[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Humots]

I do agree with what Jay said. But it is not just that the numbers that you use are off the wall.

As I said before, Bayes' Theorem is not a syllogism. It is a mathematical equation that is meaningful only with things that are defined well enough to be assigned a probability.

True scientific hypotheses and data are very specifically defined. Newton's original hypothesis about gravity contained a specific mathematical formula detailing exactly how gravity behaved. And the data used to verify the hypothesis consisted of precise measurements.

I believe that your terms "NR" and "R" and "k" are not precise enough to be included as either hypotheses or data in the Bayes' formula.

Let me try to illustrate what I mean. Suppose we hypothesize "All crows are black". Using pure logic, we can verify this statement by either:

1. Determining that every crow in the world is black, or
2. Determining that every non-black object in the world is not a crow.

Suppose we try (2), and we find an albino raven? This is a non-black object that is not a crow, so it would seem to support the hypothesis.

But a raven is genetically related to a crow, so an albino raven implies that an albino crow could exist. So here is a non-black object that is not a crow that implies that not all crows are black.

In the real world, "crow" and "raven" are not completely distinct. They overlap.

Jabba, I am trying to give an example of how your hypotheses are "fuzzy" in a logical sense that prevents them from being treated as you are treating them.

I still don't get why we care about P(Jabba) or why it would make any significant difference to any of these theological claims about the existence and perminance of the soul. Am I the only one who thinks the entire discussion can be reduced to a proper answer to this question. Why is P(the soul is eternal | Jabba) different to P(the soul is eternal), or however this is being phrased?

My contention is that P(the soul is eternal | Jabba) and P(the soul is eternal) are not valid entries in Bayes' Theorem.

 

[shuttlt]

My contention is that P(the soul is eternal | Jabba) and P(the soul is eternal) are not valid entries in Bayes' Theorem.

Because all his definitions are too ill-defined? There are certainly multiple possible objections to his argument.

 

[pakeha]

Hi, Jabba.
I've only just seen what you've posted in answer to my question:

...What do you think is supernatural, Jabba?

Pakeha,
- Currently, ESP, precognition, etc. are considered to be supernatural -- if, in fact, they exist. I think that they do exist, but that they are, in fact, natural. We just don't understand them yet.
--- Jabba

So, what do you consider to be supernatural?

Just to break up the inevitable endless loop, I present to you 100% proof of immortality. Not sure what it has to do with statistics or whole humans, though.

Thanks for the link!

Dafydd,
- Good quote. Dawson agrees with me about the probability of a particular "self" to ever exist. Wonder what he'd say about the probability of a particular self to exist today?
--- Jabba

Dawson?

 

[Humots]

Because all his definitions are too ill-defined? There are certainly multiple possible objections to his argument.

Yes, that's essentially what I am saying. And yes, my objection is one of many that are possible.

I'm hoping that focusing on the actual math will persuade Jabba to question his argument.

 

[dafydd]

Dawson?

I'm wondering who Dawson is too.

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

Squeegee,
- You're right. This is important to me.
--- Jabba

Sure. And I'm not unsympathetic to that. But you have to understand that that doesn't make you right. You still have to try to detach all emotion from this and look at it critically. That includes really trying to wrap your head round what I and everybody else are saying about the flaws in your reasoning.

When I ask you whether you'd still be telling the person typing this that they're so improbable that they must be special had it been a different sperm which fertilised my mother's egg, I'm not asking a rhetorical question. The question is one that I want you to actually think about, because it's the crux of where you're going wrong.

If it had been a different sperm, you'd still be telling that person that they're special because they're so unlikely. So would you had they been born a month later from a different egg. Or had a different father. Or came from a different mother. Or from a different set of grandparents. And so on.

And that's the point - you're saying that I'm special because I'm here. But you'd also say that anybody else in the "potential Squeegee" continuum was equally special.

To go back to the random number generator let's say, for the sake of argument, that there's 1,000 potential Squeegees and that the probability of me existing - as you would term it - is 1 in 1,000. I know that the probability would actually be much lower, but just for ease of illustration 1 in 1,000 will do.

So you've got 1,000 potential Squeegees, and there is a random number generator which generates a number between 1 and 1,000. Whoever has their number come up gets to be born. I'm number 142. The random number generator shows 142. Lucky me, I'm born. The other 999 people never get born. Therefore I'm special.

But what if the number 569 had come up? That Squeegee would have been born instead. Then s/he would have been the lucky one, and therefore special. The same is true if any other number between 1 and 1,000 had come up.

Now, if before the random number generator had done its thing you'd predicted that I would be the one to be born, that would be remarkable. But you didn't. You're looking at the number 142 on the display of the random number generator and saying "isn't it remarkable that, out of all the numbers that it could have displayed, it's displaying 142?". And the answer is that no, it's not. Because you'd be saying that 569 was remarkable, had the random number generator displayed that.

Or, to use a gambling metaphor, seeing as you started with decks of cards, let's talk about dice. Let's say that there's a lady in Vegas playing craps. We'll call her Leia. Now, Leia keeps putting money on certain numbers and then throwing those exact numbers. After a short period of time, the bouncers are going to come along, take the dice off her, and take her into a back room to answer some questions. Because repeatedly and accurately calling what number a pair of dice are going to show when you throw them is remarkable, and would almost certainly imply that the dice are dodgy.

That's what you're claiming is going on with the existence of individual humans. But that's not what you're doing. What Leia is doing in your scenario is throwing the dice and then calling out the numbers. And that's not remarkable. She's not predicting anything. She's simply reading.

That's what you're doing. You're looking at the numbers on the dice after they've rolled and saying "it's a 7, isn't that amazing?". No, it's not.

Please don't dismiss or ignore this post. I'm honestly trying to help you. Please give it some real, proper, honest thought.

 

[Humots]

Dafydd,
- Good quote. Dawson agrees with me about the probability of a particular "self" to ever exist. Wonder what he'd say about the probability of a particular self to exist today?
--- Jabba

I think Jabba means "Dawkins", as in Richard Dawkins.

I think Jabba is going a bit far in saying Dawkins agrees with him. It would be more modest to say that he agrees with Dawkins.

And I don't think that Dawkins would agree with Jabba's contention that he (Jabba) is a hand of Aces.

 

[Pixel42]

Please don't dismiss or ignore this post. I'm honestly trying to help you. Please give it some real, proper, honest thought.

Hats off to you for making another (very clear) attempt to explain this point, but if Jabba didn't understand it the first six times it was explained to him I doubt he will this time either.

He's not the first person I've come across who, despite clearly being capable of grasping it, simply refuses to do so.

 

[dafydd]

I think Jabba means "Dawkins", as in Richard Dawkins.

I think Jabba is going a bit far in saying Dawkins agrees with him. It would be more modest to say that he agrees with Dawkins.

And I don't think that Dawkins would agree with Jabba's contention that he (Jabba) is a hand of Aces.

More like a busted flush

 

[dlorde]

Hats off to you for making another (very clear) attempt to explain this point, but if Jabba didn't understand it the first six times it was explained to him I doubt he will this time either.

He's not the first person I've come across who, despite clearly being capable of grasping it, simply refuses to do so.

Can something be too obvious?

 

[Pixel42]

Can something be too obvious?

I think it's more that at some subconscious level you realise that understanding the point would destroy the foundation of your belief system, and so you prevent yourself from doing so. Like creationists who are perfectly capable of understanding what the theory of evolution by natural selection actually says, but cling to a false understanding (that it says that the complexity of life is the result of pure chance) in order to continue to dismiss it.

 

[shuttlt]

I've always thought that creationists do that in part to piss people off and divert any debate off to somewhere that they don't feel threatened. If I were a creationist I'm sure I'd be greatly ammused by coming to the JREF, saying "if monkeys evolved into us, how come there are still monkeys, eh?"

 

[Jabba]

Dawson?

You do realize that you are embarrassing yourself here, right?

carlitos,
- Sorry about that.
- When you get to be 70, I bet you have the same problem.
--- Jabba

 

[dafydd]

carlitos,
- Sorry about that.
- When you get to be 70, I bet you have the same problem.
--- Jabba

No offense intended, but that means that you may not be immortal for much longer.

 

[Filippo Lippi]

carlitos,
- Sorry about that.
- When you get to be 70, I bet you have the same problem.
--- Jabba

I would suggest that the Dunning-Kruger effect and cognitive dissonance are a better explanation for your abject posts rather than your age.

Unless you are just trolling, which would also explain your embarrasing display in this and the medieval tea towel thread.

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

Jabba, please don't ignore my posts. I'm genuinely posting for your benefit.

 

[sol invictus]

Jabba, can I accurately summarize your argument like this?

(1) According to the standard scientific view, the probability of Jabba existing right now (Jabba specifically, including all biological details) is absurdly small.

(2) Therefore, for any reasonable prior probability for the standard view, Bayes tells us we shouldn't believe in science.

If that's your argument, it's a very common confusion. Let me illustrate the problem with a simpler but analogous argument.

Suppose you generate a number with many digits according to a method you hypothesize is random. No matter the result, according to your hypothesis, the odds of generating that particular number are absurdly small. Should you therefore reject your hypothesis with high confidence?

Obviously not.... but do you understand why not?

 

[Jabba]

Sure. And I'm not unsympathetic to that. But you have to understand that that doesn't make you right. You still have to try to detach all emotion from this and look at it critically. That includes really trying to wrap your head round what I and everybody else are saying about the flaws in your reasoning.

When I ask you whether you'd still be telling the person typing this that they're so improbable that they must be special had it been a different sperm which fertilised my mother's egg, I'm not asking a rhetorical question. The question is one that I want you to actually think about, because it's the crux of where you're going wrong.

If it had been a different sperm, you'd still be telling that person that they're special because they're so unlikely. So would you had they been born a month later from a different egg. Or had a different father. Or came from a different mother. Or from a different set of grandparents. And so on.

And that's the point - you're saying that I'm special because I'm here. But you'd also say that anybody else in the "potential Squeegee" continuum was equally special.

To go back to the random number generator let's say, for the sake of argument, that there's 1,000 potential Squeegees and that the probability of me existing - as you would term it - is 1 in 1,000. I know that the probability would actually be much lower, but just for ease of illustration 1 in 1,000 will do.

So you've got 1,000 potential Squeegees, and there is a random number generator which generates a number between 1 and 1,000. Whoever has their number come up gets to be born. I'm number 142. The random number generator shows 142. Lucky me, I'm born. The other 999 people never get born. Therefore I'm special.

But what if the number 569 had come up? That Squeegee would have been born instead. Then s/he would have been the lucky one, and therefore special. The same is true if any other number between 1 and 1,000 had come up.

Now, if before the random number generator had done its thing you'd predicted that I would be the one to be born, that would be remarkable. But you didn't. You're looking at the number 142 on the display of the random number generator and saying "isn't it remarkable that, out of all the numbers that it could have displayed, it's displaying 142?". And the answer is that no, it's not. Because you'd be saying that 569 was remarkable, had the random number generator displayed that.

Or, to use a gambling metaphor, seeing as you started with decks of cards, let's talk about dice. Let's say that there's a lady in Vegas playing craps. We'll call her Leia. Now, Leia keeps putting money on certain numbers and then throwing those exact numbers. After a short period of time, the bouncers are going to come along, take the dice off her, and take her into a back room to answer some questions. Because repeatedly and accurately calling what number a pair of dice are going to show when you throw them is remarkable, and would almost certainly imply that the dice are dodgy.

That's what you're claiming is going on with the existence of individual humans. But that's not what you're doing. What Leia is doing in your scenario is throwing the dice and then calling out the numbers. And that's not remarkable. She's not predicting anything. She's simply reading.

That's what you're doing. You're looking at the numbers on the dice after they've rolled and saying "it's a 7, isn't that amazing?". No, it's not.

Please don't dismiss or ignore this post. I'm honestly trying to help you. Please give it some real, proper, honest thought.

Squeegee,

- I've been busy – and, responding to your post isn't easy. I've been working on a response for a few days (off and on) now, and have decided to let you know that I am working on it, and also to ask for patience.
- For now, I want to point out that I do understand that the probability of very specific events is always very small -- but then, I've been admitting that all along. Go back to post #82 (below), and you'll see what I mean.

Say that you find a deck of cards in the closet and decide to play some solitaire or something.

You sit down at the table and turn over the first card. It's an ace of spades. You place the ace back in the deck, shuffle the cards and once again, turn over the first card. This time, it's the ace of diamonds. Hmm. So, you try the same thing again. This time, you get the ace of spades again.

'Wait a minute…' You do it one more time, and this time, you get the ace of hearts.

If you’re paying attention, you’re growing suspicious about this deck you found in the closet. You’re starting to suspect that you don’t have the ordinary deck that you had assumed. But, why is that? Why are you suspicious?

You’re suspicious because the probability of drawing that 'hand' is so small if the deck is a normal deck.

Let’s try that again. But, this time, the first card you draw is a 3 of diamonds, the second is a
Jack of spades, the third is a 9 of clubs and the fourth is a 9 of hearts. In this case, you probably are not suspicious.

But, of course you realize that the prrobability of drawing that hand, given a normal deck, is just as small as the probability of drawing that previous hand…

So, what’s the problem here? Why are you not suspicious of this deck, when you were suspicious of the first one?

It turns out that there are two factors causing you to be suspicious of that first deck -- and one is missing in regard to the second deck. There is nothing about the second hand that sets it apart in such a way as to suggest another plausible hypothesis… If there were, you’d be suspicious of that second deck as well. It’s as simple as that…

- But then, I need to admit that you guys have, indeed, shaken my confidence in my Bayesian "proof"... I thought that I had an easy way around that problem, but now think that if I do have a way around that problem, it isn't easy...
- I'll be back.

--- Jabba

 

[dafydd]

Squeegee,

- I've been busy – and, responding to your post isn't easy. I've been working on a response for a few days (off and on) now, and have decided to let you know that I am working on it, and also to ask for patience.
- For now, I want to point out that I do understand that the probability of very specific events is always very small -- but then, I've been admitting that all along. Go back to post #82 (below), and you'll see what I mean.

Say that you find a deck of cards in the closet and decide to play some solitaire or something.

You sit down at the table and turn over the first card. It's an ace of spades. You place the ace back in the deck, shuffle the cards and once again, turn over the first card. This time, it's the ace of diamonds. Hmm. So, you try the same thing again. This time, you get the ace of spades again.

'Wait a minute…' You do it one more time, and this time, you get the ace of hearts.

If you’re paying attention, you’re growing suspicious about this deck you found in the closet. You’re starting to suspect that you don’t have the ordinary deck that you had assumed. But, why is that? Why are you suspicious?

You’re suspicious because the probability of drawing that 'hand' is so small if the deck is a normal deck.

Let’s try that again. But, this time, the first card you draw is a 3 of diamonds, the second is a
Jack of spades, the third is a 9 of clubs and the fourth is a 9 of hearts. In this case, you probably are not suspicious.

But, of course you realize that the prrobability of drawing that hand, given a normal deck, is just as small as the probability of drawing that previous hand…

So, what’s the problem here? Why are you not suspicious of this deck, when you were suspicious of the first one?

It turns out that there are two factors causing you to be suspicious of that first deck -- and one is missing in regard to the second deck. There is nothing about the second hand that sets it apart in such a way as to suggest another plausible hypothesis… If there were, you’d be suspicious of that second deck as well. It’s as simple as that…

- But then, I need to admit that you guys have, indeed, shaken my confidence in my Bayesian "proof"... I thought that I had an easy way around that problem, but now think that if I do have a way around that problem, it isn't easy...
- I'll be back.

--- Jabba

I wouldn't be suspicious of the first deck. Another unfounded assumption from you.

 

[Squeegee Beckenheim]

- But then, I need to admit that you guys have, indeed, shaken my confidence in my Bayesian "proof"... I thought that I had an easy way around that problem, but now think that if I do have a way around that problem, it isn't easy...

This is because you're starting with the assumption that your belief is correct and then trying to find a way to make the evidence point towards it. That's never a good way to try to draw an accurate conclusion.

As far as the "aces" thing goes, I answered that right at the start of the thread:

Because human beings have an in-built biological tendency to see significance where there is none, and to see patterns where there are none.