Occam’s Razor

[drkitten]

"the outsiders find that "civilization" (broadly defined) has been invented and re-invented many times throughout history"- drkitten

Your example is self-contradictory. If these 'outsiders' are able to find the evidence of these previous civilisations then the potential exists that 'science' can discover the same.

Um, no. This is a work of fiction, written from the standard assumption of authorial omniscience. The outsiders didn't "find the evidence" of these previous civilizations -- they watched the civilizations happen as a contemporaneous event. If you are willing to assume that merely being about to write about something from the viewpoint of an omniscienct witness makes something subject to scientific inquiry, then by all means, the Christian God is subject to scientific inquiry -- just read Milton's Paradise Lost. Similarly, a scientific inquiry into the nature of the afterlife is possible because Dante wrote about it.

Scientists can no more assume the viewpoint of the Discworld wizards (the "outsiders") in this book then they can the viewpoint of Dante-the-pilgrim.

Now, depending upon your theoretical framework, we may be able to hypothesize a time-travel device that permits (modern) scientists to go back and to observe for themselves. But if we're permitting ourselves such counterfactual hypotheses, it's just as easy for me to hypothesize a "soul-travel device" that permits me to travel to the afterlife and return with information about the actual existence of God. (In fact, I would argue that a soul-travel device is more plausible than a time travel device, because it doesn't involve any actual paradoxes -- the paradoxes of causality violation implicit in a time-travel device are well-known.)

Melendwyr's statement is correct. If there are no potential means of scientific inquiry into the existence of a thing then for all purposes that thing is unknowable and cannot be said to exist.

No. Re-read the paragraph with the above distinction in mind. Melendwyr -- and you -- are simply wrong.

A still more prosaic example -- what did Caesar have for breakfast on the morning he was assassinated? We have no potential means of scientific inqury into such a question. The breakfast itself has long since decayed, and no historical records mention it. But it's ludicrous to claim that the breakfast cannot be said to exist. Similarly, we have no way of investigating the identity of Caesar's maternal great-grandmother -- but you don't want to suggest that she "cannot be said to exist," do you?

 

[Festus]

More inappropriate examples?

I pointed out that within the fictional framework of your example there is a potential for discovery by later scientists of the previous civilizations. The simplest being having the 'outsiders' relate their direct observations. This by itself invalidates your example as you provided it. In any event the example is self-contradictory in the framework you presented.

"If you are willing to assume that merely being about to write about something from the viewpoint of an omniscient witness makes something subject to scientific inquiry, then by all means, the Christian God is subject to scientific inquiry -- just read Milton's Paradise Lost." -drkitten

I assume you mean "If you are willing to assume that merely writing about something from the viewpoint of an omniscient witness makes something subject to scientific inquiry, then by all means, the Christian God is subject to scientific inquiry -- just read Milton's Paradise Lost."

Why wouldn't "the Christian God" be subject to scientific inquiry? Is it because "the Christian God" doesn't exist? The ability to investigate something does not depend on whether or not someone wrote about it. Writing is not magic.

Whatever you are getting at with the time-machine I can't fathom. Melendwyr's statement does not assume that the means for scientific inquiry must exist, only that the means can potentially be developed. I wouldn't bet on a time-machine to be one of them.

"A still more prosaic example -- what did Caesar have for breakfast on the morning he was assassinated? We have no potential means of scientific inquiry into such a question. The breakfast itself has long since decayed, and no historical records mention it. "-drkitten

Are you sure no records exist? Livy and Plutarch both have details of Julius Caesar's last day. Could there be others?

"But it's ludicrous to claim that the breakfast cannot be said to exist." -drkitten

Why? Did Caesar never skip a meal? He had a busy day according to Plutarch. Perhaps his personal memoirs would give a clue. He had many, giving a means of inquiry.

" Similarly, we have no way of investigating the identity of Caesar's maternal great-grandmother -- but you don't want to suggest that she "cannot be said to exist," do you?"-drkitten

Why? Was Caesar not human, born of a woman? He certainly died as such. The fact that Caesar existed shows that in fact she also existed, her identity is another matter entirely. For that research the family of his mother, Aurelia of the Cotta family. Again, a means of inquiry. You did mean Julius Caesar? Caesar was a family name, not a title or an individual.

"but you don't want to suggest that she "cannot be said to exist," do you?"-drkitten

You don't know what I want to suggest. If I was going to suggest something it would be "Don't post a first draft."

Now that further bad examples are dismissed, let's get to the logic of Melendwyr's statement.

Again -

"Things that, by their very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry, are unreal." -Melendwyr

nature:

The inherent character or basic constitution of a person or thing

thing:

a : A separate and distinct individual quality, fact, idea, or usually entity
b : the concrete entity as distinguished from its appearances
c : a spatial entity
d : an inanimate object distinguished from a living being

potentially:

Existing in possibility : capable of development into actuality.

scientific inquiry:

The process by which scientists ask questions, develop and carry out investigations, make predictions, gather evidence, and propose explanations.

unreal:

lacking in reality, substance, or genuineness

These are the most appropriate definitions I could come up with, if I am misstating your intent Melendwyr let me know.

Given these definitions I take Melendwyr's assertion to be: If the existence of any entity or object cannot now or ever be scientifically investigated then the thing doesn't exist.

Restated; If the means to investigate a thing exists or can be developed then anything that exists can be investigated scientifically.

So then your assertion is that there are things that exist that can never be explained by science? I have heard this before, right before the woo-woo-woo...

 

[bruto]

I don't agree that Ockham's aim was necessarily to secularize science, perhaps to apply a logical system to the arguments of his day, similar to the work of George Boole.
I have read some secondary sources and it seems like Ockham's Razor may not have been directly attributable to the man himself. Rather it may be that the concept stated however many ways was identified with Ockham in the fashion of an idiosyncrasy. Not that the concept was not his but that it was not formally stated as a rule by Ockham. This is important in that it leaves open what Ockham's intention actually was.
I take the stand that the relative number of assumptions between two opposed arguments is irrelavant to the fitness of either argument.
My opinion is that William of Ockham was more of logician than a scientist and in that light Ockam's Razor is more appropriately applied to a single argument as a measure of the fitness of the assumptions than in evaluating the relative worth of opposing arguments based wholy on the raw number of assumptions. If an argument with many accurate and neccesary assumptions is in opposition to an argument with a single wholly false assumption an incorrect interpretation of Ockham's Razor would validate an argument based on falsity and therefore by nature unsound. I therefore submit that it is more fitting that an interpretation of the Razor that reduces unnecessary assumptions in a single argument would be more useful and in keeping with the nature of Ockham's work than a rule that would accept or reject one of many opposing arguments leaving the opportunity for acceptance of arguments supported by specious or unsound assumptions.
In conclusion I would like to add that rules of thumb such as Ockham's Razor are simply shortcuts to conclusions that would be better served with close reading and critical evalution of the position in all parts and as a whole. Shortcuts may save time but they should not substitute for critical thinking.

You're probably right in that since Ockham was a theologian first, and not particularly concerned with science as a pursuit, but only as a branch of philosophical thought, he was more interested in desecularizing God than the other way around. His main philosophical agenda seems to have been to deny the real existence of universals and relations, and he used the principle of economy to argue against the existence of relations as an entity, in part for theological reasons, because he found a logical contradiction between the idea of real relations and universals and divine omnipotence. However, in the process, he appears to have been pretty explicit in applying the principle of economy to science. I went back to the archives and dug up Frederick Copleston's History of Philosophy, and here is how he puts it:

"..But if creatures are 'absolutes', they can perfectly well be studied without any reference to God. Of course, as we have seen, when Ockham spoke of created things as 'absolutes' he had no intention of questioning their utter dependence on God; his point of view was very much that of a theologian; but none the less, if we can know the natures of created things without any advertence to God, it follows that empirical science is an autonomous discipline. The world can be studied in itself in abstraction from God, especially if, as Ockham held, it cannot be strictly proved that God, in the full sense of the term 'God', exists. In this sense it is legitimate to speak of Ockhamism as a factor and stage in the birth of the 'lay spirit', as M. de Lagarde does. At the same time one must remember that Ockham himself was very far from being a secularist or modern 'rationalist.' "

Eslewhere, Copleston sums up the principle of economy thus:

"If two factors will suffice to explain motion, for example, one should not add a third."

edited for sloppy typing

 

[Robin]

Similarly, we have no way of investigating the identity of Caesar's maternal great-grandmother -- but you don't want to suggest that she "cannot be said to exist," do you?

She can be said to exist because we can establish scientifically that she did. Even if we don't know who she was.

We don't know of Caesar's breakfast but we can scientifically establish that he ate food, even if we don't know that he ate at any specific time or day.

We might even be able to gain a fair degree of confidence about what his breakfast might have been, if he had one.

We don't have to hypothesise such things as time machines to establish that they are theoretically possible to scientifically establish. If we are talking about 'potentially' the subject of scientific enquiry then we could have said that perhaps Caesars body might have been preserved and the DNA in the stomach examined. Caesar might have written about his breakfast and some independent observer also happened to have written about it.

Incidentally I hardly think that a soul travel device can be said to be more plausible than a time travel device. With time travel we have at least an idea of what it is that we can't do.

 

[drkitten]

I pointed out that within the fictional framework of your example there is a potential for discovery by later scientists of the previous civilizations. The simplest being having the 'outsiders' relate their direct observations. This by itself invalidates your example as you provided it. In any event the example is self-contradictory in the framework you presented.

Boy, you really can't read for toffee, can you?

The book, as I clearly indicated, in my original posting, is fiction. It does not describe the real world, and as far as scientific inquiry goes, it doesn't matter what the Discworld wizards could and could not do, because they are fictional.

However, this fictional account raises a legitimate question regarding the real world. Were there, in fact, tool-using dinosaurs? And I raise that question in the real world, the one where actual scientist go and dig up fossils and make inferences about whether feathered dinosaurs existed (they apparently did), and whether they were killed off by an asteroid impact or by smoking (so far, the evidence supports the asteroid.)

However, I cannot, even in principle address the question of whether or not a species of dinosaurs made and used exclusively wooden tools. There is no "potential for discovery" by later scientists, because we have independent knowledge that wooden tools do not last long enough to be perserved for present study. There are no non-fictional "outsider" wizards with lifespans that are by our standard immortal who could be treated as witnesses. There is nothing. The question cannot, even in principle, be answered.

If you disagree, then please explan what sort of evidence you could expect to find.

Given these definitions I take Melendwyr's assertion to be: If the existence of any entity or object cannot now or ever be scientifically investigated then the thing doesn't exist.

Restated; If the means to investigate a thing exists or can be developed then anything that exists can be investigated scientifically.

And Melendwyr's assertion is completly, inalterably, tragically, inexorably, and unquestionably wrong, beyond salvation or repair.

Lots of things could easily exist -- and we do not have the capacity to know it. There are lots of things for which the means to investigate a thing cannot be developed because the evidence on which we would need to rely no longer exists or has been corrupted beyond the possiblity of repair.

Some simple questions. What colour were Archeopteryx's feathers? We know that such a creature existed, because we have his fossilized bones. We even have the imprints of his feathers, so we know they existed as well. But the color doesn't fossilize. How could you investigate the colour of his feathers? What could you develop that would tell you the colour of his feathers (and that doesn't involve global causality violation)?

Might there have been two different varieties of Archeopteryx, with different colouration? How many different varieties were there? Were there more or fewer colour variations then there are in the modern cat? Were the colour variations geographically separable (as hair colour is among Europeans, with blonde Norway and brunette Italy)? Were they mixed together within a family as in modern cats? Were colour differences sex-linked as in mallard ducks?

What was the courtship behavior of Archeopteryx? Did the male have some sort of mating call? Were they polygamous like African long-tailed widow birds, or monogamous like most swans and penguins?

.....

And tell me how you're going to investigate these questions. The answers to these questions undoubtedly exist. But I deny in principle your ability to investigate them.

 

[Festus]

Yet more examples?

Boy, you really can't read for toffee, can you?

The book, as I clearly indicated, in my original posting, is fiction. It does not describe the real world, and as far as scientific inquiry goes, it doesn't matter what the Discworld wizards could and could not do, because they are fictional.

I read better than you write apparently. I addressed this issue in my last post. If you didn't want your example evaluated in it's fictional context then you should not have used a fictional example. I have not proposed in any way that the example was anything other than fiction. You keep hinting that I am confusing fiction with reality, but yet it is you that proposed to disprove an assertion with science fiction. You can stop shaking that straw man it is exposed. If your example doesn't apply then you shouldn't have used it. Don't blame me for your failures. See the comment in my last post about drafts then use them. Proofreading prevents these sort of logical errors.

However, this fictional account raises a legitimate question regarding the real world. Were there, in fact, tool-using dinosaurs?

I know if such a thing as tool using dinosaurs did exist then they can be scientifically investigated. As it's fiction they cannot definitively be said to have existed, so perhaps not. Tool using dinosaurs have nothing to do with Melendwyr's assertion.

There is no "potential for discovery" by later scientists, because we have independent knowledge that wooden tools do not last long enough to be perserved for present study.

Do they now? Wood can be fossilized, frozen in ice, preserved in layers of limestone beneath the ocean depths. Even if the wood cells have long turned to dust, the material that encompasses it can hold shape and show whether it was worked into a tool. Will there some day be a method to generate the image of an artifact without disturbing it? To be able to see how it has decayed and reliably reconstruct it? There are many applications for such technology both within and outside archeology. I would be surprised if it isn't already being worked out.
You seem to regard time as some sort of universal solvent that destroys everything utterly with no trace. Yet the first law of thermodynamics states that matter cannot be created nor destroyed, only transformed. It stands to reason then that if matter, say an Archaeopteryx, is enclosed in a system, such as trapped in a mudslide, frozen in ice, or sunk in a pond and layered in sand, then all we need is an understanding of how the matter that made up the Archaeopteryx would have changed and reverse the process either physically or through a detailed model. Is it too complicated to sort out? Physicists at the Japan Marine Science and Technology Center have built the Earth Simulator in part to model atmospheric conditions on a planet-wide scale. Could the decay and dissemination of the matter of anything be similarly modeled? The potential exists. Could such a technology be expanded to ever larger scales? How about genetics? If evolution is in fact the manner which all that lives came to be in the form it is then could the process be reversed? Given sufficient computing power could all possible DNA combinations be computed? Could then these sequences be modeled to show what sort of creature would result? Not only would I have every creature that ever existed but also every creature that could possibly exist.

And tell me how you're going to investigate these questions. The answers to these questions undoubtedly exist. But I deny in principle your ability to investigate them.

Deny all you like this is not the question.Niether I nor anyone else has to have the ability to investigate however many spurious examples you come up with. All I have to show is a means of inquiry could potentially exist. Yet again, read Melendwyr's assertion.

And Melendwyr's assertion is completely, inalterably, tragically, inexorably, and unquestionably wrong, beyond salvation or repair.

Yet you cannot seem to show how.All the adjectives in all the languages ever used or yet to be cannot change the fact you have not disproved the inherent logic of the assertion. Simple denial won't do. Logic and physics won't change just because you wish it to be so.

Perhaps you could come up with a logical fallacy in Melendwyr's assertion? Perhaps you could do so without using examples? That would prove your case beyond any doubt yet you resolutely avoid this. Please, get help. Ask a professor, your local librarian, send some emails.

In conclusion this topic has wandered far from Ockham's razor, If you care to continue on new thread, do so and I will follow.

 

[Festus]

Ockham's work

You're probably right in that since Ockham was a theologian first, and not particularly concerned with science as a pursuit, but only as a branch of philosophical thought, he was more interested in desecularizing God than the other way around.

It's always nice to be right. You are far more knowledgeable about the work of William of Ockham than I am. Does Ockham have a means to logically reduce the principles of an argument to their fundamentals? I have read quite a few philosophers and scientists yet outside of Boole and to a lesser extent Blackburn there is no method for consistently structuring and comparing opposing arguments.

His main philosophical agenda seems to have been to deny the real existence of universals and relations,

What are universals and relations?

 

[bruto]

It's always nice to be right. You are far more knowledgeable about the work of William of Ockham than I am. Does Ockham have a means to logically reduce the principles of an argument to their fundamentals? I have read quite a few philosophers and scientists yet outside of Boole and to a lesser extent Blackburn there is no method for consistently structuring and comparing opposing arguments.



What are universals and relations?

Ockham, like most of the scholastics, wrote a good deal about logic, but as far as I know he pretty much followed Aristotle, and since I've never made much of of a study of it, I'd be wise to plead ignorance.

Universals, in this case, are categories such as "man," "horse," etc. Plato thought that these were the ultimate reality, and individual instances a poor copy of these ideals. Aristotle believed that only individual objects exist, and the universals are a property of them. He's still considered a "realist" because he believed that these universals were inherent in the things themselves. A nominalist like Ockham goes further and says that universals are not real apart from their instances, and are essentially logical terms or meanings which we use to organize and communciate our thoughts, rather than something that is real within the objects we are describing. The things described and the properties they share are real enough, but the universals belong to us, not the things. We can define "man" and know what a man is, and all men share in this category, but the category does not have existence of its own if there are no men to exhibit it, and has no use or meaning if there are no observers who need to know or say what a man is. Nominalism at its extreme can get a little messy, since if we decide that universals are only a term of convenience and not in some way real or at least compulsory, we are hard put to figure out why a man is not sometimes a dog. A similar question to that of universals comes up regarding to the relations between things, qualities such as "similarity." The so-called scholastic realists, such as Duns Scotus, asserted that these relations were entities themselves. Ockham rejected that, suggesting that if relations were real and distinct from their foundations, God could, for example, confer the relation of paternity on a man with no children. Once again, for Ockham the nominalist, these relations have no meaning apart from their instances, but are a way of describing properties of those objects. Ockham goes on to suggest that if relations were real, every act of every object would influence every other object in the universe, since if one moves one's finger, it moves instantaneously in relation to everything in the entire universe; so if the relation were a reality of its own, it would then logically be expected to change everything else in the universe instantaneously.

 

[Batman Jr.]

Of course science can address it. Things that, by their very nature, cannot potentially be the subject of scientific inquiry, are unreal. There is no meaningful way in which they can be said to exist.

Then are you a solipsist? Subjective experience cannot be scientifically observed, so that must constitute proof to me that you're a p-zombie, right? If something can't be observed, it can't be observed. What is your explicit rationale for believing that this means the thing is nonexistent? Here is a thought experiment: Consider a box that cannot be broken into. On top of that, it is made of a material which doesn't permit us to detect the inside of it in any other way either. Does this mean to you that the inside of the box doesn't exist?

 

[DevilsAdvocate]

Ockham's razor. The rule which states "plurality should not be assumed without necessity". In other words if you can prove a postulate without relying on an assumption, such an assumption should be excluded. Two things of interest here. First, Ockham's razor is a rule or guideline for setting the basis of an argument, the supportive information assumed by the author. Second, nothing in Ockham's razor implies in any way that it is related to the scientific method or that it is appropriate for the evaluation of any phenomenon that can be proven or disproven in fact.
There seems to be a notion that Ockham's razor can be taken to mean that the argument with the fewest assuptions tends to be the more correct. Given the quoted definition above this meaning is an extrapolation of the original that ignores the critical value of necessity.

That's the way I've always understood the use of the term "Ockham's razor". Furthermore, I've never really understood it a an alternative for "lack of evidence", like the "dinosaur tool users" case. I always saw it as a resolution a conflict for which it would be..umm..theoretically?... impossible to get scientific data.

Of course, this example is fictitious. But that's the point. Suppose that I took seriously these ideas and wanted to investigate them scientifically. I couldn't. But saying "I don't know whether or not any dinosaurs could have made wooden tools" is entirely different than saying "Dinosaurs could not have made wooden tools, because there is no way to subject the question to scientific inquiry."

I think this misses the point. Ockham's razor says when explaining anything that anything unnecessary is unnecessary. The razor can't cut suppositions. There must first be an observation that requires an explanation. If there are multiple possible explanations that can't be proven, then you apply the razor.

There may have been tool-using dinosaurs. Or alien space monkeys. Or green giraffe-necked unicorns. But there is no evidence of these things, therefore no explanation of these things is needed, therefore there is no need to apply the razor to the (non-existent) explanations.

The way "Ockham's razor" was originally explained to me was that you can’t measure the exact speed of light (give me a break with the physics, this is just an example). To measure the speed of light, you have to pass it through a long distance and record the time. For example, you bounce a light off a mirror on the moon. You calculate the time and distance, hey presto: speed of light is c. So you conclude light travels at c. But does it? Maybe it goes 2 times the speed to the moon and 1/2 the speed back. Or 3 times there 1/3 back. Or 50 times the and 1/50 back. And so on. If we have no way of testing these possibilities, then we have to decide which one would be correct.

We can either accept that the speed of light is constant c, or that the speed of light varies by n times c going and 1/c coming back. For the latter, we introduce the variable n, and the qualifier “coming and going”. Because there is no evidence or reasonable expectation that the speed “coming” would be different from “going”, "Ockham's razor" says there is no need for the variable n. So we have thousands and millions and billions and billions of possible explanations that could works for c=n*c/n, and one explanation that works without n, c=c. So we accept the simplest. c=c. In a mathematical sense, it is eliminating the unnecessary. In c=n*c/n, n has no consequence. That doesn’t mean that there is not an “n”, but it has no consequence. It has no effect on the outcome. It has no observable effect. If something has no consequence and no observable effect, then it is irrelevant.

It is possible that there were or are tool-using dinosaurs, alien space monkeys, and green giraffe-necked unicorns. But they are irrelevant. If there is no evidence, if there is no observable effect, if there is no consequence to our understanding of the world, then there is no need to “explain” these hypothetical things, and without a need to explain, there is no need to apply "Ockham's razor".

 

[RichardR]

Thanks for the responses. O.R. has been defined as:

"Plurality should not be posited without necessity."

I usually re-state this in more modern English as:

Do not invent unnecessary entities to explain something.

A key word is “invent” – ie something that is not known to exist via any other evidence. The other key word is “unnecessary” - if you can explain something without an additional unproven entity, don’t invoke the additional unproven entity.

Of course, this doesn’t prove the additional unproven entity is false; it’s just a reason not to invoke the additional entity.

So I was interested in the views of skeptics as to situations when this would not apply – when you can ignore O.R. To put it another way, doesn’t ignoring O.R. mean that you invent some unnecessary thing?

Perhaps a couple of examples.

Example A - Reincarnation

It has been stated by some reincarnation researchers that in cultures where they believe that you cannot change sex in a reincarnation, they report no cases of changed sex reincarnation. Where they do believe reincarnates can change sex, this is sometimes reported.

Two explanations have been offered for this:

1 Reincarnation doesn’t happen, and cultural beliefs are applied to make the stories fit, or

2 Reincarnation does happen, and cultural beliefs actually change what happens during reincarnation.

Option (1) above fits very well with the observed facts, and doesn’t require us to make-up and accept the extraordinary claim of reincarnation. I think option 2 is absurd. Am I right to invoke O.R. to accept explanation (1)?

Example B – God

Suppose we have no direct evidence for God, and nothing that we observe about the universe where we need to add “God” to the explanation to make the explanation work. Am I right to invoke O.R. to eliminate any explanations that invoke God?

I was especially interested in replies in the light of this response:

I think the problem is that people use Occam's Razor incorrectly. A common misapplication of it is to invoke it to justify belief in the absence of things unseen. Occam's Razor was never meant to prove the negatives of the unobserved or untestable.

Would your invisible pink unicorn be analogous to reincarnation, or God, in the examples above? If you don’t need the unicorn to explain an observation, can’t you rule it out for now, until different evidence appears?

Thanks again.

 

[bruto]

Thanks for the responses. O.R. has been defined as:

"Plurality should not be posited without necessity."

I usually re-state this in more modern English as:

Do not invent unnecessary entities to explain something.

A key word is “invent” – ie something that is not known to exist via any other evidence. The other key word is “unnecessary” - if you can explain something without an additional unproven entity, don’t invoke the additional unproven entity.

Of course, this doesn’t prove the additional unproven entity is false; it’s just a reason not to invoke the additional entity.

So I was interested in the views of skeptics as to situations when this would not apply – when you can ignore O.R. To put it another way, doesn’t ignoring O.R. mean that you invent some unnecessary thing?

Perhaps a couple of examples.

Example A - Reincarnation

It has been stated by some reincarnation researchers that in cultures where they believe that you cannot change sex in a reincarnation, they report no cases of changed sex reincarnation. Where they do believe reincarnates can change sex, this is sometimes reported.

Two explanations have been offered for this:

1 Reincarnation doesn’t happen, and cultural beliefs are applied to make the stories fit, or

2 Reincarnation does happen, and cultural beliefs actually change what happens during reincarnation.

Option (1) above fits very well with the observed facts, and doesn’t require us to make-up and accept the extraordinary claim of reincarnation. I think option 2 is absurd. Am I right to invoke O.R. to accept explanation (1)?

Example B – God

Suppose we have no direct evidence for God, and nothing that we observe about the universe where we need to add “God” to the explanation to make the explanation work. Am I right to invoke O.R. to eliminate any explanations that invoke God?

I was especially interested in replies in the light of this response:



Would your invisible pink unicorn be analogous to reincarnation, or God, in the examples above? If you don’t need the unicorn to explain an observation, can’t you rule it out for now, until different evidence appears?

Thanks again.

I think in the first instance, O.R. might not be strictly applicable, at least as Ockham would have seen it, if reincarnation is seen as a matter of faith, because he seems to have been pretty explicit that parsimony does not apply to matters of faith. I would tend to choose the simple explanation here, but it is not parsimony alone that makes me do that, but a consideration of likelihood in a matter that is not one of pure faith, at least for me. As it is, though, neither explanation deals with the scientific explanation for how reincarnation might work, so I'm not really sure whether O.R. is applicable here. In this case we're dealing with one explanation that denies reincarnation and one that explains how it might work, rather than two that explain how it works. Neither explanation goes to the base question of investigating supposed instances of reincarnation, and determining whether or not we have any reason to believe that it occurs. At that level, I could conceive of O.R. being applicable if straightforward physical or psychological explanations can be found for the phenomenon, but we need to avoid confusing parsimony with just plain believablity.

But in the second example, I would say that's pretty much what he had in mind: if you can explain the way the universe works using physical laws without god, this means, not that God doesn't exist, but that divine agency is not needed for the explanation, and should be set aside. In Ockham's world, God has a special privilege. He is assumed to exist whether or not he is needed to explain the world. On other matters, such as the existence of universals and relations, Ockham was more severe, and used the razor not only to eliminate them from consideration, but to deny their existence altogether. I think the invisible pink unicorn would be closer to the second instance: if you can explain the workings of the world without I.P.U.s then they should be assumed not only not to apply, but not to exist, unless they, like God, are required by faith (for example, if the Church regarded IPU's in the same way it does archangels).

Now that the sea of faith no longer lies like a bright girdle furled, etc. yada yada, I'm not sure we need to be as circumspect in our use of the razor, but we do need to make sure we don't confuse parsimony with judgments of likelihood and unlikelihood made for other reasons. After all, in some sense, woo explanations could be considered simpler and more direct than what we consider reasonable ones, especially by people who find it possible to deny the existence or knowability of the material world.

 

[Melendwyr]

Of course, "science" doesn't know about these. Furthermore (and this is part of the authors' point), science would not be expected to know about these civilizations -- the sand-and-spit statues, or the wooden tools, could not possibly survive to the present to be found by modern scientists. But just because we cannot possibly inquire about dinosaur tools would make them no less real.

Why can't we inquire about dinosaur tools, again? Such a field can potentially be examined.

Of course, this example is fictitious. But that's the point. Suppose that I took seriously these ideas and wanted to investigate them scientifically. I couldn't.

So what? The question is not whether you personally, or even society as a whole, possesses the capacity to investigate matters. The question is whether those matters can theoretically be investigated.

If you declare that God cannot be investigated, even in theory, then God cannot be real.

 

[Melendwyr]

Then are you a solipsist?

I don't think you understand what that term implies.

Subjective experience cannot be scientifically observed

Says who?

Here is a thought experiment: Consider a box that cannot be broken into. On top of that, it is made of a material which doesn't permit us to detect the inside of it in any other way either. Does this mean to you that the inside of the box doesn't exist?

The "inside" of the box doesn't exist in this universe. It can't interact with anything, in any way, and so isn't real.

What exactly are you asserting is the difference between the declaration that the inside exists and the declaration that it doesn't exist? What consequences are implied by one that aren't by the other?

 

[RichardR]

I think in the first instance, O.R. might not be strictly applicable, at least as Ockham would have seen it, if reincarnation is seen as a matter of faith, because he seems to have been pretty explicit that parsimony does not apply to matters of faith.

I am less interested in what Occam would have thought than in how we think it should be applied now.

I would tend to choose the simple explanation here, but it is not parsimony alone that makes me do that, but a consideration of likelihood in a matter that is not one of pure faith, at least for me.

For me it’s parsimony – Option 2 requires me to accept reincarnation which is an additional thing I have to believe in for the explanation to work, compared with option 1. Option 1 doesn’t require me to do anything – I can explain the observation using only what is known about the universe. Option 2 requires me to do something in addition – invent something called “reincarnation” that is not otherwise known to exist

 

[Batman Jr.]

Would your invisible pink unicorn be analogous to reincarnation, or God, in the examples above? If you don’t need the unicorn to explain an observation, can’t you rule it out for now, until different evidence appears?

Thanks again.

When you rule out the unicorn, you are complicating the theory. Saying "x happens whenever y happens" is simpler than saying "x happens whenever y happens and invisible unicorns have nothing to do with x and therefore don't exist." You don't have to claim that the unicorn doesn't exist to explain something without the unicorn. Take, for example, the development of theories of heredity. Principles of heredity were established before the discovery of genes, so before heredity knew of the double-helix, heredity theory didn't incorporate into its explanations the role genes play in the passing on of characteristics; it only noted that the passing on of characteristics did happen. With the advent of the study of genes, prior heredity theory wasn't thrown out or proven wrong; it was expanded. This is because the theories which remained viable were ambiguous on the specific mechanisms of heredity. The corrupted version of Occam's Razor would have dictated that for the sake of parsimony, we should have, before the discovery of genes, ruled out intermediaries involved in the transference of traits and said that a particular feature directly creates that same feature in the offspring of its original possessor. This demonstrates that using Occam's Razor in the manner sometimes prescribed is not how science really works. It also shows that your examples of reincarnation and God are false dichotomies.

I don't think you understand what that term implies.

You'd be surprised.

Says who?

An awful lot of the leading scholars in the field of the philosophy of mind. I've explained why many, including myself, have come to this conclusion too often and am sick of having arguments over it. I'd suggest reading proposed answers to Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness" to find out more.

The "inside" of the box doesn't exist in this universe. It can't interact with anything, in any way, and so isn't real.

What exactly are you asserting is the difference between the declaration that the inside exists and the declaration that it doesn't exist? What consequences are implied by one that aren't by the other?

What if there are things inside the box that interact with one another, but not anything outside the box?

 

[bruto]

I am less interested in what Occam would have thought than in how we think it should be applied now. For me it’s parsimony – Option 2 requires me to accept reincarnation which is an additional thing I have to believe in for the explanation to work, compared with option 1. Option 1 doesn’t require me to do anything – I can explain the observation using only what is known about the universe. Option 2 requires me to do something in addition – invent something called “reincarnation” that is not otherwise known to exist

I see your point, but while I think parsimony is a reasonable option to use in considering the basic question of whether or not reincarnation is real, applying it to a question on a supposed characteristic of reincarnation is a step late. Probably nitpicking, but if you're going to be an Ockhamist, reincarnation never even gets out of the gate.

 

[bruto]

I don't think you understand what that term implies. Says who?

The "inside" of the box doesn't exist in this universe. It can't interact with anything, in any way, and so isn't real.

What exactly are you asserting is the difference between the declaration that the inside exists and the declaration that it doesn't exist? What consequences are implied by one that aren't by the other?

What kind of box is this? Is it assumed to be a real box with dimensions in space? If so, we can, perhaps must, infer that some kind of inside exists, even though we are forever unable to examine it, because a box exists in three dimensions and encloses a space which no other object can simultaneously occupy, and even though we may, on principle, and by definition, never see what is inside, and the contents or lack of contents can never be confirmed, to suggest that the inside of the box is nonexistent or without dimension violates our commonly held notions of physics and geometry. Of course a Scholastic Realist would hold that that spatial relationship is an entity in its own right, but even if you don't go that far, it is enough of an implied consequence to give some meaning to the notion that the box has an inside.

Similarly, I would contend that the notion that there is a God, while it may be wrong, foolish, and is certainly not, under any known circumstances at present subject to verification, is not thereby without meaning. Even if you believe that god is entirely outside of the possibility of empirical verification, if you do in fact believe that an omnipotent benevolent deity created the universe out of nothing, having attributed to that god some specific action, then this is a conceivable, meaningful statement even if it is untrue. If I say that when I die I will go to heaven and talk to Jesus, this is a conceivable thing with a clear meaning, even if it is impossible and foolish and requires a miracle that defies all we know of science.

I say that on such and such a day, Caesar had a couple of pop tarts and a bottle of Frobscottle. Nobody can verify what he did have, but you can certainly dismiss that statement as a total fabrication and a foolish one at that. Yet despite the total inability to ascertain the truth and the total absurdity of my statement, it has a clear, well understood meaning (better understood if you've read a lot of Roald Dahl to your kids).

edited typos

 

[Flange Desire]

... Here is a thought experiment: Consider a box that cannot be broken into. On top of that, it is made of a material which doesn't permit us to detect the inside of it in any other way either. Does this mean to you that the inside of the box doesn't exist?

Thanks for the exercise Batman Jr, and please excuse my lack or rigor in the following ...

The 'inside of the box' does exist, because -
We can observe the exterior (or description) of the box.
And from experience we know how boxes are constructed,
and deduce that the box has an interior,
as all other boxes in our experience do have an interior.
Another way of saying this is that, by definition, a box has an interior.
My dictionary tells me this.
Even though it is mandated that we cannot observe its interior, we can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
By calling it a 'box', we have decided the matter.
If its interior does NOT exist then this thing is NOT a box.

Our confidence in the existence of the interior is proportional to the match between the observation (or description) of the box, with the other boxes in our experience, ie, how closely it resembles the box described in our dictionary.

If the thought experiment is reworded slightly to read '... whatever is inside the box don't exist?' (this may actually have been the meaning but I did not read it as such) then similarly, the 'whatever is inside of the box' does exist, because -
Whatever is inside the box has the potential to be observed.
Even though the experiment says that it cannot be observed, one can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
The experiment mentions nothing else special about this box, except that we cannot observe its interior, so (WRT its ability to have an interior and contain things) it is the same as the box described in our dictionary.
From experience and definition, all boxes have interiors and can contain things.

There is no reason or argument to propose that the contents of any box (including this particular one) does not exist.

(gee - i hope i was allowed to use the terms 'experience' and 'by definition' in this)

Thanks again for the excersise.
PS, I am in strong agreement with Melendwyr's statement.

 

[bruto]

Thanks for the exercise Batman Jr, and please excuse my lack or rigor in the following ...

The 'inside of the box' does exist, because -
We can observe the exterior (or description) of the box.
And from experience we know how boxes are constructed,
and deduce that the box has an interior,
as all other boxes in our experience do have an interior.
Another way of saying this is that, by definition, a box has an interior.
My dictionary tells me this.
Even though it is mandated that we cannot observe its interior, we can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
By calling it a 'box', we have decided the matter.
If its interior does NOT exist then this thing is NOT a box.

Our confidence in the existence of the interior is proportional to the match between the observation (or description) of the box, with the other boxes in our experience, ie, how closely it resembles the box described in our dictionary.

If the thought experiment is reworded slightly to read '... whatever is inside the box don't exist?' (this may actually have been the meaning but I did not read it as such) then similarly, the 'whatever is inside of the box' does exist, because -
Whatever is inside the box has the potential to be observed.
Even though the experiment says that it cannot be observed, one can still imagine a scenario where it can be observed.
The experiment mentions nothing else special about this box, except that we cannot observe its interior, so (WRT its ability to have an interior and contain things) it is the same as the box described in our dictionary.
From experience and definition, all boxes have interiors and can contain things.

There is no reason or argument to propose that the contents of any box (including this particular one) does not exist.

(gee - i hope i was allowed to use the terms 'experience' and 'by definition' in this)

Thanks again for the excersise.
PS, I am in strong agreement with Melendwyr's statement.

There's no argument to say that the contents absolutely cannot exist, but no good argument to say that they do either. This is a theoretical box, so we might even allow it to contain a theoretical perfect vacuum and be truly empty. There is a good argument, which may be what Melendwyr was aiming at, to assert that if we have no conceivable, practical way to examine the contents, discussion of their properties is irrelevant, and meaningless in a scientific sense, especially because the assumption that the contents can not be identified in any way carries with it the assumption that they cannot interact with the world outside the box in any way (including, for example, weight, magnetic induction, examination by radiation, or any other way for the contents to exert a measurable influence through the walls of the box), otherwise that interaction could theoretically be measured. It is, therefore, reasonable to treat the contents as if they do not exist in the world, but Melendwy'rs implication that there is no meaningful way to say that the contents exist is, I think, mistaken if he extends it to thought and language (and faith) as well as to useful scientific inquiry. We can imagine a scenario, as you say, that changes the rules and allows us to see within the box. We can imagine a scenario in which it turns out that the contents of the box exert a heretofore unmeasureable, unmeasured force on the world, which will not be discovered until a million more years have passed. We can imagine a scenario in which diligent inquiry and logical toil lead us to conclusions about what the box is there for, who put it there, and thence to speculation on the intended contents. It is possible to speculate in various ways on the contents, and make groundless, untrue, unsound, foolish but meaningful statements about them.