Materialism

[hammegk]

Yes, a new control mechanism. But I don't need an infinite stack of them, so what's the problem?

If it's all hard code -- dna level at minimum -- quite a sophisticated program, huh? The ultimate, operational, Turing machine as a matter of fact. And even better it has a strange side effect that in humans is human consciousness. If you can buy that, so be it.

Why go the last step if we don't need to? And when we do, we have the horribly sticky issue of how the nonphysical portion interacts with the physical brain without itself being physical. No one seems willing to address that problem. I don't understand your final sentence.

~~ Paul

Now you have at least made it to the point where the best logical conclusion is "dualism is not a practical answer". Ergo, you go with the "dna does it" answer mentioned above, or choose idealism.

 

[Win]

Stimpy:

This is exactly what I have done in my explanation of set A'. If the only distinction between set A, and set A', is that set A does not include phenomenal consciousness, and set A' does, and is causally closed, then why create the arbitrary distinction between set A and set A' at all?

Because it's not an arbitrary distinction.

One way that the contents of set A, the physical, may be defined is that all members are particles, fields, space, time or their interactions.

Another way is that members of set A stand in causal relations to each other, while no member of set B is a cause of anything in set A.

How is this different from what is done in modern physics all the time? We construct a theory which makes observable predictions, and includes some otherwise unobservable thing like an electron or a quark. Then we conclude the physical existence of that electron or quark from the success of that theory.

I think this analogy is inapt because quarks and electrons play causal roles.

A better analogy might be the existence and properties of the universe beyond our visual horizon, about which our theories of the visible universe allow us to draw meanigful conclusions.

It seems to me that the only difference between your property dualism, and physicalism,is how you define "physical". If I define physical to be anything that can be described in terms of our observations, through the application of the scientific method, then clearly my definition of physical includes the entire causally closed set A', which includes both what you are calling physical (set A), and what you are calling phenomenal (set B).

I'd have to quibble with your use of the phrase "described in terms of our observations." Surely that's not even what we're doing with quarks. Rather, we acept the existence of quarks because, in part, our observations confirm our theories, and the quarks are described in terms of those theories.

As to the rest, see the above two paragraphs.

Put in plain English, if you claim that it is possible to use the scientific method to describe the phenomenal world in terms of our observations, then this is exactly what physicalists mean when they say that phenomenal consciousness is physical.

First of all, as I note above, I don't think it's possible to "describe the phenomenal world in terms of our observations."

Secondly, I don't think that even were we to recast that statement, perhaps as, "describe the phenomenal world in terms of our theories," that would be exactly what all, or even most physicalists mean when they say phenomenal consciousness is physical. I'd say most mean "has an effect on the physical" or "interacts with the physical" or even "is a consequnce of particles, fields and their interactions in space and time."

But what is it that is really being eliminated? It is not the experience. It is not your direct access to the experience. It is simply the notion that there is anything non-physical to it. We (eliminative materialists) are pretending that something we have does not exist. We are simply not making the assumption that what we have is non-physical.

On the contrary, an eliminative materialist, such as, say, Dennett, would argue that "qualia" is a meaningless term without a referent. Once you've explained a p-zombie, you've exhausted explanation. There is simply nothing left to explain.

Nobody is conscious in the sense of possessing phenomenal consciousness.

Parsimony is only inapplicable if you can logically argue that there must be some non-physical aspect to the experience. That is, that the part of the experience you have "direct access" to is not also a part of the physical world.

And that's exactly what I've been arguing. That's what the knowledge argument, the arguments from conceivability, the argument from the epistemlogical uniqueness of phenomenal consciousness and the argument from the inconceivability of materialism are all about.

In what sense can you do this? You know only that you have direct access to your experiences, but what is the nature of the "you" that has this direct access? If the "you" is simply a function of your brain, then the thing you have direct access to is also physical.

The nature of that "you" is a combination of physical and phenomenal properties. It's not a function, solely, of my brain. My brain has no access to phenomenal consciousness. Only *I* do.

What failure? In what way is reductive materialism not possible?

As a consequence of the failure of the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical.

If you simultaneously define phenomenal consciousness to be both what we have direct access to, and the "raw experience", then you are simply begging the question that what we have direct access to is not physical.

Actually, I think you may be begging the question, namely by asuming that *we* are physical, and that phenomenal consciousness affects the physical world. I don't think either is true.

So what is different after you have learned a phenomenal fact? Your body is not any different, and you seem to have defined phenomenal consciousness in such a way that it cannot meaningfully be said to be different.

In the moment that Mary first experiences red, there is a novel feature in her phenomenal consciousness. That novelty constitutes her learning a new fact.

It sounds like you are defining phenomenal consciousness to literally be nothing. So far the only characteristic you have attributed to it is that we have direct access to it. But what has direct access to it, if not our brains?

To be nothing physical, at any rate.

*We* have direct access to phenomenal consciousness, by virtue of being partly phenomenal.

This, though, is why I said earlier that I thought you were question begging, by assuming that it is our brains that have access to phenomenal conscousness. They're physical and they don't. *We* do.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

If it's all hard code -- dna level at minimum -- quite a sophisticated program, huh? The ultimate, operational, Turing machine as a matter of fact. And even better it has a strange side effect that in humans is human consciousness. If you can buy that, so be it.

It's amazing what a few billion years of evolution can do. It's not all that astonishing that the brain is equivalent to a Turing machine.

If you postulate that "something else" is needed to get the brain to work, you're just pushing the problem to another place.

Now you have at least made it to the point where the best logical conclusion is "dualism is not a practical answer". Ergo, you go with the "dna does it" answer mentioned above, or choose idealism.

I'll go with DNA, because in the direction of idealism lies madness.

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

...
I'll go with DNA, because in the direction of idealism lies madness.

~~ Paul

I think you have it bass-ackwards; bad (re)wiring & bad biochem -- in what your *I* perceives as the brain in your *me* -- is where madness lies.

Would anyones' *I* do such a recode of the *me* on purpose do you suppose? Even if Atman=Brahman it's still mysterious, no?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

In the moment that Mary first experiences red, there is a novel feature in her phenomenal consciousness. That novelty constitutes her learning a new fact.

Without any memory, how does phenomenal consciousness know it's the first sighting of red? Do you mean that she learns a new fact by storing it in her physical memory? I'm not sure what you mean by "constitutes."

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

I think you have it bass-ackwards; bad (re)wiring & bad biochem -- in what your *I* perceives as the brain in your *me* -- is where madness lies.

Would anyones' *I* do such a recode of the *me* on purpose do you suppose? Even if Atman=Brahman it's still mysterious, no?

My brain just exploded. Hold on until I reassemble it.

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Win,

This is exactly what I have done in my explanation of set A'. If the only distinction between set A, and set A', is that set A does not include phenomenal consciousness, and set A' does, and is causally closed, then why create the arbitrary distinction between set A and set A' at all?
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Because it's not an arbitrary distinction.

One way that the contents of set A, the physical, may be defined is that all members are particles, fields, space, time or their interactions.

I would say that, given the way these things are themselves defined, and discovered, that distinction is arbitrary. Science (an physicalism) certainly don't define "physical" this way. On the contrary, they both allow for the possibility that these things may only be a subset of the physical.

Another way is that members of set A stand in causal relations to each other, while no member of set B is a cause of anything in set A.

Those two definitions are not the same thing. This also contradicts your claim that set A is not causally closed with respect to Ur.

In Science, "physical" refers to anything that can be detected and understood by applying the scientific method to our observations.

If you assert that there are properties in Ur that are not in A, but which meet the above requirement, then scientifically, those things are physical, and set A' (which includes all of these things, as well as A), is the set of physical things, and is causally closed. Set A, whatever it may be, is just a subset of what is physical.

How is this different from what is done in modern physics all the time? We construct a theory which makes observable predictions, and includes some otherwise unobservable thing like an electron or a quark. Then we conclude the physical existence of that electron or quark from the success of that theory.
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I think this analogy is inapt because quarks and electrons play causal roles.

If A is not causally closed with respect to Ur, then those properties in Ur that can be detected through observations in A also play causal roles.

Saying that nothing outside of A plays a causal role on A, is exactly equivalent to saying that A is not causally closed.

A better analogy might be the existence and properties of the universe beyond our visual horizon, about which our theories of the visible universe allow us to draw meanigful conclusions.

But that is the whole problem. If it is possible to construct a theory to explain the observation that does not make reference to anything outside of set A, then we cannot logically conclude that the observation has anything to do with anything outside of A.

The only the above would work, even with respect to cosmology, would be to show that no theory which does not make reference to stuff outside of the visible Universe could possibly explain the observation. But in the case of the phenomenal, you have already said this is not the case. The p-zombie argument requires this.

It seems to me that the only difference between your property dualism, and physicalism,is how you define "physical". If I define physical to be anything that can be described in terms of our observations, through the application of the scientific method, then clearly my definition of physical includes the entire causally closed set A', which includes both what you are calling physical (set A), and what you are calling phenomenal (set B).
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I'd have to quibble with your use of the phrase "described in terms of our observations." Surely that's not even what we're doing with quarks. Rather, we acept the existence of quarks because, in part, our observations confirm our theories, and the quarks are described in terms of those theories.

That theory (the standard model of QM) is defined entirely in terms of observations. It is a mathematical description of the probabilities of making specific observations, and nothing more.

Put in plain English, if you claim that it is possible to use the scientific method to describe the phenomenal world in terms of our observations, then this is exactly what physicalists mean when they say that phenomenal consciousness is physical.
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First of all, as I note above, I don't think it's possible to "describe the phenomenal world in terms of our observations."

Then it is not possible to describe it at all, or to know anything about it. Our observations are the only source of information we have.

Secondly, I don't think that even were we to recast that statement, perhaps as, "describe the phenomenal world in terms of our theories," that would be exactly what all, or even most physicalists mean when they say phenomenal consciousness is physical.

It would also be pointless, because we can always describe things in terms of theories. In order to be useful, the theory must be falsifiable. The only way such a theory can be falsifiable is if we could make observations that prove it wrong. If the phenomenal world is not affected in any way by the phenomenal world, then this is simply not possible.

I'd say most mean "has an effect on the physical" or "interacts with the physical" or even "is a consequnce of particles, fields and their interactions in space and time."

The first two are exactly what they would say. The last one is metaphysical nonsense. In any event, if, as you have said, set A is not causally closed with respect to set Ur, then set A is not the set of all physical things. Set Ur, or some subset of it, is. Hence my explanation of set A'.

Being able to describe something in terms of our observations requires that the thing have an effect on what we are observing (it must be physical). That is a necessary, but not sufficient, requirement.

But what is it that is really being eliminated? It is not the experience. It is not your direct access to the experience. It is simply the notion that there is anything non-physical to it. We (eliminative materialists) are pretending that something we have does not exist. We are simply not making the assumption that what we have is non-physical.
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On the contrary, an eliminative materialist, such as, say, Dennett, would argue that "qualia" is a meaningless term without a referent. Once you've explained a p-zombie, you've exhausted explanation. There is simply nothing left to explain.

See what you just did? "meaningless term without referent". If you define qualia to be "without referent", then you are not just defining it to be "what we have direct access to". You are defining qualia to be something that can be meaningfully said to exist without the referent.

Like I said before, if you define "phenomenal consciousness" to be what I have direct access to, then I am a reductionist materialist. If you define it to be something that has an existence independent of my access to it, then I an eliminative materialist. You cannot define it to mean both, without making a-priori assumptions about the nature of whatever it is that I have "direct access to".

Nobody is conscious in the sense of possessing phenomenal consciousness.

Only if you define it to be something that can exist independently of the referent. If you define it to be what I have direct access to, then we still have it.

Parsimony is only inapplicable if you can logically argue that there must be some non-physical aspect to the experience. That is, that the part of the experience you have "direct access" to is not also a part of the physical world.
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And that's exactly what I've been arguing. That's what the knowledge argument, the arguments from conceivability, the argument from the epistemlogical uniqueness of phenomenal consciousness and the argument from the inconceivability of materialism are all about.

That is where you run into a real problem, though. Let's consider the p-zombie argument.

You say that it is conceivable that the physical World could exist exactly as it does, without there being any phenomenal consciousness. From this, you say that it is logically possible for such a physical world to exist, and from this you claim that phenomenal consciousness cannot affect the physical World in any way, or be a logically necessary consequence of it.

Let's imagine your conclusion is correct. If this is the case, then even if we assume that phenomenal consciousness exist, we cannot ever learn anything about it. No observation we make can be attributed, in any way, to phenomenal consciousness. Any theory like the ones you suggested, whereby some observation could be used to infer something about phenomenal consciousness, would necessarily have to contradict the claim that this observation would have been made without phenomenal consciousness.

You see, the problem is that there are really three possibilities here.

1) That phenomenal consciousness doesn't exist. You reject this due to your direct access to it.

2) That phenomenal consciousness exists, and some specific observation tells you something about it, through some theory.

3) That phenomenal consciousness exists, but has nothing at all to do with the observation you made in (2), meaning that your theory is wrong.

Do you see the problem? Even if you assume that phenomenal consciousness exists, you cannot attribute any observed phenomena to it. And since your observations are your brain's only source of information, your brain can never know anything about it!

You can imagine some scenario by which both A and B come from Ur, so that if you knew what the (non-causal) logical relationships between A and B are, you could determine the properties of B from observations in A. But you would have to know those logical relationships first. If A is causally closed, you have no method for determining what they are. You can only guess, and have no way to verify that the guess is right.

In what sense can you do this? You know only that you have direct access to your experiences, but what is the nature of the "you" that has this direct access? If the "you" is simply a function of your brain, then the thing you have direct access to is also physical.
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The nature of that "you" is a combination of physical and phenomenal properties. It's not a function, solely, of my brain. My brain has no access to phenomenal consciousness. Only *I* do.

This comes back to my question about storage and processing.

Look at it another way. It is one thing to say that things have both physical and phenomenal properties. But when you get to the *I* this becomes problematic. The physical part of *I* stores and processes physical information. What does the phenomenal part of the *I* do? How does it work? How can it be meaningfully said to "know" things, or "learn" things, when these things all imply information storage and information processing?

What failure? In what way is reductive materialism not possible?
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As a consequence of the failure of the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical.

When has this been demonstrated? If phenomenal consciousness is defined to be what I have direct access to, and I am by brain processes, then clearly what I have direct access to is physical. Where is the problem?

You only have a problem if you define phenomenal consciousness to be something that can be meaningfully said to exist independently of my access to it. And if you do that, then you are presuming that materialism is false.

If you simultaneously define phenomenal consciousness to be both what we have direct access to, and the "raw experience", then you are simply begging the question that what we have direct access to is not physical.
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Actually, I think you may be begging the question, namely by asuming that *we* are physical, and that phenomenal consciousness affects the physical world. I don't think either is true.

If I claimed those things being true as proof that materialism was true, that would be begging the question. I do not. You claiming that those things being false disproves materialism is begging the question.

So what is different after you have learned a phenomenal fact? Your body is not any different, and you seem to have defined phenomenal consciousness in such a way that it cannot meaningfully be said to be different.
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In the moment that Mary first experiences red, there is a novel feature in her phenomenal consciousness. That novelty constitutes her learning a new fact.

How is it novel? If her phenomenal consciousness does not store any phenomenal information, then every time she experiences red, it is equally novel.

It sounds like you are defining phenomenal consciousness to literally be nothing. So far the only characteristic you have attributed to it is that we have direct access to it. But what has direct access to it, if not our brains?
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To be nothing physical, at any rate.

*We* have direct access to phenomenal consciousness, by virtue of being partly phenomenal.

This, though, is why I said earlier that I thought you were question begging, by assuming that it is our brains that have access to phenomenal conscousness. They're physical and they don't. *We* do.

Do you see the problem yet? You have defined "phenomenal" to be "what we have direct access to", and you have defined "we" to be our brain processes, plus something phenomenal.

This conveys absolutely zero meaning. If I don't know how "we" differs from our brains, then I don't know what "phenomenal" means. And if I don't know what phenomenal means, then I don't know how "we" differ from our brains.

The assertion that the phenomenal is an empty set is perfectly consistent with what you have told me so far. What I need to know is how it differs from an empty set. Simply telling me that it is not empty is not going to do it.

Anyway, it seems like this all goes back to the p-zombie thing. Would you agree that if you were not sure that phenomenal consciousness wasn't physical, that physicalism would be the most reasonable approach? If so, then the only real issue is why you are so sure this is the case. So far, the only reason you have cited for believing this, is the p-zombie argument.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Win,



I would say that, given the way these things are themselves defined, and discovered, that distinction is arbitrary. Science (an physicalism) certainly don't define "physical" this way. On the contrary, they both allow for the possibility that these things may only be a subset of the physical.

In philosophy something is physical if it is both a cause and an effect. It would be said that TLOP are explanations of the cause/effects that we see over time.

Those two definitions are not the same thing. This also contradicts your claim that set A is not causally closed with respect to Ur.

In Science, "physical" refers to anything that can be detected and understood by applying the scientific method to our observations.

In philosphy physical refers to something that holds the properties of cause and effect.

If you assert that there are properties in Ur that are not in A, but which meet the above requirement, then scientifically, those things are physical, and set A' (which includes all of these things, as well as A), is the set of physical things, and is causally closed. Set A, whatever it may be, is just a subset of what is physical.

It seems Win is saying set A is defined by it's properties of cause, effect. Set B is defined by it's property of effect.

Hence set A is physical, set B is not.

If we want to make a catagory C and define it as things that posses the property of human beings are able to theorize about then we have a different set that is not addressed specifically by dualism (AFAIK).

If A is not causally closed with respect to Ur, then those properties in Ur that can be detected through observations in A also play causal roles.

Saying that nothing outside of A plays a causal role on A, is exactly equivalent to saying that A is not causally closed.

So you are claiming that if we have two catagories:

A = cause, effect
B = effect

Then A is an effect?

I think everyone would agree.

But that is the whole problem. If it is possible to construct a theory to explain the observation that does not make reference to anything outside of set A, then we cannot logically conclude that the observation has anything to do with anything outside of A.

The only the above would work, even with respect to cosmology, would be to show that no theory which does not make reference to stuff outside of the visible Universe could possibly explain the observation. But in the case of the phenomenal, you have already said this is not the case. The p-zombie argument requires this.

I have no comment on the p-zombie argument as I feel it is one of the weaker arguments but:

If we add

set C = cause

then we still have dualism (even with three sets) and open possibilities for set D being:

set D = something else

Set C being what I am interested in and the reason I am interested in QP.

I would assert that the KA and p-zombie suggests the existence of set B and free will suggests the existence of set C. Hopefully if I can gain a better grasp of QP I can eventually assert that QP suggests the existence of set C.

That theory (the standard model of QM) is defined entirely in terms of observations. It is a mathematical description of the probabilities of making specific observations, and nothing more.

Yes, but if you change the definition of physical from cause, effect to anything that can be observed or rendered to such a state that it can be observed then you are no longer a physicliast. Dualism, however, would require their exist a faucet that is not explainable.

To give an example of set B (which I am less comfortable with):

A occurs causally necessitating B to occur. B occurs but does not causally necessitate anything. Non-causal laws may or may not rule over B, all that matters is that B occurs and does not causally necessitate anything. Since existence is actually a string of causal occurances over time it could be argued that the existence of B would be such that it never exists in time, but must exist outside of time. Hence it can not be explained in terms of our observations in set A.

To give an example of set C:

C occurs causally necessitating A or B to occur. If you were to eliminate everything from set A, C in the time < timeC then C would still have occured. The idea that C would occur without a prior necessitation is a violation of the laws of thermodynamics which seem to govern set A. Cs occurance can not be explained. That is not to say it can not be predicted. It is a logical possibility that someone, even everyone, would predict every occurance of C. I'm sure you are familiar with Hume et. al.

Then it is not possible to describe it at all, or to know anything about it. Our observations are the only source of information we have.

Which is an assertion I could argue against. If Win believes that 'we' are not the thing which observes but are something else, and the observing thing is perhaps a machine filtering information into 'us' then there is nothing inherently flawed in claiming that information could come from other sources in addition to this source.

It would also be pointless, because we can always describe things in terms of theories. In order to be useful, the theory must be falsifiable. The only way such a theory can be falsifiable is if we could make observations that prove it wrong. If the phenomenal world is not affected in any way by the phenomenal world, then this is simply not possible.

You can say that a theory must also be proven falsifiable. If you believe that everything can eventually be rendered to a state of perceivability then every false theory can be proven false. I'm not sure what else you are trying to assert. Theories involving set B cannot be proven false? How so?

What if I assert that when I drop my rock onto the floor the occurance of the rock hitting the floor causes a set B effect on the floor and rock. Today you could tell me that I am incorrect, and that it is a set A effect that has the cause of distributing force (assume) 'evenly' over the floor. But a thousand years ago you may not have been able to 'prove' that theory false.

Now if set B truly did exist and dropping the rock onto the floor truly did cause a set B effect then of course you wouldn't be able to prove me false, because I wansn't false.


More later, I have to get back to work

 

[Win]

Stimpy:

I would say that, given the way these things are themselves defined, and discovered, that distinction is arbitrary. Science (an physicalism) certainly don't define "physical" this way. On the contrary, they both allow for the possibility that these things may only be a subset of the physical.

Fair enough. I don't disagree.

Those two definitions are not the same thing. This also contradicts your claim that set A is not causally closed with respect to Ur.

Not necessarily the same thing. As to the second sentence, I have not claimed that set A is causally closed with respect to the Ur set; I've claimed it's causally closed with respect to set B.

In Science, "physical" refers to anything that can be detected and understood by applying the scientific method to our observations.

You've spent too much time in Germany. Science isn't capitalized.

If you assert that there are properties in Ur that are not in A, but which meet the above requirement, then scientifically, those things are physical, and set A' (which includes all of these things, as well as A), is the set of physical things, and is causally closed. Set A, whatever it may be, is just a subset of what is physical.

This is to miss the point, I think, which is that set A and set B are non-intersecting subsets of the Ur set.

If A is not causally closed with respect to Ur, then those properties in Ur that can be detected through observations in A also play causal roles.

I agree. The point is that we may conceive of a theory of the Ur set that makes predictions about the properties of set B and of set A, and is mutually exclusive with other theories, such that, without observing anything in set B, we may still draw conclusions about it from the confirmation of theories of the Ur set, exclusively made in set A. Our theories of the Ur set would have logically necessitated implications about set B, none of which could be independently observationally confirmed.

You might ask, why then not simply excise the portions of the theory of the Ur set that refer to set B? Because those are necessary to explain phenomenal consciousness, which we know exist by virtue of our direct access.

Saying that nothing outside of A plays a causal role on A, is exactly equivalent to saying that A is not causally closed.

To saying A is causally closed?

Assuming that's what you meant, I haven't asserted that. I've said nothing in set B plays a causal role on A.

But that is the whole problem. If it is possible to construct a theory to explain the observation that does not make reference to anything outside of set A, then we cannot logically conclude that the observation has anything to do with anything outside of A.

The only the above would work, even with respect to cosmology, would be to show that no theory which does not make reference to stuff outside of the visible Universe could possibly explain the observation. But in the case of the phenomenal, you have already said this is not the case. The p-zombie argument requires this.

I don't agree. If say, our best theory has the implication that the universe is infinite with matter uniformly distributed throughout, we can draw conclusions about what's happening beyond our visible volume of space.

The case of the phenomenal is analogous, by virtue of the fact that both it and the universe beyond our visible universe have no causal connection to the physical universe.

The p-zombie argument requires the conceivability of explaining every action, statement, belief and so on of a person without the existence of phenomenal consciousness. This is conceivable. What isn't conceivable, or possible, is explaining the existence of phenomenal consciousness without reference to phenomenal consciousness.

We don't, strictly speaking, "observe" phenomenal consciousness.

That theory (the standard model of QM) is defined entirely in terms of observations. It is a mathematical description of the probabilities of making specific observations, and nothing more.

Only if you're an instrumentalist. Not being one, myself, I take QM to be a desription, and explanation, of the world.

Then it is not possible to describe it at all, or to know anything about it. Our observations are the only source of information we have.

Not so. *We* have direct access to phenomenally realized information, which cannot be "observed."

It would also be pointless, because we can always describe things in terms of theories. In order to be useful, the theory must be falsifiable. The only way such a theory can be falsifiable is if we could make observations that prove it wrong. If the phenomenal world is not affected in any way by the phenomenal world, then this is simply not possible

Well, I disagree. Again, if we have a theory of the Ur set that makes predictions about the physical world, and has logically necessited implications about the phenomenal world, even though the phenomenal is unoberservable, our observations that confirm the theory of the Ur set will confirm also its predictions about phenomenal properties.

See what you just did? "meaningless term without referent". If you define qualia to be "without referent", then you are not just defining it to be "what we have direct access to". You are defining qualia to be something that can be meaningfully said to exist without the referent.

Well, I don't define it that way. Eliminative materialists conclude that that's what it is. Namely, nothing.

Like I said before, if you define "phenomenal consciousness" to be what I have direct access to, then I am a reductionist materialist. If you define it to be something that has an existence independent of my access to it, then I an eliminative materialist. You cannot define it to mean both, without making a-priori assumptions about the nature of whatever it is that I have "direct access to".

Again, you're begging the question of whether *you* are physical.

Only if you define it to be something that can exist independently of the referent. If you define it to be what I have direct access to, then we still have it.

I don't, and haven't. And you're begging the same question.

Let's imagine your conclusion is correct. If this is the case, then even if we assume that phenomenal consciousness exist, we cannot ever learn anything about it. No observation we make can be attributed, in any way, to phenomenal consciousness. Any theory like the ones you suggested, whereby some observation could be used to infer something about phenomenal consciousness, would necessarily have to contradict the claim that this observation would have been made without phenomenal consciousness.

In p-zombie world, the same observation would be made, but the appeal to the Ur set would be ruled out by Ockham's razor. It's a needless extra level of abstraction that exists only to explain phenomenal consciousness, which doesn't exist.

In fact, in our world, the same argument will be made, by eliminative materialists.

Who is right is determined by which world we live in, p-zombie world or our world.

Do you see the problem? Even if you assume that phenomenal consciousness exists, you cannot attribute any observed phenomena to it. And since your observations are your brain's only source of information, your brain can never know anything about it!

I agree, my brain can never know anything about phenomenal consciousness. But *I* can.

In the end, everything in p-zombie world and our world is the same, except that in p-zombie world the eliminative materialists are right, and in our world I am.

You can imagine some scenario by which both A and B come from Ur, so that if you knew what the (non-causal) logical relationships between A and B are, you could determine the properties of B from observations in A. But you would have to know those logical relationships first. If A is causally closed, you have no method for determining what they are. You can only guess, and have no way to verify that the guess is right.

Actually, the best you'll be able to get is a statement of the form: Assuming phenomenal consciousness exists, then ...

Either it does or it doesn't. The only "guess" you have to make is that it does.

Look at it another way. It is one thing to say that things have both physical and phenomenal properties. But when you get to the *I* this becomes problematic. The physical part of *I* stores and processes physical information. What does the phenomenal part of the *I* do? How does it work? How can it be meaningfully said to "know" things, or "learn" things, when these things all imply information storage and information processing?

What does the phenomeal part do? Have phenomenal experiences. Or perhaps better, be phenomenal experiences.

How does it "learn" or "know?" Phenomenally, of course.

When has this been demonstrated? If phenomenal consciousness is defined to be what I have direct access to, and I am by brain processes, then clearly what I have direct access to is physical. Where is the problem?

I deny the assumption, "I am my brain processes."

You only have a problem if you define phenomenal consciousness to be something that can be meaningfully said to exist independently of my access to it. And if you do that, then you are presuming that materialism is false.

I don't so define it.

If I claimed those things being true as proof that materialism was true, that would be begging the question. I do not. You claiming that those things being false disproves materialism is begging the question.

By begging the question, I mean assuming your conclusion. Since you're assuming that "you" are physical, you're begging the question of physicalism's truth, and applying that conclusion to your definition of "you."

And I don't make the claim that you attribute to me.

How is it novel? If her phenomenal consciousness does not store any phenomenal information, then every time she experiences red, it is equally novel.

Depends on how you define "novel," I guess. If you had global anteriograde amnesia, you could experience something for the first time, that experience being novel in an absolute sense. You, of course wouldn't form a long term memory of it, so each subsequent exposure would be "novel to you," yet still not "absolutely novel."

Do you see the problem yet? You have defined "phenomenal" to be "what we have direct access to", and you have defined "we" to be our brain processes, plus something phenomenal.

This conveys absolutely zero meaning. If I don't know how "we" differs from our brains, then I don't know what "phenomenal" means. And if I don't know what phenomenal means, then I don't know how "we" differ from our brains.

But you do know what phenomenal means, through your direct experience of it. You don't require my definition.

Anyway, it seems like this all goes back to the p-zombie thing. Would you agree that if you were not sure that phenomenal consciousness wasn't physical, that physicalism would be the most reasonable approach? If so, then the only real issue is why you are so sure this is the case. So far, the only reason you have cited for believing this, is the p-zombie argument.

As to the first question, yes.

As to the assertion that "the only reason I have cited for believing this is the p-zombie argument," that's just not so. You yourself have quoted me, in the very post I am no responding to, as citing:

And that's exactly what I've been arguing. That's what the knowledge argument, the arguments from conceivability, the argument from the epistemlogical uniqueness of phenomenal consciousness and the argument from the inconceivability of materialism are all about.

 

[The One called Neo]

Secondly, I don't think that even were we to recast that statement, perhaps as, "describe the phenomenal world in terms of our theories," that would be exactly what all, or even most physicalists mean when they say phenomenal consciousness is physical.
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It would also be pointless, because we can always describe things in terms of theories. In order to be useful, the theory must be falsifiable. The only way such a theory can be falsifiable is if we could make observations that prove it wrong. If the phenomenal world is not affected in any way by the phenomenal world, then this is simply not possible.

We can always describe things in terms of theories apart from phenomenal consciousness surely? If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous it surely cannot constitute part of any theory?

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

We can always describe things in terms of theories apart from phenomenal consciousness surely? If phenomenal consciousness is causally inefficaceous it surely cannot constitute part of any theory?

If we put phenomental conscoiusness into set B, giving it the property of being an effect but not the property of being a cause, then we certainly can make theories about it. I did so above by asserting that me dropping my rock onto the floor caused a set B occurance.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

Depends on how you define "novel," I guess. If you had global anteriograde amnesia, you could experience something for the first time, that experience being novel in an absolute sense. You, of course wouldn't form a long term memory of it, so each subsequent exposure would be "novel to you," yet still not "absolutely novel."

So, since phenomenal consciousness has no memory, every phenomenal experience should feel novel. But that isn't the way it feels.

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

In Science, "physical" refers to anything that can be detected and understood by applying the scientific method to our observations.
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In philosphy physical refers to something that holds the properties of cause and effect.

That's fine, because that is a requirement for the scientific definition to be valid. Basically, science just rules out the possibility of physical stuff that cannot be observed or analyzed with the scientific method. This is not pertinent to the discussion, though, because what is in question here is not whether there are physical things that cannot be observed, but rather whether there could be non-physical things that can be observed.

If you assert that there are properties in Ur that are not in A, but which meet the above requirement, then scientifically, those things are physical, and set A' (which includes all of these things, as well as A), is the set of physical things, and is causally closed. Set A, whatever it may be, is just a subset of what is physical.
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It seems Win is saying set A is defined by it's properties of cause, effect. Set B is defined by it's property of effect.

Hence set A is physical, set B is not.

I understand that. My point is that if A is defined to be physical, using that definition, then A must be causally closed. Win's assertion that A is not causally closed with respect to Ur is not compatible with the assertion that A is, in fact, the set of everything that is physical.

If we want to make a catagory C and define it as things that posses the property of human beings are able to theorize about then we have a different set that is not addressed specifically by dualism (AFAIK).

We can theorize about anything. That is beside the point. In order for those theories to provide any actual knowledge, they must be testable. And that means that what is being theorized about must have some effect on stuff that can be observed. It must be physical.

If A is not causally closed with respect to Ur, then those properties in Ur that can be detected through observations in A also play causal roles.

Saying that nothing outside of A plays a causal role on A, is exactly equivalent to saying that A is not causally closed.
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So you are claiming that if we have two catagories:

A = cause, effect
B = effect

Then A is an effect?

I think everyone would agree.

I don't see your point. If B is not also a cause, then no information about B can be inferred from observations in A. If B is truly just effect, and no cause, then we have no way of knowing it is there at all, much less anything about it.

The only other possibility would be if the properties of B could be logically deduced from A. But this is exactly what is meant by "reducible to the physical". Furthermore, this possibility is rejected by property dualism.

If we add

set C = cause

then we still have dualism (even with three sets) and open possibilities for set D being:

set D = something else

Set C being what I am interested in and the reason I am interested in QP.

I would assert that the KA and p-zombie suggests the existence of set B and free will suggests the existence of set C. Hopefully if I can gain a better grasp of QP I can eventually assert that QP suggests the existence of set C.

I don't follow this reasoning at all. How can there be cause without effect, or effect without cause? What does that even mean?

You can assert that C causes both physical and phenomenal effects, but any causes in C that cause physical effects are, by definition, physical causes.

That theory (the standard model of QM) is defined entirely in terms of observations. It is a mathematical description of the probabilities of making specific observations, and nothing more.
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Yes, but if you change the definition of physical from cause, effect to anything that can be observed or rendered to such a state that it can be observed then you are no longer a physicliast.

Sure you are. The second definition above is just more restrictive than the first. If everything physical can be observed, directly or indirectly, then it must have an effect on things which can be observed.

Dualism, however, would require their exist a faucet that is not explainable.

Agreed. That is one reason why it is a pointless endeavor.

A occurs causally necessitating B to occur.

If B is causally necessitated by A, then B is reducible to A.

B occurs but does not causally necessitate anything.

If B does not causally necessitate anything, then it is meaningless to say it exists. What is the difference between something that exists, but has no effect on anything, and something that doesn't exist at all?

Non-causal laws may or may not rule over B, all that matters is that B occurs and does not causally necessitate anything. Since existence is actually a string of causal occurances over time it could be argued that the existence of B would be such that it never exists in time, but must exist outside of time. Hence it can not be explained in terms of our observations in set A.

A more accurate statement would be to say that it does not exist at all. You have just described B to literally be something that does not exist!

To give an example of set C:

C occurs causally necessitating A or B to occur. If you were to eliminate everything from set A, C in the time < timeC then C would still have occured. The idea that C would occur without a prior necessitation is a violation of the laws of thermodynamics which seem to govern set A.

This is not true. There are all sorts of acausal events in the physical world. Thermodynamics says nothing about this. You have misunderstood thermodynamics.

Cs occurance can not be explained. That is not to say it can not be predicted. It is a logical possibility that someone, even everyone, would predict every occurance of C. I'm sure you are familiar with Hume et. al.

One could say that all quantum events are set C. So what? This has no relevance to consciousness or free-will.

Then it is not possible to describe it at all, or to know anything about it. Our observations are the only source of information we have.
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Which is an assertion I could argue against. If Win believes that 'we' are not the thing which observes but are something else, and the observing thing is perhaps a machine filtering information into 'us' then there is nothing inherently flawed in claiming that information could come from other sources in addition to this source.

Our brains are physical things. The only source of information our brains have is our observations. Win has already stated that the information processing takes place in the brain, so the only information that "we" can process comes from our observations.

Please note that if you are endorsing a different type of dualism than Win, then responding to my comments to Win are just going to confuse the issue.

It would also be pointless, because we can always describe things in terms of theories. In order to be useful, the theory must be falsifiable. The only way such a theory can be falsifiable is if we could make observations that prove it wrong. If the phenomenal world is not affected in any way by the phenomenal world, then this is simply not possible.
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You can say that a theory must also be proven falsifiable. If you believe that everything can eventually be rendered to a state of perceivability then every false theory can be proven false.

This does not logically follow. On the contrary, even if physicalism is true, it is always possible to construct theories which cannot, even in principle, ever be falsified.

I'm not sure what else you are trying to assert. Theories involving set B cannot be proven false? How so?

If set B has no effect on set A, then any theory about set B that makes predictions about set A can necessarily be split into two parts.

1) A theory which only makes reference to set A, and makes all the predictions about set A that the theory originally made.

and

2) A theory which makes no predictions about set A, but makes reference to set B.

The first part is falsifiable, but says noting about set B. The second part is unfalsifiable. Furthermore, since this split can be made, falsifying the first part does not falsify the second part.

In other words, if we had such a theory, and it was falsified, we could construct a new theory which makes exactly the same claims about the phenomenal world, but is consistent with our observations in set A.

What if I assert that when I drop my rock onto the floor the occurance of the rock hitting the floor causes a set B effect on the floor and rock. Today you could tell me that I am incorrect, and that it is a set A effect that has the cause of distributing force (assume) 'evenly' over the floor. But a thousand years ago you may not have been able to 'prove' that theory false.

This is what I am talking about. Even today you could claim that some sort of set B effect is present. There is just no longer any reason to think so.

I can never prove that there isn't something more to any given phenomenon than the physical. The thing is that once we get to the point of being able to completely describe everything about the phenomenon that we think there is, we no longer see any reason to imagine nonphysical stuff is present as well.

It is the classic argument from ignorance. As long as there is any aspect of consciousness that we don't completely understand in terms of physical descriptions, people will argue that there is something non-physical going on. But such a claim is pointless. If there is, we can never hope to explain it, and if there is not, we can never prove that there is not.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Not much time but if something is philisopihcally acausal then it certainly does violate the laws of thermo-dynamics.

If something is philosophically acausal then it doesn't necessitate it's own occurance, hence it would not exist in the very-next smallest slice of time.

no time, I'll be back.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

If we put phenomental conscoiusness into set B, giving it the property of being an effect but not the property of being a cause, then we certainly can make theories about it. I did so above by asserting that me dropping my rock onto the floor caused a set B occurance.

You can make all the theories you want, but how are you going to verify or falsify them? Since B isn't causal, it can't cause anything you can observe. You can only observe it within phenomenal consciousness itself, which has no memory. Heck, without any memory, I'm not sure how you could have any coherent phenomenal experience longer than an instant.

And speaking of no memory, how do you remember the phenomenal experience of dropping a rock on your foot? Since B has no memory, it must write into the brain's memory. But it isn't causal, so it can't do that.

It seems the only way out is to postulate that my physical brain, upon sensing the rock, invokes phenomenal consciousness and passes it all the memories about dropping-rock-on-foot, including whether this is the first time or not. Phenomenal consciousness thus becomes some kind of slave process of the physical brain. But why do we need it at all?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Put in plain English, if you claim that it is possible to use the scientific method to describe the phenomenal world in terms of our observations, then this is exactly what physicalists mean when they say that phenomenal consciousness is physical.
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First of all, as I note above, I don't think it's possible to "describe the phenomenal world in terms of our observations."
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Then it is not possible to describe it at all, or to know anything about it. Our observations are the only source of information we have.

Well well well, contradicting yourself yet again!

You asserted earlier in this thread that knowledge involves more than information. You maintained that, in addition, there is the knowledge supplied by actual experience. So when Mary actually experiences redness, she gains new knowledge, but no extra information.

This directly contradicts what you say above when you equate knowledge with information.

Clueless tit.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty said:
You can make all the theories you want, but how are you going to verify or falsify them? Since B isn't causal, it can't cause anything you can observe. You can only observe it within phenomenal consciousness itself, which has no memory. Heck, without any memory, I'm not sure how you could have any coherent phenomenal experience longer than an instant.

And speaking of no memory, how do you remember the phenomenal experience of dropping a rock on your foot? Since B has no memory, it must write into the brain's memory. But it isn't causal, so it can't do that.

It seems the only way out is to postulate that my physical brain, upon sensing the rock, invokes phenomenal consciousness and passes it all the memories about dropping-rock-on-foot, including whether this is the first time or not. Phenomenal consciousness thus becomes some kind of slave process of the physical brain. But why do we need it at all?

~~ Paul

Well Paul, I don't necessarily believe that set B exists. I am just saying that if I assert that an occurance of X does not necessitate any occurance of an effect then you can prove I'm wrong by demonstrating the occurance of an effect and proving that it is necesary by repeated observation.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

Well Paul, I don't necessarily believe that set B exists. I am just saying that if I assert that an occurance of X does not necessitate any occurance of an effect then you can prove I'm wrong by demonstrating the occurance of an effect and proving that it is necesary by repeated observation.

Assuming that I can design the experiment in such as way that I'm sure it causes X and not Y, and that I'm sure I can enumerate all possible potential effects of X so I can check for them. Both of these requirements sound difficult for something that we postulate has no effects in the first place.

I postulate that whenever I sneeze, an undetectable pink hamster orbiting Neptune tallies my sneeze on his chalkboard.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Look at it another way. It is one thing to say that things have both physical and phenomenal properties. But when you get to the *I* this becomes problematic. The physical part of *I* stores and processes physical information. What does the phenomenal part of the *I* do? How does it work? How can it be meaningfully said to "know" things, or "learn" things, when these things all imply information storage and information processing?

It only implies information storage and information processing from the physical perspective. From the mental perspective this needn't be so.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Clueless tit.

Stimpson J. Cat is a tit? Well now, that sheds a whole new light on the situation!

It only implies information storage and information processing from the physical perspective. From the mental perspective this needn't be so.

Why?

~~ Paul