to the one above.
Yeah, but that never happened. What actually happened was that you tried to take the scientific high ground with appeals to insight and intuition - and when you were pulled up on it, you could only bluster a hypothetical.

Ah, PixyMisa's SRIP. That is so 1980's, as well as discredited in Cognitive Neuroscience.
The journal? Interesting - do you have a reference or link? (or are you making it up?)

What is so nasty about the word comp? You can use the word phys if you want to for me.
The word itself is value free. It's your use of it that is irritating. You have already been politely asked to refrain doing this with thread contributors; if you can manage to just respond to individuals, rather than some fictitious grouping, it would be less wasteful of everyone's time.
 
.. For the rest, just read a textbook on Cognitive Neuroscience and note that they do not talk much about running computer programs.
That's it? you're claiming "they do not talk much about X" == "X is discredited" ??
 
... I know of no computer program that ever created a math theorem that is not the result using a set of already known axioms and combining them together. In other words, a computer has never passed the "mathematician writing a paper in a math journal" type of Turing test, as far as I know at least (CYA).

What is maths based on, if not axioms? How many mathematicians writing theorem papers for math journals do you suppose have done so without 'using a set of already known axioms and combining them together'?

Do you know of a maths theorem that doesn't use the axioms of maths?
 
Do tell, I love fractals and strange attractors and all that, if that is what you are referring to. It would be interesting perhaps to hear a hypothesis on consciousness related to fractals.

No it has nothing to do with fractals, sorry.

At the physical level, a computation is when the state of one system changes attraction spaces because of the attraction space some other system is in, all else being equal.

Consider a simple set of two molecules that are interacting. Each molecule, A and B, is a system in its own right -- system A and system B.

The aggregation of particles that make up a molecule has an infinite number of states that they might possibly take but nevertheless there are certain attractor states ( or sets of states, since attractors don't need to be a single state ) that "define" what the configuration of the particles will settle to, all else being equal. For example, a stable molecule like benzene has an attractor which corresponds to the ideal benzene ring -- all else being equal, the particles in the benzene molecule stay in a state that is within the attraction space of that ideal benzene ring attractor. They can vibrate all they want, and orbit each other, and bump into each other, and do all the stuff that particles do, but nevertheless their configuration as a whole remains.

If you add some molecules that benzene can react with, or add energy that can lead to a change, or remove energy, whatever, and the benzene molecule changes such that we would now call it a different chemical, well now the particles are in a state that corresponds to a different attractor, perhaps something like a benzene ring with stuff attached, or maybe the ring decomposed into two other molecules, whatever. They are now in a different attraction space. When the benzene ring reacted, the particles of the system changed attraction spaces.

This should be obvious. What might not also be obvious, though, is that if there is some other particle system -- some other molecule, in our example -- that also changes attraction spaces because of the particles in the benzene changing attraction spaces, something special has happened. A computation has occurred. Because molecule B doesn't need to behave in any of the ways that molecule A does in relation to the environment, yet molecule B is still affected by those relationships. If there is too much heat energy, and molecule A reacts, molecule B might change behavior as well -- even if molecule B doesn't change behavior due to heat energy.

Conceptually, molecule B "uses" molecule A to partition the infinite amount of environmental states to a much smaller set of classes of states. Every state where molecule A doesn't react is one class, and molecule B is behaving one way if the environmental state is of that class. Every state where molecule A has reacted is another class, and molecule B behaves another way if the environmental state is of that class instead.

So with only two systems, you should be noticing a pattern of complexity reduction:

( infinite environmental state ) --> ( finite number of attraction spaces in system A ) --> ( even smaller number of attraction spaces in system B ).

And that, fundamentally, is computation. It shouldn't be hard to imagine putting about a trillion extra steps of complexity reduction in there and ending up with the simple binary behavior of you deciding to turn left instead of right on your way home from work despite the fact that the environment around you is in one state out of an infinite number of possibilities. How does that infinite possibility reduce to a simple binary choice on your part? The complexity reduction of computation.

The thing is, what silicon computers do is also just complexity reduction, using the same principles. The computations that take place because of the transistors of computers is just as much based on changing attraction spaces as the computations that take place because of the biochemical molecules in your cells. And that is why anyone that actually understands physics and biology -- hopefully, most of the neurobiologists out there -- are supporters of the computational model.

EDIT -- this should also dispel the strawman of "since computation is everywhere, and not everything is conscious, then computation must not be the root of consciousness" because it should be obvious that a dozen steps of complexity reduction, such as what you might find in a rock, don't lead to the same behavior as a few trillion steps, such as you might find in a conscious human.
 
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The thing is, what silicon computers do is also just complexity reduction, using the same principles. The computations that take place because of the transistors of computers is just as much based on changing attraction spaces as the computations that take place because of the biochemical molecules in your cells. And that is why anyone that actually understands physics and biology -- hopefully, most of the neurobiologists out there -- are supporters of the computational model.
I must say that I support the computational model because I believe the brain is a computer, and not because it makes computations, such any physical interaction does. There is much more to a computer than computations.

EDIT -- this should also dispel the strawman of "since computation is everywhere, and not everything is conscious, then computation must not be the root of consciousness" because it should be obvious that a dozen steps of complexity reduction, such as what you might find in a rock, don't lead to the same behavior as a few trillion steps, such as you might find in a conscious human.
And I am also convinced that no amount of computations will necessarily lead to consciousness.
 
What is the basis for this assertion?

The "basis of consciousness" and complexity each belong to different categories of subject.

Imagine you had a box inside of which, for whatever reason, we all agree consciousness is occurring. The box has dials on it that can be turned to affect the state of the consciousness. Anything going on outside the box we can not agree on as far as consciousness goes.

So we hook up a computer to the box that can control the dials. What can the computer do to the consciousness in the box? It can make it more complicated. It can, say, make a red dot blink in some odd pattern in the visual field of the consciousness inside the box by adjusting the appropriate dial. It could play back some series of instructions that cause the consciousness to experience a series of sensations by adjusting the relevant dials. That is all we can agree the computer can or should be able to do in this case.

Now place the computer and the box inside a bigger box with its own set of dials for control of the computer/box system. What would a computer hooked up to the dials of such a system be able to do such that we could all agree upon those abilities without reservations? The same as before. It could coordinate and control the consciousness inside the box inside the box/computer system. That is all it could do (as far as agreement is concerned).

Of course we can continue doing this indefinitely, creating bigger and bigger boxes all the way up as much as you want, and at each stage the computer would only be able to control and coordinate consciousness, never create it (as far as agreement is concerned). What if we open up the box though? Say we open it up and inside of it is a computer hooked up to another box. It would seem perverse to say then that the computer inside the box can do something the computers outside the box can not be agreed upon to do, which is create consciousness.

And so it goes. Of course the chance of the computer club here getting the import of the above is nearly 0, but, oh well, I write for the lurkers more than anyone else ;)
 
What is maths based on, if not axioms? How many mathematicians writing theorem papers for math journals do you suppose have done so without 'using a set of already known axioms and combining them together'?

Do you know of a maths theorem that doesn't use the axioms of maths?

Mathematicians write proofs. Proofs are a series arguments about abstract entities and their relationships. It is often the case that the arguments used will be based both on known axioms as well as arguments that are new and unknown at that point.

Take the theorem that the square root of 2 is irrational. Before it was discovered by the Pythagorean school that proof by contradiction is a method of proving something in math they had the proof. The proof depends on the idea of proof by contradiction. You could program in proof by contradiction as a method for a proof checker program to use after the Pythagoreans discovered it, but we do not have computer programs that do the equivalent of the above (so far as I know).

In more general terms Gödel's incompleteness theoremsWP:

are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic.

We do not seem to be limited in the way above; computers are.
 
So, by your own logic, either everything isn't computational when looked at properly, or you're not looking at the experience of sensation properly. Which is it?

ETA or perhaps it's the unsupported assertion that there is a proper way to look at things that makes them computational...

I can not make you understand that computation and consciousness are of two different categories, you just have to understand why on your own or not. The point is that you, and everyone else who buys into the Hard-AI type stance, do not look at experience of sensation correctly. You do not take it in for itself what it is without the added baggage of various ideas.

Experience of sensation is a phenomena that just exists. Trying to figure out how the experience comes about from the physical world is one of the main goals of science. Anything else is hypothesis.
 
I can not make you understand that computation and consciousness are of two different categories
Default hypothesis (see below for reasons): consciousness is a computational process. You haven't presented any evidence or arguments to refute that.

The point is that you, and everyone else who buys into the Hard-AI type stance, do not look at experience of sensation correctly.
Evidence?
Did you read Churchland's Chimeric Colours paper? It's pretty rare that you can literally use the evidence of your own eyes to empirically validate such a theory; what is your refutation of his conclusions?

You do not take it in for itself what it is without the added baggage of various ideas.
Could you rephrase that so it makes sense?

Experience of sensation is a phenomena that just exists. Trying to figure out how the experience comes about from the physical world is one of the main goals of science. Anything else is hypothesis.
A phenomenon [singular].

The available evidence suggests: consciousness is an activity of the brain; the brain is a neural network or aggregation of neural networks; neural networks are computational; ergo, the brain's activities are computational; ergo, consciousness is computational.

If you have contradictory evidence, or a rational alternative hypothesis, feel free to present it.
 
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An EM field based phenomena.

Ok, from what I know about EM fields, there doesn't seem to be anything about them that can be responsible for consciousness. Correct me if I'm wrong.

I'm assuming you don't mean that any and all EM fields are conscious, right?

So, what's different about a conscious EM field that makes it not like an ordinary, unconscious EM field -- a difference we might be able to measure from outside the field and define in terms of known physics?

If you have a conscious EM field and divide in two, will each half still be conscious? Then divide one of those halves in half again. Is a quarter of a conscious field conscious? Keep dividing. Can you go on forever? Why not?

What kind of EM field is conscious, and how is it generated? How is, a red quale EM field detected by the rest of the brain so that not just the red apple, but the red quale, can be reported to the world? Why does the brain even bother with adding the quale, by creating, then detecting, its EM field?

Is there any evidence EM fields are responsible for consciousness?
 
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Of course we can continue doing this indefinitely, creating bigger and bigger boxes all the way up as much as you want, and at each stage the computer would only be able to control and coordinate consciousness, never create it (as far as agreement is concerned). What if we open up the box though? Say we open it up and inside of it is a computer hooked up to another box. It would seem perverse to say then that the computer inside the box can do something the computers outside the box can not be agreed upon to do, which is create consciousness.
This is Cartesian dualism. You're a dualist.
 
Evidence?
Did you read Churchland's Chimeric Colours paper? It's pretty rare that you can literally use the evidence of your own eyes to empirically validate such a theory; what is your refutation of his conclusions?
Thanks for the link, I couldn't remember the name for those colours.

That goes straight back to what I was saying earlier - that the visual perception pathway is not a black box; that if someone had their subjective perception of red and blue reversed relative to others, we could not only tell, we could work out (in principle) at which stage of the pathway the wires got crossed.
 
The configuration of the EM field inside a Faraday cage will determine what is experienced.

Pixy is right, Tensor. If the EM field theory is correct, and it is interesting at least, our consciousness would be disrupted by a lot of things we interact with every day. It's easily falsified.

Your consciousness is not behavior.

Again, a bare assertion. It's one thing to have a position, but another thing entirely to do little more than preach it.
 
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