I might be missing some of the nuance.
Well good! That's actually my major point here--that there are nuances aplenty, and we need to be careful before we make strong claims
or conclusions based on experiments. What we need to do is take inventory, so to speak. Create maps. Figure out where we are; figure out what things are involved, what the things that are involved actually are, and so on.
And we can do that with experiments as well.
It probably revolves around the word "decisions" and the way you are distinguishing parts.
Alright, I'll propose an exercise here. Back to the cups.
Arrange two cups on a table--one on the left, and one on the right. Sit in front of the cups, and at your own whim, decide to lift one of the two cups, reach out, and lift that cup. But before you move to lift the cup--before you even start moving your hand--say out loud which cup you're going to lift.
Now there are three things about this exercise that are interesting that I'll make note of. The first thing about it is that we are holding off on causing our hand to move until after we report a "prediction" of which hand to move. The second thing is that we always lift one cup, or the other, but our hand doesn't go towards the middle. The third thing is it's possible to do; that is, we can report with near perfect accuracy in this scenario which object we'll lift before we lift it.
The first illustrates a distinction that can be made between two kinds of things--the commitment to a particular goal, and the initiation of action. The commitment to a particular goal is what I mean by "decision". The act of "triggering" the choreography is what I mean by "initiation of action".
The second I don't you have issue with, but it illustrates that a commitment to one goal or the other has been made.
The third illustrates that whatever thing is doing the reporting has "inside information" as to whatever decision has been made; in particular, there's no reasonable way for the thing doing the reporting to report the
correct goal so often other than for it to be aware of which goal is the correct one (it's not sensing the movement, since by design, there is no movement; and since in practice, it is indeed possible to do). Or, alternately speaking, it
senses which decision has been made before the action has been initiated.
So here:
Suppose I snap my fingers. There is the decision and nerve impulse which leads to the finger snap, but at some level, there are muscles, nerves and cells which I do not consciously control -- the snap happens as a result of some mixture of both. I cannot say that my fingers decide to snap on their own, but neither can I say that I control or decide every detail of what happens. My reporting of the event will consist of what I am aware of and at some level, I cannot be aware of what's going on.
...we're
mainly talking about initiation of action, and it's unclear whether or not we're talking about the act of making a decision. In the Libet experiment, no decision is being made--only an action being initiated. And that's way too simple to say anything.
Is this clearer?
Because I do not think of the mind as something that decides in any sense other than a muscle "decides" to contract when it is stimulated, I don't agree that there are different parts doing different things.
We almost never reach between the two cups. It's always picking up the cup on the left, or picking up the cup on the right.
I also do not have a strong sense of decision making.
I agree. Many of the strange notions people have about what they do are based on some theory about themselves that they formulate, not on sensations. It's fairly easy to get people, upon just paying attention to it, to admit that their decisions seem to come from an "abyss".
But you do have certain senses--a sense that you own an action, a sense that you have control, etc. Those sensations are very nuanced too, as things such as particular disorders of control (alien hand syndrome, delusion of alien control, etc) suggest.
That was on my mind, but also I was thinking about the difference between a kind of armchair musing and going out to see what can be seen through a microscope. I did imply that all of metaphysics fell under that misrepresentation and I'm sorry that it was misapplied to you specifically.
Well, what I'm proposing isn't so much armchair musing as it is taking careful inventory. Experiments can help you do that, but assuming things are simple and looking at simplified setups will only lead you astray. Libet experiments, for example, do convey something interesting, but there's so much going on here, you need to ensure you understand what the pieces are before you make particular conclusions.
I sometimes forget whom I am arguing with.
That's an admiral trait actually.
I wanted to work from the biological/physical and reach consciousness/mind instead of starting with what I think needs explaining. It's not the only way to work it and certainly our own experiences are what drive us to search in the first place.
I suggest rather that we find and categorize the nuances, add them to our dictionary, and see where
that leads us.
