My argument against materialism

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

No. There's an easy way out of it: Establish standards for acceptance of concepts, and stick with them. What this argument amounts to is "Since we are not omnicient, we know nothing". Or, put another way, solipsism amounts to defining knowledge as 100% certainty, and defines 100% certainty as impossible; a circular argument. Define knowledge as 95% certainty and the circularity vanishes, along with the argument in favor of solipsism.

There's also Strong Inferrence. If my experiment can only have 2 results, and each result excludes one of my 2 working hypotheses, and my working hypotheses cover the entire range of the possible, I can conclude, after running the experiment, that one is correct and the other is incorrect. Because I have the data to demonstrate it, it burden is on the shoulders of the people whinning "But you don't KNOW it!!!"

It's early in the morning and I've got to go to work in a minute, so I'll limit my reply to: what Kevin Lowe and PixyMisa said.

 

[IMST]

Copied and pasted to a notepad file for when I run into the (millions of) arguers of...what...nonmaterialism?

Aww...thanks! I so rarely feel like I'm contributing more than an occasional laugh.

 

[I Am The Scum]

I have some observations (thought not empirical) of my own that I'd like to share.

I agree with premise 1. Premise 2 seems a little odd to me, but you seem to be saying that if materialism is true, then matter can exist independent of any conscious thought. I agree with that.

3. Empiricial evidence of something independent of consciousness needs to be independent of consciousness.

This is where it gets kinda weird. Why would evidence for x also have to share a property with x? That's like saying, if I want to demonstrate that something is dangerous, then my evidence must also be dangerous. Or if I want to provide evidence that a claim is false, then my evidence must also be false. That makes no sense.

5. Therefore: Materialism can never have empirical support.

6. A position that can never have empirical support is worthless / false.

Two problems, here. For one, it's not true. If my friend tells me that the party starts at 7:00, it is not unreasonable for me to take him at his word, without investigating and finding my own empirical evidence of when the party begins (whatever that might entail).

In addition (and I'm surprised nobody has pointed this out), you're arguing from ignorance. Just because a claim lacks support does not mean that the claim is likely false. At best, you're demonstrating that materialism is an irrational belief, but even then you're not doing a fantastic job.

 

[Dancing David]

Um, empiricism doesn't care if you are a butterfly dream, god thought, dancing energy, brains in vats.

It comes out the same, the fact that consciousness is involved does not prove or disprove materialism.

The universe behaves as though it is made of energy/mattter.

 

[Loss Leader]

The universe behaves as though it is made of energy/mattter.

Whether the universe behaves that way or not, it at least appears to do so. Thus, there's no real point in treating it as though that's not what's going on.

 

[Malerin]

I have some observations (thought not empirical) of my own that I'd like to share.

I agree with premise 1. Premise 2 seems a little odd to me, but you seem to be saying that if materialism is true, then matter can exist independent of any conscious thought. I agree with that.

3. Empiricial evidence of something independent of consciousness needs to be independent of consciousness.

This is where it gets kinda weird. Why would evidence for x also have to share a property with x? That's like saying, if I want to demonstrate that something is dangerous, then my evidence must also be dangerous. Or if I want to provide evidence that a claim is false, then my evidence must also be false. That makes no sense.

(3) could have been phrased better. This is my take on it:

(3) Empirical evidence that supports materialism cannot equally support any other mutually exclusive theory of reality (e.g., idealism, solipsism, etc.)

The only evidence we have of external reality comes from our senses*. This sense-data is equally compatible with an infinite number of mutually exclusive models of reality (materialism, dualism, idealism, brain-in-a-vatism, tricked-by-evil-geniusism etc.). Assuming that only materialism can receive confirmation from sense-data is what? Special pleading?

5. Therefore: Materialism can never have empirical support.

6. A position that can never have empirical support is worthless / false.

Two problems, here. For one, it's not true. If my friend tells me that the party starts at 7:00, it is not unreasonable for me to take him at his word, without investigating and finding my own empirical evidence of when the party begins (whatever that might entail).

But you have empirical evidence that your friend is trustworthy and wouldn't trick you. If you had a friend who was a complete jerk and pathological liar, I don't think you would take him at his word.

In addition (and I'm surprised nobody has pointed this out), you're arguing from ignorance. Just because a claim lacks support does not mean that the claim is likely false. At best, you're demonstrating that materialism is an irrational belief, but even then you're not doing a fantastic job.

It depends on the claim. I can claim that a one-eyed intelligent alien with six arms lives in the Andromeda galaxy. That has no support and is probably false. If I claim that an alien lives in the Andromeda galaxy, that also has no support, but is more likely to be true.

* This isn't entirely true. We know that at least one mind exists and that square circles don't exist. But for the most part, we rely on our senses to tell us about the world.

 

[Dancing David]

((3) Empirical evidence that supports materialism cannot equally support any other mutually exclusive theory of reality (e.g., idealism, solipsism, etc.)

Empirically you can not tell the difference between idealism, materialis. I am on ignore, I know.

Empirically you can't judge , so it is an ontological distinction that is just speculative.

 

[Malerin]

Empirically you can not tell the difference between idealism, materialis. I am on ignore, I know.

Empirically you can't judge , so it is an ontological distinction that is just speculative.

Why would you think you're on ignore? I responded to you in the consciousness thread when you claimed people who woke up during an operation were unconsciously conscious. Or something like that.

Anyway, I agree with your post. Any ontological position is speculative, including strong atheism and materialism.

 

[benjayk]

I don't think I can phrase all the propositions in a way that will satisfy everbody. It seems continuing this discussion in this vein leads only to ever more verbose descriptions of the argument and more inquiry on the other side, but without much content added.
So will try to approach the whole thing a different way. I think this problem is not really a problem that can be solved by pondering pro and con arguments and coming to a "objective" conclusion. So my approach was maybe not quite right.
I think it's an issue of introspection, that is, a fundamentally subjective issue.

By this I don't mean, that there is no "right" answer, but only that this answer can not be directly communicated (or even less proven). It is a private truth. Like the truth "I am conscious.".

So instead of trying to make an argument for an "objectively true" answer, I will try to show that there is a truth that has no "hard" argument (in the sense of a logical "proof") in it's favor but seems to be a valid truth nevertheless. Like the truth that I am conscious right now. There is no argument that can convince me rationally of this. For my rational mind the sentence "I am not conscious." could well be true. It could just be another believe I hold, maybe because I believe consciousness is superfluous in the description of this universe. Nevertheless I know that what the sentence "I am conscious." means to me is absolutely true and I don't need an rational argument for this. In fact, searching for a rational argument for this will lead me nowhere (except that I maybe find out that this does not work).

So: Regardless of whether all empirical observations are dependent upon consciousness, certainly all of YOUR observations are dependent on consciousness. This conservely means you cannot make an observation independent of consciousness.
This does not prevent you from believing that there exists something independent of you. But what does "There exists something independent of me" mean if in fact this something can not exist as (part of) an observation you make?
How do you get from "My observation" to "something apart from my observation"? What do you "have" apart from your observations that can justify (to yourself) this step?
I can make all kinds of theories *about* my observations, but what does a theory mean to me that is not about my observations?

Such a theory seems to be arbitrary and empty to me.

Please don't debate this (it is a subjective statement after all), but maybe instead try to convey what a theory that is not (exlusively) about your observations means to you, why it does not seem to be empty to you.
I sincerly can't understand this.

To prevent missunderstanding: I'm not saying materialism does not make statements about your observations, but it also make statements that are held not to be dependent on your observations and thus effectively outside ouf your observations. I'm referring just to the latter part of materialism.

I agree that if I dismiss all theories that are not about my observations (in the sense of "derived from my observations" and "making predictions about my observations") this in some way leads to solipsism.
But only in so far that I state that "only consciousness exists", not "only the particular form of my consciousness as it is now", exist. "Others" people's consciousness maybe in fact not fundamentally different from my consciousness but just another expression thereof and vice versa. I'm not stating that this is true, but I may one day discover this to be true (because the other person and me both realize that we in fact are the same consciousness, by merging our identities) - so I can not rule it out. So it's not "ego"-solipsism (what I currently identify "me" to be is all that there is) but "I am"-solipsism (that what underlies all indentifications and what is immutably true - even if my personality might totally change and maybe merge with others - is all that there is), which I think is really not what is commonly understand as solipsism but more akin to the idea of Brahman in eastern philosophy.
It's true, though, that as long as I don't get to have an experience that makes me sure that "I" (in a very general sense) and another I are in fact fundamentally the same, I can not be *sure* that there are other beings that have subjective experience similar to mine. But I believe it is a good theory to assume they do have similar experience, because it would explain their conscious behaviour and someday I might be able to confirm this.

 

[IMST]

In other words, solipsism. I know that in the end all my observations come to my own senses. But if I don't rely on that, there's nothing to rely on. And there's nothing to base my behavior on. So, in the case that there's any worth to your argument at all, I'm going to continue to behave as though my senses are sufficiently reliable. Because I have no practical use whatsoever for solipsim.

 

[tsig]

In other words, solipsism. I know that in the end all my observations come to my own senses. But if I don't rely on that, there's nothing to rely on. And there's nothing to base my behavior on. So, in the case that there's any worth to your argument at all, I'm going to continue to behave as though my senses are sufficiently reliable. Because I have no practical use whatsoever for solipsim.

Funny how 'my argument against materialism' turned into 'my argument for me'.

 

[Lowpro]

Please don't debate this (it is a subjective statement after all), but maybe instead try to convey what a theory that is not (exlusively) about your observations means to you, why it does not seem to be empty to you.
I sincerly can't understand this.

It's not that you don't understand it, it's that it doesn't satisfy you enough. That's fine, and I think we mostly encourage the skepticism.

However...

You need to realize that this argument of yours IS solopsism. It is the "we can never really know..." even when the odds are 99.9999% against your argument.

It is like when some nitwit says "we can know everything there is to know about gravity, but we can never really prove that a ball will fall when let go of in the air" because the nature of proof to you is unsatisfactory.

Again that's fine, but not a good way to move forward IMO. This argument only regresses into the debate on validity of empiricism, which really just becomes a battle of the axioms.

Edit: I think you trust too much that the senses are used for empirical evidence and totally ignore the math and calculations. No matter how much it will regress, calculations itself are immune to the solipsistic argument.

I agree that if I dismiss all theories that are not about my observations (in the sense of "derived from my observations" and "making predictions about my observations") this in some way leads to solipsism.
But only in so far that I state that "only consciousness exists", not "only the particular form of my consciousness as it is now", exist. "Others" people's consciousness maybe in fact not fundamentally different from my consciousness but just another expression thereof and vice versa. I'm not stating that this is true, but I may one day discover this to be true (because the other person and me both realize that we in fact are the same consciousness, by merging our identities) - so I can not rule it out. So it's not "ego"-solipsism (what I currently identify "me" to be is all that there is) but "I am"-solipsism (that what underlies all indentifications and what is immutably true - even if my personality might totally change and maybe merge with others - is all that there is), which I think is really not what is commonly understand as solipsism but more akin to the idea of Brahman in eastern philosophy.
It's true, though, that as long as I don't get to have an experience that makes me sure that "I" (in a very general sense) and another I are in fact fundamentally the same, I can not be *sure* that there are other beings that have subjective experience similar to mine. But I believe it is a good theory to assume they do have similar experience, because it would explain their conscious behaviour and someday I might be able to confirm this.

Let's be honest here, you would have to ignore biochemistry to come to this conclusion, so you would be pleading from ignorance.

 

[Malerin]

It's not that you don't understand it, it's that it doesn't satisfy you enough. That's fine, and I think we mostly encourage the skepticism.

However...

You need to realize that this argument of yours IS solopsism. It is the "we can never really know..." even when the odds are 99.9999% against your argument.
It is like when some nitwit says "we can know everything there is to know about gravity, but we can never really prove that a ball will fall when let go of in the air" because the nature of proof to you is unsatisfactory.

Again that's fine, but not a good way to move forward IMO. This argument only regresses into the debate on validity of empiricism, which really just becomes a battle of the axioms.

Edit: I think you trust too much that the senses are used for empirical evidence and totally ignore the math and calculations. No matter how much it will regress, calculations itself are immune to the solipsistic argument.



Let's be honest here, you would have to ignore biochemistry to come to this conclusion, so you would be pleading from ignorance.

This is the second time percentages have been given. How are these odds being derived? Is there some ontological calculus?

 

[Malerin]

I consider everything except blatant logical or mathematical contradictions as possibilities in the very, very limited sense that there is always a 0.00...01% chance that I am a butterfly living in The Matrix dreaming I am Descartes being fooled by an evil demon who is themselves a brain in a vat which is an idea in the mind of a God being electronically simulated by a post-singularity civilisation.

I'm happy to call incredibly unlikely things impossible as a kind of shorthand for "so incredibly unlikely that I fully intend to devote 0% of my brain space to worrying about it", but they aren't impossible in the truly absolute sense.




The overwhelming majority of properly conducted observations are consistent with a universe that just goes on doing its thing whether or not anyone is looking at it to make sure it does it. The universe, for example, looks very much like it's far older than conscious life could possibly be, barring time travel. Stuff predates life, hence stuff cannot be dependent on life.

As such positing the need for some kind of mind to know about stuff, as opposed to stuff just existing of its own accord, falls immediately afoul of Occam's Razor.

Stuff came first, then minds made out of stuff arose, or at least that's how it looks like to us.

Observation, by definition, is "someone looking at it". All "properly conducted observations" are equally consistent with idealism, dualism, materialism, etc. As such, they equally confirm any logically consistent model of reality.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't think I can phrase all the propositions in a way that will satisfy everbody. It seems continuing this discussion in this vein leads only to ever more verbose descriptions of the argument and more inquiry on the other side, but without much content added.
So will try to approach the whole thing a different way. I think this problem is not really a problem that can be solved by pondering pro and con arguments and coming to a "objective" conclusion. So my approach was maybe not quite right.
I think it's an issue of introspection, that is, a fundamentally subjective issue.

By this I don't mean, that there is no "right" answer, but only that this answer can not be directly communicated (or even less proven). It is a private truth. Like the truth "I am conscious.".

So instead of trying to make an argument for an "objectively true" answer, I will try to show that there is a truth that has no "hard" argument (in the sense of a logical "proof") in it's favor but seems to be a valid truth nevertheless. Like the truth that I am conscious right now. There is no argument that can convince me rationally of this. For my rational mind the sentence "I am not conscious." could well be true. It could just be another believe I hold, maybe because I believe consciousness is superfluous in the description of this universe. Nevertheless I know that what the sentence "I am conscious." means to me is absolutely true and I don't need an rational argument for this. In fact, searching for a rational argument for this will lead me nowhere (except that I maybe find out that this does not work).

So: Regardless of whether all empirical observations are dependent upon consciousness, certainly all of YOUR observations are dependent on consciousness. This conservely means you cannot make an observation independent of consciousness.
This does not prevent you from believing that there exists something independent of you. But what does "There exists something independent of me" mean if in fact this something can not exist as (part of) an observation you make?
How do you get from "My observation" to "something apart from my observation"? What do you "have" apart from your observations that can justify (to yourself) this step?
I can make all kinds of theories *about* my observations, but what does a theory mean to me that is not about my observations?

Such a theory seems to be arbitrary and empty to me.

Please don't debate this (it is a subjective statement after all), but maybe instead try to convey what a theory that is not (exlusively) about your observations means to you, why it does not seem to be empty to you.
I sincerly can't understand this.

To prevent missunderstanding: I'm not saying materialism does not make statements about your observations, but it also make statements that are held not to be dependent on your observations and thus effectively outside ouf your observations. I'm referring just to the latter part of materialism.

I agree that if I dismiss all theories that are not about my observations (in the sense of "derived from my observations" and "making predictions about my observations") this in some way leads to solipsism.
But only in so far that I state that "only consciousness exists", not "only the particular form of my consciousness as it is now", exist. "Others" people's consciousness maybe in fact not fundamentally different from my consciousness but just another expression thereof and vice versa. I'm not stating that this is true, but I may one day discover this to be true (because the other person and me both realize that we in fact are the same consciousness, by merging our identities) - so I can not rule it out. So it's not "ego"-solipsism (what I currently identify "me" to be is all that there is) but "I am"-solipsism (that what underlies all indentifications and what is immutably true - even if my personality might totally change and maybe merge with others - is all that there is), which I think is really not what is commonly understand as solipsism but more akin to the idea of Brahman in eastern philosophy.
It's true, though, that as long as I don't get to have an experience that makes me sure that "I" (in a very general sense) and another I are in fact fundamentally the same, I can not be *sure* that there are other beings that have subjective experience similar to mine. But I believe it is a good theory to assume they do have similar experience, because it would explain their conscious behaviour and someday I might be able to confirm this.

I'm afraid that there is no safe move from epistemology to ontology. We know through experience (there are a few exceptions). It does not follow that the mode of our knowing is what really exists.

The safest statement you can make is that we cannot know what really exists; we can only guess.

Specifically, you can know one thing for certain and that is that doubting (a form of thought) exists because when you doubt, the doubting occurs (whether in you or from another being).

But what if you take this further? Doubting is something 'done'; in other words, it evolves over time. So time exists. And the ability to doubt seem to depend on a movement in some direction -- after all, one doubts; it is an action -- and that implies energy.

So, what are we really left with? Time and energy. Sounds like the basis of materialism, doesn't it?

 

[Lowpro]

This is the second time percentages have been given. How are these odds being derived? Is there some ontological calculus?

Aha, by pointing out the inane portion of an argument you attempt to misdirect from the main point.

It's cute Malerin, if that's the only argument you've got then it's safe to say you've lost.

 

[AlBell]

So, what are we really left with? Time and energy. Sounds like the basis of materialism, doesn't it?

No, it doesn't.

 

[Malerin]

I'm afraid that there is no safe move from epistemology to ontology. We know through experience (there are a few exceptions). It does not follow that the mode of our knowing is what really exists.

The safest statement you can make is that we cannot know what really exists; we can only guess.

Specifically, you can know one thing for certain and that is that doubting (a form of thought) exists because when you doubt, the doubting occurs (whether in you or from another being).

But what if you take this further? Doubting is something 'done'; in other words, it evolves over time. So time exists. And the ability to doubt seem to depend on a movement in some direction -- after all, one doubts; it is an action -- and that implies energy.

So, what are we really left with? Time and energy. Sounds like the basis of materialism, doesn't it?

And mind.

 

[gentlehorse]

I don't think I can phrase all the propositions in a way that will satisfy everbody. It seems continuing this discussion in this vein leads only to ever more verbose descriptions of the argument and more inquiry on the other side, but without much content added.

Seems to be the nature of philosophy-- More an exercise in the precise use of language than a means by which we can achieve knowledge-- Language can certainly be very moving.

So instead of trying to make an argument for an "objectively true" answer, I will try to show that there is a truth that has no "hard" argument (in the sense of a logical "proof") in it's favor but seems to be a valid truth nevertheless.

Something that feels right in your gut-- Very few will argue with your gut, as long as you're up front about it. Just don't expect folks to believe that what you're saying is true based on nothing other than the strength of you personal conviction.

So: Regardless of whether all empirical observations are dependent upon consciousness, certainly all of YOUR observations are dependent on consciousness. This conservely means you cannot make an observation independent of consciousness.
This does not prevent you from believing that there exists something independent of you. But what does "There exists something independent of me" mean if in fact this something can not exist as (part of) an observation you make?

"Something independent of me" means something that exists regardless of whether I exist.

How do you get from "My observation" to "something apart from my observation"? What do you "have" apart from your observations that can justify (to yourself) this step?

Again, it's axiomatic. A mind-independent, consistent, probabilistically predictable universe seems to exist. There is no reason to assume that it doesn't.

To prevent missunderstanding: I'm not saying materialism does not make statements about your observations, but it also make statements that are held not to be dependent on your observations and thus effectively outside ouf your observations. I'm referring just to the latter part of materialism.

For instance? (bold mine--)

I agree that if I dismiss all theories that are not about my observations (in the sense of "derived from my observations" and "making predictions about my observations") this in some way leads to solipsism.
But only in so far that I state that "only consciousness exists", not "only the particular form of my consciousness as it is now", exist. "Others" people's consciousness maybe in fact not fundamentally different from my consciousness but just another expression thereof and vice versa. I'm not stating that this is true, but I may one day discover this to be true (because the other person and me both realize that we in fact are the same consciousness, by merging our identities) - so I can not rule it out. So it's not "ego"-solipsism (what I currently identify "me" to be is all that there is) but "I am"-solipsism (that what underlies all indentifications and what is immutably true - even if my personality might totally change and maybe merge with others - is all that there is), which I think is really not what is commonly understand as solipsism but more akin to the idea of Brahman in eastern philosophy.

This sounds like a bid for immortality, though I may be misreading you. I don't like the idea that I will someday cease to exist either. You speak of merging identities to the point of a total personality change. Were that to happen, how would the result be "you" in any meaningful way? Which is neither here nor there, other than as an exercise in rhetoric. Once your brain dies, you (the personality) are gone. The universe, however, will keep clicking right along.

It's true, though, that as long as I don't get to have an experience that makes me sure that "I" (in a very general sense) and another I are in fact fundamentally the same, I can not be *sure* that there are other beings that have subjective experience similar to mine. But I believe it is a good theory to assume they do have similar experience, because it would explain their conscious behaviour and someday I might be able to confirm this.

In your OP you said:

"We also could conclude that we don’t (or cannot) know what the basis of reality is."

Again, I could be misreading you, but I get the feeling that you actually adhere to an ontological position that could be summed up as "The basis of reality is mind."

All well and good-- Just don't expect folks to believe it just because you really, really, think it's true.

 

[Dancing David]

Why would you think you're on ignore? I responded to you in the consciousness thread when you claimed people who woke up during an operation were unconsciously conscious. Or something like that.

Anyway, I agree with your post. Any ontological position is speculative, including strong atheism and materialism.

I stand corrected.