[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Toontown]

You are discounting alternatives based on how you feel about them. There is no less evidence for the one-off god than for the others. Even if not, non-scientific models need not be god-based to allow mortality as opposed to immortality.

None of which serves as as a refutation of Jabba's claim. What Godless Dave did was patently fallacious. He conjured up imaginary knowledge about the behavior of an imaginary god, then used the nonexistent knowledge as an argument from nonexistent authority against Jabba's claim.

Jabba's claim may be unconvincing, but it is derived from actual science and actual observation.

 

[Toontown]

Exactly as likely as the god that creates immortals hypothesis - not likely at all.

I hadn't noticed that hypothesis having been advanced.

I would reject both as being essentially identical and equally invalid.

 

[Garrette]

None of which serves as as a refutation of Jabba's claim.

We're not at the point of refuting a claim. We are discussing his Bayesian formula. That formula is incorrect in that it makes a patently false assumption, one among many designed to tilt the outcome in his favor, though we are not yet at that outcome.

What Godless Dave did was patently fallacious. He conjured up imaginary knowledge about the behavior of an imaginary god,

Which is precisely what Jabba is doing with his non-scientific models when he presumes that they must entail immortality.

then used the nonexistent knowledge as an argument from nonexistent authority against Jabba's claim.

So far the entirety of Jabba's argument is founded upon nonexistent knowledge, and we haven't even gotten to the bit that Agatha (I think) and others have pointed out about him pulling the probabilities out of thin air.

Jabba's claim may be unconvincing, but it is derived from actual science and actual observation.

No, it is not. The framework may appear to be scientific and observation-based, but every component of it it arbitrarily chosen and affixed with arbitrary probabilities with a predilection to make the math come out in his favor. In other words, it is not only unconvincing, it doesn't reach the level of working hypothesis.

Here's what godless dave and I are saying:

The set of all models in which consciousness is mortal is larger than 1, yet Jabba has declared that it is equal to 1. It is not trivial or mistaken to point this out, nor is it indicative of either of us somehow missing the point. It is precisely the point, and you are providing Jabba with false cover in ignoring it.

 

[Toontown]

I should probably withdraw from the discussion, since I don't intend to present my own specific interpretation of reality. Which is not the same as Jabba's (or anyone else's). The only part of Jabba's argument I entirely agree with is the part that says the uniqueness assumption is probabilistically so unlikely as to call for an alternative explanation. I don't even agree that there exists a broadly supported scientific explanation of sentient experience which leads to the uniqueness assumption.

But I don't need the entirely unrewarding headache of trying to explain my alternative interpretation of reality, so I'm out.

 

[godless dave]

None of which serves as as a refutation of Jabba's claim. What Godless Dave did was patently fallacious. He conjured up imaginary knowledge about the behavior of an imaginary god, then used the nonexistent knowledge as an argument from nonexistent authority against Jabba's claim.

I did nothing of the kind. I pointed out an unwarranted assumption in Jabba's claim - that if the current scientific explanation for the existence of human consciousness incorrect, then human consciousness isn't finite and single.

Proving one hypothesis incorrect only proves that hypothesis incorrect. It does not demonstrate that competing hypotheses are correct.

 

[Toontown]

I did nothing of the kind. I pointed out an unwarranted assumption in Jabba's claim - that if the current scientific explanation for the existence of human consciousness incorrect, then human consciousness isn't finite and single.

Proving one hypothesis incorrect only proves that hypothesis incorrect. It does not demonstrate that competing hypotheses are correct.

I could quote your post, but nevermind. It's my contention that the only thing being tested by Jabba is the finite uniqueness assumption.

Sentient experience is either finite and unique or not. There are no other alternatives which can be questioned by Jabba's anthropic approach.

Your god-of-the-one-offs speculation was identical to Jabba's so-called scientific explanation in the sense that both supposedly lead to the identical conclusion. Under either hypothesis, there is a possibility, however remote, that you might briefly see the light of day. Then the lights go out forever - in the event that they would ever come on, the likelihood of which could be manipulated by additional imaginings on your part.

As I pointed out yesterday, your imaginary alternative is no alternative at all in the sense of the question at hand and the method of questioning. And I'm still trying to point it out today. And so grows the headache.

 

[Toontown]

Doesn't matter. Jabba is basing his equation on the Scientific Model (the key aspect of which is mortality), but comparing it to "any other possible model." I think that particular concept is correct, but only if the set of "any other possible model" actually includes any other possible model. What you are suggesting is that the set is actually "any other possible model that doesn't include mortality."

That's a mistake.

I only have one alternative interpretation. But I don't intend to present it.

In my opinion, Jabba is using the equation on the finite uniqueness assumption, whether either of you know it or not. If Jabba believes the finite uniqueness assumption is the inevitable consequence of the sum of scientific knowledge, then I would disagree.

I agree with Jabba that the finite uniqueness assumption is vulnerable to a form of anthropic reasoning, but that's as far as it goes. There is no way the vulnerability of the finite uniquensess assumption negates centuries of scientific research and observation.

It is therefore my personal belief is that science is basically right, and the finite uniqueness assumption that some derive therefrom is basically wrong.

But I won't try to explain it. It is an interpretation, can't be proved, is very difficult to explain, probably even more difficult to understand, is unlikely to be accepted even if understood, and may well be best left that way.

 

[Garrette]

No one has asked you to present your explanation. It would, in fact, be irrelevant. I admit I am confused. You are so spectacularly missing a point that seems so obvious I am surprised you do not see it and therefore wonder if I am not the one spectacularly missing the point. There is, however, enough solid ground that I really don't think so, so I will try again:

What godless dave and I are saying is simply that Jabba had left some alternatives out of his equation. In response, you say that since these alternatives share the uniqueness characteristic they are properly left out or do not really exist. I say you are mistaken; they must be included. Look at it this way. If only one alternative with uniqueness may be included then only one alternative without uniqueness may be included. Are we left then with but two choices?

 

[Toontown]

No one has asked you to present your explanation. It would, in fact, be irrelevant. I admit I am confused. You are so spectacularly missing a point that seems so obvious I am surprised you do not see it and therefore wonder if I am not the one spectacularly missing the point. There is, however, enough solid ground that I really don't think so, so I will try again:

What godless dave and I are saying is simply that Jabba had left some alternatives out of his equation. In response, you say that since these alternatives share the uniqueness characteristic they are properly left out or do not really exist. I say you are mistaken; they must be included. Look at it this way. If only one alternative with uniqueness may be included then only one alternative without uniqueness may be included. Are we left then with but two choices?

I'm saying that the only alternative Jabba can test by his method is the uniqueness assumption. He cannot differientiate between different mechanisms leading to the same finite uniquenes or it's alternative. He can only test the concept of finite uniqueness itself. The mechanism behind it remains opaque to him. Jabba isn't testing mechanisms. He's testing the uniqueness assumption, irrespective of underlying mechanism, whether he or anyone else besides me knows it or not.

Thus there are two possibilities testable by Jabba's method: either he is finite and unique or not. The why and how of it are not determinable by his methodology and the information he has available to him.

Jabba rejects the finite uniqueness assumption on the basis that the assumption makes his specific observed existence infinitely unlikely. You may not agree with his conclusion, but offering up an imaginary mechanism by which he would erroneously reach the same conclusion misses the point of the test. Jabba's conclusion may also be correct, which Jabba asserts is far more likely.

It is true that, unlike the all-knowing Godless Dave, Jabba would not know a god had arbitrarily decided to create him in a unique, mortal, and soulless form, just to mess with him because Dave has ordained it. Jabba would therefore reject the uniqueness assumption on the same grounds as he did, irrespective of the unknown underlying mechanism invented by Godless Dave. Jabba's conclusion would be wrong in that case, but the likelihood of Dave's Jabba-deceiving imaginings being true is, in Dave's own words, "not likely at all."

 

[Jabba]

...Proving one hypothesis incorrect only proves that hypothesis incorrect. It does not demonstrate that competing hypotheses are correct.

Dave,

- I think you're wrong here.

- Proving one hypothesis incorrect does demonstrate that a competing hypothesis is correct if the competing hypothesis is the "complement" of the hypothesis proven incorrect. This (as you probably know) is the concept of "excluded middle."
- Unfortunately for me, though, I didn't say this as explicitly as needed in order to make this a case of excluded middle... I think that if the "lead" hypothesis had been that all human consciousness is finite and single, and it had been proven incorrect, the complementary hypothesis would be that at least one human consciousness is not finite and single, and would have been proven correct.

- And while I gotta admit that such wouldn't prove that I am either infinite or multiple, it would go a long ways towards supporting such.

 

[abaddon]

Dave,

- I think you're wrong here.

- Proving one hypothesis incorrect does demonstrate that a competing hypothesis is correct if the competing hypothesis is the "complement" of the hypothesis proven incorrect. This (as you probably know) is the concept of "excluded middle."
- Unfortunately for me, though, I didn't say this as explicitly as needed in order to make this a case of excluded middle... I think that if the "lead" hypothesis had been that all human consciousness is finite and single, and it had been proven incorrect, the complementary hypothesis would be that at least one human consciousness is not finite and single, and would have been proven correct.

- And while I gotta admit that such wouldn't prove that I am either infinite or multiple, it would go a long ways towards supporting such.

This leaves you in the unfortunate position of having to disprove all of the infinity of hypotheses predicated on a finite single consciousness, not just the one you have selected at random and failed to disprove.

Good luck with that.

 

[Jabba]

No one has asked you to present your explanation. It would, in fact, be irrelevant. I admit I am confused. You are so spectacularly missing a point that seems so obvious I am surprised you do not see it and therefore wonder if I am not the one spectacularly missing the point. There is, however, enough solid ground that I really don't think so, so I will try again:

What godless dave and I are saying is simply that Jabba had left some alternatives out of his equation. In response, you say that since these alternatives share the uniqueness characteristic they are properly left out or do not really exist. I say you are mistaken; they must be included. Look at it this way. If only one alternative with uniqueness may be included then only one alternative without uniqueness may be included. Are we left then with but two choices?

Garrette,
- Just to point out that I did ask Toontown to present his explanation.

 

[Jabba]

I should probably withdraw from the discussion, since I don't intend to present my own specific interpretation of reality. Which is not the same as Jabba's (or anyone else's). The only part of Jabba's argument I entirely agree with is the part that says the uniqueness assumption is probabilistically so unlikely as to call for an alternative explanation. I don't even agree that there exists a broadly supported scientific explanation of sentient experience which leads to the uniqueness assumption.

But I don't need the entirely unrewarding headache of trying to explain my alternative interpretation of reality, so I'm out.

Toon,
- Hope you change your mind. I have a lot to say about "unique" -- just that my time of late has been especially stretched by the need to babysit my sick, twin grandkids.

 

[godless dave]

I thought the excluded middle was a logical fallacy.

 

[Garrette]

Garrette,
- Just to point out that I did ask Toontown to present his explanation.

My apologies to you both for missing that.

 

[Toontown]

This leaves you in the unfortunate position of having to disprove all of the infinity of hypotheses predicated on a finite single consciousness, not just the one you have selected at random and failed to disprove.

Good luck with that.

I'd take those odds.

If, as you claim, there are an infinity of unknown but highly unlikely ways Jabba's conclusion can be wrong, then the unavoidable implication is an equal infinity of unknown but highly unlikely ways his conclusion can be right.

So his chances of being immortal can't be worse than 50-50. Beats the hell out of the infinity of ways a finite one-off would never exist at all, as opposed to the one way it would.

 

[Toontown]

Toon,
- Hope you change your mind. I have a lot to say about "unique" -- just that my time of late has been especially stretched by the need to babysit my sick, twin grandkids.

I'll keep an eye on things. Hilarity abounds in threads like this.

 

[Toontown]

Garrette,
- Just to point out that I did ask Toontown to present his explanation.

I won't stir up that hornet nest, but I did leave a hint. Still, no chance anyone around here will guess the nature of my interpretation.

It is therefore my personal belief is that science is basically right, and the finite uniqueness assumption that some derive therefrom is basically wrong.

I'm just playing the odds. As you can see, I have them stacked heavily in my favor.

likelihood of science being basically wrong = squadouche
likelihood of the uniqueness assumption being basically right = squadouche

 

[Jabba]

I thought the excluded middle was a logical fallacy.

Dave,
- If you're not just "pulling my leg," see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_excluded_middle. As I understand this stuff, the fallacy of excluded middle is when two claims are said to represent a case of excluded middle, but do not. This happens a lot because, very often, what appear to be complementary hypotheses are seen not to be complementary upon closer scrutiny -- like what I had first claimed...

 

[Jabba]

Exactly. And in Bayes' Formula, the "event" whose probability is going to be updated is the event that the hypothesis is true. The new information that will update that event is the information that you exist. The probability of that new information, given the hypothesis, is called the "likelihood."



No. In Bayesian terminology, the prior probability is the probability of the hypothesis that you want to update with new information. The updated probability of the hypothesis is the posterior probability.



Superficially doesn't count in mathematics. Rigorous definitions do. A likelihood in statistics is a function with the same form as a probability density or mass function, but with unknown parameters whose values are conditional on the values of some observation(s). Thus in Bayes' Formula the terms that have form P(Data | Hypothesis) are likelihoods.

Jay,

- You are right.

- I thought that I had sent the following already, but apparently not...

- If I ever knew of the "likelihood" terminology, I forgot it.
- But, I would argue that in "everyday" language, the probability of an event occurring, given established beliefs, could reasonably be called the "prior probability."
- Would you agree with that?