Akhenaten
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Lemurian has raised some good points though. If you are your brain, Joobz, then you must weigh about three pounds.
I see what joobz means about equivocation.
Materialism (championed by Darwinists) makes reason Impossible.
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I see what joobz means about equivocation.
Akhenaten
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joobz
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No apologies needed. there has been too much drift in this discussion and all of it is based upon in consistent definitions being applied. I wanted to use your post as an attempt to refocus on what I was discussing and where the hypotheticals stand.
Akhenaten
Heretic Pharaoh
Regardless, we've reached no point where something "else" beside the brain is necessary, in the hypothetical, nor in reality.
To go from the former to the latter;
I was over a someone's house a few years ago, and a friend of his was there w/ his child. The kid looked seriously "knocked out" to me, and I remarked as such. A few minutes later, the friend told me that his son was born w/ numerous, large, cysts in his brain. He could not speak, move, nor eat.
It has haunted me ever since, in this way. What would his soul be like? If he were to show up in heaven, would he be a normally functioning soul? That wouldn't be him though. This child, in all likelyhood, has never had a conscious thought, only experiencing sensations.
Did he not get issued a soul at conception? Is he less human than you or me?
No, he's fully human, just w/ a malfunctioning & malformed brain, which has robbed him of his higher cognitive functions. I don't see how this example could be incorporated into the dualist paradigm.
To go from the former to the latter;
I was over a someone's house a few years ago, and a friend of his was there w/ his child. The kid looked seriously "knocked out" to me, and I remarked as such. A few minutes later, the friend told me that his son was born w/ numerous, large, cysts in his brain. He could not speak, move, nor eat.
It has haunted me ever since, in this way. What would his soul be like? If he were to show up in heaven, would he be a normally functioning soul? That wouldn't be him though. This child, in all likelyhood, has never had a conscious thought, only experiencing sensations.
Did he not get issued a soul at conception? Is he less human than you or me?
No, he's fully human, just w/ a malfunctioning & malformed brain, which has robbed him of his higher cognitive functions. I don't see how this example could be incorporated into the dualist paradigm.
joobz
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The problem with the equivocation game that Malerin played is that it is logically inconsistent with his/her argument for a soul.
I'm sorry, where's the equivocation? You're making an equivalence claim: you are equivalent to your brain. E.g., a bachelor is equivalent to an unmarried man. What is true for one is true for the other.
How much does the bachelor weigh? The same as the unmarried man.
How much do you weigh? The same as your brain?
If you don't see the problem now, you never will.
yy2bggggs
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Silly Malerin; only matter has weight.How much do you weigh? The same as your brain?
If you don't see the problem now, you never will.
joobz
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There are multiple definitions for words. You are applying a different definition than I am using. HEnce, you are equivocating.
in this case, when I say "YOU" I am clearly (to everyone who is following this discussion) referring to the "You that recognizes itself". Your Conscious self.
Considering you believe in a soul, your argument is quite dishonest.
Which post did you make the distinction that "you" refers to "conscious self"? I scrolled back, but can't find it, although I didn't look through the entire thread.
Just to be clear, when someone asks you How much do you weigh? what "you" do you think they're referring to? Conscious self doesn't work for those kinds of sentences.
You're claiming that your conscious self is your brain? That's a definitional claim, right? You're defining "conscious self" as "your brain". Would you say that your brain is your conscious self?
You're going to run into the same problems as if you said Windows is your computer.
Joobz,
No soul for me, but I think you still have a problem. If you localize the sense of self to the brain, that's fine. But then you are left with an organ that can be further divided. We might ask, "Where in the brain?"
Now, if you go with some particular subsection, then that too can be divided. I'll presume you'll resist that method and instead go with non-local modules interacting -- consciousness arises from the interactions and removing one mass of tissue will interfere with consciousness. (Don't let me put concepts in your mouth if I'm wrong.)
Now, let's see how that works with someone who wants to add another ingredient to the brain itself. We know, for instance, that not having a circulatory system with a functioning heart and lungs will stop consciousness. So we should include those as necessary. But why stop there? What about nutritional requirements? Could even stimuli affect the "self" that results and be said to alter the type of consciousness you end up with?
Coming from another direction, we have examples of functioning brains that aren't conscious -- coma, deep and dreamless sleep.
We also have a kind of consciousness in organisms without brains. Chemotaxis and quorum sensing might be examples -- but only if strict materialism is adhered to. In other words, the brain shouldn't be "special" over and above other tissues at some deep level. Of course, it boils down to whatever we claim consciousness to be, whether it is scalable or discrete. I am not a fan of strict localization although I don't see why a soul would be needed either.
No soul for me, but I think you still have a problem. If you localize the sense of self to the brain, that's fine. But then you are left with an organ that can be further divided. We might ask, "Where in the brain?"
Now, if you go with some particular subsection, then that too can be divided. I'll presume you'll resist that method and instead go with non-local modules interacting -- consciousness arises from the interactions and removing one mass of tissue will interfere with consciousness. (Don't let me put concepts in your mouth if I'm wrong.)
Now, let's see how that works with someone who wants to add another ingredient to the brain itself. We know, for instance, that not having a circulatory system with a functioning heart and lungs will stop consciousness. So we should include those as necessary. But why stop there? What about nutritional requirements? Could even stimuli affect the "self" that results and be said to alter the type of consciousness you end up with?
Coming from another direction, we have examples of functioning brains that aren't conscious -- coma, deep and dreamless sleep.
We also have a kind of consciousness in organisms without brains. Chemotaxis and quorum sensing might be examples -- but only if strict materialism is adhered to. In other words, the brain shouldn't be "special" over and above other tissues at some deep level. Of course, it boils down to whatever we claim consciousness to be, whether it is scalable or discrete. I am not a fan of strict localization although I don't see why a soul would be needed either.
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Yep, that's where I was going. You don't even need coma or dreamless sleep. Much of the brain's activities happen on an unconscious level we're not aware of (e.g., digestion).
joobz
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most recently
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=7314708#post7314708
It was the exact sentence before the one you bolded in your previous response to me.
This is the original post that set this all off.
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=7292267#post7292267
Your argument of "how much you weigh" makes no sense in context to the conversation. You are drifting.
Your question makes no sense in context to my previous posts.
read this for my answer.
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=7314708#post7314708
This makes even less sense in context to what I have already posted.
read this for my answer.
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=7314708#post7314708
joobz
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I feel like you also need to read my post completely.
as I said
I say commonly because the brain does seem to have plasticity with some of these wirings. But we have no example of our conscious self residing in the appendix. So I think "brain" is a reasonably small divisible unit for the self.joobz said:
This path is a nonstarter.
The brain function structure are intertwined.
i'm speaking of humans not bacteria.
So if we replaced your brain with another brain, you would still be you? Just like if we replaced your kidney with another's?
Wowbagger
The Infinitely Prolonged
Don't mind me, I'm just posting a quote I made in another thread, that seemed relevant to this one:
Evasions noted. When you claim multiple people aren't reading your posts correctly, perhaps the problem lies elsewhere.
joobz
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No evasion on this end. Just demonstrating your failure to actually read my posts.
ETA: you asked for the posts, and I provided them. You call this evasions?
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Partly. Same for the kidney. Me with glasses is different than me without. Me extends in time and isn't the same from day to day. I think it would be much more difficult to freeze "me" than it would be to keep this kind of loose narrative definition. Our sense of self depends on autobiographical memory and cannot just be placed in one part of the brain exclusively. This would imply that what has happened to us matters.
Me as father is different than me as son. The only justification for calling these two the same "me" is historical and illusory. My dog, killed by a car, is still my dog in one sense, but in another it is quite different -- I would stop playing fetch with it for example.
I think there is also a link, besides historicity, with ownership. As if I owned my sense of self. But returning to your example of organ replacement, if I replaced a part of my frontal lobe with another's would I still be me? And even worse, when brain plasticity changes the wiring in my frontal lobe, am I still "me" even without the transplant?
Craig4
Penultimate Amazing
