[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Toontown]

Nonsense. But you seem to think that I should be surprised that I exist, because it's unlikely (but not impossible) for this specific me to exist. That's just bad math.

You say "nonsense", but then in the next sentence you imply that you wouldn't reject a hypothesis no matter how far askew the observed data is from the hypothetical expected frequencies, as long as the skew is mathematically remotely possible.

That's pretty much true, yes. If something happened, we know it's not impossible.

It's not impossible for you to win the lottery, and you won't be surprised if you do. Presumably you are investing all available funds in lottery tickets.

Because the possibility of you winning the lottery cannot be mathematically eliminated. Therefore, your course to immense wealth is clear. And surprisingly easy. But not surprising to you.

I doubt that very much.

Of course you do. But even if I did prove you wrong again, it would still be groundhog day again tomorrow.

The pattern is clear.

 

[godless dave]

You say "nonsense", but then in the next sentence you imply that you wouldn't reject a hypothesis no matter how far askew the observed data is from the hypothetical expected frequencies, as long as the skew is mathematically remotely possible.

I said nothing of the kind. In the case of "unique brains", the observed data is equal to the hypothetical expected frequencies. One unique brain exists per human being born, except for the small number of encephalitic babies, exactly as we expect. There is no reason to reject the unique brain hypothesis on statistical grounds because the observed behavior is identical to the predicted behavior.

It's not impossible for you to win the lottery, and you won't be surprised if you do. Presumably you are investing all available funds in lottery tickets.

Because the possibility of you winning the lottery cannot be mathematically eliminated. Therefore, your course to immense wealth is clear. And surprisingly easy. But not surprising to you.

That doesn't follow. I would be surprised if I won the lottery, because it's highly unlikely. But it's not impossible. If I won the lottery, I would not assume the lottery was rigged in my favor, I would assume I got very, very lucky.

 

[Toontown]

No, I'm not. "I" haven't beaten any odds because if "I" didn't exist, "I" wouldn't have any odds to beat or not beat. "I" don't exist until after the events have happened..

That's called getting beat, dave. That's how the universe kicks your ass. Rejects your hypothesis. I would call it a bad beat, but it's the overwhelmingly likely expectation, given the unique brain assumption, which you seem determined to hold on to like a donkey.

How so? The potential brains that don't exist don't have the capacity to experience nothingness, because they don't exist.

That doesn't make it any less conspicuous by it's absence, when you do, in fact, exist.

I'm not saying that at all.

You're trying not to say that. But I don't think you're succeeding in not saying that.

Near 1, not 1.

OK, Dave, this is your argument: "not 1"

This is your argument on "not 1": 0.00000........1

Any questions?

I don't see nothingness because I exist. If I didn't exist, I wouldn't be able to see anything, because there would be no "I".

Bingo.

Oh wait. You're using that for an argument again, aren't you.

 

[godless dave]

That's called getting beat, dave. That's how the universe kicks your ass. Rejects your hypothesis. I would call it a bad beat, but it's the overwhelmingly likely expectation, given the unique brain assumption, which you seem determined to hold on to like a donkey.

I don't see how my hypothesis is rejected.

That doesn't make it any less conspicuous by it's absence, when you do, in fact, exist.

Why? If only a small number of potential brains exist, why is it surprising that those brains that do exist, exist?

If we only expect 1 out of 585 million Powerball tickets to hit the jackpot, why are we surprised when 1 out of 585 million Powerball tickets hits the jackpot?

OK, Dave, this is your argument: "not 1"

This is your argument on "not 1": 0.00000........1

Any questions?

Yes. My question is, why are you equating 0.00000........1 with impossibility?

 

[dafydd]

That doesn't follow. I would be surprised if I won the lottery, because it's highly unlikely. But it's not impossible. If I won the lottery, I would not assume the lottery was rigged in my favor, I would assume I got very, very lucky.

And you would be immortal too?

 

[godless dave]

And you would be immortal too?

Apparently, if an unlikely event happens, a miracle has occurred, so I guess so.

So now I have to worry about Christopher Lambert trying to decapitate me. There can be only one.

 

[dafydd]

Apparently, if an unlikely event happens, a miracle has occurred, so I guess so.

So in the extremely extreme vanishingly small chance that the Turin shroud is genuine we will all be immortal? Why do people die?

 

[Toontown]

I said nothing of the kind. In the case of "unique brains", the observed data is equal to the hypothetical expected frequencies.

There are no hypothetical expected frequencies available from that bird's eye viewpoint. If you want an expected frequency, you have to go to the frogs eye view. If you don't want any expected frequency, stay up there where you've got nothing.

Classical probability is conditional. It changes depending on your viewpoint.

If you are the customer at a carnival shell game, the probability distribution of the pea's location is 0.5:0.5

If you're the little girl standing next to the dealer when he lifts a shell slightly and you see the pea, the distribution is 1:0

If you're Granny across town playing bingo, the probability distribution is _:_

The customer and the little girl's distributions are equally valid. It's just that the little girl has the advantage of viewpoint.

Granny has no distribution on the pea. She knows stuff about the bingo game though.

 

[godless dave]

There are no hypothetical expected frequencies available from that bird's eye viewpoint.

Why not?

If you want an expected frequency, you have to go to the frogs eye view.

Potential brains don't have a viewpoint.

 

[Toontown]

Yes. My question is, why are you equating 0.00000........1 with impossibility?

I'm not. I gave you the 0.00000.....1. I could have insisted on 1/infinity. You would have squawked in protest, but that's all.

That's the value of your argument. AKA the probability of chance.

 

[Toontown]

Why not?

You have this habit of asking questions immediately after they're answered. It's an odd habit.

Is your internet slow?

Potential brains don't have a viewpoint.

Lucky you. You are not a potential brain. Too bad you don't want to use the viewpoint you have.

Did I mention that expected frequencies do not mysteriously disappear simply because you have observations to compare to them? That's because the expected frequencies are determined by the hypothesis, and so are unchanged by the mere observation of existing data. Which is convenient, because the ability to compare observations with expectations provides a handy way to test hypotheses.

 

[godless dave]

I'm not. I gave you the 0.00000.....1. I could have insisted on 1/infinity.

In which case you would have been wrong. The likelihood of a specific brain existing is not 1/infinity.

 

[godless dave]

You have this habit of asking questions immediately after they're answered. It's an odd habit.

Is your internet slow?

You still haven't answered the question. Why, from an objective, "bird's-eye" viewpoint, are there no expected frequencies?

Did I mention that expected frequencies do not mysteriously disappear simply because you have observations to compare to them? That's because the expected frequencies are determined by the hypothesis, and so are unchanged by the mere observation of existing data. Which is convenient, because the ability to compare observations with expectations provides a handy way to test hypotheses.

But in the case of potential brains that don't exist, it seems meaningless to consider things from their viewpoint. They won't know if they don't exist, because they don't have the capacity to know things.

But let's say, for the sake of argument, we can generate an expected frequency of existence from the point of view of a potential brain. It's greater than zero because there is a sequence of possible events that can lead to that brain's existence. So what's the issue?

 

[Toontown]

But let's say, for the sake of argument, we can generate an expected frequency of existence from the point of view of a potential brain. It's greater than zero because there is a sequence of possible events that can lead to that brain's existence. So what's the issue?

You don't need to do that. As I've explained, You can generate an expected frequency of existence from the point of view of an existing brain, which makes infinitely more sense in practical terms.

All you need is a hypothesis upon which to base the expected frequency. The existence or nonexistence of the brain will have no effect on the expected frequency, because the expected frequency is a consequence of the hypothesis, not the existence of any particular brain.

All of which I explained in the post you responded to. So It's groundhog day already again.

Goodbye, Dave.

 

[godless dave]

You don't need to do that. As I've explained, You can generate an expected frequency of existence from the point of view of an existing brain, which makes infinitely more sense in practical terms.

All you need is a hypothesis upon which to base the expected frequency. The existence or nonexistence of the brain will have no effect on the expected frequency, because the expected frequency is a consequence of the hypothesis, not the existence of any particular brain.

And if we do that for the "unique brain hypothesis", we still get a non-zero number. So what's the issue?

 

[Toontown]

But in the case of potential brains that don't exist, it seems meaningless to consider things from their viewpoint. They won't know if they don't exist, because they don't have the capacity to know things.

But let's say, for the sake of argument, we can generate an expected frequency of existence from the point of view of a potential brain. It's greater than zero because there is a sequence of possible events that can lead to that brain's existence. So what's the issue?

No issue. You now have your expected frequency, under the unique brain assumption.

The expected frequency is identical to the probability of chance.

The probability of chance is the probability that the unique brain assumption accounts for your current sentient experience, because that is the probability that the presumably required unique brain would occur by chance, and your brain is that specific prerequisite brain.

The probability of chance is sufficiently small to reject the unique brain hypothesis with very high confidence.

Leaving the corollary: experiencable sentience is not dependent on the occurrence of a specific unique brain.

 

[Toontown]

delete

 

[John Jones]

Deleted

 

[John Jones]

Seconded.

All the chis-squared stuff, all the "expected probability" stuff...anything that does not have direct bearing on Mr.Savage's claims of being able to show why compounded unlikelihoods demonstrate immortality.

Thirded.

 

[zooterkin]

Wow. You could've read post 1181.

Or a number of other posts. But you didn't.

I have read them. None of them says what this "unique brain assumption" actually is, nor how it is remotely relevant to immortality.