New Article on Custer's Last Stand

[WayneK]

In that case I feel you should clarify what you want to talk about.

1. Did Custer do anything wrong? I think most here say yes. Hard to argue different, if the result was annihilation of Custer's unit.
2. Did Custer make the right decisions, based on the information available to him at the time? That one touches on point 1, but is different enough to get it's own number.
3. Were Custers actions/decisions inevitable based on the socio/political and doctrinal circumstances in the army at that time? It seems to me, you're arguing a bit for this one, based on the fact that it was apparently expected to attack immediately.
4. something else?

1) Yes, I think Custer did some things wrong, or at least did some things I don't understand. What I'm arguing is that it's not fair to start with the end result (disaster) and use hindsight to conclude he must have been incompetent and have made horrible decisions. The decisions should be evaluated based on what he knew at the time and other factors, like the standard cavalry operating procedures in the Indian Wars.

2) see above

3) I'm arguing that they were contributing factors along with others. I'm arguing that this was a complicated battle with difficult decisions. I'm arguing with the "Little Big Man" movie portrayal of Custer as a bumbling fool.

My suggestion was that we start at the divide and work our way forwards discussing each of the major decision points. The idea was to look at what Custer knew at the time, talk about what why he made the decision he made, and express our opinions on whether the decision was justified based on what he knew.

I said before that I'm most interested in figuring out what happened and why, not in laying blame, though that can be interesting, too.

I started with the first decision, which I thought was uncontroversial: that Custer was forced to make a rapid advance on the village after his presence had been discovered by the enemy. Others have disagreed with that and expressed their arguments. I'm not convinced but I'm going to keep an open mind on it and think about it some more.

I think we've covered the "recon" issue pretty well so if there's interest in continuing, I'll go ahead with the second major decision point.

 

[WayneK]

I probably should have used "Concealment and Surprise " rather then "Concealment and Ambush".

I'm sorry to disagree but I don't think there were any surprises either.

1) When Reno attacked the upper end of the village, he stopped because of the Indians he saw gathering in his front. He fought in skirmish line, withdrew into the timber, and ultimately made a panicked retreat to the bluffs. There were no Indian surprises in this action.

2) When Custer moved downstream, he met only light resistance in the early phase of the fight for the simple reason that nearly all the warriors had grabbed their weapons and gone to the Reno fight. This is evident from the many battle descriptions by individual Indians and is also logical given the situation. The soldiers had made a direct attack on the camp, which contained women and children. The first actions of the warriors would naturally have been to meet this threat.

3) The only Indians faced by Custer when he first moved downstream was a small group of Cheyennes under Wolf Tooth who happened to be east of the river. I've speculated that there were probably also some older men and young boys who fled across the river along with women and children when Reno charged the village. These men could have joined Wolf Tooth's men in opening fire on Custer's men in the Medicine Tail Coulee area.

4) Custer faced no serious opposition until after Reno retreated. Then the mass of Indians facing Reno turned and went downstream after receiving word that there were more soldiers in that direction. This movement would have been easily visible by Custer and there would have been no surprise involved. When these Indians arrived, the heavy firing began, as heard by Reno and Benteen's men just about the time that Benteen joined Reno on the bluffs.

5) All this is confirmed, in my mind, by reading the Indian accounts describing their actions against Custer. There are virtually no descriptions of any kind of subterfuge or surprise. They swarmed around Custer on all sides and opened fire using the ridge lines for cover.

The only references to an ambush that I can think of offhand are a few sensational and unreliable newspaper reports made soon after the battle that claimed Custer walked into an ambush. The Indian accounts themselves are very clear about this: it never happened.

 

[WayneK]

f. He did know that the estimated overall strength of the FN was 800-1000 fighters (which as we know now was incorrect, as it only took into account the warriors available on one of the reservations, not on the combined forces. However, Custer could not have known prior to contact with the village at the Little Big Horn that his intel was grossly inaccurate);

.

Thanks for the detailed response. You have some good arguments and I'm going to think about them and see if I need to change my view of things. I agree that a recon would have been useful, I'm just doubtful that it was possible under the circumstances. There are people who are well-versed on 19th cavalry tactics. It'd be nice to have input from one of them on this topic. Maybe I'm off base.

I think you're too high on the Indian numbers. John Gray's analysis reached a conclusion of about 1,200 warriors (Centennial Campaign, p 356). The early estimates of 3,000-4,000 are easy to explain. People tend to overestimate the size of any crowd, plus they had obvious personal bias to maximize the number to mitigate the defeat. The encampment was struck on June 25th and set up again adjacent to the original, so when the camp circles were viewed after the battle, the village appeared twice as big as it actually was.

Custer was expecting maybe 800 warriors with the possibility of up to 500 more. These were not numbers that would have scared any cavalry officer. As it turned out, the Indians fought very well that day and Custer failed to coordinate his attack for a variety of reasons.

 

[WayneK]

Decision #2: battalion assignments

After assembling his companies on the divide, Custer divided his 12 companies into three battalions plus the pack train. I'm going to use John Gray's numbers for convenience. It's possible these numbers have been corrected somewhat since his book was published but they're close enough.

Custer's battalion = 5 companies, 213 soldiers, 8 others (scouts and civilians)
Reno's battalion = 3 companies, 140 soldiers, 35 others
Benteen's battalion = 3 companies, 115 soldiers
Pack train = 1 company, 129 soldiers, 7 others

I don't think there's anything controversial about splitting the regiment into battalions for operational flexibility. The mere existence of battalions doesn't mean they have to fight separately.

I'll just point out what I touched on earlier. Once Custer decided he had to make a rapid advance, he had to take steps to protect the pack train, which would be unable to keep up with the other three battalions. The packs contained all the spare food and ammunition. It would have been a disaster to let it fall into the enemy's hands.

Accordingly, he assigned one full company plus approx. 6 men from each of the other 11 companies. The pack train actually had more men than Benteen's battalion, and was, in effect, a 4th battalion. This significantly reduced the combat power available to Custer by tying it up in a slow-moving column that would be unable to participate in the early stages of the fight. It also created a liability that was a constant worry to Custer and which ended up having a direct effect on later decision-making.

 

[WayneK]

Decision #3: Benteen's scout

I have no issue with decisions #1 and #2. Here's where things start getting difficult. After making the battalion assignments, Custer decided to advance west along Reno Creek, taking with him his own battalion and Reno's. This was the most direct route to the Little Big horn, and would place them in the valley about two miles above the village. The pack train train would follow the same path, lagging behind.

Benteen was given a different assignment. He was to ride southwest, at a 45 degree angle to the others, and look for Indians in that direction. He was to report any sign of Indians and to attack any Indians he came across.

Custer told no one what he was thinking with this. The generally accepted explanation is that he was concerned about Indians escaping to the south, up the Little Big Horn valley. General Terry had warned him to not let the Indians slip past him to the south, but to push them north towards Terry's column which would be coming up the Little Big Horn river (they would reach the battlefield two days after the fight).

He may also have been concerned about unseen satellite villages located in that direction. Benteen received two additional orders from Custer by messenger. These told him to continue his scout on to the next line of bluffs, and the next. At each ridge Benteen looked for Indians but saw nothing.

Seeing nothing and receiving no further orders to continue his scout, Benteen turned north and rejoined Custer's trail on Reno Creek. He had gone only a mile or so out of the way but the delay was worse because he had to go up and down the ridges. When he rejoined Custer's trail he was just ahead of the pack train, and about 30 minutes behind Custer and Reno, who themselves were still several miles from the Little Big Horn.

The result, of course is that Benteen's battalion was not available for the opening phase of the attack, which was another contributing factor to the defeat. Of course, if Custer had been able to scout the village location, he perhaps could have kept Benteen with him and Reno, and had more men available at the start of the fight. I'll save further comments on this for tomorrow.

 

[anglolawyer]

WayneK

Given that Custer's job was to prevent any escape to the South and drive the Indians North towards another column, why didn't his main force take the route Benteen's battalion took rather than head directly to where he thought the enemy camp was?

 

[Border Reiver]

Decision #2: battalion assignments

After assembling his companies on the divide, Custer divided his 12 companies into three battalions plus the pack train. I'm going to use John Gray's numbers for convenience. It's possible these numbers have been corrected somewhat since his book was published but they're close enough.

Custer's battalion = 5 companies, 213 soldiers, 8 others (scouts and civilians)
Reno's battalion = 3 companies, 140 soldiers, 35 others
Benteen's battalion = 3 companies, 115 soldiers
Pack train = 1 company, 129 soldiers, 7 others

I don't think there's anything controversial about splitting the regiment into battalions for operational flexibility. The mere existence of battalions doesn't mean they have to fight separately.

I'll just point out what I touched on earlier. Once Custer decided he had to make a rapid advance, he had to take steps to protect the pack train, which would be unable to keep up with the other three battalions. The packs contained all the spare food and ammunition. It would have been a disaster to let it fall into the enemy's hands.

Accordingly, he assigned one full company plus approx. 6 men from each of the other 11 companies. The pack train actually had more men than Benteen's battalion, and was, in effect, a 4th battalion. This significantly reduced the combat power available to Custer by tying it up in a slow-moving column that would be unable to participate in the early stages of the fight. It also created a liability that was a constant worry to Custer and which ended up having a direct effect on later decision-making.

No controversies about the break up of the regiment. Protecting the pack train was indeed vital, as a sound logistics system was THE reason the U.S. Army was able to win the Indian wars.

It's fairl apparent from his dispositions that Custer intended to draw the Warriors south, causing the non-combatants to flee north where he could capture them with his main force. A sound plan. Unfortunately the large size of the village meant that when his force was detected, there were still enough uncommitted warriors to overwhelm him.

 

[WayneK]

WayneK

Given that Custer's job was to prevent any escape to the South and drive the Indians North towards another column, why didn't his main force take the route Benteen's battalion took rather than head directly to where he thought the enemy camp was?

Benteen's route was impractical for cross-country travel. By going west using the assigned route he was passing up and down the rough ridges of all the north-south tributaries that emptied into Reno Creek. After passing just two sets of ridges his men's horses were getting jaded. It was absolutely not a good way to reach the Little Big Horn. Reno Creek was the only reasonable path to take.

That's why I have to wonder how useful it would have been to Custer to learn that there were camps upstream. He was still going to come in downstream of them no matter what. But I guess it would have been useful to know that you were going to have Indians on both sides of you.

 

[WayneK]

No controversies about the break up of the regiment. Protecting the pack train was indeed vital, as a sound logistics system was THE reason the U.S. Army was able to win the Indian wars.

It's fairl apparent from his dispositions that Custer intended to draw the Warriors south, causing the non-combatants to flee north where he could capture them with his main force. A sound plan. Unfortunately the large size of the village meant that when his force was detected, there were still enough uncommitted warriors to overwhelm him.

That's a fair assessment. I'll discuss it a little more when we got to that decision point.

 

[anglolawyer]

Benteen's route was impractical for cross-country travel. By going west using the assigned route he was passing up and down the rough ridges of all the north-south tributaries that emptied into Reno Creek. After passing just two sets of ridges his men's horses were getting jaded. It was absolutely not a good way to reach the Little Big Horn. Reno Creek was the only reasonable path to take.

That's why I have to wonder how useful it would have been to Custer to learn that there were camps upstream. He was still going to come in downstream of them no matter what. But I guess it would have been useful to know that you were going to have Indians on both sides of you.

Ah, OK. Thanks.

 

[WayneK]

A sound plan. Unfortunately the large size of the village meant that when his force was detected, there were still enough uncommitted warriors to overwhelm him.

OK, to jump ahead a bit: it wasn't that there were uncommitted warriors available to deal with Custer. Reno attacked first, and the Indians scrambled to meet that attack and defend the village. The Reno fight lasted long enough that almost all warriors had time to get their weapons, catch their ponies, and enter the fight against Reno. Only a relatively few (maybe 50-100) were facing Custer in the early part of the fight and there were no Indians being "held in reserve" to fight Custer. (If someone would like more details about how I reached these conclusions, let me know).

The Indians concentrated their forces against Reno and defeated him without being attacked by any other soldiers. Those same Indians then went downstream and destroyed Custer, again without being attack by any other soldiers.

The great risk in splitting your attack is that the defenders may be able to use interior lines to defeat your divided, and weakened, forces in succession. That's what happened. None of this was planned by the Indians.

 

[Border Reiver]

Agreed that this was not a planned attack by the FN. the war Chiefs were however quite good at reading a battlefield and reacting accordingly.

 

[WayneK]

Decision #3 (contd)

I got tied up last night but will now wrap up Decision #3.

Before his turn to rejoin Custer's trail, Benteen successfully completed his mission. From the third ridge reached, they finally got a good view of the upper Little Big Horn valley and saw no Indians.

Benteen had clear orders to transmit this information to Custer but he sent no messenger. Benteen later brushed it off by saying he thought it was good enough to tell Custer himself once he joined him.

I have a difficult time justifying the scout mission. The view from the Crow's Nest earlier showed there were no Indian camps in the area covered by Benteen's scout. There was no need to send a "reconnaisance in force" for a task that could have been handled by a small group of scouts. This would have allowed Benteen's battalion to advance with Custer and Reno, making him available for the start of the fight.

The scout ended up being a waste. Some perhaps useful information was gained but it never reached Custer. Custer appeared to assume there were no Indians in that direction, and that proved correct, so even if the information had made it to him, it's hard to see how it would have changed anything.

 

[WayneK]

I'm trying to keep the narrative as simple as I can and still have enough information to understand the decision points. I found a simple map that might help follow the flow of action: Map

Look at the bottom map.

 

[WayneK]

Decsion #4: Reno's Attack

Custer and Reno continued down Reno Creek with scouts fanned out ahead, looking for any signs of the enemy. Four miles from the river, they reached the site of a former Indian encampment that included a burial tepee with a body inside (the famed "lone tepee")

From the adjacent ridge, a scout used his binoculars to look down Reno Creek into the Little Big Horn valley. There he saw a cloud of dust moving north and what appeared to be Indians fleeing up the hills on the west side of the valley.

This was the first positive sighting of the Indians and seemed to confirm fears that the Indians would spot Custer's advance and scatter. With the urgency increasing, Custer ordered Reno to take the advance. Reno set out at a fast trot with Custer's column immediately behind.

The two columns trotted together for 30 minutes, covering three miles and emerging onto a flat only a mile from the river. Here the scouts saw two Sioux retreat before them, climb a ridge overlooking the valley, and begin to ride side to side to warn the village located more than two miles downstream.

With this sighting, Custer called Reno over and gave him his attack orders: advance on the village and bring it to battle. Custer would support him.

When this order was given, the village still hadn't been seen, its view screened by the two hundred foot bluffs on the east bank of the river. By advancing down Reno Creek, crossing the river, and turning north, Reno would be preventing escape up the Little Big Horn. He would also be drawing the warriors to himself and fixing their location while Custer positioned himself to strike the second blow.

Sending Reno ahead to initiate the attack was a risky but I think reasonable course of action if, and only if, he was properly supported in a timely manner. As we'll see, that would prove to be a problem. Having advanced rapidly to attack the village, Custer ended up using only 140 men (23%) of his total force in this initial strike.

 

[skeptichaggis]

A lot here about "recon"as if it could have been done in the modern sense. It was 1876,and in 1876 battlefield recon was the same as in 1776,1376 and so on. Even if custers scouts had been sent ahead that only means Custer would have got a delayed eyewitness account.

Did Custer get it wrong at the greasy grass. Sure,but it could have gone the other way. It didn't,he gambled and lost.

Just like Edward I before Falkirk,army coming apart,starving,exposed when he got news that Wallace's army was close. He gambled,he took his crumbling army and struck. In his case the gamble worked. He destroyed Wallace's army.
Or the thebans at leuctra,taking a gamble by attacking in echelon with there best men gathered on one flank. It worked,it might not have.

Had Custer won at big horn he would have cemented his reputation as a great cavalry commander. Many of the greatest victories in history were enormous gambles.

Lastly,instead of just concentrating on what Custer done wrong look at what the tribes done right. Its a fallicy of colonial military history to presume that a losing western army did something wrong. Although clearly Custer made a booby.

 

[Border Reiver]

A lot here about "recon"as if it could have been done in the modern sense. It was 1876,and in 1876 battlefield recon was the same as in 1776,1376 and so on. Even if custers scouts had been sent ahead that only means Custer would have got a delayed eyewitness account.

Actually, barring commanders getting realtime feed from their recon elements, recon is still getting delayed eyewitness accounts. All that has changed is the speed at which the information can get to the commander.

Lastly,instead of just concentrating on what Custer done wrong look at what the tribes done right. Its a fallicy of colonial military history to presume that a losing western army did something wrong. Although clearly Custer made a booby.

this is an interesting point. What did he FN commanders do right?

As WayneK's pointed out, they were able use internal lines to move forces to overwhelm and eliminate the attacking force. It is also good to look at what they did wrong as well:

A. No unified command structure - each FN had their own war leaders, none of whom could be relied on to be able to command other FN forces;
B. Recon - they did not have scouting forces out looking for US army forces in order to provide security;
C. Logistics - no secure supply lines or source of supply;
D. Communications - other than yells, FN commanders did not have a means of transmitting orders to subordinates.

Other than B, these issues are the result of cultural norms in the Plains FN and their traditional war making techniques - raids, vice pitched battles.

 

[WayneK]

Lastly,instead of just concentrating on what Custer done wrong look at what the tribes done right. Its a fallicy of colonial military history to presume that a losing western army did something wrong. Although clearly Custer made a booby.

The whole point of my chain of posts is to not concentrate on what Custer "done" wrong but to show that most of his decisions were reasonable given what he knew at the time.

I agree that it was a high-risk attack that could have worked.

The Indians fought well that day but that's a little easier to do when you're well-armed and have a big advantage in numbers. Before assigning tactical brilliance to the Indians, I think I would need an explanation of why they let their village be taken utterly by surprise by a cavalry force crossing 10+ miles of open terrain in broad daylight.

 

[WayneK]

It is also good to look at what they did wrong as well:

A. No unified command structure - each FN had their own war leaders, none of whom could be relied on to be able to command other FN forces;
B. Recon - they did not have scouting forces out looking for US army forces in order to provide security;
C. Logistics - no secure supply lines or source of supply;
D. Communications - other than yells, FN commanders did not have a means of transmitting orders to subordinates.

Other than B, these issues are the result of cultural norms in the Plains FN and their traditional war making techniques - raids, vice pitched battles.

I agree with this. It's difficult for outsiders to understand the nuances of how it worked, but for the most part, each Indian made his own decision about when and where to fight. There were no Indian "officers" ordering warriors into lines or telling them to hold a position.

On the other hand, there was a degree of loose control exerted. Men typically fought by warrior societies, and would go into battle together and protect each other. Chiefs exerted control mostly through example. When Crazy Horse got mounted, a large group of Oglala warriors gathered around him and followed him into the fight.

The Indian method of fighting created a kind of controlled chaos in battle, with the Indians moving from position to position as they pressed the attack. If they gained an advantage, they would surge forward and fight with great courage and daring. On the other hand, if they met determined resistance and started taking casualties, they were likely to fall back and perhaps break off the fight altogether. The Indians did not accept high casualties and would withdraw if that situation developed. The western movies showing them making suicide attacks are absurd.

The Indian method of fighting was well-suited for raiding, individual combat, and fast-paced skirmishing on horseback. It was less effective in pitched battles. There, the army was able to take advantage of its more organized method of fighting. Position, manuever, and rates of fire were all controlled by officers communicating with each other and issuing orders through a rigid chain of command.

There were quite a few examples of out-numbered soldiers being able to hold off superior numbers of Indians because of these advantages. This is why Custer was not intimidated by reports of the Indian numbers. He was confident the 7th Cavalry could handle whatever number they met.

And just to be clear: I'm not saying the soldiers were better fighters or more brave. Any time you have one group of fighters who are drilled together and operate under a command structure, that group should be able to defeat an equal number of men fighting as individuals.

 

[dropzone]

Custer just got beat.

A fact that some people have difficulty accepting, I fear.

Interesting, I guess Major Neumann is as dumb as Custer.

(looking at the PDF) Nah, Custer was an even worse speller. Really, Major Neumann, it's your masters thesis. A lotta guys would ask somebody literate to read and correct it before they submitted theirs. Just because a word passes muster with a spell checker doesn't mean you have used it correctly.