Materialism

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

I want to understand the real reasons why you choose to assert that the matter is base reality and the qualia are a model. You have said twice that it is because there is a common shared reality. I have now replied twice that both materialism and mentalism can provide an explanation for this. Is there some reason why this reply is invalid or is there some other reason why you cannot accept that the consciousness is what we actually know exists and that matter is a conceptual model?

I'm not really asserting that matter is the base reality, because, as we seem to agree, there probably isn't any good way to tell. I just don't think that mental monism is any more compelling, even given all I've read about it over the past few months. The argument that "the mind is the one data point we have" just doesn't do it for me.

If you would deign to give me one lousy reference to a good, noncircular argument against the possibility of brain giving rise to consciousness, I might be one step closer to seeing your point. In the long run, however, I doubt any of this matters.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

Here is the problem with the model and the reality. Everything that Mary can book-learn about red is the model. The experience of red is the brute reality. Given these things (and I think if you look at them closely you will find that they MUST be true) then what have you just claimed that it is possible to place into the model the thing which is being modelled. The problem is that this cannot be done. So you have attempted to refute the knowledge argument by assuming something which cannot be done in real life (the book-learning of the experience of seeing red) but which must be do-able for materialism to be defended. The point is that in reality it is impossible to book-learn the experience of seeing red, therefore materialism must be false. If it were possible to book-learn red then the KA would fail.

edited :

I might add that at the same time you are claiming it is possible to "book-learn the experience of seeing red" you are also claiming that the mind cannot emulate in dreams sensations it has never experienced, which effectively refutes the claim it is possible to book-learn red.

I am not claiming that it is possible to book-learn the experience of seeing red. I do not think it is possible to book-learn the subjective facts gained when you actually see red light. This is why the KA is flawed.

However, if, for the sake of discussion, we assume that it is possible to book-learn every single objective and subjective fact about red (including the neural connections formed when red light enters the eye), then I see no reason why Mary wouldn't have the same internal experience of redness as everyone else, both in the room and out.

I do not understand what this has to do with materialism. Nowhere does materialism claim that there is no such thing as subjective facts about reality.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

I'm not really asserting that matter is the base reality, because, as we seem to agree, there probably isn't any good way to tell.

I said there was no experimental way to tell. But we still have reason.

If you would deign to give me one lousy reference to a good, noncircular argument against the possibility of brain giving rise to consciousness, I might be one step closer to seeing your point. In the long run, however, I doubt any of this matters.

The knowledge argument is as good as any of the others. They are all valid.

I am not claiming that it is possible to book-learn the experience of seeing red. I do not think it is possible to book-learn the subjective facts gained when you actually see red light. This is why the KA is flawed.

You have lost me. If it is not possible to book-learn red then it is materialism which is flawed, not the KA. It is not possible to book-learn the experience of seeing red then this experience can never appear in the materialistic model, all of which can be book-learned because it is an abstract model.

I'm not sure there is anywhere for me to take this discussion. If you don't see the problem by now then nothing I can say will help you to see the problem. I think many other people can see this problem, and I think it is real. I also think that it will never be accepted because of the implications of the solution, not because the problem isn't real, which makes it feel like a waste of time continuing with people who know the arguments and still reject them.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

You have lost me. If it is not possible to book-learn red then it is materialism which is flawed, not the KA. It is not possible to book-learn the experience of seeing red then this experience can never appear in the materialistic model, all of which can be book-learned because it is an abstract model.

Where does materialism say that it should be possible to book-learn everything? Some things are learned by experiencing them. An example is the neural connections formed when red light enters your eye and causes the neural cascade from the eye to the visual cortex and beyond. These connections are (subjective) facts, but I very much doubt they can be book-learned.

I think you have formed an artifical barrier between objective external facts and subjective internal experience. This barrier seems to exclude the possibility of subjective experience arising from subjective facts.

I also think that it will never be accepted because of the implications of the solution, not because the problem isn't real, which makes it feel like a waste of time continuing with people who know the arguments and still reject them.

I'm really not frightened of the implications, because I don't think they would make much difference to me anyway. However, without a logical argument against the possibility that consciousness arises from the brain, I don't see any reason to go with plan B.

One more point: Regardless of how much she can learn about red's material aspects in the room, surely she "knows" all the metamind facts about red. So why, in a mental monism world, would she experience anything novel when she leaves the room?

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

You may consider the lack of free-will (as you define it) to be a problem. I do not.

Dr. Stupid
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Then come on over to the free will thread and refute my valid arguments.

I have peaked in on that thread from time to time, but had never made any comments, simply because I never saw anything more than assertions that free-will must exist. I will take a look again, though, if it will make you happy.


Hammegk,

This is not true. Every argument I have ever seen for the existence of the "Hard Problem" presupposes dualism in some way. There is no Hard Problem of consciousness under materialism. Consciousness is just another unsolved problem which we are working on.
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Ok. Let's go for the "easy problem", life. Can you propose a thought experiment that would prove anything other than "perceived by humans material", in such and such a configuration, is a Sufficient (rather than Necessary) condition for life? I think not.

I don't understand the question. Could you repeat it more clearly?

Once you sort that out, we can worry about your "proof" of material Sufficiency rather than Necessity for human consciousness.

What proof are you talking about. I have not claimed to have any proof. Just a potentially falsifiable theory that, up till now, has been working very well.

Meanwhile *I* (absolutely & objectively) think, and so do you.

So what?

.... So far, all of the so-called problems he has described are not actually problems with physicalism, but rather with various forms of dualism and ontological materialism, which nobody here is defending.

Dr. Stupid
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Do you honestly believe your failure to name the ontological basis of materialism makes that ontological commitment disappear?

Scientific materialism (physicalism) has nothing to do with ontology. There is no ontological commitment, because the concept of ontology is never so much as mentioned anywhere within the formal framework. Ontology is an incoherent concept, and I have no interest in clogging up an otherwise coherent framework with it.

 

[Guest]

Paul,

I think I am going to employ a policy of not continuing to argue beyond the point where I believe the case has been made sufficiently well to convince an open-minded neutral. It is pointless for me to continue discussing this with you.

Geoff.

 

[Loki]

uce,

I believe the case has been made sufficiently well to convince an open-minded neutral.

You ain't even close!

 

[Tricky]

Paul,

I think I am going to employ a policy of not continuing to argue beyond the point where I believe the case has been made sufficiently well to convince an open-minded neutral. It is pointless for me to continue discussing this with you.

Geoff.

I believe this is the "no true Scotsman" fallacy. If a person remains unconvinced then there aren't an open-minded neutral (not to be confused with an open minded neuter), right?

 

[hammegk]

What proof are you talking about. I have not claimed to have any proof. Just a potentially falsifiable theory that, up till now, has been working very well.

Does the word "falsifiable" ring a bell? Note also I asked for a thought experiment.

Finally, do you have a problem understanding Necessary vs Sufficient?

So what?

Only that I refuse to ignore the only objective data point *I* have.

Scientific materialism (physicalism) has nothing to do with ontology. There is no ontological commitment, because the concept of ontology is never so much as mentioned anywhere within the formal framework. Ontology is an incoherent concept, and I have no interest in clogging up an otherwise coherent framework with it.

Stimpy, you are probably beginning to believe that you've said it so many times. Here you do have a problem understanding the difference between implicit and explicit.


Also, answering an old question of yours to me; Second Law of Thermo -- but why do I think you already knew that was the answer?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

I think I am going to employ a policy of not continuing to argue beyond the point where I believe the case has been made sufficiently well to convince an open-minded neutral. It is pointless for me to continue discussing this with you.

Probably a wise decision. I have spent the day searching for a compelling argument against the possibility of consciousness arising from the brain, but all I find is blah, blah, blah.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

UcE said:
Probably a wise decision. I have spent the day searching for a compelling argument against the possibility of consciousness arising from the brain, but all I find is blah, blah, blah.

~~ Paul

Maybe it depends what eyes you look with.

If there is one thing I have learned in the last 12 months it is that there is no point in trying to force these things on people, regardless of whether they are 'logically provable' or not. The very nature of what we are discussing dictates that the information be made available, but not forcibly imposed. If people are given the arguments, but hear only 'blah, blah, blah' then the information is not for them. I know that some other people who are provided with this information, hear more than 'blah, blah, blah' and choose to verify its truth for themselves. It takes all sorts to make a world.

 

[Guest]

uce,


You ain't even close!

Don't tell me you are offering yourself as an example of 'an open-minded neutral', Loki!

 

[Guest]

I believe this is the "no true Scotsman" fallacy. If a person remains unconvinced then there aren't an open-minded neutral (not to be confused with an open minded neuter), right?

The arguments have been presented, Tricky. People can judge for themselves whether the rebuttals held water or not.

NB : At this point, scribble or BillHoyt come in and deliver a tirade about that Charlatan UCE........

I don't know whether it is too late already but as far as I am concerned the lid is going back on Pandoras Box. May that which has been hidden remain hidden, apart from to the eyes of those who choose to seek.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Unus Mundus --- One World --- The Whole System is a WHOLE SYSTEM.

Adios Amigos.

 

[Loki]

uce,

Don't tell me you are offering yourself as an example of 'an open-minded neutral', Loki!

Tell you what, why don't you post *just one* message from me in the past 18 months where I have stated that materialism "must be true", or that "I *know* the truth". Just on the P-Zombie topic, it seems to me that I've probably read more Chalmers than you have.

Contrast that to yourself - when I asked you about Dennett you replied "A true believer, I'm afraid". When pressed, you admitted that you'd read "a little" of his work.

Sorry uce, but you don't seem to want to spend much time "examining the evidence". Sure, I understand that's because you already *know* the right answer, so why waste time looking any further.

Tell you what, why not read the links from Sou's "The Reith Lectures 2003: The Emerging Mind" and make some *relevant* comments or rebuttals, rather than just "closing the lid" on Pandoras box so that "that which has been hidden remain hidden"?

 

[Jethro]

Before you put the lid back on the box, could you please provide that logical proof you keep talking about? A link, a repost, a listing, something please.

And one point, I would say that physics is not a model of qualia, but a model of the external physical reality which we experience through our qualia. A distinction due only to my materialistic bent, but one I would still like to point out.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty,



I have peaked in on that thread from time to time, but had never made any comments, simply because I never saw anything more than assertions that free-will must exist. I will take a look again, though, if it will make you happy.

Hmm, perhaps I have misunderstood your position.

In any event, my assertion is not that free will exists, it is that free will holds a neccessary condition that there exists an "agent" that will not fit in with physicalism.

If you do not believe free will exists then you won't have a problem, and in fact we will probably be in agreement.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

UcE said:
Probably a wise decision. I have spent the day searching for a compelling argument against the possibility of consciousness arising from the brain, but all I find is blah, blah, blah.

~~ Paul

Really, you found blah blah blah?

What do you think the story of Mary and the black/white room is? What about p-zombies? What about consciousness-identity? What about pure ego identity?

You must not be searching 'correctly'.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

What proof are you talking about. I have not claimed to have any proof. Just a potentially falsifiable theory that, up till now, has been working very well.
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Does the word "falsifiable" ring a bell? Note also I asked for a thought experiment.

Finally, do you have a problem understanding Necessary vs Sufficient?

I noticed that the formatting of my response is screwed up, so maybe you missed where I explained that do not understand the question?

I'll repeat it, with proper formatting.

Ok. Let's go for the "easy problem", life. Can you propose a thought experiment that would prove anything other than "perceived by humans material", in such and such a configuration, is a Sufficient (rather than Necessary) condition for life? I think not.

I don't understand the question. Could you repeat it more clearly?

Meanwhile *I* (absolutely & objectively) think, and so do you.
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So what?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Only that I refuse to ignore the only objective data point *I* have.

Nobody is asking you to. Materialism in no way denies the fact that you or I are capable of thought.

Scientific materialism (physicalism) has nothing to do with ontology. There is no ontological commitment, because the concept of ontology is never so much as mentioned anywhere within the formal framework. Ontology is an incoherent concept, and I have no interest in clogging up an otherwise coherent framework with it.
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Stimpy, you are probably beginning to believe that you've said it so many times. Here you do have a problem understanding the difference between implicit and explicit.

What are you talking about? What ontological commitment do you claim that I am making?

Also, answering an old question of yours to me; Second Law of Thermo -- but why do I think you already knew that was the answer?

I don't know, why do you? After all, there are no violations of the second law of thermodynamics that I am aware of.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

I have peaked in on that thread from time to time, but had never made any comments, simply because I never saw anything more than assertions that free-will must exist. I will take a look again, though, if it will make you happy.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hmm, perhaps I have misunderstood your position.

In any event, my assertion is not that free will exists, it is that free will holds a neccessary condition that there exists an "agent" that will not fit in with physicalism.

If you do not believe free will exists then you won't have a problem, and in fact we will probably be in agreement.

Perhaps we are finally making some progress. I do not believe that free-will, as you have defined it, exists. On the contrary, I think that the logical argument you have presented, whereby you explain that Libertarian free-will requires the existence of an agent which is neither deterministic nor random, serves as an indirect proof that Libertarian free-will does not exist.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

This contracdicts your first assumption that she has learned everything about red.

~~ Paul

Now I'm stuck arguing the counter-argument that I don't believe and I have to do it because you aren't following the original argument. ARGH.

If we say that Mary learned everything about red, but did not say she has learned everything about the experience of seeing red. That is the flaw in the argument. But you wouldn't know that because you won't objectively look at the argument.

So the claim is that Mary is not learning something new about red when she see's it (because if she did then physicalism is flawed), but what she is learning is something new about the experience of red.

Now there is a counter-argument for this, but it is highly debatable. I can modify the example to say that Mary book-learns everything about red and the experience of red, and still Mary 'experiences' something new.

If Mary experiences ANYTHING new, once she has learned EVERYTHING about red and the experience of red, that means qualia! That means physicalism is false.

Objectively speaking this appears to be a valid argument. Here it is in premise -> conclusion form:


1. Mary learns everything there is to know about the color red.
2. Mary learns everything there is to know about the experience of seeing the color red.
3. Mary has never seen the color red.

4. Mary sees the color red, and gains something she did not have before.

This argument reneders physicalism false in it's current form.

Counter argument:

4. Mary gains the knowledge that she has seen the color red.

Counter-counter argument:

Not only does she gain that knowledge, but she gains some kind of fundamental understanding of the color red that she is unable to learn from books.

THIS RENDERS PHYSICALISM FALSE.

Again, what is this new thing you claim the experience provides, if we are assuming she has learned everything about red?

She is learning the experience. This suggests qualia.