Lotta people can't spell as well as you.
Feel free to post a few examples of his egregious spelling errors (not that it has anything to do with his arguments).
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New Article on Custer's Last Stand
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Lotta people can't spell as well as you.
Feel free to post a few examples of his egregious spelling errors (not that it has anything to do with his arguments).
Decision #5: Custer's turn downstream
We're on the brink of battle now and things start getting more complicated. There doesn't seem to be much interest here in getting into details, so I'm going to condense things a lot so I can get through Custer's decisions.
After Decision #4, we're left with this situation:
• Reno crossed the river and was preparing to charge down the valley to attack the south end of the village
• Custer remained on the flats a mile from the river, advancing slowly and pausing to water the horses.
• Benteen was lagging more than 3 miles (over an hour) behind Custer.
• The pack train was a mile behind Benteen.
At this point, Custer received word from Reno's column that the Indians were strong in front and were not running away. Custer then decided to make a 90 degree turn to the right and move down the river along and behind the bluffs.
Custer evidently intended to carry out a flank attack on the east side of the village, perhaps hoping to take advantage of the Indians leaving the village to attack Reno (by the way, the Indians did not come out to attack Reno).
I don't have a problem with this decision in principle. The terrain would make its proper execution difficult but not impossible.
My first criticism of Custer is that he failed to notify Reno of his intentions. Reno was concerned about advancing by himself and was expecting Custer to cross the river after him and support him from the rear or flank. He had no idea Custer intended to attack the village from the east.
My second, more important, criticism of Custer is that he failed to support Reno's attack. Reno was being asked to attack a village of 1,000+ warriors with a column of 140 men. To make that work, he needed to have some kind of support in a reasonable amount of time. That didn't happen, and for that I lay the blame on Custer.
The issue of why that didn't happen will be covered in the next decision point.
We're on the brink of battle now and things start getting more complicated. There doesn't seem to be much interest here in getting into details, so I'm going to condense things a lot so I can get through Custer's decisions.
After Decision #4, we're left with this situation:
• Reno crossed the river and was preparing to charge down the valley to attack the south end of the village
• Custer remained on the flats a mile from the river, advancing slowly and pausing to water the horses.
• Benteen was lagging more than 3 miles (over an hour) behind Custer.
• The pack train was a mile behind Benteen.
At this point, Custer received word from Reno's column that the Indians were strong in front and were not running away. Custer then decided to make a 90 degree turn to the right and move down the river along and behind the bluffs.
Custer evidently intended to carry out a flank attack on the east side of the village, perhaps hoping to take advantage of the Indians leaving the village to attack Reno (by the way, the Indians did not come out to attack Reno).
I don't have a problem with this decision in principle. The terrain would make its proper execution difficult but not impossible.
My first criticism of Custer is that he failed to notify Reno of his intentions. Reno was concerned about advancing by himself and was expecting Custer to cross the river after him and support him from the rear or flank. He had no idea Custer intended to attack the village from the east.
My second, more important, criticism of Custer is that he failed to support Reno's attack. Reno was being asked to attack a village of 1,000+ warriors with a column of 140 men. To make that work, he needed to have some kind of support in a reasonable amount of time. That didn't happen, and for that I lay the blame on Custer.
The issue of why that didn't happen will be covered in the next decision point.
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dropzone
Master Poster
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Correction: Lotsa, as in lots of. Or you could do as I did, prefacing lotta with the article, a.
As is stated in the Great Grammarian Copout, only those who know the rules may break them, and then only ironically. 
From your post, quoting Neumann:
He means led. Pronounced that way, lead is a metal.
From his abstract:
All caps his, bolding mine. As near as I can determine, both Acion and Troday only exist in English as proper names, and are not military acronyms. Either way, "courses of action" and "today's doctrinal process" make a lot more sense in context. In that sentence, Doctrinal should not be capitalized.
More from his abstract:
Basic misspellings the lousy Firefox spell checker caught.
These are five spelling errors in the single paragraph of the abstract. If Neumann is so careless as to allow those simple mistakes I shudder to think how careless he is in his research and findings.
I just have the book and had not seen the abstract. All the mistakes you cited got corrected in the book except using "lead" for "led". I don't know what the deal was with the abstract but that was pretty bad.
I think I've gotten inured to typo's as they seem to be common in books these days.
I think I've gotten inured to typo's as they seem to be common in books these days.
dropzone
Master Poster
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It is as if all the publishers fired all of their editors at once. 
I'm not saying I won't read it, but my current obsession is if Libby Custer schtupped Wild Bill Hickok. Got a gravesite 35 feet from him, but I'm afraid my corpse might catch something.
I'm not saying I won't read it, but my current obsession is if Libby Custer schtupped Wild Bill Hickok. Got a gravesite 35 feet from him, but I'm afraid my corpse might catch something.
anglolawyer
Banned
Don't construe the lack of response as a lack of interest. I am following these posts.
If Custer had ridden to support Reno, wouldn't that have had the added advantage of blocking the Indians southern escape route and driving them North into the planned entrapment?
Yes, if Custer had crossed the river with Reno it would have better sealed off any escape to the south. It also would have had a number of other advantages.
It would have been a safer attack because it would have kept the two battalions in supporting distance of each other and allowed them to better defend themselves if the battle turned against them. It would have avoided the high risk associated with splitting their attack against a superior enemy.
It may also have increased their chances of victory. The soldiers best scenario was to catch the village by surprise and strike with maximum force when the braves were unprepared, the women and children were in the village, and the pony herd was grazing at a distance. Taken by surprise, even the most disciplined fighters will often break and run.
Against all expectations, they did take the village by surprise but Reno's battalion was too weak to deliver the blow needed. With Custer taking part in the charge, I don't think Reno would have stopped short of the village. Instead of 140 men stopping and firing at a distance, they could have had more than 350 charging into the village itself.
After that, things get increasingly speculative. In the short run, I think the soldiers could have occupied at least part of the village. Maybe that would have been enough to cause the Indians to withdraw from the fight, but I doubt it. Likely, they would have rallied and made it difficult for Custer's men to hold their gains.
But even if the soldiers were forced on the defensive, I believe they were far better off fighting on the flat land by the river instead of the bluffs on the east side, where Custer ended up. The open space would have allowed them to take advantage of their more powerful rifles. If necessary, they could have retreated to the cover of the trees along the river, where they would have had a strong defensive position, and where Benteen could have joined them later, along with the pack train. Maybe most importantly, they would have had access to water if they did end up besieged.
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anglolawyer
Banned
Thanks for the response. Do you think Custer was distracted by a pursuit of personal glory?
I'm not sure how to answer that. As I've said, I'm more interested in the historical mysteries of the battle, particularly what happened to Custer's command after it separated from Reno. I don't have much stake in the Custer-was-the-greatest vs Custer-was-an-idiot fight.
Custer liked fame. He certainly wasn't unusual in that. He was an aggressive commander who believed that bold action would win the day. Sometimes it does and sometimes it leads to disaster. I don't think anything he did that day was out of character except maybe, I would argue, his final important decision, which is coming up next.
anglolawyer
Banned
It is kind of relevant, isn't it? If his plan worked he would have been able to claim sole credit for the destruction of these renegade bands, whereas he was supposed to be a subordinate part of a larger operation. You say boldness, some might say hubris.
Axxman300
Philosopher
No.
If you look at Custer's combat history you'd see this was how he rolled. They used to call it "Custer's Luck" because so often his audacity, which is a good thing for a combat leader, often won the day against unfavorable odds.
Custer was looking to redeem himself in the eyes of the Army leadership, having been kicked out not long before, only to be reinstated at Sheridan's personal request. He'd been given a job to do by an old friend, and didn't want to let him down.
It's hard to say what would have become of Custer had he won. Few people outside of western history buffs know who Gen. George Crook was, or know about his exploits as an Indian fighter even though at the time his name was in the headlines a lot.
Reno's Fight
Before moving on to Custer's next decision, let me briefly describe Reno's fight. After crossing the river, Reno took some time to form up his three companies, then began his charge down the valley.
It took about 15 minutes to cover the two miles at a gallop. Contrary to his expectations, no Indians came out to oppose him. He advanced to within a few hundred yards of Sitting Bull's Hunkpapa encampment, the southernmost of the camp circles.
There Reno halted his charge and dismounted his men, forming them into a single skirmish line. The right flank was anchored on the timber of an old dry loop of the river. The left flank was "in the air" with nothing to keep the Indians from passing that side and getting in his rear. While the soldiers deployed, the 40+ Arikara scouts rushed ahead and managed to cut out part of the Sioux pony herd and start driving it upstream.
To allow effective fighting from foot, every 4th soldier gathered four horses and took them into the woods for protection. This necessary action reduced the strength of the firing line by 25%, down to about 100 men.
Initial Indian resistance was relatively light as the alarm of the soldier attack was slow to spread. Many warriors were resting in their tepee's, lounging about near campfires, or swimming in the river. Riders did sound the alarm, but only just barely ahead of Reno himself. The first warriors to respond were those near the south end of camp. These warriors quickly grabbed weapons and rushed forward on foot to protect the village. Other warriors ran to the pony herd west of camp. The women grabbed the children and fled down the valley and to the west hills.
The soldiers remained in the skirmish line for 15 minutes, firing steadily at the Indians ahead. Reno repeatedly looked to the rear for the promised support from Custer but saw nothing. The Indians in his front rapidly increased. He was now facing probably 600-900 warriors, and some of these were beginning to pass his open flank.
With this threat to his flank, Reno ordered a withdrawal into the timber. There he found the perimeter too long to be effectively covered by the men available. Ammunition began to run low, then came word that the Indians were infiltrating the woods from the east and threatening the led horses.
After 20 minutes in the timber, Reno abruptly gave the order to retreat. His men hurriedly mounted their horses and burst out of the timber, riding back upstream at a dead run. The Indians first retreated in response to this startling move but when they saw the soldiers were running away, they followed and began shooting them at close range.
Reno's men crossed the river well downstream of the original crossing point and began climbing the bluffs on the east side. Fortunately for them, most of the Indians did not follow them across the river because they saw new soldiers on the bluffs upstream. Benteen's column had finally arrived, just in time to prevent the destruction of Reno's command.
This retreat (Reno insisted on calling it "a charge to the bluffs") was done without any organization or covering force. In his valley fight, Reno had lost 35 men killed, 11 wounded, and another 13 left behind in the timber. His three companies had suffered devastating casualties and were in no condition to continue fighting.
No one knew what had happened to Custer but immediately after Benteen joined Reno, the Indians in the valley suddenly turned and began riding downstream. After that came the sound of heavy firing beyond the bluffs to the north.
Before moving on to Custer's next decision, let me briefly describe Reno's fight. After crossing the river, Reno took some time to form up his three companies, then began his charge down the valley.
It took about 15 minutes to cover the two miles at a gallop. Contrary to his expectations, no Indians came out to oppose him. He advanced to within a few hundred yards of Sitting Bull's Hunkpapa encampment, the southernmost of the camp circles.
There Reno halted his charge and dismounted his men, forming them into a single skirmish line. The right flank was anchored on the timber of an old dry loop of the river. The left flank was "in the air" with nothing to keep the Indians from passing that side and getting in his rear. While the soldiers deployed, the 40+ Arikara scouts rushed ahead and managed to cut out part of the Sioux pony herd and start driving it upstream.
To allow effective fighting from foot, every 4th soldier gathered four horses and took them into the woods for protection. This necessary action reduced the strength of the firing line by 25%, down to about 100 men.
Initial Indian resistance was relatively light as the alarm of the soldier attack was slow to spread. Many warriors were resting in their tepee's, lounging about near campfires, or swimming in the river. Riders did sound the alarm, but only just barely ahead of Reno himself. The first warriors to respond were those near the south end of camp. These warriors quickly grabbed weapons and rushed forward on foot to protect the village. Other warriors ran to the pony herd west of camp. The women grabbed the children and fled down the valley and to the west hills.
The soldiers remained in the skirmish line for 15 minutes, firing steadily at the Indians ahead. Reno repeatedly looked to the rear for the promised support from Custer but saw nothing. The Indians in his front rapidly increased. He was now facing probably 600-900 warriors, and some of these were beginning to pass his open flank.
With this threat to his flank, Reno ordered a withdrawal into the timber. There he found the perimeter too long to be effectively covered by the men available. Ammunition began to run low, then came word that the Indians were infiltrating the woods from the east and threatening the led horses.
After 20 minutes in the timber, Reno abruptly gave the order to retreat. His men hurriedly mounted their horses and burst out of the timber, riding back upstream at a dead run. The Indians first retreated in response to this startling move but when they saw the soldiers were running away, they followed and began shooting them at close range.
Reno's men crossed the river well downstream of the original crossing point and began climbing the bluffs on the east side. Fortunately for them, most of the Indians did not follow them across the river because they saw new soldiers on the bluffs upstream. Benteen's column had finally arrived, just in time to prevent the destruction of Reno's command.
This retreat (Reno insisted on calling it "a charge to the bluffs") was done without any organization or covering force. In his valley fight, Reno had lost 35 men killed, 11 wounded, and another 13 left behind in the timber. His three companies had suffered devastating casualties and were in no condition to continue fighting.
No one knew what had happened to Custer but immediately after Benteen joined Reno, the Indians in the valley suddenly turned and began riding downstream. After that came the sound of heavy firing beyond the bluffs to the north.
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anglolawyer
Banned
Thanks
BazBear
Possible Suspect
I had never thought of that way before. His death in a battle with Native Americans is what created the myth that perpetuated and elevated his legend. It's certainly possible ACW buffs would be the only people familiar with the man today, had he won at Little Big Horn.
Decision #6: Custer delays his attack.
Having committed Reno's 140 men to attacking a far superior enemy, it was imperative that Custer support that attack by striking the village himself, the sooner the better. This second attack had to be done quickly because:
1) Reno could not reasonably be expected to hold his position for an extended period of time.
2) Custer's best chance of victory was to attack the Indians in flank and rear while they were engaged with Reno.
The longer Custer delayed his attack, the more time the Indians would have to rout Reno, knock him out of the fight, then turn all their forces on Custer. This is exactly what happened.
Custer had the opportunity to make the attack needed, but didn't:
1) There were no significant Indian forces between Custer and the village. Nearly all the warriors had gone to the Reno fight. There was no secret ambush force waiting in the village. This is clearly indicated by the individual Indian accounts themselves and is strongly supported by the logic of the situation. The village was under immediate threat by Reno. Naturally, the Indians hurried to meet this threat. Once this threat was disposed of and word was received that there was another threat (Custer), they then turned downstream and hurried to meet that threat.
2) Custer had time to make the attack before Reno retreated. As Reno deployed his skirmish line, Custer was on the bluffs across the river, and about 2 1/2 miles from the village based on the route he took. He could have reached the Medicine Tail Coulee ford in 30 minutes, assuming a standard cavalry trot of 6 mph. He thus could have joined the fight in the village before Reno withdrew from the valley.
When Custer crossed the ford, he would have been striking the north end of the village only a mile from Reno's position. The Indians fighting Reno would have been forced to wheel north to meet this new threat. This would have lessened the pressure on Reno, and possibly allowed him to move out of the timber and join the attack with Custer.
This would have given the soldiers a chance at victory against tall odds. Given the circumstances and Custer's personality, I don't know why he didn't seize the opportunity.
Having committed Reno's 140 men to attacking a far superior enemy, it was imperative that Custer support that attack by striking the village himself, the sooner the better. This second attack had to be done quickly because:
1) Reno could not reasonably be expected to hold his position for an extended period of time.
2) Custer's best chance of victory was to attack the Indians in flank and rear while they were engaged with Reno.
The longer Custer delayed his attack, the more time the Indians would have to rout Reno, knock him out of the fight, then turn all their forces on Custer. This is exactly what happened.
Custer had the opportunity to make the attack needed, but didn't:
1) There were no significant Indian forces between Custer and the village. Nearly all the warriors had gone to the Reno fight. There was no secret ambush force waiting in the village. This is clearly indicated by the individual Indian accounts themselves and is strongly supported by the logic of the situation. The village was under immediate threat by Reno. Naturally, the Indians hurried to meet this threat. Once this threat was disposed of and word was received that there was another threat (Custer), they then turned downstream and hurried to meet that threat.
2) Custer had time to make the attack before Reno retreated. As Reno deployed his skirmish line, Custer was on the bluffs across the river, and about 2 1/2 miles from the village based on the route he took. He could have reached the Medicine Tail Coulee ford in 30 minutes, assuming a standard cavalry trot of 6 mph. He thus could have joined the fight in the village before Reno withdrew from the valley.
When Custer crossed the ford, he would have been striking the north end of the village only a mile from Reno's position. The Indians fighting Reno would have been forced to wheel north to meet this new threat. This would have lessened the pressure on Reno, and possibly allowed him to move out of the timber and join the attack with Custer.
This would have given the soldiers a chance at victory against tall odds. Given the circumstances and Custer's personality, I don't know why he didn't seize the opportunity.
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dropzone
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I long ago realized that our forefathers drank heavily, especially before combat, and that many bad decisions could be laid at the feet of John Barleycorn. I was surprised at how little liquor they had at the battle. There goes that theory!
Rincewind
Philosopher
I have a question - could Custer have heard Reno's engagement, or would the terrain have masked the sound?
[Sorry if this has been dealt with before]
Custer's movements after descending into Medicine Tail Coulee is one of the central mysteries of the battle. One of the things known with certainty, though, is that at least part of his command ascended the heights between the two forks of Medicine Tail Coulee. This is evidenced by the clear trail of cartridges fired by his men on Nye-Cartwright Ridge, leading to Battle Ridge.
On these heights, his men would have been 2.5 miles from Reno. Since Custer's own fight was clearly heard later by Reno and Benteen's men 3.5 to 4.5 miles away, it seems likely that Reno's gunfire would have been heard by Custer. The one caveat is that his own men were firing here so this may have masked the sound. I believe he also could have seen the fight, or at least the dust being stirred up, and possibly could have seen evidence of Reno's retreat to the bluffs.
Part of Custer's command may have been split off and left on this ridge to guide in Benteen. Custer had sent a message to Benteen: "Come on. Big Village. Bring Packs. PS Bring Pacs [sic]". They likely could have seen the dust of Benteen's column as it went to Reno and stopped rather than coming downstream to Custer.
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There wasn't a lot of liquor there but some of the officers had flasks, I believe. Some Indians claimed the soldiers fought like they were drunk. This is generally seen as an attempt to shift blame and avoid retribution. Even 50 years after the battle Indian veterans feared they might yet be hanged for killing Custer.
Rincewind
Philosopher
Thanks for the clarification!
I assume that Reno would have been approximately where Custer expected him to be.
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