On Consciousness

[tensordyne]

response

That isn't true.

If you properly define "feeling" and "something" then the algorithms are trivial.

Try defining "feeling" and "something" and I can show you.

This shows the blind-spot right here. You do not define "feeling", feeling things is what helps to define everything else. There are certain aspects of a science that must just be understood in their own right. This is just like how in Geometry we do not really define certain things used in various axioms (like say points), we just use them.

Quite amazing really. For instance, if I say the feeling of a what it is like to be a bat, you could set up various sensors hooked up to a computer "brain" and then do various processing and so on... but how do you know your new bat-device really experiences anything? You have no right by logic to say that any such bat-robot has any form experience. You could say it is sensing (in terms of information) various things, but to say that this implies anything else would quite simply be wrong.

Here is why, the only one who can say they are conscious with any certainty is one who is conscious (if you do not accept this as a basic postulate then I do not consider your position to be a very wise one). This is the dread solipsism. There is a certain amount of wisdom in understanding this idea, as well as why it is such a sterile position to hold in its most extreme form. The wisdom in solipsism is in understanding that we are all so "disconnected" in terms of consciousness. Overcoming our disconnectedness is part of why we do Science, I suppose.

Speaking of Science, a favorite principle of Science of mine is the Principle of Uniformitarianism, which from Wikipedia is:

Uniformitarianism is the assumption that the same natural laws and processes that operate in the universe now, have always operated in the universe in the past and apply everywhere in the universe.

So I am conscious (sorry, you will have to take my word on that). You have (assuming you are human without any major head injuries) the same basic physiology as me, so that you follow mostly the same laws of physics when it comes to certain biological processes as I do, including consciousness (this can be observationally shown). I take it therefore that you are conscious too because I am and because of the Principle of Uniformitarianism.

Therefore, lets start with figuring out consciousness in humans before moving on to assigning this property to creations of our own making? It is only logical, after all.

I will introduce three main materialistic forms of basis for consciousness. Altogether, these possibilities should hopefully exhaust what a scientist would or could accept as a basis for consciousness (sorry, no souls allowed!).

1. Consciousness is something that happens in a physical system when the computational complexity of a system reaches a certain point. Call this position DENNETT.

2. Consciousness is something that happens when a physical system is in a certain range of physical states. This then is the idea that consciousness has a physical basis. Certain materials or physical fields (say, like the EM field) in certain arrangements would then lead to consciousness. Call this position SEARLE.

3. Some combo of 1. and 2. is necessary for consciousness. Call this perhaps CHALMERS (not that that actually reflects his views, I just needed a name).

I do not like option 1. for several reasons. If you have read Wolfram's "A New Kind of Science" you will have come across what Wolfram called "The Principle of Computational Equivalence (PCE)". I do not agree with a lot of what he said in that book, but I think his PCE makes a good point. It does not take much to get a system that can do just as complex a set of calculations as any other system. Complex computations are ubiquitous in nature.

The goal posts of the DENNETT position keep moving as well. "If we just get complex enough computers and programs", so the saying goes, "then we will have consciousness emerge!" When this magical point is reached is up to a test that only determines if a machine can fool a human or not. I do not consider that to be the primrose of real scientific thinking.

The problem is PCE shows that there is no such thing as higher levels of computation. There are basically only two levels, a system that can simulate a Universal Turing Machine versus those that can not. Once this is understood, we can see why the DENNETT position is psuedo-scientific, we already have computers of sufficient complexity.

The question of why does 10^10 versus 10^29 computing units makes any difference to consciousness as a computational enterprise is never addressed. It is an article of faith that this is the case among the denizens of DENNETT.

The SEARLE position is Scientific. It says, "Let's start from what we can be reasonably sure of and go from there." Part of the problem has to do with a big misunderstanding on what constitutes Science by DENNETT-type thinkers and perhaps others. The problem, as I see it, is that many people think that Science is about "The Natural World", it is not. Science is a social activity that explores our largely similar experiences. "The Natural World" is a model, just like Newton's Theory of Gravity is.

This is not to demote looking at the world in terms of this model I am calling "The Natural World", just to point out that it IS a model (a very successful one at that) and NOT of primary importance to the epistemology of Science. The problem is when we get to trying to figure out consciousness (experience version of consciousness, I know people like to think of consciousness in all sorts of silly ways).

Say your epistemology is all about "The Natural World" (DENNETT) instead of "Group Consciousness Exploration" (SEARLE). The DENNETT Epistemology has a problem dealing with investigations into consciousness. If something exists in the natural world, then we should all be able to agree about it given certain conditions that you would expect in any scientific endeavor.

This does not help when studying consciousness. If you mess with someones brain to see what they say they experience (happens during neurosurgery?), then such experiences are not something that are shared among all participants. Such experiences are not a part of the DENNETT mode of science as experiences (observations) must be able to shared by all participants at the time the observation is made. The person who's brain is getting finagled with will not share similar experiences as the medical staff has.

If you like the works of Dennett and are a Hard-AI type thinker, I understand your position, but I see with all of the above, that I think you are missing some things. Please think about what I wrote above before going into a diatribe. It is hard to explain to someone when they have a conceptual blind-spot what that blind-spot is. So please try and at least consider the concepts here in their own right so that your putative mental scotoma can be abated.

If this stuff seems very wrong to your sensibilities, it is perhaps because you have been introduced to a new concept. New concepts require thought and time to sink in. Unfortunately, some concepts just can not be understood by some people, they are too abstract.

A mentally handicapped person will probably never really understand Calculus. I hope you can understand the ideas above. They really are in keeping with the best traditions and practices of science and in actuality are not very abstract at all. In fact, I think because experience is such a visceral thing and not abstracted from experience as abstract concepts are, that many a reader here will not get what I am saying.

Above all, do not put the cart before the horse. Do not put your abstract ideas before your experiences that allow you to have those ideas. The inability of many people I meet to distinguish between model (which is abstract) and primary experience, is interesting. Perhaps it is part of a "Western Worldview", or is part of some other meme not yet identified at this time. I do not know.

Good luck. All the best to you all!


p.s. I think CHALMERS is probably the most correct, but who knows? Plus, of course I favor the Electromagnetic Basis of Consciousness idea.

 

[tensordyne]

One more post. If you do not understand what I meant earlier about a physical basis of consciousness, let me give you an example.

Say we have two computers. One type of computer is made of dry parts and another made of wet parts. Wet and dry are physical aspects of the two computers. You could simulate dry or wet on other computers but you could not say that any computer simulating something really has the properties it simulates unless it actually does. Dry versus wet has to do with real-life materials with various properties.

Now, knowing what was just written, I can say the wet computer can do something the dry computer can not do. The wet computer can be wet! The dry and wet computers could in theory perform all of the same calculations (this is something hard-AI types love pointing out) but wet versus dry is not about calculation, it is about how molecules in the real world react to various conditions. Again, wet versus dry is a physical property of the two different computers.

Now take wet and dry and replace it with conscious versus unconscious and I think you will understand what I mean by consciousness being a physical property. First off, consciousness as a word is already an adjective property word from the -ness ending it has. If this is not a mistake, then I think we should figure out what physical conditions are necessary for this property of consciousness to exist.

Just some thoughts.

 

[tensordyne]

[qimg]http://disinfo.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/neuron2.jpg[/qimg]

The top = neurons
To bottom = large scale structure models of the universe.

Non universality derived self similarity, anyone?

Take 60mg dimethyltryptamine, watch physical reality dissolve, and then come back and scientifically rationalize everything you experienced. Be sure to include the exact % of trancendance you experienced. It will be something like this.

Bravo, best post in a while...

 

[tensordyne]

Fundamental8st science at its best or worse:

The human brain is the only conscious thing in the universe, unless we make machines that could also be conscious.

I like the notion of 'nothing special about us or consciousness', but why must it always eliminate all other entities from the equation?

We are so alone in the universe, longing for other intelligent life, that we may have to create it.

Or drive over it on the way to work.

This discussion is gratuitously anthropomorphic and cynical.

Whatever floats your boat.

I want to defend the remarks I have made up to this point from anyone possibly making the kind accusations above about what I have said. I do advocate researching consciousness primarily in humans first. I do so not for
reasons of 'superiority' or similarly such vane reasons.

My reasons are that it is simply easier to study consciousness in humans than in other animals because we can talk to each other. That is not to say we should not study consciousness in animals besides our self, it is just a matter of practicality. When we figure out the physical basis of consciousness hopefully then we will be able to use that to help study consciousness in other creatures, possibly even for artificial creations of our own making.

The correct word in the second to the last sentence should be "anthropocentric", not anthropomorphic. Although the religious among us here I am sure anthrocentrically anthropomorphize the universe (often in the androgenic form of a big sky daddy), that is another topic.

 

[Zeuzzz]

I know, that's why I brought it up.

Go ahead and press on your eyeball. Seriously.

If one didn't know how the functron filters in the first stages of the visual processing system worked, they might try to attribute the similarity in patterns that *all people* see to some universal consciousness.

However once you know how those work, it is obvious that "oh, they are just malfunctioning" and that causes the patterns and furthermore that since the circuit is the same in all humans, so is the pattern.

You totally missed my point, I think.

The reason I said "There's a difference between poking some-ones closed eyeball with a finger, poking them with a red hot poker or poking them with an acid coated toothpick." was to demonstrate totally different senses involved between each, and thus the different neurochemical reactions they would produce, creating different end effects.

The psycho-actives I noted after are also totally different in terms of the neurochemical reactions and receptor binding, yet when a certain "+5" state is reached, totally disparate drugs end up converging to largely identical effects that many users report in such "transcendental" states.

 

[Itztli]

Now take wet and dry and replace it with conscious versus unconscious and I think you will understand what I mean by consciousness being a physical property. First off, consciousness as a word is already an adjective property word from the -ness ending it has. If this is not a mistake, then I think we should figure out what physical conditions are necessary for this property of consciousness to exist.

I assume that in your analogy, the fact whether the computer is wet or dry has no effect on the computations it performs, in such a way that the output from the wet computer is exactly the same as the output from the dry computer. Apart from looking inside the case, there would be no way to find out if the computer was wet inside.

Similarly, I assume that in the case of consciousness, the observable behavior would be exactly the same, with or without this property of consciousness.

If that is the case, how would we know that other people have this property ? I can imagine there could be a genetic mutation in part of the population that causes this property to get lost. Since it wouldn't affect the person's behavior, it would not make any difference on chances to survive, so the genetic mutation would propagate unimpeded.

In fact, why even assume the property of consciousness would evolve in the first place, as it apparently has no benefit.

 

[Mr. Scott]

why even assume the property of consciousness would evolve in the first place, as it apparently has no benefit.

That's an interesting question. Why did consciousness evolve? My hypothesis is it's a side effect of a useful processes.

Sometimes I think we really mean self-consciousness in this conversation. What's useful is being able the picture to point of view of another being. Once we could do that, we could turn it on ourselves, then begin to ask, "what am I?" Being conscious of another being's point of view is extremely useful. Being conscious of our own consciousness, maybe not so useful, perhaps detrimental, but on balance, better to have this module than not.

Crows, it turns out, are able to picture other crow's viewpoints. It's not know if they can turn this ability on themselves like we can -- observing our own consciousness. Maybe they can!

 

[Zeuzzz]

In fact, why even assume the property of consciousness would evolve in the first place, as it apparently has no benefit.

As an example, appreciation of boobies is something I consciously benfit from.

 

[tensordyne]

Before answering the quotes below I want to say that the questions and points made are pretty strong and well thought-out, so that helps.

I assume that in your analogy, the fact whether the computer is wet or dry has no effect on the computations it performs, in such a way that the output from the wet computer is exactly the same as the output from the dry computer. Apart from looking inside the case, there would be no way to find out if the computer was wet inside.

You are exactly correct about the particulars. Although I want to make a point about "looking inside the case" later.

Similarly, I assume that in the case of consciousness, the observable behavior would be exactly the same, with or without this property of consciousness.

Can not say. Is it possible to have something that has the same behavior as a human or other erstwhile conscious entity while not being conscious? I submit that behavior does not determine consciousness (consciousness being an internal subjective state). Consciousness is something that may or may not go along with any particular behavior. Such questions would have to be experimentally determined.

If that is the case, how would we know that other people have this property ? I can imagine there could be a genetic mutation in part of the population that causes this property to get lost. Since it wouldn't affect the person's behavior, it would not make any difference on chances to survive, so the
genetic mutation would propagate unimpeded.

It is certainly possible that there might be a genetic mutation causing someone not to be conscious. I am pretty sure though that anyone who was not conscious would at a minimum not meet basic medical tests of consciousness.

The possibility of the philosophical zombie who goes around making business deals and other activities while having no lights on inside, well, it seems to me to be a needlessly overcautious case to consider (thus, philosophers made it up).

When it comes many biological processes, there is quite a bit of variability possible. Conversely though, the processes that occur from light going to an eye and signaling a rod or cone, to the signal going down the optic nerve, etc. etc. are pretty much exactly the same between each and every person on the planet (that has vision that is). I could go on, it seems though that the general point is made.

There are many physiological processes we all share and that are remarkably similar. Consciousness is most likely one of these processes because we are all much more similar physiologically speaking then we are dissimilar. My best guess is consciousness works on the same basis between all of us also because it is such an integral part of our makeup. I guess we will see.

The rules of physics are the same everywhere. If we find the physical basis for consciousness in us, I am pretty sure it will be the same everywhere else as well. If there are other forms of subjective mental states we do not know about currently (plants, fungi consciousness?), we very well may never learn much about them or ever even learn of their existence. Oh well, knowing as much as we can about what we can know is still an important and worthwhile goal.

In fact, why even assume the property of consciousness would evolve in the first place, as it apparently has no benefit.

Well, I agree that consciousness is strange and given the laws of the universe we know of, seemingly has no benefit or logical necessity, but I can not escape the self-evident fact that I am conscious; that more than likely, so are you too.

Now because I find the black-box "looking inside the case" example so evocative in terms of what is being addressed, I want to write about that now. In terms of black-boxes and the discussion thus far, we all would be one of these boxes.

We look around at other boxes. The various box's walls are made of differing materials and we can even look inside the box to see what it is physically made of. The mystery about the box is not what it is made of, or even in theory how the contents of the box are arranged or work, the mystery is whether it is anything to be like a particular box.

Now supposedly, one or more of the boxes might or might not be conscious(other?). If one of the boxes is conscious, presumably that box might even know it is conscious. The box can then look inside other boxes and see what they are made of. Perhaps it might even figure out that one or more other boxes have exactly the same internal box contents that do the same things as the given box has does. Is it perhaps too much of a stretch then to conclude that the other boxes are conscious in the same kind of way as our original box?

If you say no, then I do not see why you say no. The boxes have the same contents that work in the same way as far as matters that are observationally verifiable go. If all the working parts are the same and have the same physics, then why would this other property (consciousness) not also go along for the ride? True, one box can not say for absolute certainty that another box is conscious just because it itself is, but it seems like asking for too much to demand such certainties. Such a requirement for that kind of certainty is almost unscientific in a way.

Implicitly in Science we take it that another observer is conscious all the time. What would be the point if they are not? If I live in some lonely solopsistic universe, I may very well do various Scientific based investigations, who though would I argue my case for given I make a discovery? Science is a social activity of conscious actors. Unless those actors can communicate (thus also implying some degree of shared characteristics of consciousness) to share ideas, the Scientific method and enterprise are not possible.

I guess I feel like I am arguing for common sense and science here (like Searle does). Philosophy is nice and all, but I want neuroscientists figuring out what causes consciousness, not philosophers (or programmers for that matter). Philosophy at its best shows the possible limits of human understanding, it has a generally abysmal record on most other topics (my own opinion).

All the best to you all!

 

[Itztli]

That's an interesting question. Why did consciousness evolve? My hypothesis is it's a side effect of a useful processes.

Do you mean a side effect of something useful, but without any useful properties itself ?

The problem with the notion that consciousness is just along for the ride, but doesn't do anything itself, is that it makes consciousness undetectable in the behavior. And if it's undetectable, we must leave open the possibility that not everybody has it. And, as a consequence, we have no way of finding out how it works.

The only way it would make sense to assume everybody is conscious, is to conclude that it must affect one's behavior in a beneficial way for survival. And if it affects one's behavior, it must be a result of the mind's information processing.

 

[tensordyne]

That's an interesting question. Why did consciousness evolve? My hypothesis is it's a side effect of a useful processes.

Did it evolve, or did evolutionary processes lead into, perhaps inevitably, conscious organisms? Whether side effect or no, consciousness looks like it is a fundamental aspect of the universe. Why? Asking me in another post if you wanna know, as it is kind of a tough question.

Sometimes I think we really mean self-consciousness in this conversation. What's useful is being able the picture to point of view of another being. Once we could do that, we could turn it on ourselves, then begin to ask, "what am I?" Being conscious of another being's point of view is extremely useful. Being conscious of our own consciousness, maybe not so useful, perhaps detrimental, but on balance, better to have this module than not.

Well, I mean just consciousness myself when that is what I write (consciousness is what it is like to be something that has something that it is like to be, there are worse definitions!). Self-consciousness is one of those things people like to bring up when it comes to consciousness. I find it odd myself that this is brought up so much. The really weird aspect of the universe is not self-consciousness, it is just consciousness.

It is probably like something to be a bat. Bat's most likely do not have self-consciousness though. I like to look at it this way:

self-consciousness = consciousness + mind.

Consciousness is already hard enough. Throwing in a self-reflective mind makes for some definitely interesting possibilities.

Crows, it turns out, are able to picture other crow's viewpoints. It's not know if they can turn this ability on themselves like we can -- observing our own consciousness. Maybe they can!

Interesting about the crows. I remember that in psychology 3 year old children think everyone has the same mind they do, while 4 and up do not think this. I am sure there is a video on youtube if you want to see this in action (involves some toys and an experiment).

The relevance to crows is what psychologists call "Theory of Mind". The 3 year old has the Theory of Mind that everyone knows the same thing as they do. Crows seem to have a theory of mind of sorts given that what is written in the quote above is correct (mirror neurons?).

Christof Koch's new book has a chapter on why self-consciousness is not as important as many people make it out to be. It seems like to me though that there is a subtle kind of anthropocentric thinking going on with why some people want to talk about self-consciousness.

Not that that is what is going on in the quotes above, it is just, what is the point? Why bring up what only a few conscious creatures can do (us humans as well as a smattering of the other species that occupy our planet), when consciousness itself is in all likelihood a pretty common attribute out there in the biome?

Sure, the mind is mysterious, but certain aspects of its type of functioning have been worked out. Logic tables, inferential logic, syllogisms, etc etc. have at least been worked out as to a basic outline of how they should be researched and thought about. A similar understanding for how to research consciousness is in its nascent stages right now.

Yeah, I do not want to seem too hard-nosed here because we are talking about things that are very much still yet to be resolved. I just have the general feeling there are huge swaths of the population that do not think about these topics in the right way. Oh well, let the scientists do their work and as long as they follow the scientific method I am not worried.

 

[Mr. Scott]

consciousness looks like it is a fundamental aspect of the universe

Why does it look that way to you? Show us what you're looking at.

There's no evidence consciousness exists anywhere but in the animal brain. I'm NOT saying it can't or doesn't exist outside the brain. I'm saying there's currently NO EVIDENCE of extra-cranial consciousness.

 

[tensordyne]

Indeed, let me crack the nut of why I think it is fundamental in about 8 to 10 hours. It is a guess though but I do have some reasons.

 

[Zeuzzz]

Why does it look that way to you? Show us what you're looking at.

There's no evidence consciousness exists anywhere but in the animal brain. I'm NOT saying it can't or doesn't exist outside the brain. I'm saying there's currently NO EVIDENCE of extra-cranial consciousness.

See Bolded: Sort of agree with this, from my purely scientific side, in terms of physically measurable experimental evidence being the essential precursor of any theory.

See italisized: And note purely the emphasis.

I honestly dont know how I can make you see my side of the argument without advocating doing something I don't like recommending to people unless they make that decision themselves.

 

[!Kaggen]

A word is merely a reference.

If it references something, it is precise.

Thus all words are precise in their used context.

If you disagree, then I would ask you why I can say "the fridge is running" and "the cat is running" and you know exactly what I mean.

You don't interpret "the fridge is running" to mean it has legs, and you don't interpret "the cat is running" to mean the cat is keeping beers cold.

If that isn't precision, I don't know what is.

How about the robot is running

 

[rocketdodger]

This shows the blind-spot right here. You do not define "feeling", feeling things is what helps to define everything else. There are certain aspects of a science that must just be understood in their own right. This is just like how in Geometry we do not really define certain things used in various axioms (like say points), we just use them.

Quite amazing really. For instance, if I say the feeling of a what it is like to be a bat, you could set up various sensors hooked up to a computer "brain" and then do various processing and so on... but how do you know your new bat-device really experiences anything? You have no right by logic to say that any such bat-robot has any form experience. You could say it is sensing (in terms of information) various things, but to say that this implies anything else would quite simply be wrong.

Here is why, the only one who can say they are conscious with any certainty is one who is conscious (if you do not accept this as a basic postulate then I do not consider your position to be a very wise one). This is the dread solipsism. There is a certain amount of wisdom in understanding this idea, as well as why it is such a sterile position to hold in its most extreme form. The wisdom in solipsism is in understanding that we are all so "disconnected" in terms of consciousness. Overcoming our disconnectedness is part of why we do Science, I suppose.

Speaking of Science, a favorite principle of Science of mine is the Principle of Uniformitarianism, which from Wikipedia is:



So I am conscious (sorry, you will have to take my word on that). You have (assuming you are human without any major head injuries) the same basic physiology as me, so that you follow mostly the same laws of physics when it comes to certain biological processes as I do, including consciousness (this can be observationally shown). I take it therefore that you are conscious too because I am and because of the Principle of Uniformitarianism.

Therefore, lets start with figuring out consciousness in humans before moving on to assigning this property to creations of our own making? It is only logical, after all.

I will introduce three main materialistic forms of basis for consciousness. Altogether, these possibilities should hopefully exhaust what a scientist would or could accept as a basis for consciousness (sorry, no souls allowed!).

1. Consciousness is something that happens in a physical system when the computational complexity of a system reaches a certain point. Call this position DENNETT.

2. Consciousness is something that happens when a physical system is in a certain range of physical states. This then is the idea that consciousness has a physical basis. Certain materials or physical fields (say, like the EM field) in certain arrangements would then lead to consciousness. Call this position SEARLE.

3. Some combo of 1. and 2. is necessary for consciousness. Call this perhaps CHALMERS (not that that actually reflects his views, I just needed a name).

I do not like option 1. for several reasons. If you have read Wolfram's "A New Kind of Science" you will have come across what Wolfram called "The Principle of Computational Equivalence (PCE)". I do not agree with a lot of what he said in that book, but I think his PCE makes a good point. It does not take much to get a system that can do just as complex a set of calculations as any other system. Complex computations are ubiquitous in nature.

The goal posts of the DENNETT position keep moving as well. "If we just get complex enough computers and programs", so the saying goes, "then we will have consciousness emerge!" When this magical point is reached is up to a test that only determines if a machine can fool a human or not. I do not consider that to be the primrose of real scientific thinking.

The problem is PCE shows that there is no such thing as higher levels of computation. There are basically only two levels, a system that can simulate a Universal Turing Machine versus those that can not. Once this is understood, we can see why the DENNETT position is psuedo-scientific, we already have computers of sufficient complexity.

The question of why does 10^10 versus 10^29 computing units makes any difference to consciousness as a computational enterprise is never addressed. It is an article of faith that this is the case among the denizens of DENNETT.

The SEARLE position is Scientific. It says, "Let's start from what we can be reasonably sure of and go from there." Part of the problem has to do with a big misunderstanding on what constitutes Science by DENNETT-type thinkers and perhaps others. The problem, as I see it, is that many people think that Science is about "The Natural World", it is not. Science is a social activity that explores our largely similar experiences. "The Natural World" is a model, just like Newton's Theory of Gravity is.

This is not to demote looking at the world in terms of this model I am calling "The Natural World", just to point out that it IS a model (a very successful one at that) and NOT of primary importance to the epistemology of Science. The problem is when we get to trying to figure out consciousness (experience version of consciousness, I know people like to think of consciousness in all sorts of silly ways).

Say your epistemology is all about "The Natural World" (DENNETT) instead of "Group Consciousness Exploration" (SEARLE). The DENNETT Epistemology has a problem dealing with investigations into consciousness. If something exists in the natural world, then we should all be able to agree about it given certain conditions that you would expect in any scientific endeavor.

This does not help when studying consciousness. If you mess with someones brain to see what they say they experience (happens during neurosurgery?), then such experiences are not something that are shared among all participants. Such experiences are not a part of the DENNETT mode of science as experiences (observations) must be able to shared by all participants at the time the observation is made. The person who's brain is getting finagled with will not share similar experiences as the medical staff has.

If you like the works of Dennett and are a Hard-AI type thinker, I understand your position, but I see with all of the above, that I think you are missing some things. Please think about what I wrote above before going into a diatribe. It is hard to explain to someone when they have a conceptual blind-spot what that blind-spot is. So please try and at least consider the concepts here in their own right so that your putative mental scotoma can be abated.

If this stuff seems very wrong to your sensibilities, it is perhaps because you have been introduced to a new concept. New concepts require thought and time to sink in. Unfortunately, some concepts just can not be understood by some people, they are too abstract.

A mentally handicapped person will probably never really understand Calculus. I hope you can understand the ideas above. They really are in keeping with the best traditions and practices of science and in actuality are not very abstract at all. In fact, I think because experience is such a visceral thing and not abstracted from experience as abstract concepts are, that many a reader here will not get what I am saying.

Above all, do not put the cart before the horse. Do not put your abstract ideas before your experiences that allow you to have those ideas. The inability of many people I meet to distinguish between model (which is abstract) and primary experience, is interesting. Perhaps it is part of a "Western Worldview", or is part of some other meme not yet identified at this time. I do not know.

Good luck. All the best to you all!


p.s. I think CHALMERS is probably the most correct, but who knows? Plus, of course I favor the Electromagnetic Basis of Consciousness idea.

No.

None of these people you speak of really know that much about the subject. Baars knows a little more, but not by much, since he isn't a computer scientist.

The people that know alot about the subject are the researchers making robot brains out of neural networks. Brains that function using the same principles as ours.

You wrote quite a bit of stuff, but none of it is really relevant, because there are researchers making robot brains out of neural networks that function using the same principles as ours.

I repeated that, because it is important.

 

[!Kaggen]

This is kind of a dumb statement.

Look at this string: "1 + 1 == 2"

Are you honestly saying each part of that string has no meaning?

“Mathematics may be defined as the subject where we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true.”Bertrand Russell - that dumb guy

 

[rocketdodger]

You totally missed my point, I think.

The reason I said "There's a difference between poking some-ones closed eyeball with a finger, poking them with a red hot poker or poking them with an acid coated toothpick." was to demonstrate totally different senses involved between each, and thus the different neurochemical reactions they would produce, creating different end effects.

The psycho-actives I noted after are also totally different in terms of the neurochemical reactions and receptor binding, yet when a certain "+5" state is reached, totally disparate drugs end up converging to largely identical effects that many users report in such "transcendental" states.

Let me point out that my position is that consciousness arises from the topography of the brain's neural networks and the causal relationships between the neurons.

You are telling me that drugs with different chemical actions -- that don't disturb the topography of the network or those causal relationships -- lead to a very similar perceptual state.

How, exactly, does that refute my position?

The reason I brought up the pressing on eyes thing is that the perceptual state generated is due to the way our neurons are connected. You see moving colors at first, and eventually black/white checkerboard patterns. Why would every human see a checkerboard pattern? Because it is 100% due to how the neurons are connected, and that is all.

 

[rocketdodger]

How about the robot is running

Touche

 

[rocketdodger]

I guess I feel like I am arguing for common sense and science here (like Searle does). Philosophy is nice and all, but I want neuroscientists figuring out what causes consciousness, not philosophers (or programmers for that matter).

Of course I am biased, being a programmer, but IMO it is the good programmers who understand more about our world than anyone else.

Needing to write your own code that numerically simulates/models a world tends to make you think about just exactly what that whole "world" thing entails.