Normal Science is a Puzzle

[Araneus]

I checked out this book from the libraryabout 18 months ago and after reading it decided to buy the book. I seldom buy a book until I have first read it. Since then I have studied it from first to last page because it is a very important concept that I think everyone would find it useful for understanding reality. I highly recommend it.

Can you explain it in simple terms for the less intellectual amongst us?

Even "complex" ideas can usually be put in such a way that a non-genius can understand them, assuming of course that there is any genuine content to understand.

 

[Cuddles]

Can you explain it in simple terms for the less intellectual amongst us?

Even "complex" ideas can usually be put in such a way that a non-genius can understand them, assuming of course that there is any genuine content to understand.

Bolding mine. There's the problem.

 

[drkitten]

These Kuhn theories are either beyond my ability to comprehend, or just meaningless nonsense. I genuinely can't figure out what he is trying to say.

Or simply badly expressed. Given cobert's writing style, I vote for number three.

Kuhn is generally considered to be one of the most influential philosophers of science (one of the holy trinity of Popper, Quine, and Kuhn), but he's also the most often misinterpreted and most misunderstood. But to understand Kuhn, we need to step back to Popper.

(Sir Karl) Popper pointed out that you don't learn anything from an experiment that matches your prediction. For example, if my theory is that all swans are white, then it doesn't help me to look for more and more white swans. I need, instead, to look for black ones, and the more black swans I fail to find, the stronger my theory is. On the other hand, if I find a black swan, I need to revise or abandon my theory.

(Willard V. O.) Quine pointed out that, even if you find evidence against your theory, that doesn't mean that you will abandon it. Theories tend to come in mutually supportive clusters -- so, for example, if I find a black swan, I could decide that my theory that all swans are white is wrong. Alternatively, I could tweak the definition of "swan" because, after all black swans aren't "real" swans." More seriously, when everyone believed in the ether, no one really knew what its properties were, and it was possible to tweak the properties -- for example, what its "viscosity" or "temperature" was -- to make it fit almost any experimental result. The end result of this kind of tweaking is that we ended up with a set of "measured" properties that seemed counterintuitive -- it had very low viscosity but was almost infinitely stiff (very low compressibility), for example.

But if theories are this malleable, how is it possible for theories ever to be abandoned? In particular, how did we eventually decide that the ether didn't exist? This is where Kuhn steps in. Basically, he noted that scientists at a given time tend to work in what he called a "paradigm," a shared theoretical framework that everyone understands, and they work doing "normal science," filling in the current gaps in the theory but not seriously challenging it.

Over time, a number of problems with the current paradigm will accumulate. These problems -- he termed them "anomolies" are initially overlooked (we assume that we will eventually be able to figure them out) precisely because they don't fit into the current paradigm. And eventually either these anomalies will be explained, or someone else will come up with an entirely new theoretical framework -- a new, superceding paradigm -- that explains the anomalies and therefore replaces the old pradigm with the new one.

Einstein, for example, presented a new paradigm that explained the anomalies regarding the aether by redefining basic terms such as "space" and "time."

This is one of the keys to reading Kuhn. His central point -- which most people miss -- is not that science proceeds by fits and spurts. That's obvious. His central point is that these "fits and spurts" generally proceed via major redefinitions of concepts and terms, so that two different theories (from two different paradigms) are often incommeasurable. Basic concepts, such as length, no longer mean the same thing from paradigm to paradigm. In special relativity, I can no longer answer a question like "how long is a piece of string," because "length" doesn't really mean anything outside of a specific reference frame.

As to what this all has to do with coberst's theories of critical thinking? Not a hell of a lot. Kuhn lends himself well to citation-without-comprehension.

And this thread seems to be a very good example.

 

[hgc]

Thanks drkitten for the nice summary. I first read Structure of Scientific Revolutions 25 years ago, and found it very compelling, as such ideas were new to me. I've read it a few times since, and have always been amazed about the amount of misinformation and misunderstanding concerning him. I find his work to be non-controversial. His adoption by the pomos is as absurd as the adoption of Nietsche by the Nazis.

I also think that coberst did a fine job of describing Kuhn. Not quite sure why everyone jumped down his throat.

 

[drkitten]

I also think that coberst did a fine job of describing Kuhn. Not quite sure why everyone jumped down his throat.

Because coberst is making some of the same pomo-like mistakes in his interpretations.

Specifically, if you read this :

I think that we place “Science” on too high a pedestal and thereby distort our comprehension of political and social problems. We cannot solve social and political problems like we solve the questions formed by the normal sciences.

Do you think that the techniques of normal science are directly applicable for solving the problems of society?

... it's obvious that he doesn't understand the distinction that Kuhn draws between "normal science" and "science" in general, since he conflates the two. Second, he assumes without warrant that we actually have a paradigm for "solving social and political problems," despite the extensive definition of what a pre-paradigmatic science looks like. (And, funny, it looks an awful lot like the "science" of sociology and politics.)

Similarly, a little later, he writes:

Normal science is successful primarily because it is a domain of knowledge controlled by paradigms. The paradigm defines the standards, principles and methods of the discipline. It is not apparent to the laity but science moves forward in small incremental steps. Science seldom seeks and almost never produces major novelties.

Science solves puzzles.

Again, note the conflation of "science" with "normal science"; he explicitly rejects the idea that "science" might be done by paradigm-switching despite the fact that such is the major them of Structure.

Science uses instrumental rationality to solve puzzles. Instrumental rationality is a systematic process for reflecting upon the best action to take to reach an established end. The obvious question becomes ‘what mode of rationality is available for determining ends?’ Instrumental rationality appears to be of little use in determining such matters as “good” and “right”.

There is a striking difference between the logic of technical problems and that of dialectical problems.

Note, again, the assumption that "science" == "normal science" combined with the "argument from personal incredulity" : "appears to be of little use," despite the well-known results from game theory and genetics about altruism as a winning strategy.

 

[hgc]

Because coberst is making some of the same pomo-like mistakes in his interpretations.

Specifically, if you read this :



... it's obvious that he doesn't understand the distinction that Kuhn draws between "normal science" and "science" in general, since he conflates the two. Second, he assumes without warrant that we actually have a paradigm for "solving social and political problems," despite the extensive definition of what a pre-paradigmatic science looks like. (And, funny, it looks an awful lot like the "science" of sociology and politics.)

Similarly, a little later, he writes:

Again, note the conflation of "science" with "normal science"; he explicitly rejects the idea that "science" might be done by paradigm-switching despite the fact that such is the major them of Structure.

Note, again, the assumption that "science" == "normal science" combined with the "argument from personal incredulity" : "appears to be of little use," despite the well-known results from game theory and genetics about altruism as a winning strategy.

Yeah, I see. I guess I skimmed over the BS a little too lightly.

For the record: the same scientific method applies in doing Kuhn's "normal" science and "revolutionary" science.

 

[phildonnia]

Real life problems cannot be solved using deductive and inductive reasoning.

Here's where I would disagree. "Real life", as you call it, is mostly beyond our present analytical ability, but the paradigms of economics are already in place and widely accepted as applicable. The question (as in your example) of whether to use an atomic bomb, is, in theory, a matter of the value of lives, and the value of military objectives. These values are supposed to be objective and quantifiable, even if we yet lack the tools to measure them reliably.

 

[fuelair]

The OP focuses on 'normal science' as defined by Kuhn.

That doesn't make the definition correct - and I hope you don't expect people in the sciences to accept his definition over the perfectly workable one(s) used by real scientists. Defining terms so they support an argument is a lifegrazer (and others who shall here go nameless) kind of game.