gumboot
lorcutus.tolere
- Joined
- Jun 18, 2006
- Messages
- 25,327
For anyone that is interested, I think I also cracked the mystery of the Langley fighters being sent east instead of north as well.
Firstly, when Langley were put on Battle Stations, they were calling into NEADS to ask for the specific wording of why they were putting on Battle Stations. Major Nasypany's response was "Are you watching the TV? That's why."
When the Langley Sergeant pushed with it, they said "National Defense". This is the first step in the wayward fighters. They didn't know they were being scrambled for an airliner escort - and indeed they weren't. It was an Active Air Defense Mission for National Security. Now in any other case, a scramble for that is East. So Langley weren't sure where they were going.
But here's where the SNAFU occurs.
The focus for NEADS between 0900 and 0930 was very much getting tanker aircraft into position to support fighters. There were at least four tankers involved by the time Langley was scrambled - TEAM 2-2 and TEAM 2-3 launched from McGwyer AFB put into W-107 to support Langley, TEAM 2-1 already airborne, also sent to W-107 to support Langley, and MAYDAY 5, also already airborne, sent to W-105 to support Otis.
Now, with three tankers converging on W-105, NEADS decided to send one of them to W-386 instead. They chose TEAM 2-2.
The training areas are controlled by a Navy facility called Fleet Air Control And Surveillance Facility Virginia Capes (FACSFAC VACAPES) call sign "Giant Killer".
But you also had the fighters coming out of Langley with call signs QUIT 2-5 and QUIT 2-6. At the exact time that Langley were taking off, Giant Killer was being told to take TEAM 2-2 down to W-386. Then abruptly at 0932 NEADS notice that QUIT 2-5 are being handed off from Washington Center to Giant Killer, and are being directed to W-386.
Now let's bear in mind, by this stage several ATC sectors are declaring ATC Zero. Already the Otis fighters have been refused entry by New York ARTCC. I'm guessing hand off from Langley's TRACON to Washington ARTCC went wrong, QUIT 2-5 got handed to Giant Killer instead, and Giant Killer mixed the call signs up, sending QUIT 2-5 to W-386. Hearing that NEADS had ordered Giant Killer to take them to W-386, QUIT 2-5 would have immediately reverted to their 60-90 default departure, and because they weren't sure where or why they were being scrambled, they would have gone with Giant Killer's direction.
This explains the total confusion in the Giant Killer ATC's voice when he said "you now want them to go to Baltimore?" Because as far as he's aware he was told by the same person - literally 2 minutes earlier - take them to W-386. Of course he wasn't, he was told to move TEAM 2-2 there, not QUIT 2-5.
One last thing to add, is the key function of delay. What I'm finding repeatedly is that NEADS are actually receiving and deciding stuff much faster than any timelines indicated. But that's because it takes time for things to happen. For example, Nasypany ordered Langley scrambled at 0921, pretty much as soon as word of AA11 still airborne was received. But just giving the orders for each pair of fighters takes a minute. Then Weapons have to issue the Scramble Order with call signs and authentication. That's another minute or two. Then Langley want to confirm scramble destination. That's another 2 minutes. Next thing you know Langley aren't being scrambled until 0924.
What strikes me is the speed with which NEADS moves. Scrambling a fighter, or moving a tanker into position, is not a simple case of saying "you go there". The technical aspects, just from listening to the tapes, are multitude. Call signs need to be confirmed. Beacon codes have to be confirmed. Radio frequencies have to be confirmed. Radios crackle and people are asked to repeat themselves. People request clarification. If you tell person X to do something, you then have to let people A, B and C know that X is doing that.
And so on. It all adds up.
Essentially, hearing what is actually involved in scrambling fighters and intercepting an airliner, I feel sorry for the people in NEADS. They just didn't have a chance.
Firstly, when Langley were put on Battle Stations, they were calling into NEADS to ask for the specific wording of why they were putting on Battle Stations. Major Nasypany's response was "Are you watching the TV? That's why."
When the Langley Sergeant pushed with it, they said "National Defense". This is the first step in the wayward fighters. They didn't know they were being scrambled for an airliner escort - and indeed they weren't. It was an Active Air Defense Mission for National Security. Now in any other case, a scramble for that is East. So Langley weren't sure where they were going.
But here's where the SNAFU occurs.
The focus for NEADS between 0900 and 0930 was very much getting tanker aircraft into position to support fighters. There were at least four tankers involved by the time Langley was scrambled - TEAM 2-2 and TEAM 2-3 launched from McGwyer AFB put into W-107 to support Langley, TEAM 2-1 already airborne, also sent to W-107 to support Langley, and MAYDAY 5, also already airborne, sent to W-105 to support Otis.
Now, with three tankers converging on W-105, NEADS decided to send one of them to W-386 instead. They chose TEAM 2-2.
The training areas are controlled by a Navy facility called Fleet Air Control And Surveillance Facility Virginia Capes (FACSFAC VACAPES) call sign "Giant Killer".
But you also had the fighters coming out of Langley with call signs QUIT 2-5 and QUIT 2-6. At the exact time that Langley were taking off, Giant Killer was being told to take TEAM 2-2 down to W-386. Then abruptly at 0932 NEADS notice that QUIT 2-5 are being handed off from Washington Center to Giant Killer, and are being directed to W-386.
Now let's bear in mind, by this stage several ATC sectors are declaring ATC Zero. Already the Otis fighters have been refused entry by New York ARTCC. I'm guessing hand off from Langley's TRACON to Washington ARTCC went wrong, QUIT 2-5 got handed to Giant Killer instead, and Giant Killer mixed the call signs up, sending QUIT 2-5 to W-386. Hearing that NEADS had ordered Giant Killer to take them to W-386, QUIT 2-5 would have immediately reverted to their 60-90 default departure, and because they weren't sure where or why they were being scrambled, they would have gone with Giant Killer's direction.
This explains the total confusion in the Giant Killer ATC's voice when he said "you now want them to go to Baltimore?" Because as far as he's aware he was told by the same person - literally 2 minutes earlier - take them to W-386. Of course he wasn't, he was told to move TEAM 2-2 there, not QUIT 2-5.
One last thing to add, is the key function of delay. What I'm finding repeatedly is that NEADS are actually receiving and deciding stuff much faster than any timelines indicated. But that's because it takes time for things to happen. For example, Nasypany ordered Langley scrambled at 0921, pretty much as soon as word of AA11 still airborne was received. But just giving the orders for each pair of fighters takes a minute. Then Weapons have to issue the Scramble Order with call signs and authentication. That's another minute or two. Then Langley want to confirm scramble destination. That's another 2 minutes. Next thing you know Langley aren't being scrambled until 0924.
What strikes me is the speed with which NEADS moves. Scrambling a fighter, or moving a tanker into position, is not a simple case of saying "you go there". The technical aspects, just from listening to the tapes, are multitude. Call signs need to be confirmed. Beacon codes have to be confirmed. Radio frequencies have to be confirmed. Radios crackle and people are asked to repeat themselves. People request clarification. If you tell person X to do something, you then have to let people A, B and C know that X is doing that.
And so on. It all adds up.
Essentially, hearing what is actually involved in scrambling fighters and intercepting an airliner, I feel sorry for the people in NEADS. They just didn't have a chance.
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