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On Consciousness

Is consciousness physical or metaphysical?


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You used the word qualia in your answer. How is your answer meaningful?

It is meaningful if you have a brain, can read English as well as know what some words mean. Additionally, have a look online for other sources to see if you think it makes sense to you.

Hope that helps!
 
An interesting statement. How is rejecting nonsensical concepts (dualism) and embracing evidence-based inquiry unscientific ?

Evidence comes from observation. Observation involves sensation, which is rejected by Hard-AI types as a concept (several people on this thread have said they are p-zombies, a pretty explicit rejection of the ideas behind sensation as consciousness).
 
I am not a fan of Dennett particularly, however we do know quite a bit about the processes, I believe myself that hard AI is one path of exploration, but neural nets have a lot in common with analog computing as well. There is a huge kludge in the brain, lots of parallel processing, cross reference and complete fabrication.

See, I told you Dancing David we had something in common, we are both not fans of Dennett (unlike 80% of the people on this forum).

I agree with the idea of exploring all possible legitimate avenues of research. The current approaches mostly circle around the problem of figuring out how consciousness works, which is fine. I just want the goal to be understood, and I do not think the Hard-AI types get it (there is a reason why Dennett's book is parodied as "Consciousness Ignored").
 
Epimistemically subjective is special pleading.

There are no such things, there are events, all events are open to the scientific method, including concepts like beauty.

The is also a fallacy of construction and a false dichotomy.


Subjective has to do with value judgement and more private events, they are still amenable to study and the methods of science.

:)

We are looking for epistemically objective (science) not epistemically subjective results (value judgements). Unfortunately, consciousness is ontologically subjective. Luckily, we have an abstract mind that helps us to relate to each other to bridge the gap.
 
If qualia is consciousness, then tell me what kind of entity observes qualia, and how does it function? Reference post #1 in this thread to get a picture of the problem.

Actually, on the issue of 'who' is doing the observing, I oddly enough agree with Dennett. There is no one doing the observing, there is only the observation (the sensations that make up the consciousness that is).

How does it function? Are you kidding? How the hell should I know? That is a topic for continuing research.
 
It is meaningful if you have a brain, can read English as well as know what some words mean. Additionally, have a look online for other sources to see if you think it makes sense to you.
I know how the word "qualia" is defined, and what it means is "we stopped bothering to think about the problem".

Is that what you intended?
 
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Evidence comes from observation. Observation involves sensation, which is rejected by Hard-AI types
No. Not even remotely.

as a concept (several people on this thread have said they are p-zombies
A rejection of dualism. The notion of p-zombies is incoherent under any monism.

a pretty explicit rejection of the ideas behind sensation as consciousness).
Uh.... What? :confused:
 
Evidence comes from observation. Observation involves sensation, which is rejected by Hard-AI types as a concept (several people on this thread have said they are p-zombies, a pretty explicit rejection of the ideas behind sensation as consciousness).

Entirely wrong. No one rejects the existence of sensations; we just reject the magical explanation of sensations, including "qualia", which refer to some property of experience that isn't borne out by the evence.

In addition, depending on your definition of "sensation", it may not be required for observation.
 
You're asking me how I know my brain is working? Seriously?

Nope, you use behaviors just like everyone else. You have the behaviors we define as consciousness. And yes, how do you know your brain is working?

By using the behaviors of a conscious brain?

When did you learn the word, conscious and what it meant?
 
[QUadelson's illusion.OTE=Belz...;8386610]Entirely wrong. No one rejects the existence of sensations; we just reject the magical explanation of sensations, including "qualia", which refer to some property of experience that isn't borne out by the evence.

In addition, depending on your definition of "sensation", it may not be required for observation.[/QUOTE]

Sensation is the detection of stimuli by the various sensory receptors. For examaple, light is detected by the rods and cones in the retina. They respond equally to squares A and B in Adelson's Illusion. However, on the way to the occipital lobes, the signals are subject to lateral inhibition and other processes. The result is the perception that the two squares are different in brightness. I think what the philosophers call "qualia" are perceptions, not senations and any extra baggage the word carries should be tossed. web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html
That link doesn't work. Maybe this www.petapixel.com/2011/08/17/amazing-optical-illusion-shows-that
 
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I know how the word "qualia" is defined, and what it means is "we stopped bothering to think about the problem".

Is that what you intended?

That is an asinine assessment. Qualia is a concept (and a word). Concepts are useful if they link with other concepts and allow one

The point behind qualia is to help in conveying the idea of observations that carry with them as little interpretation as possible and simply reflect what is being felt. Is that really so awful?

What would you call the above, if you had to give it a word or set of words?

The qualia idea was meant to be a tool in helping in the exploration of consciousness, not as an end goal in itself. It is only with certain philosophers who love to play word games that you get this muddled conception of qualia.
 
That is an asinine assessment.
Perhaps. But accurate.

The point behind qualia is to help in conveying the idea of observations that carry with them as little interpretation as possible and simply reflect what is being felt. Is that really so awful?

What would you call the above, if you had to give it a word or set of words?
I don't need a word for that, because there's no such thing. By the time you are consciously aware of any sensation, it's already an interpretation of an interpretation of an interpretation.

Look at visual perception - it's one progressively more abstract perception filter after another.

The qualia idea was meant to be a tool in helping in the exploration of consciousness, not as an end goal in itself. It is only with certain philosophers who love to play word games that you get this muddled conception of qualia.
No, it's always been used as an excuse to stop thinking.
 
That doesn't answer my question. If I'm feeding operations manually into the CPU, it functions, but there is no OS. Am I incorrect ?

I know it doesn't answer your question, because your question isn't relevant. Sure the CPU can still function. So what? I bet the brainstem can still "function" without a cortex. We call those vegetables. Do vegetables still have emotions?

The relevant question is whether this thing we call "emotion" has any meaning whatsoever that is independent of this thing we call "attention." The answer to that question is no, it does not.
 
These aren't the same argument at all. It's plausible, I'll agree, but so is every baseless scientific hunch. That doesn't make them right. Jumping the gun and going "omg guys, this is it, this is what science tells us" isn't exactly drinking the kool-aid, but it is mixing it and staring longingly at the glass.

Ok, let's just cut to the chase.

How about you tell me a *single* definition of "emotion" -- just one definition -- that is both more plausible and based on everything we know about neuroscience.

The working definition of every paper I have read that even touches on emotion is exactly what that site specifies -- that emotion is how minds select what to pay attention to, period. This not only makes perfect sense but also has decades of scientific research to back it up.

Do you have some other definition that you would like to share? I'm being serious -- for you to say that this definition is baseless, you must have something else in mind. Otherwise you are just talking without thinking, no? So just share it -- what is this "else" that you have in mind?

This guy's even made a magic formula that you can put stuff like Quake bots into and get their "consciousness quantitative score" to know exactly how conscious they are. That's where the silly exponential thing is coming from: he just made it up.

Who cares about the stupid formula? I certainly don't.
 
Ok, let's just cut to the chase.

How about you tell me a *single* definition of "emotion" -- just one definition -- that is both more plausible and based on everything we know about neuroscience.

The working definition of every paper I have read that even touches on emotion is exactly what that site specifies -- that emotion is how minds select what to pay attention to, period. This not only makes perfect sense but also has decades of scientific research to back it up.

Do you have some other definition that you would like to share? I'm being serious -- for you to say that this definition is baseless, you must have something else in mind. Otherwise you are just talking without thinking, no? So just share it -- what is this "else" that you have in mind?
How is that even remotely the right chase to cut to?

No, no, you know what, I'll humor you. Here are the first papers I found on the two subjects that were at all relevant (i.e. didn't deal with ADHD or emotion in schizophrenia):

Emotion
All primary-process emotional-instinctual urges, even ones as complex as social PLAY, remain intact after radical neo-decortication early in life; thus, the neocortex is not essential for the generation of primary-process emotionality.

Attention
The mechanism in the pulvinar is assumed to be a particular type of circuit that reciprocally connects thalamic relay cells to cortical cells.


rocketdodger said:
Who cares about the stupid formula? I certainly don't.
It's the scale you're arguing for.

[ETA] Well, piss, now I notice the second paper isn't open access. I'm trying to make a deliberate effort to only cite papers everyone can read these days. Ah well.
 
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