[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Aepervius]

Page 117 with 40 posts per page!

Has Jabba demonstrated immortality through Bayesian statistics yet?

Or, more leniently, has he managed to actually stake out his complete argument yet?

He more or less did, but found out rapidly that is "decades of solid argumentation" quickly sublimated and now he has to change his very "solid" argument.

Which is funny on so many level, if only because it should give a "hint" to jabba that maybe something is wrong with his argument, but then again I think he simply ignore us.

 

[jt512]

- The denominator in the likelihood of me given A.

So, I'm assuming that A is your hypothesis, the one you had been calling NSM, correct? At some point you had been writing the term as P(me|NSM,B), where B is the background information. So, the value of P(me|NSM,B) depends on three events: me, NSM, and B, where "me" is the data, NSM is the hypothesis, and B is the background information. Which of these events are the "selves" you're referring to a part of: the data (me), the hypothesis (NSM), or the background information (B)?

 

[Jabba]

So, I'm assuming that A is your hypothesis, the one you had been calling NSM, correct? At some point you had been writing the term as P(me|NSM,B), where B is the background information. So, the value of P(me|NSM,B) depends on three events: me, NSM, and B, where "me" is the data, NSM is the hypothesis, and B is the background information. Which of these events are the "selves" you're referring to a part of: the data (me), the hypothesis (NSM), or the background information (B)?

- No. A is what I had called "SM."

 

[godless dave]

- No. A is what I had called "SM."

In that case, it can't possibly included immaterial selves. Those aren't part of the scientific model.

 

[jt512]

- No. A is what I had called "SM."

Ok, so that likelihood term, P(me|SM,B), can be written in terms of three events: the data, "me"; the hypothesis, SM; and the background information, B. Which of these events are the "selves" you are referring to a part of?

 

[Loss Leader]

- No. A is what I had called "SM."

Of all the things to respond to, that's what you pick?

Why would you choose to correct a simple (and meaningless) typo? What happened to you saying you'd take whichever question came first?

You have yet to explain why your "intrinsic" number should be used in the denominator. You have yet to answer objections that cards, lotto numbers and people are exactly alike, separated only by limiting conditions that you have indiscriminately placed or ignored.

Please answer substantive objections.

 

[Jabba]

Ok, so that likelihood term, P(me|SM,B), can be written in terms of three events: the data, "me"; the hypothesis, SM; and the background information, B. Which of these events are the "selves" you are referring to a part of?

- If I understand your question, the selves are the data.

 

[Jabba]

Of all the things to respond to, that's what you pick?

Why would you choose to correct a simple (and meaningless) typo? What happened to you saying you'd take whichever question came first?

You have yet to explain why your "intrinsic" number should be used in the denominator. You have yet to answer objections that cards, lotto numbers and people are exactly alike, separated only by limiting conditions that you have indiscriminately placed or ignored.

Please answer substantive objections.

- Not to worry.
- It is no longer my plan to answer the first questions first. Mostly, I just need to keep my focus. JT's questions were easy to answer (if I understood them), and are central to the discussion; yours require more time. But, yours do relate directly to my current focus, so I'll try to answer them next...

 

[Monza]

- I agree with both of you except That it doesn't matter that I haven't applied my criteria consistently. In a sense, that's the whole point -- I'm saying that we can set up a situation in which the possibilities are intrinsically finite, and others where the possibilities are only extrinsically finite.
- The main point is that the limits on the number of possibilities possible can be determined by factors solely "internal" to the situation defined, or, they can be determined by factors external to the situation defined.
- Poker hands and lottery tickets are "closed" by definition; Volkswagens are "open."


outsidethe situations' definitionunder certain circumstances, things

Hi, Jabba. I know others have already pointed out the error in your reasoning, but it is important to understand if you attempt to base your proof on this concept of intrinsic and extrinsic finite-ness. As someone stated a couple days ago, you are not comparing apples to apples. Depending upon which constraint you apply, both poker hands and VWs can be considered intrinsically finite or extrinsically finite. I will try to explain why.

You say that poker hands are intrinsically finite. That is, there are a finite number of combinations that can be made. This of course assumes that we define a poker hand given some finite variables. For example, a deck only has 52 unique cards and a hand is made up of 5 cards.

But we can do the same for VWs. Say we define a list of three options: type of transmission, body style, and color. We define each option with two choices: transmission (manual or automatic), body style (coupe or convertible), and color (red or blue). Now we are comparing apples to apples. You can only make a finite number of unique VWs (poker hands) given the dealer options (types of cards).

Now let's look at your concept of having an unlimited supply of resources and energy. In this case, yes you can make an infinite number of VWs. Note that many of them will be identical. You would have more than one automatic-coupe-red VW. To compare apples to apples, you can have this same situation with poker hands. Given an unlimited supply of cards you will have an infinite number of poker hands. But as with the VWs, you will have more than one aces-over-eights full house. Either poker hands or VWs can become extrinsically finite if the resources or energy is limited.

Basically, in one scenario you are counting the number of combinations given finite variables and the other you are counting multiple and identical objects. If you want to define this as intrinsic and extrinsic, that is fine but understand that it makes no difference.

I sincerely hope this has helped clarify what others have been saying. Their criticisms are valid and an understanding of them is important to move forward.

 

[Loss Leader]

- If I understand your question, the selves are the data.

Eleven hours ago, you said differently:

- The denominator in the likelihood of me given A.

However, if you'd like to put infinity in the numerator, I certainly won't argue with you.

 

[Jabba]

In that case, it can't possibly included immaterial selves. Those aren't part of the scientific model.

Dave,
- I don't understand your question. Immaterial selves are not part of the scientific model. The scientific model deals with "selves" of some sort -- just not immaterial selves.

- Sorry LL. I think that was another easy one.

 

[Giordano]

- No. A is what I had called "SM."

As already pointed out, A and ~A add up to 1. But B is not predicted mathematically by the probability of A at all. If you think B (your NSM hypothesis) is more likely than A, fine, that is religion not science or math. But I don't know of a mathematic proof that defines B as ~A, or in any other way relates your B to A. Isn't this a problem for your "proof?"

 

[Aepervius]

By your standard Jabba there is an infinite number of flower combination with petal form and color spectra. Therefore flower are immortal.

There is also an ifninite combination of leopard dot. Therefore leopard are immortal.

I'll leave the itnermediate step as "the probablity of a single leopard with such spot is 1/infinite" to you.

 

[Giordano]

- No. A is what I had called "SM."

First if your model of SM involved selves not linked to physical brains, then you are wrong about the model. But perhaps this is proposed by your NSM hypothesis? And so are part of B?

But even more so, then as pointed out, A and ~A add up to 1. But B is not predicted mathematically by the probability of A or of ~A at all. If you think B (your NSM hypothesis) is more likely than A, fine; that is religion not science or math. But I don't know of a mathematic proof that defines B as ~A, or in any other way relates your B to A. Isn't this a problem for your "proof?"

 

[Giordano]

- If I understand your question, the selves are the data.

I thought you said that in your theory the "selves" survive death, but our memories do not. Therefore our "selves" are not our memories, but instead are the way we process and interpret the data to form memories. So are our memories the data, or the rules by which we record it?

Some of my confusion comes from your analogy to DVDs, where the data is most equivalent to our memories, not to our "selves."

 

[Mojo]

- As to my argument for there being an infinite ‘number’ of potential selves (it will be largely what you've read before, but now we should be able to judge each assertion, by itself, one at a time):

1. There are two different "kinds" of “finiteness” – extrinsic and intrinsic.

2. Potential poker hands and potential combinations of numbers on a lottery ticket are intrinsically finite.
2.1. Each grouping has a preexisting “pool” of possible combinations. The pool of possible poker hands is much smaller than the pool of possible combinations on a lottery ticket.

3. Potential Volkswagens are only extrinsically finite.
3.1. There is no preexisting pool of potential Volkswagens. Any limit on the number of Volkswagens possible would be due to extraneous variables only.

4. And, what is extrinsically finite can be intrinsically infinite.
4.1. If we had infinite matter, energy and time, we could produce new Volkswagens forever.

5. Potential selves may be extrinsically finite -- but even if they are, they are intrinsically infinite.
5.1. There is no preexisting pool of potential selves. Any limit on the number of selves possible would be due to extraneous variables.

6. The appropriate ‘number’ of potential selves to be inserted into our Bayes formula is the intrinsic number.
6.1. There not being a preexisting pool of potential selves, each new self would be “brand“ new – with no limit on “who” exactly it would be…

I think I've got it. Jabba is arguing that "selves" and Volkswagens are both "extrinsically" finite, and that just like "selves", the number of potential Volkswagens is infinite.

A friend gave me a lift home last night, in a Volkswagen. Because there are an infinite number of potential Volkswagens, the odds of that particular Volkswagen having existed when I was given the lift are one over infinity.

Now, if we define A as "Volkswagens have one finite existence"...

- I had best leave it there for now.

Yes, you had.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- I don't understand your question. Immaterial selves are not part of the scientific model. The scientific model deals with "selves" of some sort -- just not immaterial selves.

So your idea that they come from nowhere doesn't apply.

 

[Loss Leader]

Dave,
- I don't understand your question. Immaterial selves are not part of the scientific model. The scientific model deals with "selves" of some sort -- just not immaterial selves.

To amplify godless dave's last comment, you say above that the infinite number of selves are not immaterial selves. So, they must be material - comprised of atoms and molecules and stored electrical energy and other physical stuff.

But earlier you said that these selves "come from nothing." If they come from nothing, they are not physical. If they come from nothing, they must not be material.

If they are material, they are limited by the amount of matter, energy and time in the universe. If they are immaterial, they have no place in the scientific model.

So, which is it? You've said both. Which one should we use in the scientific model and why?

- Sorry LL. I think that was another easy one.

No, it wasn't. You contradicted your earlier statements and created an unsolvable paradox.

 

[pakeha]

- I agree with both of you except That it doesn't matter that I haven't applied my criteria consistently. In a sense, that's the whole point -- I'm saying that we can set up a situation in which the possibilities are intrinsically finite, and others where the possibilities are only extrinsically finite. ...

No, Jabba.
It DOES matter that you haven't applied your criteria consistently.
It matters because you've crossed a line from science to religion, where anything goes.

 

[xtifr]

I think I've got it. Jabba is arguing that "selves" and Volkswagens are both "extrinsically" finite, and that just like "selves", the number of potential Volkswagens is infinite.

A friend gave me a lift home last night, in a Volkswagen. Because there are an infinite number of potential Volkswagens, the odds of that particular Volkswagen having existed when I was given the lift are one over infinity.

No. Again, because of the physical limitations at the small end due to the Planck length, there are a finite number of possible arrangements of matter in the universe. It's the permutations of an already mind-croggling number (the amount of quanta in the universe), so it's an even more mind-croggling number, but it is still finite. And only a subset of those finite arrangements can reasonably be described as a Volkswagen. Therefore, the number of potential Volkswagens is not infinite. "Intrinsicly", "extrinsically", or otherwise.

Ditto for "selves".