You're quite right: the Hamas leadership has absolutely no interest in martyring themselves, they only send others to be martyred in their place.
But the whole wanting to kill Jews thing? Yeah, they're pretty serious about that. I would think that would be obvious to everyone by now, but none so blind...
Indeed, some of them surely are. But that is no excuse not to examine them carefully.
This 2009 article offers some insight into the organization I think that is useful, and shows us I think, some perspectives that reveal some of the reasons one might consider openings and possibilities within Hamas to achieve a deal:
If war and siege have not crippled Hamas, Gaza’s misery appears to have prompted its greater willingness to compromise and offer its people a political future. Hamas leaders, including the more outspoken exiled leadership based in Damascus, have lately muted criticism of Fatah in the interest of intra-Palestinian reconciliation—even after Abbas’s Palestinian Authority reportedly bowed to Israeli pressure and withdrew its demand for UN action against Israel following Justice Richard Goldstone’s UN report into war crimes by the belligerents in Gaza’s winter war. They have played down the significance of their party’s fiery founding charter, which rejects any recognition of Israel, hinting that they could live with a two-state settlement. In its draft laws, Hamas defines “Palestine” not as the area including Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza but as the geographical district over which the Palestinian National Authority rules. As leaders of Fatah did a generation earlier, some members have discreetly met with Israelis at international conferences, talking peace over breakfast. In addition, within its own fiefdom Hamas’s leaders have decided to suspend declaration of an Islamist state and application of sharia, and to focus on the economy instead
These kinds of moves alienated some of the hardest core elements, people who really do want Jews to be killed if it means a homeland:
Cracks emerged when Hamas drifted from social activism and armed struggle into politics. After Hamas decided to contest the 2006 elections, one of its preachers in Rafah left the movement with scores of followers. God’s will above man’s, he said, and besides Hamas had no business participating in an authority established by agreement with Israel. During the contentious interregnum of national unity government before Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007, both Fatah and Hamas solicited Salafist support. Unruly clans seeking an Islamist cover to press their claims bolstered their ranks. Amid the chaos, the Salafists sought to enforce their authority by waging a nasty morality campaign against Internet cafés, hairdressers, the American school, and other such places of ill-repute.
Indeed, the picture revealed is that of a fractious organization, not particularly united but rather a nexus of competing interests and factions, many of whom are particularly odious and commit acts of evil, but others who have different goals, values and ideas as well that we would find not so alien. We see movement within the organization over time: the departure and addition of influential men and their followers, some with their own deviations from party orthodoxy. We see changes in stance, changes in the way Hamas deals with Egypt, Israel and the world at large.
The article's conclusion ends on a similar note:
Hamas is unlikely to be budged anytime soon from its Gaza stronghold. It is playing a waiting game, hoping that other forces will blink before it does: that the international community will feel shamed into relieving the siege of Gaza, or that Egypt’s hostile regime will fall, or that Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel will prove so stingy in its dealings with Mahmoud Abbas that the Fatah government on the West Bank will collapse. But in the meantime Hamas is under pressure to deliver something more than bravado to its people. Perhaps, as Gunning suggests, it will one day admit that its armed struggle against Israel (unlike against its internal rivals) has been largely symbolic, and that its declaration of a divine right to Palestine represents more of a credo than a political program. Gunning declines to judge whether, with regard to hopes for Middle Eastern peace, Hamas is what political science would term an “absolute spoiler,” or only a limited one. But as he says, politics is never static, nor are political organizations. (emphasis mine)
I post this merely to illustrate some of the understanding that is possible if we allow ourselves to.
What I hear when people reduce things to "Well they want to kill Jews" is an unwillingness to think any further.
What is most sad - and an offense to my burgeoning sense of skepticism and intellectual inquiry - is that while I and others in fact share that deep disgust over the brutal crimes of hateful people, because some of us take a few steps further along the road of discovery (never losing or forgetting that sense of deep sadness at the wrongful murder of so many), we are penalized as somehow directly/indirectly supportive of those crimes.
See, because a group of people stop at "They Want to Kill Jews" and go no further, everyone else must too, or reveal themselves to be willing to see nuance nested among yes, some evil outcomes and some evil people, and therefore, be what, responsible intellectuals able to absorb facts others inure themselves too?
Now some people may be misguided, some have been influenced by poor sources and some by internal ideology. This may cause them to make poor observations of the situation in the Middle East and of Hamas too.
But I still believe that almost all of us on this board share a deep and abiding disgust for the horrible crimes of people willing to do evil for the sake of their silly religion or stupid ideology.
And I don't think I've seen anyone lately, bikerdruid as well!, who I would think deserves to not be included in that assumption of shared horror at acts of evil.