[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Toontown]

The thing that made it impossible to communicate was your firm insistence on sticking with the bizarre phrase "odds to one". If you'd tried communicating in standard English instead of inventing eccentric and counterintuitive coinages, I think you would have gotten a lot farther.

Oh, the bizarre horror of it all. An eccentric and counterintuitive coinage has been committed, which has caused vast confusion. Multiple pages of verbosity must now be devoted to extracting penance for this insidious practice!

So, now that we've gotten this far, and maybe are both on the same page, what, exactly, is it that's so special about odds where the numerator is one?

Red herring.

 

[Toontown]

I didn't say it should have relevance to Jabba's argument. Since you say it doesn't, I won't bother trying to figure out what your point is.

You don't need to figure it out. I already told you what my point was. It was to rebut Garrette's bogus assertion.

 

[Garrette]

Why should it, when it was a rebuttal to an assertion which itself had no relevance to Jabba's argument?

Which was itself a response to your point, so if you want to continue down the rabbit hole I would be most appreciative if you stop pretending innocence.

You don't need to figure it out. I already told you what my point was. It was to rebut Garrette's bogus assertion.

Tsk, tsk. You've hardly demonstrated such. I am beginning to doubt the existence of your chops at all. Natheless, read on, McDuff, to the next post.

 

[Garrette]

Apologies for the full-on and lengthy quote. I rarely do it, but in this instance I thought quoting two back was best for clarity.

Quibble I had intended to point out to Jabba earlier: The 7 billion should be much more than that, unless you are restricting this to consciousness existing right now. Not that 1 trillion over infinity is any further from zero than 7 billion over infinity.

It doesn't matter how many of anything exists. You might as well be counting grains of sand on Mars.

Two errors in one! Well done!

Your first sentence implies I didn't get the point about anything over infinity; if you re-read my last sentence, you will see I was admitting precisely that point. But you have worded your response too broadly. It most certainly does matter how many of anything exists, particularly if one asserts that the "how many" is infinity, which has been rather the point of this pulled thread of conversation.

Your last sentence is more fundamental, though. I've no idea how many grains of sand on Mars there are, but I do know it is not infinite. The distinction is the point: infinite possibilities versus non-zero probabilities.

If you hypothesize that a unique brain is the only way to experience sentience,

I don't. Do you?

then the probability of experiencing sentience is exactly equal to the probability of that unique brain coming into existence, in that unique organization, in those unique spacetime coordinates, or it's nothingness forever.

This is true regardless if we hypothesize that a unique brain is the only way to experience sentience. You have managed to restate what we have been agreeing with all along.

Well, we might expect some 7 billion to be present but not necessarily those specific 7 billion.

In which case your imagined substitutes would be the 7 billion. No matter.

On the contrary, it matters a great deal.

Yes, but we also do not expect to find ourself among them even with other hypotheses, re the recent discussion about definition of "self." (Might be remembering terms incorrectly, but as you are adamantly not hung up on those, I gather I'm safe there).

I don't know what hypotheses you're referring to, but if they make my sentient experience equally unlikely, then I will reject them with equal certainty.

So you are a puddle-fits-the-hole kindaguy.

I guess I'm just odd that way. I tend to be skeptical of hypotheses that can't account for my existence.

Not a bad position to take, but you are applying it where the hypothesis is at worst unlikely to account for your existence. That's the rub, and there's a world of difference. You keep interchanging long odds with impossible and acting superior when we don't agree.

I might even prefer a hypothesis that seems less parsimonious in other respects if the alternative stacks giganogargantuan odds against my primary observation.

Fine by me; you may prefer whatever you wish, but your preference does not an argument make.

Why is that what is actually being tested? It is of interest, yes, but I see no requirement for its involvement in the question to hand.

If the presumed prerequisite to my sentient experience does not occur, then what is the alternative?

First, you've yet to show that your preference is an alternative, merely that it is a preference. Second, who says any presumed prerequisite does not occur? You exist; it happened regardless of long odds.

To me, at least, the "seemingly obvious question" is not obvious at all. Clarification, please?

Sorry, I forgot what the "seemingly obvious question" was. But take my word for it. It was seemingly obvious.

I can believe quite sincerely that it was seemingly obvious.

I'll leave out discussion of whether you are using "prior odds" correctly, because I don't know the answer, but your questions seems rather intentionally tautological, i.e., if there were infinite odds against my being, does my being mean I beat infinite odds? I would think the answer is, yes, of course, but that is only a valid argument, not necessarily a sound one.

You need to remember what gave rise to that IF. That IF was brought about by assuming a hypothesis to be true for testing purposes. Your sentient experience means you beat infinite odds ONLY IF the presumed hypothesis is true. But the presumed truth of the hypothesis is an IF, not a fact. What you know is, the hypothesis says what you are experiencing is far too unlikely to maintain any confidence in the hypothesis.

So you're engaging in a thought experiment separate from Jabba's question. I suspected as much earlier on but couldn't quite put my finger on it.

I actually agree with your answer, but not your premise. Leaving aside the definition of "beat" in regard to the odds, the odds weren't infinite. The use of the word "significantly" in your request ("significantly more than infinitely unlikely") is misleading. Anything at all that is more than infinitely unlikely is "significantly" so, even if virtually vanishingly small. Infinite possibilities is not the equivalent of infinite impossibilities.

I don't insist that the odds are infinite. But an argument could be made. I do insist that the odds are giganogargantuan. It's just that infinite is quicker to type, and doesn't change the issue at hand.

I understand what you are saying here and the various forms in which you have said it earlier, but you explain it this way but apply it the other (as if the odds were infinite).

The bottom line is, I would prefer a consistent hypothesis that makes what I see more likely over an otherwise consistent hypothesis that makes what I see less likely. I'm just odd that way sometimes.

Reality has a funny way of not caring about our preferences.

And I should bow down before you now? I've little trouble accepting that I fall far short of many here, and probably even you, in the philosophical realm, among others. Doesn't mean I have no place in the race, particularly when the back of the runner in front of me seems more like the guy in high school who was a bit quicker than I am but was not Usain Bolt by any means. You aint Usain, Toontown.

Yes. You must bow down before Zarg.

There are worse fates, I suppose, than playing toadie to one who will provide me comforting bits of hypothetical fluff when I toss restlessly in my sleep...

Or come up with a consistent hypothesis that makes what I see more likely than the alternatives.

Nope. Burden of proof and all that. You've done nothing to (a) demonstrate a problem with Jabba's SM or (b) demonstrate that what you're proposing (which is amorphous at best so far) has more explanatory power. You have merely demonstrated your mental discomfort with the SM. Not enough for me to get excited about, what with my limited slivers of sentience and all.

 

[Garrette]

Objectively, it is a great deal less likely that your ticket wins the lottery than it is that one of all the others does -of which the old lady's ticket would be an unspecified member, unlike your ticket, selected by the fact that you have it, and it is the sole determinor of your lottery destiny.

And now you conflate someone inside the observation with a hypothetical (and in the OP's case fictional) observer outside it.

And that's why you will be surprised if you do win, and that's why surprise is an appropriate response.

Emotionally surprised, yes, but not experimentally. I understand you would be, but that is not for me to change.

Because it's not going to happen for you, even if there is 1 chance in 15 million that it will.

That's a darn good bet, and I'd place money on it if someone would take the wager, but it's only a bet, lacking the certainty you affix to it, and certainly far, far away from the certainty you pretend exists for the non-existence of finite uniqueness.

Trust me. Don't hold your breath, and don't dismiss odds stacked to the moon against you as if they're nothing.

I don't, but I also do not pretend that long odds means impossibilities. Are you suggesting that there are also not finitely unique lottery winners?

And what if an extremely high predicted probability failed to materialize? Such as a giganogargantuan probability predicted by a certain hypothesis that you would never have a sentient experience? That wouldn't mean anything?

Who predicted my sentience? That's the point, or at least one of them. Something was going to happen; I ended up being part of it.

So, if Bernie Madoff guaranteed you a 99.99% chance of doubling your money, and you took the shot and came up cold, your confidence in Madoff's promises would remain unshaken?

You can do better with your analogies.

Nothing you've said indicates you wouldn't call an all in bet with your entire stack to draw to a gutshot straight on the turn against a one-suited board.

You mean I'd go with the odds? Darn tootin', Yosemite Sam, and I'd likely win and possibly not. The "possibly not" grows with repetition. More importantly, I wasn't there before my sentience arose to place a bet that it would. If you think that doesn't matter here then you're mistaken.

 

[Garrette]

Garrette,
- Thanks for giving me something to focus upon. Seriously.
- Hopefully, I can provide some effective answers.
- I'll be back.

You're welcome. I look forward to your thoughts.

 

[Toontown]

Two errors in one! Well done!

Your first sentence implies I didn't get the point about anything over infinity; if you re-read my last sentence, you will see I was admitting precisely that point. But you have worded your response too broadly. It most certainly does matter how many of anything exists, particularly if one asserts that the "how many" is infinity, which has been rather the point of this pulled thread of conversation.

I don't assert that. I arrive at the "infinite" odds against my finite uniqueness by considering what it takes to get my unique brain - a dauntingly complex unique organization occurring at unique spacetime coordinates as an indirect result of the chaotic quantum shuffle which occurred shortly after t = 0 + 10^-43
Nor would a head count mean anything if I chose to calculate my finite unique odds your way. It matters not how many finite unique beings exist. It matters how many are possible, whether they happen to exist or not, which is just a simplistic way of stating what I just did above.

What do you think you get if you divide 1 by the number of existing beings?

Your last sentence is more fundamental, though. I've no idea how many grains of sand on Mars there are, but I do know it is not infinite. The distinction is the point: infinite possibilities versus non-zero probabilities.

Keep quibbling, and maybe you can get that finite uniqueness probability up to something marginally greater than zero, like 0.000000.....1. Then you can proceed to ignore it.

This is true regardless if we hypothesize that a unique brain is the only way to experience sentience. You have managed to restate what we have been agreeing with all along.

But if we do not hypothesize thusly, then your particular sentient experience is not likewise uniquely improbable. But we are nowhere near the point where we consider alternatives. You still do not comprehend the nature of the test.

The finite uniqueness assumption might look superficially consistent from the bird's eye view. But it's not being tested from the bird's eye view. It's being tested from the frog's eye view, where the question becomes "That's all good from up there where you can ignore the flaw. But what am I, specifically, doing here? I'm supposed to be infinitely unlikely."

But I keep forgetting, infinitely unlikely or gargantuanly unlikely means nothing to you. All you need is bird's eye blinders so you don't have to look at it.

Not a bad position to take, but you are applying it where the hypothesis is at worst unlikely to account for your existence. That's the rub, and there's a world of difference. You keep interchanging long odds with impossible and acting superior when we don't agree.

At worst, infinitely unlikely. At best, giganogargantuanly unlikely. But we've already established that you studiously ignore those as if they're nothing. Further establishment thereof is redundant.

So you're engaging in a thought experiment separate from Jabba's question. I suspected as much earlier on but couldn't quite put my finger on it.

No, it's just a restatement of Jabba's question.

There are worse fates, I suppose, than playing toadie to one who will provide me comforting bits of hypothetical fluff when I toss restlessly in my sleep...

If you think the implications of rejecting your specific brain as the only way to have a sentient experience is "comforting", then you do not understand the implications.

Nope. Burden of proof and all that.

There is no "prove" in probability, so I'm not trying to absolutely prove anything.

Just to belatedly respond to several of your previous red herrings I ignored.

You've done nothing to (a) demonstrate a problem with Jabba's SM or (b) demonstrate that what you're proposing (which is amorphous at best so far) has more explanatory power.

Of course it is impossible to probabilistically demonstrate anything to people who habitually studiously ignore and wave off the probabilities.

I'm not trying to disprove science. There is no broadly supported scientific theory I'm challenging.

You have merely demonstrated your mental discomfort with the SM. Not enough for me to get excited about, what with my limited slivers of sentience and all.

Your supposed limited sliver of sentience is the presumed consequence of an assumption as to an implication of the SM, and has nothing to do with your ability to get excited, but does have something to do with the comparison of the magnitude of the sliver to the magnitude of eternity.

 

[Toontown]

Who predicted my sentience? That's the point, or at least one of them. Something was going to happen; I ended up being part of it.

Yes, and the fruit flies I used to test fruit fly heredity hypotheses were going to happen, and they ended up being part of it. And dammit to hell, the probability that they existed while I was counting them under the stereomicroscope was 1. But I still used their prior probabilities to accept or reject various fruit fly heredity hypotheses with ruthless efficiency.

You mean I'd go with the odds? Darn tootin', Yosemite Sam, and I'd likely win and possibly not. The "possibly not" grows with repetition. More importantly, I wasn't there before my sentience arose to place a bet that it would. If you think that doesn't matter here then you're mistaken.

Right. You'd try to make an inside straight when your opponent probably already has a flush, and could high-card you if you both miss. Remember, the board is one-suited, and I did not say you have a card of that suit. You're probably drawing dead.

But then, the facts of the particular situation and the probabilities derived therefrom mean little to you. All you know is, you might make a straight and you might make a flush. And you're getting 1:1 odds to go for it. It's donkey heaven.

More importantly, I wasn't there before my sentience arose to place a bet that it would. If you think that doesn't matter here then you're mistaken.

And infinitely more importantly, if you think that does matter, you're the mistaken one.

 

[Jabba]

- This is really getting interesting. I think that we're mostly focusing in on the same sub-issue -- and, it happens to be the one that I perceive as the most problematic for me, as well as the one that I have several possible answers to... We'll see.

- I think that a lottery winner makes for a pretty good analogy. Say that I just won the lottery. Is there something about me, or my situation, to suggest that I didn't win by chance. Is there something that sets me apart from the other winners? Do I NEED to be set apart from the other 'lottery winners' (selves) in a way that makes my winning suggest a different explanation than chance? If so, what is it that sets me apart?

- My first answer is the one that I think Toon is most focused upon. There is NO NEED to set me apart from other lottery winners – in this particular case, we are all special.

- The basic question to be asked in this case is, ‘Is chance the most likely explanation for my “win” (my current existence).’ Is there some other possible, somewhat plausible, explanation that would make my current existence more likely than does the chance/null explanation?
- In the lottery analogy, the rules seem to work, and no one seems able to cheat. Chance prevails. Chance seems to be our best guess…
- If, however, we discovered that the winner was the spouse of the person most responsible for running the lottery program, we would begin to question our previous assumption, suspecting that chance was NOT the best (most probable) explanation for the win.
- In the my-current-existence case, the sum probability of my current existence -- given the OTHER possible explanations/hypotheses -- is already much greater than it is when given the chance/null explanation/hypothesis – IOW, I don’t NEED to be set apart, I don’t need to be “special,” in order that my current existence allow me to validly reject the null hypothesis…
- To come to a valid conclusion re the null hypothesis in this case, we just need to take into account the sum of prior probabilities of these other explanations/hypotheses… Given the chance/null hypothesis estimate of my likelihood, if the sum prior probability of the other possible explanations is anything non-vanishing, we can reject the chance/null hypothesis. Check mate?

 

[Recovering Agnostic]

So there was this guy who won the lottery, was invited to join a sooper-sekrit club for lottery winners, and went around the whole time saying "So, you won the lottery too, huh? Man, what are the odds?"

Can someone tell me whether this thread's any more profound than the observations of Mr Not-So-Bright the lottery winner? Because I'm not seeing it.

 

[Akhenaten]

So there was this guy who won the lottery, was invited to join a sooper-sekrit club for lottery winners, and went around the whole time saying "So, you won the lottery too, huh? Man, what are the odds?"

Can someone tell me whether this thread's any more profound than the observations of Mr Not-So-Bright the lottery winner? Because I'm not seeing it.

I think you've got a pretty good handle on it.

Hopefully it'll pick up a bit when somebody tries to explain how winning the lottery makes Mr Not-So-Bright immortal.

 

[lenny]

No, that's not the point at all. That's the antithesis of the point.

With all due respect. I think it is quite near the point, and points to the flaw in your argument.

One is neither surprised before nor after.

After you have the data, you have a means of testing the hypothesis, because you have an observation. It just happens, in the case of the particular hypothesis in question, that the observation is vanishingly unlikely by the available means, which would almost certainly not exist if the hypothesis is correct.

You know before that a low probability event is gong to happen.the particular event that does happens had the probability you expected the outcome to have before you knew it. There is no surprise.

Or perhaps there is and I just do not see it. If that is the case could you explain it to me please?

 

[Toontown]

Which was itself a response to your point, so if you want to continue down the rabbit hole I would be most appreciative if you stop pretending innocence.

A bogus response.

Innocence of what?

Tsk, tsk. You've hardly demonstrated such. I am beginning to doubt the existence of your chops at all. Natheless, read on, McDuff, to the next post.

Tsk, tsk, schmsk, schmsk. Yada, yada, yada about how I've hardly proved anything.

You apparently don't even know what kind of chops I was talking about. I said, in effect, that I'll prefer the hypothesis of anyone who has the chops to come up with one that adequately accounts for my observed existence.

I'm not the one being unreasonable here.

 

[Toontown]

With all due respect. I think it is quite near the point, and points to the flaw in your argument.

One is neither surprised before nor after.

You know before that a low probability event is gong to happen.the particular event that does happens had the probability you expected the outcome to have before you knew it. There is no surprise.

Or perhaps there is and I just do not see it. If that is the case could you explain it to me please?

You'd see it if you got hit in the head with a brick. That's a low probability event. You expect to see low probability events. Low probability events have been happening all day. But that brick is unexpected, isn't it. Nor does considering all the other random things that have been happening all day do much to allay your suspicions. All those other random things are red herrings. They mean nothing. They are not the question. The question is, why did that brick hit you in the head? Better think fast. There might be another one coming.

As to the question at hand, you're still assuming the conclusion. You do not know the hypothesis in question is true. You may not necessarily believe it's true. That's why you test it.

You do not expect to observe a low probability event if the hypothesis is true.
You would not expect to observe anything at all, if the hypothesis is true, with near certainty.

 

[Garrette]

A bogus response.

Nope.

Innocence of what?

Of the origin of that series of comments. You imply that I began the conversation regarding surprise when in fact you did.

Tsk, tsk, schmsk, schmsk. Yada, yada, yada about how I've hardly proved anything.

Well said.

You apparently don't even know what kind of chops I was talking about. I said, in effect, that I'll prefer the hypothesis of anyone who has the chops to come up with one that adequately accounts for my observed existence.

I understood exactly to what you were referring when you said, and I quote: "You don't have the chops." I suggest you read a bit more carefully when determining what I mean when I used the word.

I'm not the one being unreasonable here.

Perhaps not, but you are also not being convincing.

Despite how my quoted post seems, I'm really not trying to be contentious. I enjoy such exchanges, particularly when I'm challenged, which I am here, so if any offense was implied, it wasn't intended, and you have my apologies. I would caution, though, that if such is the case that you should be a bit more careful with your own wording and challenges about who has what chops.

 

[Garrette]

You'd see it if you got hit in the head with a brick. That's a low probability event. You expect to see low probability events. Low probability events have been happening all day. But that brick is unexpected, isn't it. Nor does considering all the other random things that have been happening all day do much to allay your suspicions. All those other random things are red herrings. They mean nothing. They are not the question. The question is, why did that brick hit you in the head? Better think fast. There might be another one coming.

As to the question at hand, you're still assuming the conclusion. You do not know the hypothesis in question is true. You may not necessarily believe it's true. That's why you test it.
You do not expect to observe a low probability event if the hypothesis is true.
You would not expect to observe anything at all, if the hypothesis is true, with near certainty.

Regarding the first bit I highlighted: This may be the crux of the issue. The point is not to test a hypothesis, at least not in this thread. The OP is about proving a different hypothesis, and the means chosen is to compare probabilities. What we have been arguing is that he has assigned probabilities incorrectly AND has misinterpreted current reality in regard to its meaning vis a vis prior probabilities.

Regarding the second bit I highlighted: Absolutely, positively, unequivocally, incorrect. That's the point. We most certainly would expect to observe something; we just would not know what it was before it actually happened (as your birdseye observer).

 

[Toontown]

-
- I think that a lottery winner makes for a pretty good analogy.

I actually disagree that the lottery is a good analogy to the finite uniqueness question you've posed.

The lottery is not a hypothesis, it is a functioning system, the output of which is fully known and understood.

I used the lottery only to rebut what I believed was a bogus assertion.

 

[Toontown]

Regarding the first bit I highlighted: This may be the crux of the issue. The point is not to test a hypothesis, at least not in this thread. The OP is about proving a different hypothesis, and the means chosen is to compare probabilities. What we have been arguing is that he has assigned probabilities incorrectly AND has misinterpreted current reality in regard to its meaning vis a vis prior probabilities.

Regarding the second bit I highlighted: Absolutely, positively, unequivocally, incorrect. That's the point. We most certainly would expect to observe something; we just would not know what it was before it actually happened (as your birdseye observer).

Red herring.

I didn't say "we", I said "you", in reference to the specific, presumed unique observer. You need to get that difference straight.

Everything looks consistent from the bird's eye. The flaw is only seen up
close, from the frog's eye.

 

[Toontown]

Perhaps not, but you are also not being convincing.

Yada, yada, yada about how I'm not convincing you of anything.

Join the club, bub. You haven't convinced me of squat.

Did I ever hope or expect to convince you of anything?

Have I ever, at any time in any of these forums, seen
anyone convince anyone of anything? Maybe a couple of times. Hard to say.

So why do people bother belaboring the obvious to the effect that their opponents are invariably failing miserably to convince them of anything?

Is it because it's an easy part, and we all know how to play it so well?

 

[Garrette]

Yada, yada, yada about how I'm not convincing you of anything.

Join the club, bub. You haven't convinced me of squat.

Did I ever hope or expect to convince you of anything?

Have I ever, at any time in any of these forums, seen
anyone convince anyone of anything? Maybe a couple of times. Hard to say.

So why do people bother belaboring the obvious to the effect that their opponents are inevitably failing miserably to convince them of anything?

Is it because it's an easy part, and we all know how to play it so well?

And this is your least convincing bit yet, both from the birdseye and frogs eye views.