[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Giordano]

I'm suggesting in my theory that there is such a thing as consciousness, which may be an emergent property of totally physical activity, but is itself "mental" and totally non-physical and non-physically existent prior to its physical "entrance." The brain is its "stargate" into physical existence, and determines its physical capacity.

If this non-physical conscious is an emergent property of our physical brains, why would it need to be reincarnated? Doesn't the formation of new physical brains (by the usual biological method) lead to and fully account for all new consciousnesses? A consciousness might be immortal in your theory, existing after we die, presumably in some non-physical state, but it need not come from pre-existing consciousnesses by your theory.

 

[jt512]

Jabba's theory before and after applying Occam's Razor​

Before:

I'm suggesting in my theory that there is such a thing as consciousness, which may be an emergent property of totally physical activity, but is itself "mental" and totally non-physical and non-physically existent prior to its physical "entrance." The brain is its "stargate" into physical existence, and determines its physical capacity.

After:

I'm suggesting in my theory that there is such a thing as consciousness, which may be an emergent property of totally physical activity, but is itself "mental" and totally non-physical and non-physically existent prior to its physical "entrance." The brain is its "stargate" into physical existence, and determines its physical capacity.

 

[Akhenaten]

*sighs* Here I'll just quote the post you already ignored.

If mental activity can continue after death, how do you explain brain damage?

If a part of your brain is damaged you can lose a part of your mental functioning. So how exactly would damage to your entire brain, i.e. death, allow for any part of that same functioning to continue?

And what if while I'm alive I suffer brain damage. When I die does my spirit or my ghost or my angel get that damaged part of my mental process back? Are there ghosts and angels suffering from Alzheimer or in the afterlife?

Do lobotomized people have lobotomized ghosts? Does Phineas Gage's angel have its left frontal lobe back?

Joe,

- I'll try to ignore the *sigh* and answer your basic question.

Given that it was a response to your false accusation that you'd been insulted, I'd expect you to take special note of it. Besides, if your intent was to ignore it then you wouldn't have even mentioned it.

1) My answer isn't very good -- I think we can call it "post hoc." Or maybe, a good (or bad) SF story.

Not much in the way of essential proof then?

2) I'm suggesting in my theory that there is such a thing as consciousness, which may be an emergent property of totally physical activity, but is itself "mental" and totally non-physical and non-physically existent prior to its physical "entrance." The brain is its "stargate" into physical existence, and determines its physical capacity.

Describing that answer as "not very good" is like describing the surface of the Sun as being "warm to the touch".

All you've done here is try to describe what an emergent property is - something that everyone else here seems already to understand - in terms that a ten year old would find childish.

3) But the weakness of this explanation is already taken into account when I accept the "prior probability" of immortality as only 1%.

There is no possible way that the vapidity of such an explanation could be taken into account by anything, let alone by yet another of your hare-brained theories.

- You (and others) will have numerous questions and objections about my answer . . .

The numerous questions and objections are the result of you having explained precisely nothing.

. . . but I need to go back and focus on the older questions and objections about my two recent questions...

 

[Akhenaten]

- 1) If the brains of two different people were exactly the same, would they be the same person in the sense that they would share experiences (IOW, would each person be looking through two sets of eyes)?
A. Yes.
B. Probably
C. No idea
D. Probably not
E. No.

- I asked this question to see who accepted that what appears to be a continuous self during a lifetime was not determined by anything physical.

If that's what you wanted to find out then why didn't you ask that question rather than a completely different one?

You (singular) may have answered this question previously, but tracking you all (plural) down regarding your previous answers would have taken me a long time.

It would likely have taken an infinite time, despite the answers all being the same, but so what? You'll never track down the answers that have been given this time either because you'll wander off in some random direction and forget that you even asked the question.

- Now, I'll go back to see who said "No" -- and thereby accepts that what appears to be a continuous self during a lifetime was not determined by anything physical.

Again, you won't discover any such thing because that's not what your question asked.

 

[Monza]

[qimg]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/customavatars/avatar4187_1.gif[/qimg]

Monza probably thinks that hand is special.

Yes, and it will last forever.

 

[Akhenaten]

​

2) Is there a way in which a self, at least, appears to be the same self throughout life?
A. Yes.
B. No.
C. Don't know.

- I asked this question in order to see who of you were on my page. If you are own my page, you answered A."

You don't need a quiz to determine that, Jabba.

Here:

 

[Jabba]

- I'll see if I can explain my reasoning re question #1.
- If you don't believe that the very same physical characteristics would produce the same consciousness/self, you seem to believe that the difference between them is not caused by physical differences.

 

[godless dave]

So two identical things are the same thing?

 

[Akhenaten]

- I'll see if I can explain my reasoning re question #1.

And then you'll respond to the negative feedback by attempting to explain the explanation.

ad infinitum

- If you don't believe that the very same physical characteristics would produce the same consciousness/self, you seem to believe that the difference between them is not caused by physical differences.

I'm inclined to think that being hit over the head repeatedly with a 5 pound hammer would alter one's consciousness. Would you regard that as non-physical?

I think you'd be the only one.

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

- I'll see if I can explain my reasoning re question #1.
- If you don't believe that the very same physical characteristics would produce the same consciousness/self, you seem to believe that the difference between them is not caused by physical differences.

Let's say that I own 2 computers. They're old home computers. Let's say ZX Spectrums. They are from a time long before the internet or, indeed, home computers being able to communicate with other home computers. My computers are identical, having come off the production line immediately after each other.

I turn them both on. I load Manic Miner in to one of them. I don't touch the other one at all. My question to you is - have both computers got Manic Miner loaded in to them? If your answer is no, then you'll know why answering that there's not one consciousness between two identical brains doesn't mean that you believe in a soul. If your answer is yes, then you are not only ignorant about computers, but are arguing that computers have immortal souls.

Or, if that example is too difficult for you to grasp, why not read back over the thread where exactly what you're asking has already been discussed to death. With you. In conversations you've already had.

 

[godless dave]

Jabba, I'm typing this comment on a Samsung Galaxy Tab 2 10.1. Samsung made thousands of these, with identical specifications - same screen, same electronics, same buggy firmware. They are physically identical.

Do you think the comment I'm typing is appearing on the screen of every Samsung Galaxy Tab 2 10.1 in the world? After all, they are physically identical.


Edit: this is the same question Squeegee is asking.

 

[Loss Leader]

- I'll see if I can explain my reasoning re question #1.
- If you don't believe that the very same physical characteristics would produce the same consciousness/self, you seem to believe that the difference between them is not caused by physical differences.

Um ... If you had to identical DVD's of Paul Blart: Mall Cop, would you seem to believe that the difference between them is not caused by physical differences?

They are two separate things, made up of separate molecules. I can sort them, I can count them, I can mail one of them to China.

If you had a question about whether anyone here believed that two otherwise identical people had differences that were anything but physical, why didn't you just ask that?

Why try to make a strained inference from a poorly worded question?

It appears that you are having more and more trouble sorting out your own ideas.

 

[Loss Leader]

- Now, I'll go back to see who said "No"

No need. I'll do it for you.

F) Of course not, that's a ridiculous idea.

We've already discussed this. No.

Your question, as asked, is 'way too simplistic for the simplsitic answers you listed.

What? I mean to say, what, what? This has all been discussed, Jabba. Remember?

E. No.

No. Absolutely not.

To avoid you having to page up, I again pick essentially E.,

So, those are all the people who answered your question.

-- and thereby accepts that what appears to be a continuous self during a lifetime was not determined by anything physical.

Well, we can just ask all those people listed above if they accept that what appears to be a continuous self during a lifetime was not determined by anything physical.

I was one of those people, so I'll go first: NO!

 

[Giordano]

- I'll see if I can explain my reasoning re question #1.
- If you don't believe that the very same physical characteristics would produce the same consciousness/self, you seem to believe that the difference between them is not caused by physical differences.

Which question #1?

As explained repeatedly to you, brains with the very same physical characteristics, including the very same synapses and action potentials (ions and ion flows) in the same neurons, would produce the same thoughts (mental consciousness if you wish). But two initially physically identical brains would soon diverge in detailed physical structure (if only in which neurons had action potentials) very quickly due to differences in experiences and development and would have different thoughts as a result of those detailed physical changes. I am not referring to genetic identity for reasons I've already described; genetically identical brains are not physically identical. And I am not saying it is possible for us to duplicate brains in this fashion. And yes, I think two brains side by side in the same room would have different experiences (if only because one sees another brain to its left, and the other sees another brain to its right).

 

[Giordano]

No need. I'll do it for you.

To summarize and make it easy for you, that appears to be:
8 disagree with you.
0 (1/infinity in your notation, not mine) agree with you.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

- I asked this question to see who accepted that what appears to be a continuous self during a lifetime was not determined by anything physical. You (singular) may have answered this question previously, but tracking you all (plural) down regarding your previous answers would have taken me a long time.
- Now, I'll go back to see who said "No" -- and thereby accepts that what appears to be a continuous self during a lifetime was not determined by anything physical.

It doesn't make a difference. Truth is not a democracy and reality isn't determined by votes. If something is true, it can be demonstrated. I think that would be a better place for you to start.

 

[Slowvehicle]

- I'll see if I can explain my reasoning re question #1.
- If you don't believe that the very same physical characteristics would produce the same consciousness/self, you seem to believe that the difference between them is not caused by physical differences.

Good afternoon, Mr. Savage.

I am a bit distressed that you appear to be ignoring my posts again. I wrote an answer to this issue yesterday--did you miss it?

Let's explore this idea that two brains can be identical.

-Suppose, just for the sake of argument, you could, precisely, atom-for-atom, "duplicate" a brain.

Would they, actually, be identical? Would they be composed of the same atoms, molecules, cells, neurons, synapses, and so forth? Wouldn't they be, at best, extremely similar,as different atoms would make up the structure of the original, and the duplicate?

Are two Lego models of the same ship, but made form different Lego set, actually identical?

-So, suppose that two structurally for-all-practices "identical" (ignoring the "different materials" problem) could, by some process, be fabbed.

Is the duplicate "identical" to the original? (How did you bring the duplicate to life?)

-Suppose that you could, somehow, "jump-start" the duplicate, bringing it to life.

Would it be "identical" to the original? Would it be identical to the original at the instant of its completion? (What would have happened to the original in the meantime?)

Would it be, instead, identical to the original at the moment it was "brought to life"? Really? Would that be identical to the original as it was at that very moment, or as the original had been when the duplicate was fabbed, or as the original had been when the micrometrically precise measurements were done?

Suppose that you could, in fact, through some trick of stasis, cause a moment to exist at which the emergent property of consciousness arising from the original neurosytem could be said to be identical with the emergent property of consciousness arising form the duplicate neurosystem.

...what is the very next thing that would happen? Would not the two consciousnesses, at that very instant, began to diverge, as the experiences each underwent became more and more different?

Unless and until you can demonstrate that the "soul" actually exists, and exists independently of a specific neurosystem, the fact that consciousness acts as if it is nothing more (and nothing less) that an emergent property of a specific neurosystem, your belief in the "soul's" existence, to say nothing of its immortality, is supported only by your hopes, and by your fears of oblivion.

Seriously. Please just present the practical, empirical, objective evidence the the "soul" as you conceive it exists, and is immortal.

 

[Giordano]

I would like to thank Slowvehicle, who was patient enough to repost and detail an excellent explanation, and to thank Frozenwolf150 for reminding me once again that truth does not come from polls: even if the outcome was exactly the opposite and everyone agreed with Jabba, he would still be wrong.

 

[PixyMisa]

- I'll see if I can explain my reasoning re question #1.
- If you don't believe that the very same physical characteristics would produce the same consciousness/self, you seem to believe that the difference between them is not caused by physical differences.

No. A trillion times no.

If you have two distinct brains, no matter how similar, you have two distinct minds.

For the brains to be identical in every respect, they would have to be in the same location as well as having the same internal structure. Since that is obviously impossible, the brains will be subject to to different experiences, and so produce different (as well as distinct) minds.

 

[Akhenaten]

Good afternoon, Mr. Savage.

I am a bit distressed that you appear to be ignoring my posts again. I wrote an answer to this issue yesterday--did you miss it?

Such is the cost of losing one's Least Critical Poster™ status. Welcome to invisibility, Trusty Transporter of Things.