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On Consciousness

Is consciousness physical or metaphysical?


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Say clearly what you mean by "computer".

While I can't answer for Pixy, I'd say that the definition of "computer" is pretty simple. It's a device which can accept, store, and process data according to a pre-determined set of rules. Storing may not be absolutely necessary; I don't think it really matters for the purpose of this discussion, but there it is.

Cite your evidence that the brain is one.

Well, the brain can accept data (the five senses), store it (memory), and process them according to a predetermined set of rules (various neurons and nerve clusters interacting).

Explain what this contributes to our understanding of consciousness.

It lets us know that it arises from a complex system like the brain, can be altered by making changes to the rules or damaging the system, and can theoretically arise from artificial systems as well as natural ones.

So if you want to build a truck to get you somewhere, you can't program it, you have to build it. And by the same token, if you want to build a thing that actually has experiences, you can't just program it, you have to build it that way.

I'm not entirely sure what you're arguing here. Or, rather, I'm pretty sure I understand what you're saying; I just don't get how it applies to the situation at hand.

Do you think that a robot could ever be conscious? Say that it was given analogues for the ear, eye, nose, mouth, hand, leg, and so on, as well as an artificial brain that could receive, process, and react to all this information in exactly the same way that a human brain could.

Would this robot be conscious? It has been "built", after all, and has the capability to "go somewhere" - experience and react to things. If you think it isn't conscious, why do you think that?
 
If you think it's relevant, then let's look at it.

I'll go back and pick it up again (you were right, I didn't finish the first page) and if you don't mind just tell me in a few sentences what was accomplished and how you think it's relevant to the study of consciousness.

And we'll pick it up from there.

They wired up some artificial neural networks according to a hypothesized pathway that they thought might be part of how the mamallian brain controls motor movements via imagination, hooked the simulation up to a robot arm with a camera sensor, and it worked. The robot imagined that if it turned a certain way it would see an object of a color that it "liked" and because of that imagined reward it actually turned.

I don't think it is necessarily directly relevant to the search for phenomenal consciousness. Rather, I think it is relevant to all of the arguments you have made against the computational model, for starters.

You have explicitly stated that simulating neurons can't lead to real world results, that what happens in simulations is just ones and zeros that only humans can make sense of. Well, you are wrong about that, because these guys hooked up a robot to simulated neurons, and it did something on its own.

You have explicitly stated your distaste for AI research because it goes on in some sort of vacuum from brain research. Well, you are wrong about that, because these guys made an artificial neural network based on known brain pathways, in fact the paper goes into a good amount of detail describing such pathways and even provides citations of its own for the "brain research," as you call it, that the researchers educated themselves with.

You have explicitly stated that computing is somehow not "real time" and thus a program is incapable of emulating what is necessary for consciousness. Well, you are wrong about that, because these guys simulated the neurons in software, and those neurons didn't have any problem interacting with the world in "real time."

You have explicitly stated that there is no indication by any research thus far that the functions of the brain necessary for consciousness can be divorced from its "real-spacetime function" which you have explicitly stated is surely more than what known computers can provide. Well, you are wrong about that, because these guys seem to have emulated at least a few of the functions required for that thing we call "imagination" in a computer.

Whether or not the research explains much in terms of consciousness for you isn't really the point. The point is that the research clearly shows that just about every single one of your counterarguments isn't valid. That's why I brought it up. Turns out there are dozens of projects like this, just go to the aisb home site and look at their symposiums over the last decade.

So my question would be, given that there is actual research going on where people are looking at the mamallian brain and emulating its functions with artificial computers and getting behavioral results that confirm their hypotheses, why do you think that simply making post after post trying to argue to the contrary is productive? Once you move past this silly need to control the conversation and "win" a debate at any cost maybe you will start to learn a few things, eh?
 
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Clearly we are not in a position to use weather systems to compute anything non-trivial, but if we can use a digital computer to compute the same things as a working human brain (and the Blue Brain project suggests we might), and if it is the computational workings of the human brain that give rise to consciousness, then, as Markram says, "I don’t know why you wouldn’t be able to generate a conscious mind".

When I asked what you meant by "computational equivalence" it's really the same thing as asking what you mean by "compute the same things".

I think you'd agree with me that you can only "compute" stomach acid in the Wolfram sense of "compute".

If you're talking about the IP sense of "compute" then the outcome of any computation is symbolic, and requires a reader.

So to "compute consciousness" makes sense if we're talking about Wolfram computation.

But to "compute consciousness" makes no sense if we're talking about info processing of a symbolic type. That's categorically.

If there's another way to define "computing" that allows for digital computer and human brains to be "computing the same thing" in a non-trivial sense, then that's certainly interesting.

In the meantime, I would anticipate that the odds of the Blue Brain generating consciousness are about as good as a computer simulation of a power plant generating electricity -- it'll happen if they get the hardware right.

And since Markram specifically discusses putting the brain into a body, well, they might just do that.
 
I guess 'perform' will do for 'experience'. Makes more sense than 'produce'. It may sound pedantic, but how one thinks about these things makes a difference.

I prefer "perform" over "produce" myself, and prefer both over "contain", a term I wish we'd do away with in this context.
 
If there's a theory for how and why we get from particular configurations of information (independent of particular physical behaviors) and not from others to phenomena in the consciousness cluster such as yellow, mustiness, or the sound of thunder, I'd like to know what it is.

And I'd like to know why consciousness is more likely to depend on a supposed informational layer supported by the physical behavior rather than directly from the physical behavior itself.

Why do you insist on thinking there is a difference between information and physical behavior?

I have no idea where you get this from. Whatever your source is, it is entirely wrong.
 
Saying that the mechanism is not yet known, and that we don't have a "firm" basis for proposing one, is a far cry from knowing nothing about it.

Furthermore I question why you perpetually consider people who do little besides write popular books "heavyweights."

I personally would consider the people doing the actual research the "heavyweights," if the term is even applicable, and I doubt they share such a conservative viewpoint because the very fact that they are doing research suggests they have some hypothesis to test at least.

I've never said we know nothing about it, of course.

And although there are some hypotheses being tossed around, the focus at the moment is just to continue investigating NCCs and see where it goes, which is pretty raw stuff.

Besides, I quoted them directly so the viewpoints expressed are theirs.

Anyway let's see if the folks I cited have done any actual research....

Christof Koch of Caltech, author of Biophysics of Computation: Information Processing in Single Neurons -- his research focuses on visual systems, information theory, and questions of machine sentience.

Ned Block from NYU -- you might be interested in his panel appearance along with Koch and info-theorist Giulio Tononi in the "Consciousness and Intelligence" seminar of last year's "Brains, Minds, and Machines" symposium at MIT, which btw I think demonstrates the actual current intersection of neurobiology and info theory.

Bernard Baars of Berkeley who's done all kinds of things.

V.S. Ramachandran of UC San Diego's Center for Brain and Cognition, who has done some research.

Michael Gazzaniga who was on the original split-brain study team, led the continuing research, and is the current president of the Cognitive Neuroscience Institute.

Steven Pinker of Harvard, advocate of the computational model of mind
 
Exactly.

At the end of the day, no matter how you slice it, it really is that simple.

It's as if you didn't read my refutation of Massimo's comparison of consciousness to sugar, or you didn't understand it.

Photosynthesis outputs sugar.

What does the brain output?

How is consciousness like sugar?
 
I can't see a computer, with the rules it must be assembled with, coming up with:
"It was a dark and stormy night"... or "Call me Ismael"... or "In the beginning..",
particularly the last which has what a computer would recognize as physical absurdities, much less plots that have been pre-figured in the author's mind to go in a specific direction, which may or may not be possible in a physical world.
The pig go. Go is to the fountain. The pig put foot. Grunt. Foot in what? ketchup. The dove fly. Fly is in sky. The dove drop something. The something on the pig. The pig disgusting. The pig rattle. Rattle with dove. The dove angry. The pig leave. The dove produce. Produce is chicken wing. With wing bark. No Quack.
 
Say clearly what you mean by "computer".
Any system that is Turing completeWP. That's what anyone who understands computers means by the term.

Cite your evidence that the brain is one.
The brain is Turing complete. This was understood by everyone in the all related fields the minute we came up with the term "Turing complete".

Explain what this contributes to our understanding of consciousness.
Consciousness is a self-referential informational process. From Descarte's cogito to Dennett and Hofstadter, that's what we've always meant by the term. Consciousness is a function of the brain. The brain is a computer.

It's not hard, Piggy. Complicated, yes. but not hard. All you have to do is stop believing in magic.
 
When I asked what you meant by "computational equivalence" it's really the same thing as asking what you mean by "compute the same things".

I think you'd agree with me that you can only "compute" stomach acid in the Wolfram sense of "compute".
Well, you can of course also simulate it. But for things defined by their physical properties (e.g. acid) there's a divide that does not exist for things defined by their informational properties (minds, consciousness).

If you're talking about the IP sense of "compute" then the outcome of any computation is symbolic, and requires a reader.
Only if you're a dualist. Are you a dualist?

So to "compute consciousness" makes sense if we're talking about Wolfram computation.
And in the symbolic sense.

But to "compute consciousness" makes no sense if we're talking about info processing of a symbolic type. That's categorically.
Categorically wrong, yes.

In the meantime, I would anticipate that the odds of the Blue Brain generating consciousness are about as good as a computer simulation of a power plant generating electricity -- it'll happen if they get the hardware right.
On what basis? Other than the usual arguments from personal incredulity and ignorance?
 
For our purposes, the truck and the brain are enough alike to make the point here.

No, they're not. The truck is a thing that moves from A to B while transporting something. The brain is a thing that gets data and outputs other data. How are they alike ?

You can't program the real-world behavior of a truck... a purely programmed truck can't get you to work. And a purely programmed pancreas can't function in your body.

True. You could program a very precise simulation of a truck, but not a real truck.

And ditto for a brain. Unless you've got some reason for me to believe that this particular glob of matter operates under some very special rules.

Not "special rules", but "different processes". See, the brain, as I said above, gets, processes, and outputs symbolic data. It just so happens that this is exactly what computers do, and nothing else in the universe does only that. To me that's a pretty convincing case for their similarity, and why one can emulate, simulate or be the other.

Just because we haven't figured out what's going on yet, we are not therefore relieved from our obligation not to jump to the conclusion that something other than brute physics is at work here.

Quite true.

If you want to use that view, which is Wolfram's view, then everything computes.

Right. I don't like that definition because it's not very useful, by way of being too broad.

But if you're talking about symbolic information processing, which is what my PC does, then you're talking about a system which requires an encoding and decoding mind, and there's no such service for what's going on in our brains.

Yes, it requires an encoding and decoding mind. But it need not be an external mind, right ?

There is as much symbolic information in our brains as there is in our fingernails.

I'm sorry, what ?

That's pretty damn weak.

Didn't like the 80s commercial reference ?

Are there any two objects that you couldn't get up a list of that caliber for?

For computing ? No.
 
No, if you stab my brain, my brain does not produce red. It stops producing red because I lose consciousness.

If you're looking at my brain when it gets stabbed, then your brain will produce (or more accurately, perform) red.

Did you just make a completely irrelevant distinction ?

No, there doesn't.

Well it's hard to imagine having a reasoned conversation with you about this, then, isn't it ?

The other side hasn't provided any citations of anybody.

That is untrue. I've seen one on the same page as your post.
 
So if you want to build a truck to get you somewhere, you can't program it, you have to build it. And by the same token, if you want to build a thing that actually has experiences, you can't just program it, you have to build it that way.

I just had an idea for an analogy and I'm not sure if it'll work. Here goes...

A truck is a metal frame over an axle and four wheels, transports stuff and goes places, right ?

Let's do the consciousness/computer thing in reverse.

Let's say I build an organism in a lab. It's a vertebrate with a tough skin with hard plates. It has flabs on either side that you can open to get inside its frontal cavity, in which there are ganglions you can push or pull to trigger certain functions of its nervous system. In front are two white bioluminescent organs. Same thing for the rear, but red. There is another cavity at the back. You can input a slush-like food in an orifice to the side, which feeds the organism, and comes out as fart from the rear. Under it are four legs arranged in a way that they can spin on themselves without damage, so they turn like wheels. Using these attributes, you can shove stuff in its back cavity, hop inside, press a few ganglions and go see your father-in-law in Jersey.

Is it a truck ?

I'd say you'd have a number of truck enthousiasts, amongst others, claiming it can never be a truck because it's organic, etc.
 
The pig go. Go is to the fountain. The pig put foot. Grunt. Foot in what? ketchup. The dove fly. Fly is in sky. The dove drop something. The something on the pig. The pig disgusting. The pig rattle. Rattle with dove. The dove angry. The pig leave. The dove produce. Produce is chicken wing. With wing bark. No Quack.

Huh ?
 
In various circumstances, your brain will perform red. That's all.

Who or what is the brain "performing" red to? You have to explain not just the performer and how it performs, but also the audience, and how THAT works. And why performance of qualia needed to evolve in the first place. The biological sciences have yet to isolate a performer or an audience in the brain of such things, have they?

How do you know the internal subjective experience of a non-biological data processing machine cannot possibly seem, to it, like magic?
 
Why do you insist on thinking there is a difference between information and physical behavior?

I have no idea where you get this from. Whatever your source is, it is entirely wrong.

"Information" is a term we can use in a variety of ways, as you know.

In the Wolfram sense, it's totally equivalent to physical activity and properties.

If you use the term to refer to degrees of entropy, then the equivalence is not complete.

If you use the term in such a way that it allows an informational "world of the simulation" to exist which can (and must) be described in radically different ways from the physical activity of the simulator -- as y'all do -- then you (not I) have divorced the information from the physical behavior in a radical way.

If we use the term "information" in the sense of something that can be encoded and decoded, then that information becomes independent of physical reality in very important ways.

I can send the same message to you -- say, "Help!" -- using the motion of flags, or an arrangement of rocks on a beach, or by flashing lights in certain patterns, or by causing air to bounce inside your ears in a particular way. That means that there must be a "difference between information and physical behavior" when we're talking about this kind of information, or else all those different physical set-ups couldn't carry the same kind of information.

However, there's a caveat when talking about this last sort of information, because it requires an encoder and decoder.

Someone who doesn't speak the same language as me (whether that's English or semaphore) won't get the message, unless they use other shared information such as our human understanding of what a frantic cry sounds like, which is another kind of encoding and decoding.

In other words, there actually is no "information" in the rocks or the lights or the flags or the air, just like there's no pain in the knife.

So we can talk about the brain objectively (without inserting any encoder and decoder) in the Wolfram sense, and we can speak metaphorically about "information in the brain" when we're really referring to the brute physical activity, and we can talk about information exchanged in a system that contains more than one brain.

But to talk about this last kind of information existing objectively in the isolated brain, well, that makes very little sense.
 
If you use the term in such a way that it allows an informational "world of the simulation" to exist which can (and must) be described in radically different ways from the physical activity of the simulator -- as y'all do -- then you (not I) have divorced the information from the physical behavior in a radical way.
Yes, it's simulated. However, this does not divorce the information from the information.

However, there's a caveat when talking about this last sort of information, because it requires an encoder and decoder.
Which can be pretty much any switching mechanism. The operation of a computer does not need to be decoded, because it is itself a decoder.
 
I'd say that the definition of "computer" is pretty simple. It's a device which can accept, store, and process data according to a pre-determined set of rules. Storing may not be absolutely necessary; I don't think it really matters for the purpose of this discussion, but there it is.

Well, the brain can accept data (the five senses), store it (memory), and process them according to a predetermined set of rules (various neurons and nerve clusters interacting).

What do you mean by "data"?

If I consider food "data", then my body can accept it, store it, and process it according to a predetermined set of rules.

But that seems odd to say because we normally use the term "data" to refer to sets of symbols -- to what we find in spreadsheets and on printed pages and burned into discs and such.

A baseball hitting you in the head is not generally considered "data". The number of beanballs a pitcher has thrown in his career (an abstraction) is condidered "data".

And because "data" requires abstraction, or encoding, it must be decoded -- if all intelligent life were to vanish from the universe tomorrow, our data would vanish with us.

So the problem with your model is that the brain's "input" is the equivalent of getting hit by a baseball -- it's just a whole bunch of physical bombardments.

No "data" goes into that organ of your body.

Once that organ is up and running properly, then we can talk about producing data, but not when we're talking about how the organ itself runs.

My PC, on the other hand, has been specially designed by human beings to help us handle data.

It lets us know that it arises from a complex system like the brain, can be altered by making changes to the rules or damaging the system, and can theoretically arise from artificial systems as well as natural ones.

But we already knew that consciousness arises from a complex system like the brain, because we already knew that it's a function of the brain. So there's no contribution on that count.

And we already knew that consciousness can be altered by physically manipulating or damaging the brain through lab experiments.

And we already assumed that this behavior, like all others, can (in theory, unless we discover different) be mimicked in some sort of other physical system, if properly designed and built.

We get all of this from observing the brain. So there are no contributions here.

I'm not entirely sure what you're arguing here. Or, rather, I'm pretty sure I understand what you're saying; I just don't get how it applies to the situation at hand.

Do you think that a robot could ever be conscious? Say that it was given analogues for the ear, eye, nose, mouth, hand, leg, and so on, as well as an artificial brain that could receive, process, and react to all this information in exactly the same way that a human brain could.

Would this robot be conscious? It has been "built", after all, and has the capability to "go somewhere" - experience and react to things. If you think it isn't conscious, why do you think that?

No, that's not my point.

Let me rephrase it....

As long as you're talking about signal-in/signal-out, it's fine to swap a computer out for some part of a system.

For instance, I can replace my car-body paint crew by replacing their brains and their arms with computers and mechanical arms.

That's because to run the paint sprayers I just need the computer to accept electrical signals in the right pattern and put them out in the right pattern.

That's why it's so (relatively) easy to build a machine that does what your knee does when the doctor taps it with a mallet.

Making your leg jump requires only that a nerve signal go up one line and trigger other signals that go back down another. (You do consciously feel what's going on, but you don't have to -- it's not necessary for the process to occur.)

So why can't I get a computer -- and a computer alone -- to haul my trash to the dump, or produce sugar, or filter my blood?

In other words, why can't I swap a computer (with only enough hardware to run the logic and nothing else) for my truck, or a leaf, or my liver?

It's because these processes are not just signal-in/signal-out... real work is required for these outcomes, even though they are all quite different in nature.

And although we don't know what it is yet, exactly, or how it's done, consciousness does not seem to be "signal out". (If it is, what is the signal and where is it going to, and how does it produce colors and sounds and smells and pain and such?)

In another thread I used this analogy to illustrate the point....

Suppose there's a town in a mountain pass separating the interior farmland from the port on the coast. All farms must go through this town.

Inside the town, there were various points where taxes had to be paid (in produce) and you might get "change" back in the form or other produce -- e.g. if you don't have a cantaloup to pay a tax, you pay a watermelon and get back two tomatoes.

Also, when farmers would meet at intersections, they would often barter among themselves.

The taxes changed all the time, and so did the barter, so you never knew what you'd end up with in your wagon when you left... you just had to wait and see.

So that's a vegetables-in/vegetables-out system.

But eventually, folks got tired of the traffic, so one day the mayor had an idea. They'd build a moat around the town, float all the farmers' crops and their wagons on barges from one gate to another, and give the farmers lists of their crops, both type and weight/number.

That way, they could do all their transactions on paper, and just pick up the right mix of veggies and their wagon on the other side.

Essentially, they've swapped an information system for a physical system.

But there's a catch... this only works if no real work needs to be done with the original inputs along the way.

(Think back to the truck and the leaf... you can't use a computer alone to substitute for either of these because the computer does symbolic work, and we need real work done here.)

So imagine if the mayor had contracted out the work of building a moat, but hadn't told the contractor why. And suppose he requested some sort of engine to make the moat flow in a circle.

The contractor thinks, "I know, there are weigh scales at every tax office and on every corner in town to facilitate the taxes and barter on vegetables... we'll capture the energy of the movement of the scales to make this moat flow."

So that's how he designs the system.

Well, now we're in trouble because the new information-based system can't do that work, so the moat doesn't flow.

As far as we know, consciousness is a direct result of the physical activity of the brain. We have no reason to believe otherwise.

As far as we can tell, the electrochemical activity in your brain directly results in behaviors like blue and green and pain and the smell of coffee and the feeling of disgust and the sound of birds singing.

Consciousness is not signal-in/signal-out.

Conscious phenomena are the result of real physical work by the brain, and if you swap it out with a computer which is only designed to "run the logic" and isn't built with the right hardware to actually make blue and green and pain happen, they won't happen.

That's why the comparison with the truck and the leaf is apt.

Here's a second way of thinking about it....

Suppose Major Tom is on a spacewalk to repair a space probe. When he's done, he sees there's a dangerous space squid between him and the mothership.

So he requests to be beamed back. They convert his physical structure somehow, preserve the information on how it's assembled, and re-assemble it back on the ship, and he's home safe.

But suppose he decides that the space squid is a threat to the ship, and he must kill it.

In that case, you can't convert to your information system... he has to go there himself in his suit and kill the thing.

You could, of course, beam him aboard and alter the information so that he appears in the same state he would have been in if he had killed the squid -- he'll be tired and a bit roughed up and he'll have a memory of killing the squid.

But the squid will still be there.

To actually do that work, you can't switch to an informational system.

That's why you can use a machine with a computer in it as a substitute for a liver, but you can't use just a computer with only enough hardware to run the logic, because real-world behavior can't be accomplished with logic alone.

That's why you can use a machine with a computer in it to do what my truck does, but you can't use a computer alone with only enough hardware to run the logic.

Ditto for a leaf... photosynthesis cannot be performed with logic alone.

There is absolutely no reason to think that the behaviors of conscious awareness are any different. They must require real work, not just logic.

ETA: That's where this "magic bean" nonsense comes from. The computational literalists believe that logic alone can create consciousness -- although they have no theory of how or why -- so they dub the physical process the "magic bean" since they think we don't need it.
 
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