[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

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- I think that what I would like to do now is shift over to the real complementary model and see if I can establish that its posterior probability is unimaginably small -- given my current existence. If I can do that, I'll come back to the immortality model and argue it.


You're going to have a seriously difficult time doing that. One of the complements to your existence in a non-deterministic universe is that everybody else exists. We know that to be true. So we know that one of the possibilities actually can and did happen. Other people exist. Separating out the difference between your immortal existence and the mortality of the entire species should prove to be impossible.

At the same time, one of the other possible complements is that we live in a deterministic universe. If the universe ran from the beginning, it would turn out exactly the same way. There is no experiment that can be devised that could show the universe to be random, rather than predetermined. Philosophically, it is an intractable, unsolvable problem. So, good luck with that.


ETA: Let me advance a possible logical proof of your beliefs:

1. The fear of death scares the bejezus out of Jabba.
2. Through complicated mathematical gymnastics, Jabba can create some belief in himself that he will not die.
3. It is a good thing to safeguard oneself from fear.
Thus: Jabba should think of himself as immortal.

I think that's your strongest case. And, incidentally, it is a case in which I completely agree. If you find comfort in your beliefs, I am very glad for you. If your beliefs help you and don't hurt anyone (and it doesn't seem like they could), I wish nothing but the best for you.
 
LL,

- Previously, I couldn't figure out why you were saying a "random" universe. Now I think that you were implying "as compared to a deterministic universe."

- As for my definitions of p and ~p -- assuming that P is what I'm calling the "Scientific Model" -- specifically, this model holds that my self will exist for only one finite life at most. The complementary model is that my self will exist and it will exist continuously, or for multiple lifetimes.
- At this point, I have to admit that my model is not quite complementary. My model is that I am immortal -- that I will exist continuously or periodically ... forever.

- I think that what I would like to do now is shift over to the real complementary model and see if I can establish that its posterior probability is unimaginably small -- given my current existence. If I can do that, I'll come back to the immortality model and argue it.

Oh give it a rest. You can't present a successful argument even when you get the mods to quash all but one dissenting voice.

You haven't done so since you first appeared at the JREF fora, and there's no reason to think you ever will.

Take it to PMs. why don't you? AFAICT, you have nothing but baseless claims repeated to the point of monotony.
 
Loss Leader,
- I'll give it my best shot.
- A deterministic universe wouldn't make any difference re the prior probabilities. Prior Probabilities are based upon the information we have prior to the event -- allowing that we don't have all the relevant info.

Good evening, Mr. Savage!

At the risk of being accused of being "unfriendly", I must point out to you that you are, apparently, still dropping tha ball as far as ~p bing everything but p.

I will continue to point this out.
 
LL,

- Previously, I couldn't figure out why you were saying a "random" universe. Now I think that you were implying "as compared to a deterministic universe."

- As for my definitions of p and ~p -- assuming that P is what I'm calling the "Scientific Model" -- specifically, this model holds that my self will exist for only one finite life at most. The complementary model is that my self will exist and it will exist continuously, or for multiple lifetimes.
- At this point, I have to admit that my model is not quite complementary. My model is that I am immortal -- that I will exist continuously or periodically ... forever.

- I think that what I would like to do now is shift over to the real complementary model and see if I can establish that its posterior probability is unimaginably small -- given my current existence. If I can do that, I'll come back to the immortality model and argue it.

Good evening, Mr. Savage!

At the risk of being accused of being "unfriendly", you cannot just handwave away this issue. Let's simplify: Suppose "p" is the condition "being Rich Savage". In that case, "~p" would NOT be,"being Loss Leader"; or "being Akhenaten"; or "being Agatha"; nor yet "being the third mushroom from the left under the bridge to Lulongomeela". "~p" would be..."not being Rich Savage". Everything that satisfies the condition, "not being Rich Savage" is "~p".
 
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This reminds me of the major flaw in the kalam cosmologial argument for the existence of God. It begs the question, because the only thing allowed in the category of uncaused things is God, the very conclusion it's aiming for; in other words, it begs the question. Here, the only thing Jabba is allowing into his category of not-P is the conclusion he wants, that he is immortal.

So Jabba, how do you rule everything else out and distill not-P all the way down to the sole condition of your immortality?
 
In addition to the larger issues, I'm currious why you keep saying the scientific model says we each have "at most" a single, finite existence. The scientific model says we each have exactly one finite existence.
 
In addition to the larger issues, I'm currious why you keep saying the scientific model says we each have "at most" a single, finite existence. The scientific model says we each have exactly one finite existence.

No, the scientific model predicts that radioactive particles only have half-lives.
 
Good afternoon, Mr. Savage!

I do hope you will read, and take to heart, Loss Leader's post, quoted below:



The highlighted bit has been pointed out to you in multiple threads by multiple posters. Please read what Loss Leader has said, and respond to it.

Thanks!


You and Loss Leader have done well to explain this issue. It is the simple logical fallacy of false dichotomy which is hampering Jabba's "essential proof". In fact, this is the major problem with his Effective Debate(TM) proposal which is focused on "hearing both sides". But for many issues (as Loss Leader so properly explained in the moderated thread) there are often more than two sides.
 
- Reviewing the last two pages, I found the following issues.
1. Deterministic universe? (My answer @ #2558.)
2. Why aren’t the rest of us special? (My answer @ #2540.)
3. False dichotomy. (My answer @ #2560.)
4. Why “at most”?
5. Validity of my numbers?
6. Other life forms?

- I’ll start by elaborating re #3.
- As for my definitions of p and ~p -- assuming that P is what I'm calling the "Scientific Model" -- specifically, this model holds that my self will exist for only one finite life at most. The complementary model is that my self will exist and it will exist continuously, or for multiple lifetimes.
- At this point, I have to admit that my model is not quite complementary. My model is that I am immortal -- that I will exist continuously or periodically ... forever.

- I think that what I would like to do now is shift over to the real complementary model and see if I can establish that its posterior probability is unimaginably large (I had it backwards before) -- given my current existence. If I can do that, I'll come back to the immortality model and argue it.


- Questions?
 
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Questions?

Why are you doing this? There is no such thing as immortality. Are you so afraid of death? If you are purporting the existence of an immortal soul then why don't you just say so? Maths has nothing to do with it.
 
- Reviewing the last two pages, I found the following issues.
1. Deterministic universe? (My answer @ #2558.)
2. Why aren’t the rest of us special? (My answer @ #2540.)
3. False dichotomy. (My answer @ #2560.)
4. Why “at most”?
5. Validity of my numbers?
6. Other life forms?
As post numbers can change, it is better to provide links to the posts to which you want to refer back.

1. 2558 Which doesn't really answer Loss Leader's point.

2. 2540 In which you tell us that you will answer the question about whether we are all special at some later unspecified time.

3. 2560 In which you accept that you have set up a false dichotomy, as your models are not complementary.



- I’ll start by elaborating re #3.
- As for my definitions of p and ~p -- assuming that P is what I'm calling the "Scientific Model" -- specifically, this model holds that my self will exist for only one finite life at most. The complementary model is that my self will exist and it will exist continuously, or for multiple lifetimes.
- At this point, I have to admit that my model is not quite complementary. My model is that I am immortal -- that I will exist continuously or periodically ... forever.

- I think that what I would like to do now is shift over to the real complementary model and see if I can establish that its posterior probability is unimaginably large (I had it backwards before) -- given my current existence. If I can do that, I'll come back to the immortality model and argue it.


- Questions?

As I understand it, you are starting again, with your P being that your 'self' is immortal, and your ~P is that your 'self' is not immortal. You intend to demonstrate that the probability of ~P is less than 1.

I am suspicious that this is a reset of sorts, but I will wait to see your calculations.
 
- I think that what I would like to do now is shift over to the real complementary model and see if I can establish that its posterior probability is unimaginably large (I had it backwards before) -- given my current existence. If I can do that, I'll come back to the immortality model and argue it.[/i]

- Questions?

Why? You admit that the complimentary model isn't what you want to try to prove, so why try to prove it? Why not actually try to prove what you're trying to prove? Proving the complimentary model of your hypothesis won't help you to prove what you're tying to prove.

Let's use the analogy of a six-sided die. Let's say that "the scientific model", as you describe it, is rolling a 6. Immortality is rolling a 1. What you're now saying is that you're going to try to prove that rolling a 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 is more likely than rolling a 6. From there you intend to prove that rolling a 1 is more likely than any other result.

Why? Just start with showing how likely rolling a 1 is.
 
- I’ll start by elaborating re #3.
- As for my definitions of p and ~p -- assuming that P is what I'm calling the "Scientific Model" -- specifically, this model holds that my self will exist for only one finite life at most.

Not "at most": it should be "exactly". We do not have less than one life, and we do not have more than one life. We have exactly one life.

The complementary model is that my self will exist and it will exist continuously, or for multiple lifetimes.
- At this point, I have to admit that my model is not quite complementary. My model is that I am immortal -- that I will exist continuously or periodically ... forever.
I hope that your last sentence means that you have realised that the complementary model will have everything that is not exactly one life, for instance "two lives, nothing more, and nothing less", and so on.
 
- I think that what I would like to do now is shift over to the real complementary model and see if I can establish that its posterior probability is unimaginably large (I had it backwards before) -- given my current existence. If I can do that, I'll come back to the immortality model and argue it.[/i]

- Questions?


Your numbers do not matter. Your probabilities, however you establish them, are meaningless. The only thing that matters is that the probabilities of all of the possible conditions add up to 1.

Defining the total possible conditions is essential. However, I see no way for you to do so.
 
As post numbers can change, it is better to provide links to the posts to which you want to refer back.

1. 2558 Which doesn't really answer Loss Leader's point...
Agatha,
- LL had more than one point. Are you saying that I didn't answer his point re a deterministic universe?
 
...
3. 2560 In which you accept that you have set up a false dichotomy, as your models are not complementary...
- Yeah.
- I had been trying to show that immortality was "essentially" the complement of one finite existence, before I showed why the complement "essentially" had to be true -- but, that was surely a mistake.
 
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