Omnipotence

[stamenflicker]

So explain in your own terms, and try to do it in as few words as possible, please.

Sorry... it is not possible for both things to occur. Is that more helpful?

Stamen

 

[stamenflicker]

You say that "permanence is not intrinsically impossible". But on the other hand you say something unbreakable is intrinsically impossible if there is an omnipotent God. So some object could be permanent but breakable? But if something was unbreakable wouldn't it also be permanent? You appear to be flip-flopping on this issue. Are you saying that permanence is not intrinsically impossible, but would be intrinsically impossible with an omnipotent God?

Robin, I have said this many times. Let me say it again. Permanence is not intrinsically impossible. Omnipotence is not intrinscially impossible. Omnipotence in relation to permenance is a semantic mysnomer, and either a) not possible (your position) or b) not knowable (my position). My problem with your logic is that we lack language rules to know whether or not this is possible, because the two things when combined, are either one thing with two distinctions, no things, two illogical things. In short, I side with many linguists (and even Russell) who would say that constructing two limits the way you have done so is ungrammatical and semantically illogical.

Do I agree with your first sentence, God can create something and say, "This will never be broken?"

No it is a grammatical and semantic error, therefore nothing can be known about the sentence.

Stamen

Stamen

 

[stamenflicker]

Your whole argument is closer to South Park than Wittgenstein.

Then respect my authorit-I.

You must admit that it is very sloppy to say something is intrinsically impossible if it is in fact possible. Would Heidegger do that? Would Wittgenstein?

No they would have made mince-meat of your logic in two paragraphs or less. Sadly I lack the depth of their insight and the ability to communicate as neatly.

My original position was put on page 1 and I have seen nothing that would make me want to modify it. You are saying Robin's sentence must be false because stamenflicker can make up a totally separate sentence and if stamenflickers sentence does not make sense then Robin's cannot either.

That is right because the underlying semantics of limits remains constant through both sentences.

"All-lying person can never tell the truth".

Sigh. Neither of these limits "range over themselves."

To remain semantically consistant, you'd need to say: "An all-lying X can create a Y that is un-lying." Which is exactly what you are saying by "All powerful X can create an Y which resists all power."

They would all be rolling in their graves to hear their names co-opted to such a lame argument as you are making.

No they all made the exact same arguments, they just were able to work around the paradox with greater language skills than my own. And if you read them and understood them, why are we debating?

So I am asking you again 'Can God prevent an object from being broken, say for the period of 1 hour?'

And I am saying that your question is grammatically incorrect because the answer to the question is unknowable. Since the two limits overlap, either they are the same object, non-existant, two seperate but illogical objects, or (my position) unknowable due to the restrictions of language.

And yes Ossai, the overlapping of the limits makes them mutually exclusive, since any one of the two limits can be logical and exist just fine on their own. It is when you take them both simultaneously that they overlap. It is no different than saying a coin can flip and be heads and tails at the same time.

Stamen

 

[stamenflicker]

Ossasi...

I suppose they don't have to be mutually exclusive in their states which extend beyond themselves. I suppose the infinite set of power could contain the infinite set of unbreakables.... i.e. God contains the unbreakable kingdom. However, this too is would be ontologically meaningless wouldn't it? Therefore we are back where we started.

Stamen

 

[ceo_esq]

ceo_esq
Which means an omnipotent being can do everything except what an omnipotent being can’t do.

Ossai, the statement above is true because the statement X can do anything except what X can't do is necessarily true for all X. That is a banal tautology that has nothing to do with the limits of omnipotence. It would still be true regardless of how omnipotence, or indeed, powers less than omnipotence, were defined. You seem to have obsessively latched on to the fact that the statement is coincidentally true of omnipotent beings and erroneously concluded that the tautology arises from how omnipotence is traditionally defined. This is just not the case.

To see why, just let X be any other entity besides an omnipotent being. Let's leave omnipotence completely aside and let X = Ossai, for example. I assume that given enough time and information we could come with a sensible, non-arbitrary, non-circular description of what Ossai's powers are. Yet it would still be true that Ossai can do anything except what Ossai can't do. So obviously the truth of X can do anything except what X can't do does not proceed from any special argument or definition of omnipotence. Accordingly, please don't get hung up on it.

The argument you're patting yourself on the back for essentially comes down to this:

1. X can do anything except what X can't do is true of an omnipotent being.
2. X can do anything except what X can't do is true of me, Ossai.
3. Therefore, I, Ossai, must be an omnipotent being.[/list=1]Do you spot the mistake in reasoning?
   

   Because your omnipotent being is still limited by human logic.

   What do you mean by human logic? Logic is logic in every possible universe, whether such universe contains human beings, omnipotent beings, both, or neither.
   

   It’s intrinsically impossible for a person to come back to life after being dead for a day and a half, and yet the omnipotent being (or some part of) supposedly did that.

   A few observations here. First, who says the omnipotent being did that? We're not talking about the God of the New Testament. We're talking about the "God" of philosophy of religion, which is ordinarily merely a shorthand term for a hypothesized bundle of a few basic attributes (such as omnipotence). We are looking for basic theoretical contradictions here, not scrutinizing the religious narratives of Christianity specifically.
   
   Second, a person coming back to life after being dead for a day and a half is not intrinsically impossible. Neither are leprechauns, hexes, or telekinesis. Like most skeptics, I daresay we both believe that such things are factually untrue in this universe, and indeed impossible as a practical matter in the ordinary course of events. But when philosophers and logicians talk about things being "intrinsically impossible", it means things that cannot logically exist in any conceivable universe. A dead person coming back to life might violate physical principles, but not logical ones. (In contrast, a person being simultaneously physically dead and physically not dead would violate logical principles.) I trust the difference is clear.

 

[ReFLeX]

Ok, stamenflicker. Your point about language may be completely valid. I dont know enough about linguistics to argue against it. However, I still don't think that the borders of human language restrict the idea of omnipotence, indeed for you to think that would be very anthropocentric. I used predicate logic instead of language with your Limitless Adjectives and it came out as a valid argument. The point left to argue was whether two powers can be discovered that are intrinsically possible on their own, but are Mutually Exclusive. If one of the powers is rejected as impossible (such as the unliftable rock I used for premise 4), then it will not be because of semantics or range, it will be the inherent properties of the supposed power. I do not think the extent of written/spoken language entirely limits human knowledge.

Remember feral children. The most famous one in recent years, Genie, discovered at the age of 13 (or about that) in California. She could only say two phrases, stopit and nomore.

She scored the highest recorded score ever on tests that measure a person's ability to make sense out of chaos and to see patterns. Her abilities to understand and to think logically were also strong. She had a perfect score on an adult-level test that measured spatial abilities. One test required that she use a set of colored sticks to recreate a complicated structure from memory. She was not only able to build the structure perfectly, she built it with sticks of the exact same color as the first structure! Despite all this, Genie remained unable to master the basics of language.

Right?

 

[Ossai]

Stamenflicker

Well fine. Let them. They remain undefeated and the game remains unwinnable.

So God says "This will never be broken" and then they go on for eternity, God trying to see if he can break it. God remains omnipotent and the kingdom remains unbreakable. That logic breaks down instantly.

How so?

What you are saying is that the moment god declares B, god becomes non-omnipotent because cannot then declare not B.

Ossai

 

[stamenflicker]

What you are saying is that the moment god declares B, god becomes non-omnipotent because cannot then declare not B.

No, as in the example with unwinnable game.... both properties retain their infinitude because they never overalp. If the undefeatable, or omni-victorious team or whatever goes on "playing the game" forever then they remain undefeated AND the game remains unwinnable.

It is not that God declares "not B" but then cannot do "not B." It's that God is in the perpetual process of either both B and NOT B, or neither B, NOT B. In short, by introducing eternity, we introduce yet another undefined logic problem.

Stamen

 

[stamenflicker]

However, I still don't think that the borders of human language restrict the idea of omnipotence, indeed for you to think that would be very anthropocentric.

I agree that it is anthropocentric and that bothers me probably as much as it does you. I for one am uncomfortable with logical posivitism for the same reason. But I am not really saying that language "does" restrict the real "it", only that we cannot know the real "it" or really even talk about "it" and certainly not reach any conclusions about it because we don't have a good enough language structure for it. We can move to pure nominalism I think and avoid the problems... but I'm not sure that is a healthy answer either.

I bet Gina knows the real "it", she's just not saying.
Seriously, though I'm going to think through the bit on Gina more and post back. It's interesting and deserves more thought.

Initially, I'm thinking about what Russell and other have pretty much said all along, that ontology itself is very, very slippery. Whether it is language or logic, we have to make lots of special exceptions and exemptions to move anyplace.

Stamen

 

[Robin]

Stamenflicker,
So what about the sentence:

God can create an object and say "this will last forever".

is that ungrammatical, intrinsically impossible or absurd?

 

[Robin]

Omnipotence in relation to permenance is a semantic mysnomer, and either a) not possible (your position) or b) not knowable (my position).

Now I see the source of your confusion. Where exactly did I say that omnipotence in relation to permanence is not possible? I said that there was no reliable definition of omnipotence.

You assumed you knew what I meant without actually reading what I said. So everything you have been arguing with me all this time was based on this dud premise! Unbelievable!

 

[Robin]

"All-lying person can never tell the truth".

Sigh. Neither of these limits "range over themselves."

A lie doesn't "range over" the truth? Are you serious? A lie necessarily ranges over the truth. To "range over" something does not imply a contradiction or mutual exclusion as you seem to think, it merely refers to the set that a function lands in. A lie will necessarily land in the set of truth values (ie true/false).

In any case what you actually said was that "All Can [VERBS] a Cannot" is necessarily silly. I demonstrated that it was not.

[edit]Grammatically speaking a function that ranges over itself would be something like "I am what I am". Or the one that Russell might even have been referring to "The Barber of Seville shaves every man who does not shave himself".[/edit]

 

[stamenflicker]

Now I see the source of your confusion. Where exactly did I say that omnipotence in relation to permanence is not possible? I said that there was no reliable definition of omnipotence.

It is quite possible I have misunderstood you. I assumed you were saying omnipotence was not possible because it should be able to say, "This will never be broken."

Are you then saying that omnipotence is possible?

is that ungrammatical, intrinsically impossible or absurd?

It is unknowable because it is ungrammatical. It is intrinsically impossible because it is ungrammatical. And it is absurd because it is ungrammatical. The only way to possibly make sense of it is to assume the infinite set of unbreakableness in contained within the infinite set of omnipotence. Even then it is rather meaningless, ontologically speaking.

I said that there was no reliable definition of omnipotence.

And I'm saying there is a reliable definition of omnipotence, just like there is a reliable definition of an unwinnable game. The problem is when it is taken in relation to/with an infinite contradictory class. If there is no reliable definition for omnipotence, I'm fine with that, but like I said all bets for anything infinite in our language structures are off because semantically I can construct a sentence or phrase in which the limits overlap themselves. To reject one and not all is illogical, to single out omnipotent and not all platonic language is illogical, that is my point of contention.

A lie will necessarily land in the set of truth values

I lie, by definition lands outside a set of truth values, that is why we determine it to be false.

In any case what you actually said was that "All Can [VERBS] a Cannot" is necessarily silly. I demonstrated that it was not.

No, you didn't this is what you did:

All lying / person / can never tell / the truth
All not truth / person / can never tell / the truth
or...
All not X / person / cannot [VERB] / X.
or if you prefer...
All X / cannot [VERB] / not X. Which is logically fine.

To remain consistant, you'd need to say, "An all truthful person can tell a lie."

ie. All X / can [VERB] / a not X. Which is not logically fine.

Stamen

 

[Robin]

Robin: So I am asking you again 'Can God prevent an object from being broken, say for the period of 1 hour?'

Stamenflicker: And I am saying that your question is grammatically incorrect because the answer to the question is unknowable. Since the two limits overlap, either they are the same object, non-existant, two seperate but illogical objects, or (my position) unknowable due to the restrictions of language.

Fascinating! Earlier you were claiming that the rules of semantics were as consistent and precise as the rules of mathematics but everytime I ask you a question you say "unknowable due to the restrictions of language".

OK, let's deal with your objections. You have said that an omnipotent being is a possibility. Say the object is an ordinary glass window. Say an ordinary rock also exists. They would seem to be possible objects. So

1. "...they are the same object...". Well, let's say that the ordinary glass window is not an omnipotent being.
2. "...non-existent...". Since they are possible then they can exist so let's say that each exists.
3. "...two separate but illogical objects...". Let's say that an omnipotent being exists simultaneously with an ordinary glass window and a rock.

Which leaves "unknowable" which is imprecise. We naturally don't "know" if an omnipotent being exists but you say it is possible so we can assume it can exist.
So let's find out exactly where the linguistic unknowability occurs:

1. An omnipotent being may exist simultaneously with a glass window and a rock
Is this knowable or not, bearing in mind you have said that omnipotence is possible?
2. The rock may be moving directly towards the glass window at approximately 100kph which in the normal course of events would break the window
Is this knowable?
3. The omnipotent being could cause the rock to stop dead in its tracks and fall to the ground, thus preventing the window from being broken
Is this knowable or not?

 

[Robin]

I lie, by definition lands outside a set of truth values, that is why we determine it to be false.

'false' is a truth value. The set of truth values is {true,false}. A function that ranges over the set of truth values is called a boolean function. A lie necessarily lands in the set of truth values. So the statement "never tell the truth" clearly refers to all of {true,false} and an all-lying function will land on this set. Also an all-liar will need the whole set because otherwise how will he consistently lie if he does not know what the truth is?

It is quite possible I have misunderstood you. I assumed you were saying omnipotence was not possible because it should be able to say, "This will never be broken."

Are you then saying that omnipotence is possible?

I have consistently said that there is no unambiguous definition for omnipotence so clearly I am unable to say whether or not omnipotence is possible.

[edit]But as I have also said, if omnipotence is possible then omni-destructive powers would not logically be necessary. A purely omnipotent being would create nothing superfuous and so would the need for destruction would never arise.[/edit]

 

[Robin]

All lying / person / can never tell / the truth
All not truth / person / can never tell / the truth

Tut tut again. You are saying that "not truth" is an equivalent term to "lying" Again, are you serious? I suppose you will tell me that Heidegger, Russell and the lot would say the same thing? Have you heard of a little thing called fiction which is neither truth nor lies? Don't substitute terms unless you are absolutely sure they are equivalent.

 

[ceo_esq]

Show me where I use any line of argumentation that is unique to multiple omnipotences. I have tried to use traditional theology.

By suggesting that we might not be using the same standard, I think I was referring to a different standard for intrinsic impossibilities. I then tried to point out that the notion create an immovable rock can - arguably, anyway - be shown to contain within itself a contradiction without needing to refer to possible externalities such as the existence or non-existence of an omnipotent being. Pushing in a given direction, which you've argued should be an impossibility under certain circumstances (if it involves O1 opposing O2), does not seem to be intrinsically impossible insofar as it is not impossible by the same standard that creating an unliftable rock is. I'm not sure I've clearly explained myself here. Do you catch my drift, though?

But there is no special pleading here, conventional theology says that an omnipotent being cannot do the wrong thing. ...

[snip...]

That an omnipotent being is rational is axiomatic. That a rational being must act rationally is tautological.

Hmm. Do you mean to suggest that an evil omnipotent being and a good omnipotent being will always behave indistinguishably? Or that it is futile to speak of the moral alignment of an omnipotent being in any event? That's a new one to me.

For that matter, can't two different choices be equally rational? What about choices that appear morally or rationally neutral? Can't O1 prefer to paint the living room blue and O2 prefer to paint it red?

An omnipotent being is incapable of sinning or making a mistake - but this intrinsic impossibility does not exist unless omnipotence exists.

I don't think this is true of intrinsic impossibilities. A married bachelor is a priori impossible (i.e. impossible independent of whether or not marriage exists, or bachelors exist).

But as you said yourself, intrinsic impossibility is a null set.

This is another reason why I suspect that the opposition of O1 and O2 is not an intrinsic impossibility - because it bears upon actions that can be theoretically conceived (like wanting to move the rock ten feet to the left, although your omnipotent twin wants to move it ten feet to the right).

Square circles, to use an example, are not really things. They're not even ideas, properly speaking. A set "containing" them is null because there aren't any contents to describe. Don't you see, or even sense intuitively, that this is qualitatively different than actions which are allegedly "impossible" merely because it would mean disagreeing with another omnipotent being?

With multiple omnipotent beings, according to your theory, are there even any intrinsically possible actions? Would all actions be merely contingently possible - contingent, that is, on the consent of the other omnipotent beings?

I would be interested too, but I am not aware of it - the closest is the Christian doctrine of the Trinity one God three Persons.

Good point, although it seems to me that theological discussions of the Trinity have been largely preoccupied with showing that the doctrine did not imply the existence of three omnipotent gods. Partly, I should think, out of a desire to avoid running afoul of the general recognition of the logical absurdity of multiple omnipotentates.

 

[stamenflicker]

You have said that an omnipotent being is a possibility

Actually I said omnipotence is a possibility. As for the rest of your post I didn't read it. Re-state your thoughts by using the argument at hand please.

'false' is a truth value. The set of truth values is {true,false}. A function that ranges over the set of truth values is called a boolean function. A lie necessarily lands in the set of truth values. So the statement "never tell the truth" clearly refers to all of {true,false} and an all-lying function will land on this set. Also an all-liar will need the whole set because otherwise how will he consistently lie if he does not know what the truth is?

That's fine. The set of omnipotent values is then {all powerful activities, not all powerful activities.} That which resists all power necessarily lies in the set of all power values. So the statement "never be broken" clearly refers to all of {all powerful, not all powerful} and an all unbreakable function will land on this set.

Can you even see where this ontologically problematic?

you said semantics were as consistent and precise as the rules of mathematics

Hmmm? I missed the post where I said that. Maybe I had too much Amber-boch that night. Can you find where I've said that and save me the trouble?

You are saying that "not truth" is an equivalent term to "lying"

In your sentence it is exactly the same. Lying is defined as "not telling the truth." Unless you want to redefine lying as "telling fiction." But you just said that a fiction is neither truth nor lie, which we agree.

A lie is a "not truth." If we cannot agree on that we will go no where.
Just because a lie is "not truth" does not mean that mean that all "not truth" are lies.

My logic stands.

Flick

 

[Robin]

Robin: You have said that an omnipotent being is a possibility

stamenflicker : Actually I said omnipotence is a possibility.

Same thing - a base requirement for omnipotence is surely existence.

As for the rest of your post I didn't read it.

So what else is new?

Re-state your thoughts by using the argument at hand please.

I would remind you that I am the topic starter. However I addressed your points in details and you have accused me of not wanting to argue language with you, so quit finding excuses to avoid answering.

Robin: you said semantics were as consistent and precise as the rules of mathematics

stamenflicker: Hmmm? I missed the post where I said that. Maybe I had too much Amber-boch that night. Can you find where I've said that and save me the trouble?

Certainly, here is the first:

quote:

Robin: But we can deal with infinity mathematically because we have a method (the mathematical field of limits) of doing so rigorously and consistently. If you know of some similar method of resolving the ambiguities posed by intrinsic impossibility please share.


stamenflicker: Intrinsic impossiblity is the result of semantics, pure and simple. It is the same method applied to infinity, only because the problem is language it can't look exactly the same nor can it be repeatable.

"same method applied to infinity", which as I have already pointed out is rigorous and consistent, and here again:

Robin: Again maths harnesses the intrinsic impossibility in a rigorous and consistent manner - the method of proof by contradiction.

stamenflicker: And the same is true in language, you just don't accept the language rules nor the matter of proven contradiction.

"...the same is true in language" - but I differentiated maths and semantics by the properties of rigor and consistency. Do you now accept that semantics is not rigorous and consistent and that your original comparison of theological intrinsic impossibility to infinity was therefore inappropriate?

Robin: You are saying that "not truth" is an equivalent term to "lying"

stamenflicker: In your sentence it is exactly the same. Lying is defined as "not telling the truth." Unless you want to redefine lying as "telling fiction." But you just said that a fiction is neither truth nor lie, which we agree.

No, I used lying and truth as a mutual exclusion - which they are (at least in common usage). By substituting "not truth" for "lying" you have implied that they are complementary terms, which they are not.

A lie is a "not truth." If we cannot agree on that we will go no where.

No, because by saying an X "is a" Y you are saying they are equivalent. By substituting terms you are saying they are equivalent. But "lie" and "not truth" are not equivalent. If you can't see that we will go nowhere.

Just because a lie is "not truth" does not mean that mean that all "not truth" are lies.

My logic stands.

That is the second time you have confused a mutual exclusion with complementary terms. Both times you have not even acknowledged your error. Lies and truth are mutually exclusive (in common usage) but are not complementary. If you want to substitute "not Y" for X then X and Y must be complementary and not just a mutex.

 

[Robin]

Originally posted by ceo_esq
By suggesting that we might not be using the same standard, I think I was referring to a different standard for intrinsic impossibilities.

But I think both standards are inherent in the Thomist definition of omnipotence quoted in my OP.

The Thomist definition of omnipotence (and this is the one that I believe is "Catch 22") defines intrinsic impossibility in two ways, one of them being Actions out of harmony with God's nature and attributes which includes the idea that God cannot sin. I believe the Thomist definition is the prevailing philosophical definition for omnipotence.

I then tried to point out that the notion create an immovable rock can - arguably, anyway - be shown to contain within itself a contradiction without needing to refer to possible externalities such as the existence or non-existence of an omnipotent being. Pushing in a given direction, which you've argued should be an impossibility under certain circumstances (if it involves O1 opposing O2), does not seem to be intrinsically impossible insofar as it is not impossible by the same standard that creating an unliftable rock is. I'm not sure I've clearly explained myself here. Do you catch my drift, though?

Most people argue that the intrinsic impossibility of the unliftable or unmoveable rock occurs with respect to omnipotence. I do not see why moveability, liftability or breakability form the definition of a rock or any other object independent of any externalities. Surely the very idea of moving or lifting an object implies some externality.

If existence itself implied breakability an omnipotent being would not be possible. The property of unbreakability would only be an intrinsic impossibility if it contradicted some other property that the object had. So if God can do anything that is not intrinsically impossible he can create an object with the property 'eternal' then 'breakable' becomes the impossibility.

Hmm. Do you mean to suggest that an evil omnipotent being and a good omnipotent being will always behave indistinguishably? Or that it is futile to speak of the moral alignment of an omnipotent being in any event? That's a new one to me.

Certainly neither of my main arguments in this thread would hold up under an evil or indifferent God, I concede that. O1 and O2 have to be both benevolent. Unbreakable objects can only be shown to exist under a Thomist definition of omnipotence.

For that matter, can't two different choices be equally rational? What about choices that appear morally or rationally neutral? Can't O1 prefer to paint the living room blue and O2 prefer to paint it red?

This is a good point, although I am sure that traditional theism argues that everything a benevolent God does has a purpose. And if there were two morally or rationally neutral (or equivalent) courses of action what would one omnipotent, benevolent being do? There is no rational method of deciding, so one perfectly rational being (incapable of doing anything that is not rational) would be deadlocked just as much as two would. He can't throw a dice since he already knows what will come up.

I am sure that traditional theists would argue that everything has some moral dimension, if only indirectly and there can never be two exactly morally or rationally equivalent courses of action. In which case God and O1 and O2 would simply choose the best course even if the difference was infinitessimal.

I don't think this is true of intrinsic impossibilities. A married bachelor is a priori impossible (i.e. impossible independent of whether or not marriage exists, or bachelors exist).

As I said earlier the "intrinsic impossibility" of God sinning comes from the Thomist definition, so you would have to take that up with St Tom.

But to me the impossibility here depends on the definition of marriage and bachelorhood as mutual exclusions. So the intrinsic impossibility of overruling an omnipotent being depends only on the definition of omnipotence and so is a priori[/].

This is another reason why I suspect that the opposition of O1 and O2 is not an intrinsic impossibility - because it bears upon actions that can be theoretically conceived (like wanting to move the rock ten feet to the left, although your omnipotent twin wants to move it ten feet to the right).

Square circles, to use an example, are not really things. They're not even ideas, properly speaking. A set "containing" them is null because there aren't any contents to describe. Don't you see, or even sense intuitively, that this is qualitatively different than actions which are allegedly "impossible" merely because it would mean disagreeing with another omnipotent being?

You have introduced two concepts in this quote: 1. the intrinsically impossible thing, 2. the action that cannot be done due to the intrinsic impossibility. A square circle may not really be a thing but it is possible to conceive some being continuously attempting to create it and failing. So "try to create a square circle" is not an intrinsic impossibility, it is just that succeeding in the task is. We assume that a rational being will not attempt to do that which can not be done.

The "overruled omnipotent being" is the square circle, it is not a thing or even an idea, like the square circle it is an oxymoron and there is no qualitive difference. We can also conceive the attempt to overrule an omnipotent being but we know that this will not succeed. And we assume that a rational being will not attempt to do that which cannot be done.

This applies to traditional theology because it can be theoretically conceived that a single omnipotent being can change his mind. He can declare the Kingdom that will never be destroyed and then someone eats the wrong fruit from the wrong tree again and all bets are off. So God changes his mind and destroys the kingdom that will never be destroyed and so was wrong (or deceptive). It can be theoretically conceived that God can destroy the indestructible Kingdom, but it is absolutely, intractably impossible for him to do so (under the Thomist definition).

So the question arises, is this example an exception to omnipotence, or is it part of the null set? A traditional theologist would surely see God's absolute inability to destroy the eternal Kingdom as a strength, rather than a weakness - the ability to break a promise is merely the inability to make one, or the inability to decide on the right course of action in the first place.