- Surely, this will require a lot of tweeking to get any agreement at all -- but, this seems to be my basic syllogism for there being an infinity of potential selves.
Good Morning, Mr. Savage!
While I realize that you will most likely ignore this post, I appreciate your presentation of your premises.
As you might expect, I have a few objections to delineate.
- My claim is that according to the scientific model...
1. You guys may be right in claiming that consciousness is an emergent property of a living nervous system, and of nothing else. But since my claim includes that possibility, I'm happy to use it as my opening premise.
No, not really. "According to the 'scientific model'," consciousness is an emergent property of a living neurosystem (not "may be", but "is").
It can only be "part of your premise" if you state it correctly; that is, once you amend the "scientific model" to include "
may be an emergent property of a living nervous system", then you are not, in fact, "including" the "scientific model" in your premise. You are, in fact,
disagreeing with the "scientific model", improperly extending it to pretend that is contemplates a condition (consciousness independent of a living brain) which it, in fact, does not.
If you re-write your premise to state that, to the limit off our understanding, consciousness is an emergent property of a properly functioning neurosystem, or words to that effect, you will be on fairly safe, common ground with the "scientific model".
2. Next, I claim that there are two different types of things emerging from the nervous system: A) various characteristics of the person and B) the particular consciousness (self) of the person.
3. A person's characteristics are the result of specific DNA and experience/environment.
4. The person's specific consciousness, however, emerges when a living nervous-system reaches the necessary complexity -- with no dependence on the specific DNA or experience/environment -- so long as the necessary complexity of the nervous system is reached.
Once again, you are trying to define into existence a distinction that is not supported by evidence, and is not a part of the "scientific model".
The particular consciousness that emerges form a properly functioning neurosystem will be the result of the physical propertied of the neurosystem (as determined by environment and heredity),
combined with, or
affected by the experiences of the neurosystem.
This is where your "identical consciousnesses from identical brains" question founders. Even if it were possible to construct two identical neurosystems (and it is not, as has been repeatedly explained to you), each of those neurosystems would undergo unique experiences, and a unique consciousness would emerge.
The characteristics of my consciousness are part of the characteristics of me.
Not to mention the complete and utter lack of any evidence at all for there ever having been a "shared consciousness" (or "the same 'self' in two brains" as you propose).
5. In other words, a person's particular consciousness (self) that emerges has no prior physical "representation" (I'm using quotes cause I'm not really satisfied with the term, but currently can't think of anything better) of any kind, or limitations.
First, that is a precisely correct use of scare quotes: that is, using the closest possible word you can find, but demonstrating doubts about, or dissatisfaction of, its accuracy or precision in its current use. Well done!
However:
The fact that I am left-handed, but was forced to imitate a "righty" had no prior physical representation.
The fact that I have several different degenerative genetic conditions had no prior physical representation.
The fact that I am (relatively) tall had no prior physical representation.
The fact that I am stubborn, and willful, and contrary, had no prior physical representation.
The consciousness that emerges as part of the function of a healthy, sufficiently complex neurosystem is the result of all of the factors affecting it. Of course there is no "pool" of pre-made consciousnesses waiting to be installed in a proper neurosystem; just as there is no "white" waiting to be installed in snow.
6) In still other words, there is no physical limit on "who" the particular person will be -- you did not come from a limited pool of possible selves.
There are, in fact, limits on "who" the person will be; limits imposed by the physical constraints of reality. A consciousness that "used to be" Napoleon Buonaparte (but that has none of the Little Corporal's memories, or experiences, or other characteristics) cannot emerge as part of the functioning of the neurosystem, as the neurosystem as part of which it emerges was not the neurosystem as part of which Buonaparte emerged.
7) And therefore, according to the scientific model, whatever the appropriate numerator, the denominator for your likelihood of existing is unlimited (infinite).
This is a completely improper use of "therefore". Your conclusion, which you reached first, is not supported by the "scientific model"; for that matter, it is not supported by the amended version of the "scientific model" you want to be allowed to use.
There are not an "infinite" number of potential consciousnesses.
Given that you exist, the likelihood of your existence is 1.
Not to mention:
What has any of this to do with the existence of the "soul", or its "immortality"?
You are still trying to pretend that what you think "ought to be" is "more likely" that what observably is.
When do you intend to get to your evidence?