More from Szasz
In the area about assuming MI as brain illness
In the first place, what central nervous system symptoms would correspond to a skin eruption or a fracture? It would not be some emotion or complex bit of behavior. Rather, it would be blindness or a paralysis of some part of the body. The crux of the matter is that a disease of the brain, analogous to a disease of the skin or bone, is a neurological defect, and not a problem in living
I do grant that Szasz wrote this a long time ago, but the basic idea is that there are regulatory problems under the symptoms of mental illness, thery may be caused by regulatory disorders from a nuerological defect, such as autism. Or in the case of depression a lack of appropriate regulation in the complex anatomy of the brain, like a timing chain slipping in a car.
But here Szasz empasises the 'problem in living', at the time he wrote this, cognitive behavioral theory was just about to happen, Ellis had not yet formed rational Emotive therapy, or the other behavioral based interventions. The predominant theories at the time were psychogenic in nature, and they are no longer exactlt mainstream, although psychotherapy and existential therapy do exist.
But you can have the person change the behaviors and address thier problems in living and the persistant sad mood still exists .
What then the sad mood still is reported , as is the lack of energy and motivation, the problems sleeping etc?
Some people do not need medications , they will respond solely to the behavioral interventions, but what about the people who don't , how does that remain solely a problem in living?
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The second error in regarding complex psycho-social behavior, consisting of communications about ourselves and the world about us, as mere symptoms [p. 114] of neurological functioning is epistemological. In other words, it is an error pertaining not to any mistakes in observation or reasoning, as such, but rather to the way in which we organize and express our knowledge. In the present case, the error lies in making a symmetrical dualism between mental and physical (or bodily) symptoms, a dualism which is merely a habit of speech and to which no known observations can be found to correspond. Let us see if this is so. In medical practice, when we speak of physical disturbances, we mean either signs (for example, a fever) or symptoms (for example, pain). We speak of mental symptoms, on the other hand, when we refer to a patient's communications about himself, others, and the world about him. He might state that he is Napoleon or that he is being persecuted by the Communists. These would be considered mental symptoms only if the observer believed that the patient was not Napoleon or that he was not being persecuted[sic] by the Communists. . This makes it apparent that the statement that "X is a mental symptom" involves rendering a judgment. The judgment entails, moreover, a covert comparison or matching of the patient's ideas, concepts, or beliefs with those of the observer and the society in which they live. The notion of mental symptom is therefore inextricably tied to the social (including ethical) context in which it is made in much the same way as the notion of bodily symptom is tied to an anatomical and genetic context (Szasz, 1957a, 1957b).
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I understand where szasz appears to be coming from, thier are problems in communication that create difficulties in the human condition.
But Stamen, he here is making specific reference to delusions, he is ignoring the fact that there is a biological basis for the way the brain works, unless you support immaterialsm.
He is specificaly saying that delusions are a product of social communication issues, and while that is true, delusions create a specific threat when they involve the paranois are bizzare elements.
people do try and do kill people because of delusional beliefs, I would say that is an extreme communication problem.
And you say Stamen, that you count schizophrenia as possibly a real menatl ilness, you are aware I assume that there are people who when depressed or manic hear voices and experience delusions? People with OCD can have the same intensity of belief as a person with delusions, they just recognise the irrational nature of the belief.
I don't see how needing to count steps to avoid a panic attack is a 'problem in living', it is a problem that effects behavior, but changing the person's life is not going to make the compulsions go away.
I agree with Szasz, there are many people who do not need mental health treatment, there are people who do attempt to medicate conditions other than mental illness, but that in and of itself does noty preclude mental illness, there are those who change thier lives and still suffer.
