[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[jsfisher]

Slowvehicle,
- I do mean what you suggested I mean -- I think that there must be an infinite number of potential selves.
- But, when I said something about us being on the same page, I wasn't referring to that page -- I know that you disagree with me about the infinity thing. I'm just hoping that you and I have the same concept of "self," or the same part of the self, in mind...
- Do you accept that there is a part of the self (the "experiencer" itself) that does not change from its first memory to its last?

No.

 

[Loss Leader]

- Maybe, I should have called it an "aspect" of the self, or better yet, the "core" of the self. Whatever, it's the part of the self that does not change from it's first memory, at least, to its last. And probably, it doesn't change from conception to death -- at least.
- Does that help at all?

What evidence do you have that there is such a "self"? How could you possibly design a test that would show that a 7 year old has the same "self" as a 77 year-old? Just because the older man remembers being the child doesn't mean the two have much in common. The structure of the man's brain is different, the neural pathways are different, the coding of memories are different, the types of things remembered are different.

At 7, I hated mustard and mushrooms. Now I love both of them. At 7, I thought girls were gross; now I spend most of my time trying to make just one of them happy. At 7, I could remember what I had for breakfast on June 5, 1978. I can't remember that detail now. Am I the same person? Am I responsible for the behavior of that 7 year old? If he was mean to another child in school, should I be held accountable? If he told his mother he hated her, should I be asked to appologize?

Furthermore, there are actual experiments that tend to demonstrate that the self is not a constant state. People with traumatic brain injuries have had startling shifts in personality. There are even rare cases of total retrograde amnesia where a person has no access to memories (or the feelings those memories would bring).

You cannot say that the "self" or "soul" that you are proposing even exists, let alone that there are an infinite number of them.

- Do you accept that there is a part of the self (the "experiencer" itself) that does not change from its first memory to its last?

No. No. No.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Slowvehicle,
- I do mean what you suggested I mean -- I think that there must be an infinite number of potential selves.
- But, when I said something about us being on the same page, I wasn't referring to that page -- I know that you disagree with me about the infinity thing. I'm just hoping that you and I have the same concept of "self," or the same part of the self, in mind...
- Do you accept that there is a part of the self (the "experiencer" itself) that does not change from its first memory to its last?

Good Afternoon Mr. Savage.

For the record, we are NOT "on the same page".

You are still trying to find some way to pretend that something (anything, really) of what I am saying (that consciousness is an emergent property of neurosystems) can be squinted at in such a way that you can claim that we really are talking about the same thing when you coyly avoid saying "soul".

It seems to me that you are postulating the existence of an immaterial "something" that is "installed" from an immaterial "somewhere" into a material neurosystem; and that the existence of the immaterial "something" is independent of the existence of the material neurosystem in which it gets "installed" (to the point that you appear to be claiming that the same "something" can be "installed" in different neurosystems, and can and does, in fact, exist without the neurosystem at all).

This is why I wish you would address the problems of traumatic aphasia, traumatic amnesia, senile dementia, and physiochemical cognitive disorders (as well as other similar phenomena). If "I" really is a "something" independent of "my" neurosystem, why did severe blunt trauma to that neurosystem result in palpable, measurable, objectively perceptible degradation and diminution of function?

We are NOT on the same page. I do NOT agree that what you want to avoid calling the "soul" exists, much less exists independently of a neurosystem, much less exists in potentially infinite numbers.

You want to get me on your page? Show me objective, practical, empirical evidence supporting the "something" you are claiming exists.

 

[godless dave]

- At this point in our discussion, I am trying to support my insistence that there is an infinity of potential selves.
- The first obstacle in the way of doing that is that we are not all talking about the same "self." Giordano and Dave give me what seems like the perfect example of this diversion. Giordano and Dave are not talking about the same self. Dave is talking about the self that I'm trying to talk about.
- Maybe, I should have called it an "aspect" of the self, or better yet, the "core" of the self. Whatever, it's the part of the self that does not change from it's first memory, at least, to its last. And probably, it doesn't change from conception to death -- at least.
- Does that help at all?

It helps me understand that you are talking about something that I don't believe exists. More importantly for this discussion, it is something that is not included in the scientific model of consciousness.

Do you accept that there is a part of the self (the "experiencer" itself) that does not change from its first memory to its last?

No.

 

[Agatha]

Jabba, your concept of the 'self' appears to be at odds with everyone else's concept.

I disagree that there is a 'self' which remains the same throughout life. A human being has a personality which changes with time and experiences. If the 'self' to which you refer is not the personality, is not the memories, is not affected by the experiences, and is not affected by structural changes to the brain, then what is it?

I suspect that you are trying to suggest something akin to a religious concept of a soul (though there is no reason to think that this, if it existed, is a static, unchanging thing either). Here in SMMT we'll need some evidence that such a thing exists. Otherwise, we may as well ask for this thread to be dumped in R&P.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

Slowvehicle,
- I do mean what you suggested I mean -- I think that there must be an infinite number of potential selves.
- But, when I said something about us being on the same page, I wasn't referring to that page -- I know that you disagree with me about the infinity thing. I'm just hoping that you and I have the same concept of "self," or the same part of the self, in mind...
- Do you accept that there is a part of the self (the "experiencer" itself) that does not change from its first memory to its last?

To quote the old adage, change is the only universal constant. The mind is dynamic and ever-changing as one takes in new experiences and forms new memories. The things we learn and the choices we make define who we are, and learning is defined as a change in behavior. Hypothetically speaking, if there were such a thing as a soul; and I'm using the term very loosely and interchangeably with "mind"; then why would it function any differently?

 

[Giordano]

If it helps, I join the others in disagreeing with your statement that there is a "self" or soul that doesn't change from birth to death. So none of us are on the same page as you.

However, if for purposes of discussion, we use a definition of "self" as which is "how we perceive things at any specific time," then yes there limits to "selves" based on physical limits to the universe, but I am willing to believe that there are lots of ways to design a human brain, and lots of possible "selves" as a result.

So begin please, and convince me that each "self" is recycled from a reincarnated self.

 

[John Jones]

Slowvehicle,
- I do mean what you suggested I mean -- I think that there must be an infinite number of potential selves.
- But, when I said something about us being on the same page, I wasn't referring to that page -- I know that you disagree with me about the infinity thing. I'm just hoping that you and I have the same concept of "self," or the same part of the self, in mind...
- Do you accept that there is a part of the self (the "experiencer" itself) that does not change from its first memory to its last?

This is a pathetic Appeal to Popularity logical fallacy.

 

[John Jones]

Jabba, your concept of the 'self' appears to be at odds with everyone else's concept.

I disagree that there is a 'self' which remains the same throughout life. A human being has a personality which changes with time and experiences. If the 'self' to which you refer is not the personality, is not the memories, is not affected by the experiences, and is not affected by structural changes to the brain, then what is it?

I suspect that you are trying to suggest something akin to a religious concept of a soul (though there is no reason to think that this, if it existed, is a static, unchanging thing either). Here in SMMT we'll need some evidence that such a thing exists. Otherwise, we may as well ask for this thread to be dumped in R&P.

Hear, Hear!

 

[PixyMisa]

Slowvehicle,
- I do mean what you suggested I mean -- I think that there must be an infinite number of potential selves.

But we know that this is not only not true, but not possible.

- But, when I said something about us being on the same page, I wasn't referring to that page -- I know that you disagree with me about the infinity thing. I'm just hoping that you and I have the same concept of "self," or the same part of the self, in mind...

Clearly not, because any scientific model of self will result in only a finite number of potential selves.

- Do you accept that there is a part of the self (the "experiencer" itself) that does not change from its first memory to its last?

Absolutely not. That contradicts everything that is known about, well, everything.

You seem to be starting with the assumption of an immaterial soul. There is no evidence whatsoever that such a thing exists or is possible. There is no scientific theory that would require or allow such a thing. If you need such a premise for your proof to succeed, you will never get past step one.

 

[Loss Leader]

You seem to be starting with the assumption of an immaterial soul. There is no evidence whatsoever that such a thing exists or is possible. There is no scientific theory that would require or allow such a thing. If you need such a premise for your proof to succeed, you will never get past step one.

He can actually have his "soul" concept in the second half of his formula. However, his first half is all about the universe as it is known to science. It is impossible for a person who exists to have had an infinitely small chance of existing in the universe as it is now understood. These are a bunch of reasons:

1. There is a finite amount of matter in the universe.
2. There is a finite amount of time that life can be supported in the universe.
3. There are a finite number of arrangements of matter that could be individual people in the universe.
4. In our universe, 1/inf. is zero. Nothing that now exists could have had a zero chance of ever existing.

and now 5. There is no such thing as a continuous "self" in our universe.

 

[AdMan]

- Do you accept that there is a part of the self (the "experiencer" itself) that does not change from its first memory to its last?

Personally, I don't, either. How did you ever reach this conclusion? It makes no sense.

 

[xtifr]

3. There are a finite number of arrangements of matter that could be individual people in the universe.

I highlighted the part that is irrelevant and potentially misleading. The sentence is equally true with that phrase dropped. And with that phrase intact, he might still think the arrangements of matter without people is infinite, which would actually sort of support his claim.

And then we'd have to spend another week or two explaining why he was reading too much into the way you worded that...

 

[AdMan]

I highlighted the part that is irrelevant and potentially misleading. The sentence is equally true with that phrase dropped. And with that phrase intact, he might still think the arrangements of matter without people is infinite, which would actually sort of support his claim.

And then we'd have to spend another week or two explaining why he was reading too much into the way you worded that...

A week?! I'd say another month or two, at least, given Jabba's apparent speed in understanding the most basic of concepts.

 

[pakeha]

...You seem to be starting with the assumption of an immaterial soul. There is no evidence whatsoever that such a thing exists or is possible. There is no scientific theory that would require or allow such a thing. If you need such a premise for your proof to succeed, you will never get past step one.

Not to mention there still isn't a consensus on the definitions of A and non-A.

 

[Akhenaten]

Not to mention there still isn't a consensus on the definitions of A and non-A.

This can't be repeated often enough, given that those labels were only applied by Jabba so he could "more narrowly focus" on his bogus mathematics without having to deal with the underlying bogus definitions of the Scientific and Non-Scientific Models.

 

[Akhenaten]

3. There are a finite number of arrangements of matter that could be individual people in the universe.

I highlighted the part that is irrelevant and potentially misleading. The sentence is equally true with that phrase dropped. And with that phrase intact, he might still think the arrangements of matter without people is infinite, which would actually sort of support his claim.

It's worse even than that, I think, since Jabba seems to believe that the mysterious selves to which he keeps referring are able to exist without the benefit of being any kind of arrangement of matter at all.

He may have backed away somewhat from claiming that his infinitely divisible pool of souls is a thing that actually exists somewhere, but there is another question that he has been asked several times which still requires an answer if we're to get a bead on what it is exactly that he's claiming to be immortal.

viz.

The total number of people that have ever lived on Earth is 108,000,000,000 which means (if immortality of the self is essentially true) that there are currently 101,000,000,000 more selves than there are people.

Where are they?

And then we'd have to spend another week or two explaining why he was reading too much into the way you worded that...

Only a week or two? Your optimism is an inspiration.

 

[Jabba]

If you could absolutely reproduce a physical neurosystem to the detail of every last action potential and neurotransmitter-receptor physical state, then yes, I think you would exactly duplicate the same "self" and thoughts. This is my idea of how consciousness is an emergent property of a physical brain. However, in a matter of milliseconds, the selves would diverge because their experiences were different. By the way- we cannot do this exact physical duplication even for clones or identical twins: the genetics are the same, but the physical neurosystems (either due to chance or to different experiences, e.g being in the left vs right womb) diverge.

I think they would be identical but they would be two separate selves - they would not share experiences, thoughts, or feelings, even if they were having the same thoughts or feelings.

Like dealing the same hand from two different decks of cards. They're identical, but separate.

- At this point in our discussion, I am trying to support my insistence that there is an infinity of potential selves.
- The first obstacle in the way of doing that is that we are not all talking about the same "self." Giordano and Dave give me what seems like the perfect example of this diversion. Giordano and Dave are not talking about the same self. Dave is talking about the self that I'm trying to talk about.
- Maybe, I should have called it an "aspect" of the self, or better yet, the "core" of the self. Whatever, it's the part of the self that does not change from it's first memory, at least, to its last. And probably, it doesn't change from conception to death -- at least.
- Does that help at all?

It helps me understand that you are talking about something that I don't believe exists. More importantly for this discussion, it is something that is not included in the scientific model of consciousness.

Dave,
- Above, you say how the perfect reproduction of a specific neurosystem would not share experiences with the original neurosystem and would therefore be a separate self.
- In the case of one person, the existing self does share the experiences of all the preceding selves, and is -- in that sense -- the same self. This self has "changed" enormously over the years, but in that one sense, remains the same self.

- I suspect that the above won't help either, but I think it does get at the meaning of the "self" that I'm talking about. When someone says that he doesn't want to die, he's alluding to the discontinuation of his heretofore continuous self.

 

[pakeha]

...
- In the case of one person, the existing self does share the experiences of all the preceding selves , and is -- in that sense -- the same self. This self has "changed" enormously over the years, but in that one sense, remains the same self. ...

Hold on, Jabba.
Have you forgotten the definition of a self or consciousness?

 

[Aepervius]

- In the case of one person, the existing self does share the experiences of all the preceding selves, and is -- in that sense -- the same self.

Which is why an amnesiac is actually two persons, one before and one after the accident provocating the amnesy. And somebody with memory problem not able to build new memory is frozen in time.


hmmmm.

ETA: in case this is not clear, I am clearly very sarcastic