[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

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Maybe the immortal words of Tom Jones are better apt:

"Friends, Romans...Countrymen!
Screw your courage to the sticking-place
And be not sick, nor pale with grief
That thou, her handmaid, art far more fair
Than she. Why doth the drum come hither?
...It comes for thee."
Or the words of Lewis Carroll:

"Friends, Romans, and countrymen, lend me your ears!"
(They were all of them fond of quotations:
So they drank to his health, and they gave him three cheers,
While he served out additional rations).
 
I really hate to introduce yet another analogy. I keep thinking, as futile as it may be, that someone will explain all of this such that it will finally click for Jabba. People here post some very well explained arguments drawn from known science and Jabba just keeps skipping over those posts and ignoring what they have to say. And yet, in our Sisyphusian manner, we continue as thus...

Imagine a Slinky. It is moved and produces a wave that travels the length of the Slinky. The wave as a separate entity doesn't actually exist. It is an emergent property of the movement of the Slinky. Now, imagine that the movements of the Slinky are repeated a second time. The movements are repeated exactly, I mean exactly. What is the result?

The result is another wave that travels down the Slinky just like the first one. If you video-taped each wave you could not tell them apart. The waves are exactly alike.

Jabba believes that the first wave is special. Even if you repeated the movements of the Slinky, you may get a wave that is identical, but it is not the first wave. You see, the first wave will always be the first wave and no other wave can be it. An identical wave will never actually be that first wave. Thus, you can keep repeating the exact movements of the Slinky, but you will never get that first wave again. The probability of that first wave being the first wave is one over infinity. This is how Jabba sees selves. Sure, another can be exactly identical but it is not that first self.

Jabba, the problem in your thinking is still the concept of separate but identical. Just as there is no difference between waves emerging from identical movements of a Slinky, there is no difference between selves emerging from identical neurosystems. You can't state being separate as a distinguishable characteristic of identical items. Separate is part of the definition of multiple items, not a distinguishable characteristic.

Ugh.
 
I really hate to introduce yet another analogy. I keep thinking, as futile as it may be, that someone will explain all of this such that it will finally click for Jabba. People here post some very well explained arguments drawn from known science and Jabba just keeps skipping over those posts and ignoring what they have to say. And yet, in our Sisyphusian manner, we continue as thus...

Imagine a Slinky. It is moved and produces a wave that travels the length of the Slinky. The wave as a separate entity doesn't actually exist. It is an emergent property of the movement of the Slinky. Now, imagine that the movements of the Slinky are repeated a second time. The movements are repeated exactly, I mean exactly. What is the result?

The result is another wave that travels down the Slinky just like the first one. If you video-taped each wave you could not tell them apart. The waves are exactly alike.

Jabba believes that the first wave is special. Even if you repeated the movements of the Slinky, you may get a wave that is identical, but it is not the first wave. You see, the first wave will always be the first wave and no other wave can be it. An identical wave will never actually be that first wave. Thus, you can keep repeating the exact movements of the Slinky, but you will never get that first wave again. The probability of that first wave being the first wave is one over infinity. This is how Jabba sees selves. Sure, another can be exactly identical but it is not that first self.

Jabba, the problem in your thinking is still the concept of separate but identical. Just as there is no difference between waves emerging from identical movements of a Slinky, there is no difference between selves emerging from identical neurosystems. You can't state being separate as a distinguishable characteristic of identical items. Separate is part of the definition of multiple items, not a distinguishable characteristic.

Ugh.

Well put. Feng Shui on a sinking ship, but well put.
 
6. Matter, energy, time and/or space may be finite and thereby limit the number of different selves that could ACTUALLY COME INTO EXISTENCE.

7. But even if any of these things is/are finite, the number of POTENTIAL selves is not.
How does "the number of different selves that could actually come into existence" differ from "the number of potential selves"? Aren't those exactly the same? And so aren't you contradicting yourself here?

(Hint: if you think they are different somehow, that is probably the main point where your idea of "what science thinks" differs from what science actually thinks. Because science actually thinks there is no difference between those two.)

But you're wrong either way.

11. Again, each new self is BRAND new – and while the TYPE of thing (or process) that this new self is, is determined by biology, the PARTICULAR self, itself, is determined by nothing
Physics, not biology! And most definitely not "nothing!"

Each self is associated with a single brain. The whole "identical copies" thing is a red herring. One brain = one self, whether it's identical to another or not.

And since there are only a finite number of possible arrangements of matter in the universe and only a subset of those include any brains at all, the number of potential selves is very much finite!

Note that when I say "possible arrangements of matter in the universe", I'm not just talking about arrangements that may arise naturally. I'm talking about every theoretical permutation of every bit of mass and energy in the entire universe. Even that inconceivably large set is still finite.

Must I remind you again of the Planck length? Which means that the universe is not infinitely divisible, quite unlike an abstract, mathematical volume of space?
 
This situation reminds me of an attempt at alien contact in a classic science fiction story, The Dragon Masters by Jack Vance.

An alien race is using genetic engineering to "domesticate" humans, creating servants, warriors and even draft animals. Every so often they raid a human settlement to get new material.

The humans manage to capture some of the aliens and attempt to use them as hostages to end the raiding.

Unfortunately, the aliens, or The Revered as they call themselves, have a philosophy of predestination. This philosophy clearly states that: it is an outrage to reality that The Revere" be captives, and it is ordained that they be released without conditions.

The alien's negotiator, a domesticated human, makes this argument again and again, using different words but saying the same thing. He even does a fringe reset. He pities these poor humans who cannot understand his simple logic.

The humans refuse to see reason, and even threaten to execute the captives. After due consideration, the remaining aliens and their servants go insane and destroy themselves.

The captive aliens rationalize that since this cannot be happening to The Revered, they must be "a different order of creature entirely".

The humans have a suggestion...
 
- Once more, into the breach. Here’s what I think that science thinks -- or at least, what I think that science SHOULD think.

1. A certain physical situation creates consciousness.
2. Each separate consciousness brings with it, or develops, a “self” – or, at least, a sense of self. [ . . .]

No, Jabba, no.
Do you remember the definition of a sense of self?



Dave,

- I accept that replicating my brain -- whenever that would be done -- would not replicate "me."
- But, that's actually one of my own premises...

- I'm claiming that my biology is not exclusive to me.
- Then, I'm claiming that according to the scientific model, my biology, just like that of anyone else, produces a brand new consciousness that takes on, or brings with it, a brand new self of its own. [ . . . ]

Jabba, do you remember how consciousness is defined?



- I guess this is our real point of divergence. It has to do with what "identical" includes. To me, the selves (or senses of self) would have different identities. [ . . . ]

Jabba, please keep in mind how sense of self is defined.
 
- I accept that replicating my brain -- whenever that would be done -- would not replicate "me."

Jabba. are you saying that replicating your brain would not replicate you? Just asking. I may repeat the question endlessly until I can distort your answer to match what I believe.
 
Jabba,

Do you at least agree that an exactly duplicated VW (if that were possible) would be indistinguishable from the original to someone who happened upon them afterward? Including the VIN number?
 
This situation reminds me of an attempt at alien contact in a classic science fiction story, The Dragon Masters by Jack Vance.

An alien race is using genetic engineering to "domesticate" humans, creating servants, warriors and even draft animals. Every so often they raid a human settlement to get new material.

The humans manage to capture some of the aliens and attempt to use them as hostages to end the raiding.

Unfortunately, the aliens, or The Revered as they call themselves, have a philosophy of predestination. This philosophy clearly states that: it is an outrage to reality that The Revere" be captives, and it is ordained that they be released without conditions.

The alien's negotiator, a domesticated human, makes this argument again and again, using different words but saying the same thing. He even does a fringe reset. He pities these poor humans who cannot understand his simple logic.

The humans refuse to see reason, and even threaten to execute the captives. After due consideration, the remaining aliens and their servants go insane and destroy themselves.

The captive aliens rationalize that since this cannot be happening to The Revered, they must be "a different order of creature entirely".

The humans have a suggestion...

I have checked out the e-book, on your recommendation. TY!
 
I win! Two posts in and Jabba introduces "VIN Number" in place of "self."
To Jabba: No. First, your introduction of VIN Numbers as differentiating VWs is ludicrous; the premise was that VWs were replicated with the same physics. Second, you are continuing the fallacy of separating "self" from "consciousness."

Will you ever stop?

For the vin. It's been a long thread, have we covered stolen passports yet?
 
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Jabba. are you saying that replicating your brain would not replicate you? Just asking. I may repeat the question endlessly until I can distort your answer to match what I believe.

It depends on how you define "you". In one sense, they'd both be you, but as far as you were concerned, you would be you and the copy wouldn't be (and the copy would feel the same way, but in reverse). It is, I believe, that latter sense that Jabba is referring to, and if so, then he's correct.

It still doesn't help him, though, and I think we should stop quibbling about the duplicate thing, because it's a red herring.

The bottom line is: one functioning brain = one sense of self. Whether duplicates or not. If you copy the brain, you get another brain with a separate (but identical) sense of self. One consciousness per brain.

Now Jabba just has to prove that there's an infinite number of potential brains that could exist. Which he can't.
 
I have checked out the e-book, on your recommendation. TY!

I hope you enjoy it. It came out in 1962, in an SF magazine called Galaxy, and won the Hugo Award.

The original publication included artwork by the SF artist Jack Gaughan. Here is the cover and here is some interior artwork.

It's one of my favorite stories. Please tell me if the e-book includes any of it.
 
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