http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/chron.htm
This timeline doesn't list US governmental involvement, but there are significant instances listed that would be worth looking into if you want to find out who was involved in what activities. Not anything definitive, but likely a decent start.
- 1980--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Reexport via Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge enrichment activities).
- 1981--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: New York, zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).
- 1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Texas, krytrons (nuclear weapon triggers).
- 1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: US cancelled license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.
- 1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Pennsylvania, maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture and bomb components).
- 1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: California, oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon R&D).
- 1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence service.
- 1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms control authority, claims US has turned a `blind eye' to proliferation developments Pakistan in and Israel.
- October 1990 -- President Bush announced that he could no longer provide Congress with Pressler Amendment certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon. Economic and military aid was duly terminated, though the Bush administration continued to permit a limited number of commercial military sales to Pakistan. Pakistan handled the cutoff with little public rancor and committed itself to freezing the nuclear program in an attempt to placate the United States.
- January 1996 -- The Brown amendment was signed into law to relieve some of the pressures created by the Pressler sanctions, which had crippled parts of the Pakistani military, particularly the Air Force. The Brown amendment allowed nearly $370 million of previously embargoed arms and spare parts to be delivered to Pakistan. It also permited limited military assistance for the purposes of counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, anti-narcotics efforts, and some military training.
None of that, as I said, is at all conclusive of any direct complicity on the part of the US government. It just provides dates to focus on as times when the US may have been aware and able to be aware of Pakistan's nuclear activity.
This link is an article that talks some about Levy's and Scott-Clark's book. A couple of examples:
In 1987 then-Rep. Stephen Solarz, D-N.Y., chairman of the House International Relations Committee, “went wild,” Barlow says, when he heard that officials were lying. But it never was explored in the open.
Barlow’s name was never mentioned, but Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., briefly summarized what happened after Barlow told Congress the truth and asked Wolfowitz if whistleblowers should be retaliated against if they provided Congress classified information.
“My answer is, absolutely not,” Wolfowitz said. He added that he was “aware of the issue” in the 1980s, and sought to distance himself from the decisions of Reagan and Bush administration officials not to tell Congress what was going on.
“I specifically sensed that people thought we could somehow construct a policy on a house of cards that Congress wouldn’t know what the Pakistanis were doing. I’ve always thought policies based on withholding information from Congress are going fail in the long run, and in that case there was a clear legal obligation to keep the Congress informed,” Wolfowitz told Levin in 2001.
The rest of the article has more detail (as well as a bit more hyperbole), but it seems to basically have a similar message as the NPR (Fresh Air) program.
Also, in
this Congressional record report, John Glenn, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, spoke out about a lot of objections of nuclear programs in South Asia, particularly Pakistan. Here is one of them:
Fourth, should we be concerned about a nuclear-armed but democratic Pakistan? While recent political developments in Pakistan are surely welcome, the restoration of democracy brings with it no guarantee of progress toward nuclear arms control or disarmament. In today's democratic Pakistan, let us not forget that the `voice of the people,' as reflected in the media and parliamentary debates, is calling for the bomb. Neither the flag of democracy nor the banner of the Afghan `freedom fighter' should be used as a cloak for proliferation. A wink today at Pakistan's Bomb could, in an instant, lead to a nightmare tomorrow. In response to those who argue that because we are on friendly terms with Pakistan we should forget about its bomb, I can only thank
God that no such reasoning had prevailed in shaping our relations with Iran a decade ago. How soon people forget.
And from
the following Congressional report, Pete Stark of the House of Reps. had the following to say regarding aid sent to Pakistan and Pakistan's nuclear program:
Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, Pakistan may not receive United States aid because of its nuclear weapons program. The purpose of the law was to punish countries pursuing these weapons of mass destruction. But for almost a decade, we have made excuse after excuse, passed waiver after waiver, and sent more than $5 billion to Islamabad. From the record our generosity does not appear to have slowed down the Pakistani nuclear weapons program one bit.
It is inconceivable to me that we could even consider giving Pakistan aid this year. How many solemn oaths, promises, and agreements do they have to break before we change our attitude? In the area of nuclear proliferation, Pakistan's word means nothing. They are the Joe Isuzu of bombmakers. Let's make the United States word mean a little more and keep our promise to cut off assistance.
Senator Larry Pressler gave the following testimony in
another Congressional record:
Yesterday's Foreign Relations Committee hearing explored the State Department's view that the Pressler amendment allows for the continued licensing of private sales of arms and technology to Pakistan notwithstanding what many consider very clear statutory language prohibiting such sales. To quote from the amendment, `no assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any other Act. * * *'
The language is quite clear. By licensing the export of arms and military technology to the government of Pakistan under the terms of the Arms Export Control Act, it seems to this Senator that the administration is in violation of both the letter and spirit of the Pressler amendment.
Mr. President, my concern is not just that the State Department is misinterpreting a statute passed by Congress. I am also very concerned that the purpose of the Pressler amendment--to stop nuclear weapons proliferation and ensure U.S. taxpayers are not asked to subsidize indirectly
the building of a nuclear weapons program in Pakistan--is not being achieved because while we have penalized Pakistan by cutting off most assistance to that country, arms continue to flow through the back door of private sales.
Later in that same report, John Glenn goes into more problems he has with US governmental aid and money going to Pakistan in spite of knowledge of a nuclear program:
The foreign secretary's statements raise some thorny problems for both the administration and the Pakistani government:
1. If Pakistan possessed these `elements' back in 1989, then how could the President have certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device? By the State Department's own interpretation of the Pressler amendment, if Pakistan possessed the bomb in pieces, it possessed the bomb.
2. If Pakistan did not possess these `elements' back in 1989, but acquired them after President Bush made his certification of nonpossession in October 1989, then the foreign secretary's statement that the program was `frozen' when his government came to power in November 1990 is hardly reassuring. The foreign secretary is saying that Pakistan has frozen its status as a de factor nuclear weapon state. He is also admitting that Pakistan has violated its solemn commitment to the United States in 1984 that it would not enrich uranium beyond the 5% level needed for civilian uses.
The foreign secretary's candid remarks about the existence of a nuclear capability in 1989--combined with his remarks about weapons `cores' that he claims were produced before his government came to power--raises the real possibility of a violation of the non-possession standard in that year or even earlier.
The second violation also occurred in 1989--actually it was just a repeat of 4 prior violations by President Reagan--when President Bush certified that the provision of new assistance would `reduce significantly' the risk that Pakistan would possess a nuclear explosive device. In contrast to voluminous evidence indicating that Pakistan's program to develop nuclear weapons was advancing throughout the late 1980's, there were just no credible grounds for concluding that the provision of new foreign aid was reducing the risk of Pakistan possessing the bomb.
Most damning, though, is when Senator Glenn continues:
In fact, I believe there is considerable evidence that America's aid and high technology undoubtedly contributed to Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities. The F-16 aircraft we provided along with the dual-use goods we transferred to nuclear and missile facilities in Pakistan provide sufficient grounds for this conclusion.
The third violation--and I do indeed call this a violation--occurred in 1992, when it was officially confirmed that the United States government was continuing to license arms sales to Pakistan despite the clear requirement of the Pressler amendment that `no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan' if it has not received the required Presidential certifications.
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Funny thing: I barely did any research on this. I simply followed the links in one of Arkan_Wolfshade's earlier posts and looked for relevant corresponding data. I did a search on the book name by the authors in the NPR show and found that article that also talks about the book. Yet, in just my little bit of searching, I was able to find public record statements of very credible members of Congress-- one of whom was actually the one to propose the legislation to refuse aid to Pakistan if they continued a nuclear program-- and one former US diplomat (and member of the arms control authority) stating quite clearly that the US government had been turning a blind eye to the Pakistani nuclear program
at the very least, and sending aid, money, and miltiary equipment
in violation of our own legislation prohibiting it.
I've only looked at a few documents. If you want to look for yourself at the Congressional records,
you can start here for some specific details, and I'm sure a little poking and boolean-searching can yeild more specific data.
The more I read, the less this looks like conspiracy theory material (though I'm sure there's loose conspirational connections, just not malicious) and the more it looks like typical two-faced political stupidity under the premise of national self-interest.
Which happens to be exactly what I said in the first place.