So the potential and reality of -- or possibility of a collapse was discussed early on. But we were at a level of commitment. We also received numerous distress calls. We realized we had a lot dying and fire up there. When the civilian staff arrived, then Commissioners Feehan, Fitzpatrick and Commissioner Von Essen, we discussed strategy and tactics.
I specifically remember telling Commissioner Von Essen that we were not attempting to extinguish this fire. It's just strictly a search and rescue operation. We were not trying to put this fire out. We had thousands of people coming down the stairs, and that was our focus, to answer as many distress calls as we could and complete whatever searches we could. That was the focus of our strategy there at the time.
Shortly thereafter, we arrived a the World Trade Center. Chief Ganci assigned me to take command of the north tower and he assigned Chief Donald Burns to take command of the south tower. Getting out of my car, putting my gear on, I then went and did a reconnaissance of the exterior of the north tower.
I saw we had numerous floors on the upper levels on fire, approximately eight floors with fire showing. As I was going around the far side of the north tower, I than saw the second plane hit the south tower. I immediately went into the lobby of the north tower to take command of operations. In the lobby of the north tower, in command was Chief Peter Hayden, and Chief Joe Pfeifer
I took command and we started assigning additional units to the upper floors.
I gave them instructions that we are not going to be extinguishing fire. What we were going to do is assist in evacuating the building. Numerous units arrived. They were sent up and put to work. Joined at the time – I was in the lobby. We had very little communication via handy talky during the time I was in the lobby with the units on the upper floors, because of the building construction. The elevators were not working, nor were any of the building communication systems. So we had very little control, communication wise, with the units that were on the upper floors.
Approximately 40 minutes after I arrived in the lobby, I made the decision that the building was no longer safe. And that was based on the conditions in the lobby, large pieces of plaster falling, all the 20 foot high glass panels on the exterior of the lobby were breaking.
There was obvious movement of the building, and that was the reason on the handy talky I gave the order for all the Fire Department units to leave the north tower.
[FDNY Commissioner] Van Essen came over to the 18 Truck as soon as we got into the building or shortly thereafter and said,
"Forget about the fire. Just get the people out."