Beelzebuddy
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Jun 10, 2010
- Messages
- 10,581
I apologize if I seem to be omnislashing. Your posts posits a number of questions and concepts have kinda need to be teased apart when replying.
Define your terms, Mr. Scott. If you have a specific definition of consciousness you'd like me to weigh in on, let's hear it. Neither "internal subjective experiences" nor "not a zombie" outlines the problem in a manner in which it can be approached.
Qualia is generally presented as straight dualism, but in computational neuroscience it usually ends up resembling a touchy-feely version of Pixy's SRIP, with a dash of dualistic special pleading. We understand a fair bit of how our emotions work - massive feedback loops, basically - but just labeling a random feedback loop in an artificial system with "emotion" gets pushback from the "real" qualists because you're just supplying feedback to the system, it's not really feeeling anything. The author is saying "that's enough, ffs lay off," without addressing that this is only a relatively minor part of what people call consciousness and if he wants to use that term there's plenty of further objections in wait for him.I'm not sure what you mean by "the usual qualia ***." What's the usual, and why is it wrong?
What experience are you talking about, exactly? Emotion? Attention? Episodic narrative? Neural function is not a discrete, unified thing.We're talking about the internal subjective experience.
Yes, because there's nothing special about each of the components that constitute what we consider consciousness. It's only together that we slap on a special label and declare the whole shebang mystical and unattainable.Do you think a machine can be made to achieve that? Why, or why not?
Which capabilities? Memory? Problem-solving? Getting all ********** up on goofballs and lying around in a daze, ranting about the consciousness of the universe and trying to conduct meaningful conversations with our washing machines?We're also talking about capabilities our brains/minds have that some believe are impossible to mechanize. What's your position on that?
Define your terms, Mr. Scott. If you have a specific definition of consciousness you'd like me to weigh in on, let's hear it. Neither "internal subjective experiences" nor "not a zombie" outlines the problem in a manner in which it can be approached.