We're not arguing about whether the copy would be a separate person. We all agree on that. We're asking you to show how having a separate consciousness makes consciousness a special property, when all the other properties of the copy would also be distinct!
The fingerprints would be identical, but the fingers would be distinct, and if one finger got cut, the copy's fingerprints wouldn't reflect that. They wouldn't be the same fingerprints. If one copy went for a jog, the other would not benefit from the exercise. If both copies had a mild case of heartburn at the moment of copying, one taking an antacid would not cure the other. They're separate (though identical) because they occupy different locations in spacetime. It's that simple.
To quote the famous real estate aphorism: location, location, location!
Being teleported is scientifically indistinguishable from destroying the original and creating a copy in a new location.
Simply existing is indistinguishable from destroying the original and creating a copy in the same location.
The only thing that makes the copy a different person is that it's a separate person in a separate location, so its separate brain has a separate set of activities and properties.
Physics, Jabba, physics. Location, location, location!
You said that you agreed that location might affect your theory. Well, it's obvious (and has been all along) to the rest of us that it totally affects your theory, and it's time to address it, as you've been promising to do for pages now.