Akhenaten
Heretic Pharaoh
Squeegee,
- It is this consciousness that most of us treasure and don't want it to go away for good.
I think you'll find that wishful thinking isn't quite the same as essential proof.
Squeegee,
- It is this consciousness that most of us treasure and don't want it to go away for good.
Squeegee,
- You're "present consciousness" and it's continuity over your physical lifetime, is the actual "thing" I'm talking about.
I'm not talking about the underlying, constantly changing machine.
Squeegee,
- It is this consciousness that most of us treasure and don't want it to go away for good.
Squeegee,
- It is this consciousness that most of us treasure and don't want it to go away for good.
Dave, Pixel & Squeegee,
- How about this?
- What we're talkin about is sort of analogous to a camera and and its film. You guys are talkin about the film. I'm talkin about the camera. The film changes, but the camera stays the same (basically). The camera is the "observer" or "self."
- I suspect that won't help, but it's worth a try.
I stopped following this thread back in February, when Jabba stopped posting. I didn't notice that he started again in October.Jay, Humots, Lenny, xtifr,
- Any of you guys still around? I can't believe that you don't have any objections to my argument at this point.
- If anyone else here accepts the individual consciousness I'm trying to convey, maybe you could describe it better.
Squeegee,
- Try these.
- From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-awareness#The_basis_of_personal_identity
According to Locke, personal identity (the self) "depends on consciousness, not on substance" nor on the soul. We are the same person to the extent that we are conscious of our past and future thoughts and actions in the same way as we are conscious of our present thoughts and actions. If consciousness is this "thought" which doubles all thoughts, then personal identity is only founded on the repeated act of consciousness: "This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but ... in the identity of consciousness."
- Rene Descartes: Cogito ergo sum.
- That's about as well as I can do for now. I assume that such is not enough, but I need to move on otherwise. If needs be, I'll come back to this issue later on.
- I still claim that there is a real concept here -- it's just difficult to convey. A few years ago, I ran into a 3D Xmas tree on line. When you first see it, it looks like a bunch of little 2D trees. But, if you sort of re-focus, all of a sudden you see a big 3D tree. I think that, somehow, you need to sort of re-focus in order to recognize what I'm talking about... Though, it could be that we aren't really disagreeing about the concept itself, but rather semantics...
- If anyone else here accepts the individual consciousness I'm trying to convey, maybe you could describe it better.
Squeegee,
- You're "present consciousness" and it's continuity over your physical lifetime, is the actual "thing" I'm talking about. Your present consciousness is the thing that I claim actually does continue past your physical lifetime. We just can't express it after our body dies (and, we can't remember it when we come back in a different body -- if reincarnation is the answer). I'm not talking about the underlying, constantly changing machine.
According to Locke, personal identity (the self) "depends on consciousness, not on substance" nor on the soul. We are the same person to the extent that we are conscious of our past and future thoughts and actions in the same way as we are conscious of our present thoughts and actions. If consciousness is this "thought" which doubles all thoughts, then personal identity is only founded on the repeated act of consciousness: "This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but ... in the identity of consciousness."
- Rene Descartes: Cogito ergo sum.
- That's about as well as I can do for now. I assume that such is not enough, but I need to move on otherwise. If needs be, I'll come back to this issue later on.
- I still claim that there is a real concept here -- it's just difficult to convey. A few years ago, I ran into a 3D Xmas tree on line. When you first see it, it looks like a bunch of little 2D trees. But, if you sort of re-focus, all of a sudden you see a big 3D tree. I think that, somehow, you need to sort of re-focus in order to recognize what I'm talking about... Though, it could be that we aren't really disagreeing about the concept itself, but rather semantics...
Dave,Yes:
Identical twins come from the same sperm and ovum, but they don't share a self. The reason they don't share a self is because there are two of them, not one. So even though their brains start out nearly identically, each has its own point of view.
Also, brains develop in response to stimuli, so two brains that started out as identical will develop differently because they will be exposed to different stimuli.
Dave,
- I'll try to get back to your first point next.
- In regard to your second point, I'm talking about a shared "observer." If the two bodies actually shared the same observer, their exposure would not be different. This observer would be exposed to the events of both bodies.
Dave,Yes:
Identical twins come from the same sperm and ovum, but they don't share a self. The reason they don't share a self is because there are two of them, not one. So even though their brains start out nearly identically, each has its own point of view.
Also, brains develop in response to stimuli, so two brains that started out as identical will develop differently because they will be exposed to different stimuli.
Dave,Dave,
- You may be right about the DNA, I'll try to track that down.
- The question here is when the "self" is established. We know that it's established, and remains the same, at least by the time of our earliest memory -- even though our "characteristics" are being revised for many years thereafter.
Akhenaten,It's ridiculous.
Have you essentially given up trying to prove immortality?
Dave,
- I'll try to get back to your first point next.
- In regard to your second point, I'm talking about a shared "observer." If the two bodies actually shared the same observer, their exposure would not be different. This observer would be exposed to the events of both bodies.