New Article on Custer's Last Stand

[WayneK]

I guess, what with being cavalry, their main means of defence when outnumbered was to gallop away. That they could not do so here for some reason has not been touched upon I think (sorry if I missed it). From the pictures of the battlefield there seems to have been no cover at all so it looks as though they were forced by some insuperable circumstance to stand their ground. I assume they got themselves surrounded as well as, apparently, being widely separated. How did that happen?

Once the Indians arrived in force from the Reno fight, Custer was soon surrounded and further movement would have been extremely difficult. There are a number of Indian stories of individual soldiers trying to break through Indian lines. These were chased down and killed. One or more may have been messengers dispatched to try to get through to Reno.

The nature of the terrain was a big factor. It was ill-suited for defense, especially if the enemy had the numbers to surround you. Ideally, you'd like a position where the enemy was in front of you and you had some cover to fire from. Custer's men didn't have that because the Indians were all around. When I say "all around" you shouldn't picture a solid mass of Indians in a ring around Custer. They didn't have the numbers for that. They picked their spots to fire from carefully, and massed at these locations. One of the fascinating things coming out of the 1984 dig was the identification of these spots.

There was no safe place to shelter the horses (though there was a pretty good one in the swale running northeast from Calhoun's position). The horses were stampeded at various stages in the fight and may have carried away spare ammunition in the saddle bags. A number of horses were shot by their owners to try to create cover for the soldiers, especially on Custer Hill.

We just don't know how Custer deployed his five companies after entering Medicine Tail Coulee. We have some hard evidence (mostly bullets and cartridges) of where soldiers were at one point or another but there's no way to put together a detailed, reliable description of Custer's movements.

My thinking is that Custer was maneuvering offensively downstream with little thought that things were turning against him. Judging by the way he left Reno to fight the Indians by himself, I can only surmise that Custer thought Reno had sufficient forces to handle it. For himself, by the time Custer finally realized that he was on the defense, not the offense, it was too late to retreat upstream to rejoin Reno and Benteen. They were too far away and there were too many Indians firing on him. He had no choice but to take up a defensive position as best as he could and try to hold out until help could arrive from Reno and Benteen.

To rejoin Reno and Benteen, Custer would have had to move his five companies in mounted columns over four miles of open country. All the while, the Indians would have been taking up positions behind adjacent ridges and pouring a devastating fire into Custer's exposed columns. Effective return fire would have been impossible because they were mounted and unable to take careful aim. I guess they could have done what Reno did: run like hell, every man from himself.

 

[anglolawyer]

Once the Indians arrived in force from the Reno fight, Custer was soon surrounded and further movement would have been extremely difficult. There are a number of Indian stories of individual soldiers trying to break through Indian lines. These were chased down and killed. One or more may have been messengers dispatched to try to get through to Reno.

The nature of the terrain was a big factor. It was ill-suited for defense, especially if the enemy had the numbers to surround you.

There was no safe place to shelter the horses (though there was a pretty good one in the swale running northeast from Calhoun's position). The horses were stampeded at various stages in the fight and may have carried away spare ammunition in the saddle bags. A number of horses were shot by their owners to try to create cover for the soldiers, especially on Custer Hill.

So I guess it could be (and Im sure has been) argued that Reno and Benteen did not put up as much of a fight as they reasonably might to pin down as many Indians as they could. In fact, wasn't there bad blood arising from an incident some years before when Benteen felt Custer had abandoned a fellow officer for whom he could have done more. Seems as though there was some poisonous resentment within the officer cadre. Maybe somebody is to blame for that.

 

[WayneK]

So I guess it could be (and Im sure has been) argued that Reno and Benteen did not put up as much of a fight as they reasonably might to pin down as many Indians as they could. In fact, wasn't there bad blood arising from an incident some years before when Benteen felt Custer had abandoned a fellow officer for whom he could have done more. Seems as though there was some poisonous resentment within the officer cadre. Maybe somebody is to blame for that.

Yes, there has been a lot of criticism directed towards Reno and Benteen. Like most things in this battle, there aren't many black and white answers. Different people look at the same evidence and come to opposite conclusions.

Reno has been criticized for stopping short of the village; for not holding his position in the timber; and for conducting a disorganized retreat.

I've expressed my opinions on these. Reno was justified in stopping short of the village. There is no justification for the way he retreated.

The issue of whether he could have stayed in the timber doesn't have a clear answer. The men who were there had divided opinions on it. If he could have held his position, it might well have affected the outcome. Since he was adjacent to the village and an immediate threat to the women and children, the Indians would have been forced to devote a sizable force to keeping him there. This would have reduced the force sent to deal with Custer and may have given him the chance to carry through his attack or at least avoid the disaster that happened.

I'll post some thoughts about Benteen later.

 

[anglolawyer]

Yes, there has been a lot of criticism directed towards Reno and Benteen. Like most things in this battle, there aren't many black and white answers. Different people look at the same evidence and come to opposite conclusions.

Reno has been criticized for stopping short of the village; for not holding his position in the timber; and for conducting a disorganized retreat.

I've expressed my opinions on these. Reno was justified in stopping short of the village. There is no justification for the way he retreated.

The issue of whether he could have stayed in the timber doesn't have a clear answer. The men who were there had divided opinions on it. If he could have held his position, it might well have affected the outcome. Since he was adjacent to the village and an immediate threat to the women and children, the Indians would have been forced to devote a sizable force to keeping him there. This would have reduced the force sent to deal with Custer and may have given him the chance to carry through his attack or at least avoid the disaster that happened.

I'll post some thoughts about Benteen later.

Those will be interesting.

I saw somewhere that Reno was given to drink. That he was actually an alcoholic (whether at the time of the battle or not I'm not sure). Any thoughts on the relevance of that (if any) would be interesting too.

 

[Axxman300]

I agree with most of what you say but don't know where you get the idea that we had no history of the battle before 1942 except the the COI and books by the Custers. This is one of the most written-about events in American history. The accounts began immediately after the battle and have been appearing continuously ever since. Many of them included the Indian side of the story. The volume of history written about this battle before 1942 is large.

What was known and what was accepted as fact depended on when and where the story was being told.

Yes, the Indian side of the story was told in western news papers. The New North-West of Deer Lodge, Montana, in its August 11, 1976 edition ran a story where seven Sioux warriors related their side of the story. They said two key things:

1. Custer managed to attack the far end of the camp.
2. They left enough warriors surrounding Reno's position to keep him pinned down before they took off to the other end of the camp.

The Bismark Tribune, on February 7, 1877 ran a harsh review of Whitaker's "Life of Custer" where they ridiculed his attempt to make Custer into a hero, and repeatedly claim that Custer blew it by moving faster than Terry had ordered him to move.

I doubt that sentiment made it to the big cities of the east.

The myth visibly evolves over time. It is apparent in the articles about Sitting Bull's capture, and later his obituary.

Ironically while researching this post I found an account of Maj. Reno interviewing Sitting Bull in Washington in the Bozeman Weekly Chronicle. Sitting Bull told him there were between 6000 and 8000 warriors at Little Big Horn that day.

So what was known was not universally disseminated, or accepted by publishers and the public for the better part of a century. It's just that Americans suck at history.

If you'd like history you can check out the National Archives "Chronicling America" page:

http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/

Type in keywords "Little Big Horn" and "Custer" ( or whatever you're curious about), and select a date range. Read for yourself, it's free, and really cool.

 

[WayneK]

What was known and what was accepted as fact depended on when and where the story was being told.

Yes, the Indian side of the story was told in western news papers. The New North-West of Deer Lodge, Montana, in its August 11, 1976 edition ran a story where seven Sioux warriors related their side of the story. They said two key things:

1. Custer managed to attack the far end of the camp.
2. They left enough warriors surrounding Reno's position to keep him pinned down before they took off to the other end of the camp.

The Bismark Tribune, on February 7, 1877 ran a harsh review of Whitaker's "Life of Custer" where they ridiculed his attempt to make Custer into a hero, and repeatedly claim that Custer blew it by moving faster than Terry had ordered him to move.

I doubt that sentiment made it to the big cities of the east.

The myth visibly evolves over time. It is apparent in the articles about Sitting Bull's capture, and later his obituary.

Ironically while researching this post I found an account of Maj. Reno interviewing Sitting Bull in Washington in the Bozeman Weekly Chronicle. Sitting Bull told him there were between 6000 and 8000 warriors at Little Big Horn that day.

So what was known was not universally disseminated, or accepted by publishers and the public for the better part of a century. It's just that Americans suck at history.

If you'd like history you can check out the National Archives "Chronicling America" page:

http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/

Type in keywords "Little Big Horn" and "Custer" ( or whatever you're curious about), and select a date range. Read for yourself, it's free, and really cool.

I was responding to your assertion that there was no history available before 1942 except the COI and the Custer books. That's not the case. To say that it wasn't accepted etc is an entirely different issue.

I believe I have very close to everything that's ever been published about the battle, except what's been published in the last few years (as I've said, I've been out of the loop for a while). I won't detail the efforts I went through to get this material but they involved a lot of driving over a number of years in the 1980s. I also have quite a bit of unpublished material from the Walter Campbell and Walter Camp collections.

I'm still hoping there is significant material available in unpublished sources that I can get hold of. Some of this material may have been published recently, for example in Dutch Hardoff's books.

I'm most interested in primary sources by eyewitnesses but I'm afraid those are about tapped out. It's always exciting to find new ones but usually they don't reveal anything new.

 

[WayneK]

I'm going to try posting an image of the Custer Battlefield with my markups added. I hope this might be a helpful overview of the Custer Fight. My image is only of the fight on Battle Ridge. Other sections of the battlefield aren't shown.

The markups should be self-explanatory. I show the approximate soldier and Indian positions. I show how far away the Indians were from the soldiers they were firing at. I also show a very rough approximation of how the battle proceeded. The company's were rolled up from south to north, as shown.

Obviously, I'm leaving out a lot of detail and I'm not trying to present a detailed, final analysis of the battle. Some of the info show is open to dispute but it should still be a useful overview, especially for those who aren't familiar with the fight.

OK, let me work on this a bit more. I'm not happy with how readable it was.

 

[WayneK]

Trying again with the map. OK, that doesn't look too bad. I tilted the view a little in Google Maps to make the ridges and coulees more distinctive. That throws off the scale somewhat. I hope someone finds this useful because I spent way too much time fiddling with it. But I enjoy it, so no complaints.

Naturally, every time I look at it, I see something else to tweak but we'll go with this for now.

 

[anglolawyer]

Is that supposed to have the combatants' positions or have you still to add those?

I watched a documentary about the battle this evening - Gruesome Reality of Custer's Last Stand. It's on You Tube. Pretty good for getting an idea of the terrain. I had not picked up in the course of the discussion that Custer split his own column into two before heading down towards the Indian encampment, leaving Keogh behind. Why did he denude his force further in that way?

Another question: with those carbines that take a good few seconds to reload, what exactly was he going to do if he made it into the camp? With no sabres to hack at people with, what was supposed to happen?

 

[Garrette]

Trying again with the map. OK, that doesn't look too bad. I tilted the view a little in Google Maps to make the ridges and coulees more distinctive. That throws off the scale somewhat. I hope someone finds this useful because I spent way too much time fiddling with it. But I enjoy it, so no complaints.

Naturally, every time I look at it, I see something else to tweak but we'll go with this for now.

Thanks. That helps. I was trying to mentally superimpose battle maps onto Google maps, and it wasn't working. I had not envisioned the FNs so strongly blocking the far side of the position (meaning not between Custer and the camp) so the long yellow Indian position was a surprise.

 

[WayneK]

It's true that Reno and Benteen had more men (approx. 340 vs Custer's 210) and also had the advantage of the spare ammunition in the packs. So maybe that was the deciding factor. But I think if you look how dispersed Custer's position was, there was no way for them to make a long stand against the numbers he faced.

I have a couple of follow up thoughts on this. Yes, maybe the reason Reno and Benteen survived was because they had more men. But the advantage may not be quite as great as it appears. Reno's three companies had been thoroughly routed and demoralized. So fully 1/3 command of the combined command was in no shape to fight effectively. It can take weeks for a unit to fully recover from a beating like that.

In addition, the Indians had the advantage of the weapons captured from Custer: more than 200 good Springfield rifles along with ammunition. If you look at the numbers I gave above, they effectively doubled the number of good rifles they had.

The more you look at it, the more similar the two fights look:

• Same opponent
• Same soldiers (ie from the same regiment with identical training)
• Same weapons (as noted, Reno-Benteen had advg of more ammo)
• Similar odds (heavily outnumbered by a well-armed and confident foe)
• Same terrain
• Same weather

Of course, the two fights weren't identical but they were very similar. If you want to see how the Indians fought Custer, look at how they fought Reno and Benteen. If you want to know how Custer could have successfully defended himself, look at how Reno and Benteen defended themselves.

 

[WayneK]

Thanks. That helps. I was trying to mentally superimpose battle maps onto Google maps, and it wasn't working. I had not envisioned the FNs so strongly blocking the far side of the position (meaning not between Custer and the camp) so the long yellow Indian position was a surprise.

Yes, finally finding out where the Indians were was a big step forward in understanding the battle. I can remember standing at the battlefield and looking out over that endless expanse of shapeless ridges and coulees, and thinking "so where were the Indians?" It was really hard to figure out but once you see it, it makes a lot of sense.

I think in the early stages there may have been more Indians on the west side because the first priority would have been to get between the soldiers and camp. Once Custer was safely stopped and surrounded, they gradually shifted to the east side because there were firing better positions there.

I've been on the east ridge. It's a very good position to fire from because you have a clear, almost-level shot to Calhoun Hill which looks quite close. You can lie down below the brow of the hill and be completely protected except for the brief moments when you raise up to fire. And it's a long ridge, so there could have been a great many Indians there laying down a devastating fire on Calhoun and Keogh (L & I).

 

[Rincewind]

Thanks - it does help in understanding how it unfolded.

 

[anglolawyer]

Trying again with the map. OK, that doesn't look too bad. I tilted the view a little in Google Maps to make the ridges and coulees more distinctive. That throws off the scale somewhat. I hope someone finds this useful because I spent way too much time fiddling with it. But I enjoy it, so no complaints.

Naturally, every time I look at it, I see something else to tweak but we'll go with this for now.

Ah, I can see that now on my desktop but, strangely, not on the iPad, which only shows the terrain but not the markings. Worthy of study. Thank you.

 

[WayneK]

Keep in mind that the map shows the primary locations where the Indians fired their guns that used cartridges (their best guns). Muzzle-loaders, and of course bows and arrows, would leave no such trace.

The locations are not exhaustive. There were other scattered locations of lesser importance, especially if you include amateur sketches of where cartridges were found over the years. These, naturally, are much less reliable than the dig maps.

What I've posted should give at least a decent overview.

 

[WayneK]

Is that supposed to have the combatants' positions or have you still to add those?

I watched a documentary about the battle this evening - Gruesome Reality of Custer's Last Stand. It's on You Tube. Pretty good for getting an idea of the terrain. I had not picked up in the course of the discussion that Custer split his own column into two before heading down towards the Indian encampment, leaving Keogh behind. Why did he denude his force further in that way?

Another question: with those carbines that take a good few seconds to reload, what exactly was he going to do if he made it into the camp? With no sabres to hack at people with, what was supposed to happen?

I see you got the markups to show up.

The evidence that Custer divided his battalion into two wings is fairly persuasive but something short of conclusive. I remember the first time I heard this proposed I couldn't believe he would divide his command AGAIN after having already dangerously fragmented his regiment.

Here's some of the evidence.

1) The earliest map of the battlefield was done by Lt Maguire who arrived two days later with Terry's column. I've attached a rough copy. Custer's route is shown as a dotted line that approaches the river at Ford B (Medicine Tail Coulee) then splits into two wings during the retreat to battle ridge.

This map has to be given considerable weight because it was done on the field immediately after the battle. One of the officers said that when they rode to the Custer field after the battle, Custer's path along the bluffs was plainly visible.

Note that even though Maguire has the battalion split, the two wings are moving together in close proximity and supporting distance. This is unlike many of the recent proposals that have the wings widely separated.

2) There's rock solid evidence that part of Custer's command passed over Nye-Cartwright Ridge on the way to Battle Ridge. The cartridge evidence here is extensive and unmistakable. There is also some hard evidence that he approached the river, though it is more ambiguous. There have been finds of cartrdiges, shells, etc but they aren't extensive and could be explained by Indians passing over this area after the battle.

If you accept the evidence for the presence of soldiers at the ford, this would point towards a separation of command. It would not be logical for all of Custer's command to go to the ford, then go backwards to pass over Nye-Cartwright.

3) Some Indian accounts insist Custer never approached the river but stayed on the bluffs back from the river. Other accounts insist he approached the river and had a light engagement at the ford before turning away. One way to reconcile these accounts is to presume they were seeing different wings at different times.

4) I mentioned before that the separation of command would be one way to make sense of the widely separated deployment of the companies on battle ridge. If they were operating in separate wings, they may have been unable to re-unite after the Indians arrived from the Reno fight.

What Custer did and why he did it after separating from Reno is one of the central mysteries of the battle. Probably one of the more popular ideas is that one wing was detached to wait for and link up with Benteen and the packs. The other wing moved downstream to head off and capture the women and children, or maybe to just find a ford where he could cross and attack the village from the north.

There are other possibilities. It's a jigsaw puzzle with many pieces missing. I've yet to see or come up with a scenario that makes me think "obviously, THAT'S what he was doing."

As to the weapons: yes, it would have been difficult to rapid fire the Springfield from horseback. They did have pistols for rapid fire, and at some point they would have wanted to dismount and fight on foot if the fighting got intense.

 

[anglolawyer]

Thanks again.

The documentary treated the separation as some kind of established fact FWIW.

 

[WayneK]

I saw somewhere that Reno was given to drink. That he was actually an alcoholic (whether at the time of the battle or not I'm not sure). Any thoughts on the relevance of that (if any) would be interesting too.

I'm pretty sure one officer claimed he saw Reno take a swig from a flask soon after he'd retreated to the bluffs. There was a lot of drinking in the cavalry. I haven't made a point of researching this issue but I don't believe there was much liquor available during this battle, and don't think it affected anything.

Back in my college drinking days, alcohol made me recklessly brave. That wasn't Reno's problem.

 

[WayneK]

I'm going to share a link to a paper I presented at the 1988 Custer Battlefield Symposium. Warning: this is for people who want to get into more detail about happened to Custer's battalion on Battle Ridge.

The paper focuses on what might have happened at the south end of Battle Ridge where Calhoun's Company L was stationed. I believe that what happened here is the key to understanding the fighting on Battle Ridge.

It's not an overview of the whole fight, and it presupposes some familiarity with the battle. I think if you use the previous map I posted for reference, you can probably follow it pretty well. I'll, of course, answer any questions.

I probably should have put this on the map, but here's a cross-reference for understanding which company I'm referring to when I use company commander names:

Calhoun = Company L
Keogh = Company I
Custer, Tom = Company C
Yates = Company F
Smith = Company E

You'll notice that I was using an estimate of 1,500 total warriors. If you notice any other discrepancies between what I said in the article and what I've said in this thread, go with the article. I was much conversant with the fine details of the battle than I am at this moment (that might change now that I'm retired).

https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/4582674/Calhoun-1.pdf

 

[WayneK]

Thanks again.

The documentary treated the separation as some kind of established fact FWIW.

I'm sure in their minds it is an established fact. I'm not quite at that level of acceptance. Admittedly, there's a fair degree of subjectivity in determining what is an established fact. For me, there has to be a confluence of different types of evidence that ideally includes some powerful deciding argument that resolves the usual contradictions found in evidence.

In this case, what's missing is confirmation by the Indian eyewitnesses. If we had multiple sources who saw Custer's men operating in two clearly separated groups, that would be enough for me. But we don't have that.

It doesn't mean it didn't happen but without the eyewitness support, I need a pretty strong line of argument from other evidence. This is a topic I'd like to delve into further to see if I can reach a conclusion that satisfies me. If I had to make a call right now, I'd say it probably happened, but I don't think it's a well-established fact.