On Consciousness

[!Kaggen]

That's good! It seems some people believe that consciousness cannot be made up of unconscious parts. I wonder how far they feel it must be broken down. Perhaps they believe quantum interactions are the smallest bits of consciousness.

What I'm hearing is, "because of the way consciousness feels to me, the smallest pieces of my consciousness must also be conscious." In other words, divide the magic bean of consciousness in half, and you get two half-sized magic beans of consciousness? Divide each half again into quarters, etc, do you ever get a non-conscious bit of bean? If not, then do you have any theory of consciousness at all?

Sure, made up the same way the word running is made up of the letters i,n,g,r & u.

Doesn't mean that the letters i,n,g,r & u tell you anything about running

 

[rocketdodger]

If you can tell me how you put things together in a certain way that causes that thing to experience red (or anything), then you have solved how to have something be artificially conscious.

But this isn't even an unknown anymore, the only reason so many researchers avoid making assertions about phenomenal consciousness is because it is such a controversial issue, not because they don't have any ideas. Issues like that tend to bring out the emotional side of people, and once that happens all reasoning goes out the window.

If you doubt that it is so easy, well just ask yourself these questions:

1) Do animals that lack the ability to use language experience redness?
2) If an animal has a mutation that alters the wavelengths it's retinal neurons respond to, does it experience redness?
3) If someone has never seen a red object, can they imagine redness?
4) Look closely at the "post icons" box directly below any response you are typing to this post. Notice the colors there. These have been in your field of view the whole time -- what colors are they? Have you been experiencing each of those colors this whole time, or only now that I brought it up? Note that either way you answer has implications for your notion of "experience."

 

[rocketdodger]

Sure, made up the same way the word running is made up of the letters i,n,g,r & u.

Doesn't mean that the letters i,n,g,r & u tell you anything about running

That's a pretty lame analogy, given that "running" is a word.

An accurate analogy would be to ask "does looking at the mechanics of individual parts of the leg tell you anything about running?"

The answer is obviously "yes."

 

[!Kaggen]

So, from you perspective, there's no reason to suspect that they will continue to be accurate in the future, correct?

Problem of induction^WP

 

[!Kaggen]

That's a pretty lame analogy, given that "running" is a word.

An accurate analogy would be to ask "does looking at the mechanics of individual parts of the leg tell you anything about running?"

The answer is obviously "yes."

Well yes it is also a word. Its not a leg though so I am not sure why you brought up a leg.

 

[tensordyne]

If you believe it is possible to make conscious experiences you describe out of elements that are not themselves conscious, then why are EM fields such an appealing notion ?

There are an appealing notion to me because they are physical and not just about information.

As far as I can see, EM fields are attractive, because they avoid the cutting up of consciousness into non-conscious parts. They keep it whole. I have not seen anything that explains (in some kind of formal detail) what EM fields can do, that old fashioned wired connections between neurons or other elements could not do.

If EM fields of various kinds give rise to consciousness (something yet to be established), in terms of consciousness they give you consciousness (wet computer versus dry computer). EM fields send information at close to the speed of light, a definite advantage over slower chemical processes of the action potential, which would be evolutionary advantageous as well.

In terms of information processing, the "wired connections" (I was critiqued on this so I put it in quotes to let it be known that I mean whatever the consensus connectionist model is about axons, dendrites and neurons, etc. is and am only using the terms metaphorically) store and process information in something like a logic gate way?

EM fields obey the principle of superposition so you would have wave-like processing in space. This is a much richer form of computation in that it allows for more 'computation' with the same amount of resources (in a kind of similar way to how Quantum Computing is richer than Turing style computing).

 

[Zeuzzz]

EM fields obey the principle of superposition so you would have wave-like processing in space. This is a much richer form of computation in that it allows for more 'computation' with the same amount of resources (in a kind of similar way to how Quantum Computing is richer than Turing style computing).

If you believe it is possible to make conscious experiences you describe out of elements that are not themselves conscious, then why are EM fields such an appealing notion ?

As far as I can see, EM fields are attractive, because they avoid the cutting up of consciousness into non-conscious parts. They keep it whole. I have not seen anything that explains (in some kind of formal detail) what EM fields can do, that old fashioned wired connections between neurons or other elements could not do.

Also probably noteworthy that our brains are, to an extent, connected to the universe at large via the electromagnetic field and ion flow of electric currents that permeate the universe. If consciousness is no more than simple computation of electrical signals between molecules then the universe is brimming with similar consciousness. This electrical information is not only everywhere but at every scale; from a synapse firing all the way up to interstellar electric currents. Cosmic scale electric current systems are certainly more mechanical and deterministic than synapse firings; but both are in essence similar types of electrical information. To infer a common consciousness derived model for information processing on such different scales sounds preposterous on its face, but its not. The uniquely scale invarient and translationally invarient nature of maxwells electromagnetic equations allow this. The wonders of biological evolution here on earth may have enabled the electromagnetic information we find throughout the universe to evolve over time into far more complex and condensed type systems here on earth.

 

[tensordyne]

1) Do animals that lack the ability to use language experience redness?

I do not see why not. Many of these animals have very similar physiological processes as I do. By the principle of uniformitarianism I therefore conclude that such animals, whether they lack language skills or not, can experience red.

2) If an animal has a mutation that alters the wavelengths it's retinal neurons respond to, does it experience redness?

To answer that I would have to have a theory of consciousness about how the experience of redness works, as well as know how the specific if unnamed mutation being referred to affects said animal's experience of redness. As I do not have many of these points of information I decline to give any form of definite answer.

3) If someone has never seen a red object, can they imagine redness?

Red is being used in two ways here. The experience of red and the concept of red. The best answer to this hypothetical question I think was given by V. S. Ramachandran. I will try to state his answer as best as I remember it.

If that someone goes past some age (Mary in her black and white room) without being exposed to red, chances are in terms of biology that even when shown red objects they will not look red to Mary, the mind will make them some other color.

That is why it would be important to figure out how consciousness works in a healthy responsive human who can speak back to us before looking further afield. This would serve as a reference point when moving on afterward to harder questions about how consciousness works in various alternate possibilities (persons with modified sensoriums, in other animals, after that, who knows what else).

4) Look closely at the "post icons" box directly below any response you are typing to this post. Notice the colors there. These have been in your field of view the whole time -- what colors are they? Have you been experiencing each of those colors this whole time, or only now that I brought it up? Note that either way you answer has implications for your notion of "experience."

Ah, this is a pure Dennett'ism. I can have as many notions of experience as I want, but what I am experiencing right now, at any given moment, does not depend on how it is interpreted, it merely is what it is.

The goal would then be to use all that we have at our disposal to explore this realm of experience so that we can predict what sensations we will have, what they will be like, and so on. To this end I advocate the use of the Scientific Method with as few assumptions as necessary that may be needed to handle the difficulties associated with consciousness.

 

[tensordyne]

Yes, and people who do get Searle are just p-zombies in denial.

I am not sure what is meant by p-zombie in this context. Are you saying that people who respect the primacy of sensory experience as a means of gaining knowledge and in terms of sensory experience think it is the sine qua non of consciousness (Searle), have no sensations and are in fact philosophical zombies (phenomenal? the p needs explication) denying such to themselves that in fact they experience nothing and are mindless robots haunting the universe with their meaningless ramblings?

How one could be in denial of sensation without ever having sensation is beyond me. If I experienced my leg being chopped off, maybe later I could be in denial of it, but it is absurd to think I could be in denial of having experience when I never had an experience because there would not even be a me to be in denial of anything to.

 

[tensordyne]

Also probably noteworthy that our brains are, to an extent, connected to the universe at large via the electromagnetic field and ion flow of electric currents that permeate the universe. If consciousness is no more than simple computation of electrical signals between molecules then the universe is brimming with similar consciousness. This electrical information is not only everywhere but at every scale; from a synapse firing all the way up to interstellar electric currents. Cosmic scale electric current systems are certainly more mechanical and deterministic than synapse firings; but both are in essence similar types of electrical information. To infer a common consciousness derived model for information processing on such different scales sounds preposterous on its face, but its not. The uniquely scale invarient and translationally invarient nature of maxwells electromagnetic equations allow this. The wonders of biological evolution here on earth may have enabled the electromagnetic information we find throughout the universe to evolve over time into far more complex and condensed type systems here on earth.

I can see in the quote above some Plasma Cosmology ideas kind of circling around. It is an interesting post.

 

[rocketdodger]

I do not see why not. Many of these animals have very similar physiological processes as I do. By the principle of uniformitarianism I therefore conclude that such animals, whether they lack language skills or not, can experience red.

Alright. Note that your answer implies that you don't think one needs to be able to recognize the experience of redness in order to experience redness ( since such recognition requires an internal dialogue, which in turn requires language ). This is fine.

To answer that I would have to have a theory of consciousness about how the experience of redness works, as well as know how the specific if unnamed mutation being referred to affects said animal's experience of redness. As I do not have many of these points of information I decline to give any form of definite answer.

Well you are stuck in a chicken or egg scenario then -- you claimed that the "primarily neural-network" model of consciousness doesn't explain phenomenal experience yet now you claim a model is first necessary before we can determine what may or may not impact phenomenal experience.

Red is being used in two ways here. The experience of red and the concept of red. The best answer to this hypothetical question I think was given by V. S. Ramachandran. I will try to state his answer as best as I remember it.

If that someone goes past some age (Mary in her black and white room) without being exposed to red, chances are in terms of biology that even when shown red objects they will not look red to Mary, the mind will make them some other color.

That isn't really my question. My question is whether or not someone like Mary can imagine red, given that they have never seen a red object.

That is why it would be important to figure out how consciousness works in a healthy responsive human who can speak back to us before looking further afield. This would serve as a reference point when moving on afterward to harder questions about how consciousness works in various alternate possibilities (persons with modified sensoriums, in other animals, after that, who knows what else).

Again -- chicken or egg.

The whole point of developing neural network models of the brain is so we can understand how human brains work. Yet you claim that before we know what to put in the neural network model, we need to understand how the brain works.

....

Ah, this is a pure Dennett'ism. I can have as many notions of experience as I want, but what I am experiencing right now, at any given moment, does not depend on how it is interpreted, it merely is what it is.

No, it isn't. I don't bother with Dennett. I haven't ever read even so much as a sentence he has written.

My question is whether you are experiencing those little color blips even though they aren't the focus of your attention. It has nothing to do with whether anything is interpreted one way or another.

Let me phrase it another way -- if there is *any* red object in your field of view, do you experience "seeing red?" Or is it only if you are actually paying attention to one of the red objects?

 

[tensordyne]

But this isn't even an unknown anymore, the only reason so many researchers avoid making assertions about phenomenal consciousness is because it is such a controversial issue, not because they don't have any ideas. Issues like that tend to bring out the emotional side of people, and once that happens all reasoning goes out the window.

If such is known, tell me the setup (lets call it a machine for definiteness) one needs to see red or any other experience. Also, I would like to see some kind of proof of some kind, even if it is tenuous at best, that said machine really does experience what it is claimed it experiences, whatever that may be.

 

[tensordyne]

Alright. Note that your answer implies that you don't think one needs to be able to recognize the experience of redness in order to experience redness ( since such recognition requires an internal dialogue, which in turn requires language ). This is fine.

Cool, a point of seeming agreement.

Well you are stuck in a chicken or egg scenario then -- you claimed that the "primarily neural-network" model of consciousness doesn't explain phenomenal experience yet now you claim a model is first necessary before we can determine what may or may not impact phenomenal experience.

I have problems with the "primarily neural-network" model of consciousness for separate reasons that are not related to the problem I have with the people who most often advocate for it. The advocates of the connectionist school of thought on the issue of consciousness, it is my contention, do not even get what consciousness is about (Searle). They are missing the "what it is like to be" idea.

I have no problem with the idea of making models of consciousness (perhaps unlike !Kaggen I think math and science do help in understanding the world at large), of whatever origin they may be. Looking over the literature on the subject, it has come to my notice that the only kind of scientifically acceptable basis for consciousness, in the broadest sense, belong in one of two categories.

1. Consciousness is related to information.
2. Consciousness is related to physics.

I prefer option 2. Let me give an analogy based story on why.

Let's say that there is a universe in which creatures have a head that has switches on it. These switches are of a fundamental kind to that universe, just like the electron up and down spin are fundamental to our universe.

When these creatures flip one of these switches a part of their vision goes from blue to red as appropriate. The creatures can play with these switches to change part of their vision however they please.

The role that information processing can play in such a universe is only to make the switching more complicated. To put the switching into various patterns over time and so on. It does not address the fundamental aspect of the switch itself (that it causes the creatures to see red or blue as appropriate).

Consciousness seems to me to be of a similar notion in our universe, so far as I can tell. The difference is, we do not know what the physical basis is. If we ever do learn of the physical basis you could conceivably then use that to make something experience whatever you want because we could use information corresponding to the experience to form matter into appropriate patterns to allow for it (the information being spoken of would be some encoding of the necessary pattern of matter and energy to allow for the given experience).

That isn't really my question. My question is whether or not someone like Mary can imagine red, given that they have never seen a red object.

My apologies, I do not wish to ever sidestep an answer. If something has the right physical make up to see red, then I have little doubt they can imagine it as well, but this would require research to establish that I have not seen done yet, so I have no answer except to say I do not know.

Again -- chicken or egg.

The whole point of developing neural network models of the brain is so we can understand how human brains work. Yet you claim that before we know what to put in the neural network model, we need to understand how the brain works.

....

I have my doubts that neural network models (or neuronal network models) are sufficient, but that is a separate issue. In general though, as long as whomever is doing research is using the Scientific Method, I say, carry on the good fight.

As far as studying consciousness goes (as aside from studying the brain as an organ), I just do not think that people who buy into the connectionist ideas even know what consciousness is about, so how can they even study it?

Oh yeah, my chicken and egg problem I have solved by the principle of uniformitarianism and the recognition that I am conscious. From those basic assumptions we can expand out the research into consciousness.

It will still be hard because the kind of experiments one would need most would involve poking around peoples' brains and asking what they experience, all without regard to the said persons health or benefit. Since this is immoral we can not do that.

Instead, we do what we can.

No, it isn't. I don't bother with Dennett. I haven't ever read even so much as a sentence he has written.

My question is whether you are experiencing those little color blips even though they aren't the focus of your attention. It has nothing to do with whether anything is interpreted one way or another.

Let me phrase it another way -- if there is *any* red object in your field of view, do you experience "seeing red?" Or is it only if you are actually paying attention to one of the red objects?

Funny that you haven't read Dennett because it almost seems like you are channeling him at times. If I have a red object in my field of view, whether I am paying attention to it or not, then there is the conscious experience of a red object occuring, in my field of view. Why is this not obvious?

Consciousness is about what it is like to experience a given set of sensations, it is not about focus! Focus is when sensation becomes more attuned to a given object. At this point Dennett would engage in various pseudo-scientific word games to show how like a magician (perhaps The Amazing Randi) there is no such thing as consciousness (the rabbit disappeared!). Sorry, I really do not like Dennett's philosophy of knowledge.

 

[rocketdodger]

If such is known, tell me the setup (lets call it a machine for definiteness) one needs to see red or any other experience.

Any machine with a sensor that can be excited by photons with a wavelength in the range 630-740 nm is fundamentally capable of "experiencing" red.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red

If you want more of an answer, then feel free to elaborate on what you mean by "experience." I have some very good ideas about "experience" but you seem to want to just skip all the technical stuff, otherwise you would have been content to just answer my questions from the other post I made.

EDIT -- nm, I see that you answered them, albeit in a pretty un-technical manner. Ill respond when I can.

Also, I would like to see some kind of proof of some kind, even if it is tenuous at best, that said machine really does experience what it is claimed it experiences, whatever that may be.

What proof do you have -- even tenuous -- that a dog really does experience redness?

This is the conundrum people like you face -- you try to reduce "experience" to something that is only detectable via self-report, but you also seem to think animals that are incapable of self-report share similar experiences to ours.

 

[rocketdodger]

The advocates of the connectionist school of thought on the issue of consciousness, it is my contention, do not even get what consciousness is about (Searle). They are missing the "what it is like to be" idea.

It isn't that we are missing it, it's that we think it is trivial.

If something is an X, then that thing knows what it is like to be an X. Think about it.

My apologies, I do not wish to ever sidestep an answer. If something has the right physical make up to see red, then I have little doubt they can imagine it as well, but this would require research to establish that I have not seen done yet, so I have no answer except to say I do not know.

You contend you can imagine something that you have no prior experience of? I don't believe you. Do you have any examples?

If I have a red object in my field of view, whether I am paying attention to it or not, then there is the conscious experience of a red object occuring, in my field of view. Why is this not obvious?

I know it is obvious, I am just trying to establish a common language with you.

If you agree that you don't need to be consciously focused on something to consciously experience it, then we remove a ton of possible ( unnecessary ) explanations for "experience." In particular, any higher cognitive function becomes irrelevant.

So now, based on your answers, we are left with something like this:

1) Most mammals probably experience redness, or at least some color based qualia
2) Humans don't need to even be thinking about it to experience redness

Is that a fair assessment?

 

[quarky]

I'm too old and slow and lazy to wade through all of this.

There's 2 parts of this debate that irk me.

One, is the part about human self-aggrandizement. To me, its simply the next logical extrapolation of racism. I'll gladly stretch that one out for those that are curious or confused.

Two, Why would we bother?
Just because we may be able to create a two-headed dog, does that mean we have to?

For the less scientific amongst us, this is a reasonable point:

Science run amok; given carte blanche; doing no wrong; worthy of suspicion.
If I was religious, I would dedicate my life to trashing science. Science will be the religion that destroys us, ultimately.

Without science, the Earth would be populated with superstitious hunter-gatherers; at most, 1 billion. Global warming would be non-existent. Old age would be mostly unknown, as well as its special diseases.

I can't stomach the arrogance; the manifest destiny; the willingness of various smart people to spew their cock-sure take on what is and what isn't.

You know nothing.
Or as close to nothing to be rounded off to nothing. Yet, it sounds like you know everything.

Do you guys have any idea how creepy that is?

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Without science, the Earth would be populated with superstitious hunter-gatherers; at most, 1 billion. Global warming would be non-existent. Old age would be mostly unknown, as well as its special diseases.

Not sure if ironic.

 

[tensordyne]

Any machine with a sensor that can be excited by photons with a wavelength in the range 630-740 nm is fundamentally capable of "experiencing" red.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red

If you want more of an answer, then feel free to elaborate on what you mean by "experience." I have some very good ideas about "experience" but you seem to want to just skip all the technical stuff, otherwise you would have been content to just answer my questions from the other post I made.

EDIT -- nm, I see that you answered them, albeit in a pretty un-technical manner. Ill respond when I can.

A sensor and its attendant mechanisms might or might not be made of the same material as our eyes are. Further, the materials might or might not be arranged in a way that is the way that gives rise to consciousness. So far as I can tell though, most such sensors (cameras) have very different material characteristics than us.

BTW, be as technical as you want when it comes to me. Chances are I will be at least acquainted with whatever technical background is needed to understand the topics you bring up. If this is not the case I will let you know.

What proof do you have -- even tenuous -- that a dog really does experience redness?

Not sure if dogs experience red or not because they have a different chromatic range then humans. They must be seeing some kind of colors because they do have cones. In general, then, my proof that they see colors is that we do as well and we share many aspects of physiology. Oh, that and the principle of uniformitarianism (which is an assumption, truth be told, but a damn good assumption).

This is the conundrum people like you face -- you try to reduce "experience" to something that is only detectable via self-report, but you also seem to think animals that are incapable of self-report share similar experiences to ours.

Experience IS about something that is self-reportable. It is not a problem with "people like you", it is a problem with consciousness itself. If you do not get that, you do not get consciousness, period. Objective reality, as it is called, is just our agreed upon version of mental models that come from Subjective experience. This is in keeping with the founders of the Scientific Method the Empiricists.

Stop putting the cart (your mental models) before the horse (observations, experience, sensation, consciousness).

 

[tensordyne]

It isn't that we are missing it, it's that we think it is trivial.

If something is an X, then that thing knows what it is like to be an X. Think about it.

I have, a lot. Knowing something does not just imply being able to experience things, it implies a pretty well developed mind.

It is easily conceivable that a rock for instance could be experiencing nothing, nothing at all. X = "rock", but if the last sentence is correct, then there is nothing it is like to be a rock.

Fundamentally, we may never know what it is like to be something very far outside our realm of experience type (EDIT: or physical makeup). You do what you can though. The safest starting point for investigating consciousness is ourselves, that is unless someone comes up with a way to experience what other creatures/entities feel.

You contend you can imagine something that you have no prior experience of? I don't believe you. Do you have any examples?

That was a guess. If you look at the last sentence my final answer to this line of questioning was given which was: I do not know.

I know it is obvious, I am just trying to establish a common language with you.

OK, sounds good.

If you agree that you don't need to be consciously focused on something to consciously experience it, then we remove a ton of possible ( unnecessary ) explanations for "experience." In particular, any higher cognitive function becomes irrelevant.

So now, based on your answers, we are left with something like this:

1) Most mammals probably experience redness, or at least some color based qualia
2) Humans don't need to even be thinking about it to experience redness

Is that a fair assessment?

Generally speaking (meaning I do not want to be held down too hard to this answer), yes.

 

[quarky]

Not sure if ironic.

The perfect response, imho.