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Materialism and Logic, mtually exclusive?

I see. What mathematical results do you propose have meaning ... if they cannot be substantiated by an observer vis-a-vis reality?
How about the mathematical result that the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its sides.
 
I think I understand at least part of the confusion... when I say that facts are not logical, I am not saying that they are therefore illogical...
logical ≠ not logical.

This which is not logical is illogical.

It's as simple as that.

What I am saying is that the terms "logical" and "illogical" apply only to arguments. An argument can be logically correct or incorrect.
A = B is logical.

The statue is rock. A = B. This is logical as opposed to "not logical" or illogical.

A rock cannot be either.
"A rock" is not a statement of fact. However that rocks exist is logical.

If there are things that exist, and which are not arguments, but which are illogical - please give an example.
? Only that which is logical can exist. Otherwise it would be illogical. Please see Through the Looking Glass by Carroll. Your understanding of logic is a bit bizzare. I higly recomend Carroll's tome. It is a wonderful way to view the world in an illogical way to understand why the world can only be logical.

You see. A river that flowed uphill would be illogical because water seeks the course of least resistence.
  1. Water seeks the course of least resistance.
  2. Water does not seek the course of least resistance.
stillthinking, by your logic,

#1 is true but illogical.
#2 is not true but illogical.

#1 = #2

Are you offering Wittgenstein and Tacitus as arguments from authority?
Not "Tacitus", Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

And yes, I consider Wittgenstein an outstanding authority, you?

I dont really know what they might have meant by their comment. I would be glad if you can provide the quotes, in their original languages as well as an English translation, in some of the author's context as well.
Fair enough. However I don't have the original language version of it and I can't imagine the relevance. How many languages other than english do you speak? The quote by the way isn't exact and I will concede that it is not literal. I avoid the use of quotes for non-literals but it is an acceptable practice if the quote is substantively the same as the intent of the speaker.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) is a pivotal work in linguistic philosophy which helped to define the aims and methods of logical positivism and of analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein's approach to the analysis of language had an important influence on many twentieth-century philosophers who attempted to redefine the problems, aims, and concerns of philosophy.

Linguistic analysis is an approach to philosophy that uses the logical analysis of language as a means to understand and resolve philosophical problems. According to this approach, the aim of philosophical inquiry is to analyze and clarify propositions. Philosophical problems are seen as arising from linguistic errors or confusions, and therefore recognition of these errors and confusions may enable many philosophical problems to be resolved.

The Tractatus has seven numbered sections. Each section consists of a set of statements or aphorisms, which are each given a decimal number. The logical order of each aphorism is denoted by its decimal number, such as 2.011, 2.012, etc.

The thesis of the first section is that the world is a totality of facts. The thesis of the second section is that facts are composed of elementary units, called atomic facts. The thesis of the third section is that thoughts are logical pictures of facts. The thesis of the fourth section is that thoughts are expressed by propositions. The thesis of the fifth section is that propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions (which assign a truth-possibility to atomic facts). The thesis of the sixth section is that propositions may have meaning only if they are logical pictures of facts. The seventh section consists of only one statement, that 'whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent.'

For Wittgenstein, 'the world is everything that is the case,' and the world consists of facts. However, if we confront questions in which it is not the case that we can make a logical picture of relevant facts, then we cannot formulate any logical proposition.
 
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RandFan:

You are saying that the adjectives "logical" and "illogical" apply only to statements. I had already said they only apply to arguments. So it appears we have two different defintions of "logical".

By my definition, neither #1 nor #2 are logical or illogical, any more than a rock or a river are logical or illogical by either of our definitions.

It seems to me that my definition, i.e. that the term "logical" and "illogical" applies properly only to argument, is common English usage among philosophy students.

Your definition seems to make "logical" and "illogical" synonyms for "true" and "false" respectively.

I would consider Wittgenstein an authority on what Witgenstein thought. That would probably be about it.

I have studied four different languages in depth besides, English. I am fluent in two. I taught Classical Greek at the University level, but that was 19 years ago. I suspect that the word "logical" is a poor translation of the word Wittgenstein used, but I have no idea.
 
Most have no trouble observing that vis-a-vis reality, and even moving on to c**2 = a**2 + b**2.

It is impossible to verify empirically:

1. the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square
2. the pythagorean theorem

Both are easy to prove. Neither can be demonstrated empirically.

This is because there is no such thing as a square, or a right angled triangle, in the material world.
 
The control mechanism will exist and be quite content without any inputs or outputs. It might not be useful to you, but that is your need. We are the ones who need machines.
I haven't been terribly clear. I'm referring to inputs and outputs as components of a control mechanism, as opposed to actual data flow during use. They are the sine qua non of a control mechanism. Even a dormant one. They have no needs as in desires, obviously, nor does contentment apply.

I think it is another anthropomorphic projection to say that, for example, "machines need us to maintain them and fix them". They dont need that, we need it if we want to keep the machines operating.
Machines need maintaining, no doubt about that, and ain't nobody but us gonna do it. It would indeed be odd for someone to bother pointing that out. Not on this occasion, of course, since I was prompted. :)

My car doens't need me to push the gas pedal. If I need to drive my car somewhere, then I need to push the gas pedal. If the car is going to move, then there is a sense in which it needs to have the gas pedal pushed. But this is a projection of my need. Material things dont need anything.
"Need", a good old simple word. :)
 
You are saying that the adjectives "logical" and "illogical" apply only to statements.
?

No, that's not at all what I'm saying. Please don't tell me what I'm saying. If there is some confusion on your part as to what I believe or what I'm trying to say then please ask me. I think that is only fair, right?

I had already said they only apply to arguments.
"They"?

So it appears we have two different defintions of "logical".
Let's get to the heart of the matter. Here are my definitions of "logic" and "logical" as they pertain to this discussion.

Logic

Logic is concerned with what is true and how we can know
whether something is true.

Logical

reasonable; to be expected
  1. A statement of fact is concerned with what is true (thus it pertains to logic).
  2. A statement of fact that is reasonable and is to be expected is thus "logical".
Question: Do you have a disagreement with either premise or the definitions that I have provided?

By my definition, neither #1 nor #2 are logical or illogical, any more than a rock or a river are logical or illogical by either of our definitions.
Let's use a disjunction.

A Statement of fact is logical or It is not the case that a statement of fact is logical.

It is logically impossible for "A or not A" to be false, agreed?

It seems to me that my definition, i.e. that the term "logical" and "illogical" applies properly only to argument, is common English usage among philosophy students.
A statement of fact or an axiom is considered logical by philosophy students. Would you not agree that it is logical for axioms to conform with the laws of physics (a question but this could easitly be a statment of fact)?

Your definition seems to make "logical" and "illogical" synonyms for "true" and "false" respectively.
No. A statement of fact is logical.

To state that "water does not seek the course of least resistance" is both false and illogical.

To state that "water seeks the course of least resistance" is both true and logical.

That which follows the laws of physics is logical.

I would consider Wittgenstein an authority on what Wittgenstein thought. That would probably be about it.
That's unfortunate. Wittgenstein is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century having been chosen by Time Magazine as one of the top 100 scientists and thinkers of that era and for very good reason.

I suspect that the word "logical" is a poor translation of the word Wittgenstein used, but I have no idea.
? This is a rather bizarre statement. Perhaps my understanding of Wittgenstein is completely wrong. I'll admit that it is possible but I can't for the life of me see how. What the hell could he have possibly have meant if it wasn't "logical"?

Thanks,

RandFan
 
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Not "Tacitus", Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

And yes, I consider Wittgenstein an outstanding authority, you?
As W. rejected significant amounts of his early work later in life, you probably shouldn't use "Argument from Authority" to justify quotes from Tractus.
 
It is impossible to verify empirically:

1. the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square
2. the pythagorean theorem

Both are easy to prove. Neither can be demonstrated empirically.

This is because there is no such thing as a square, or a right angled triangle, in the material world.
So in what we perceive as physical, measurement errors occur and/or Heisenberg was right. What is your point?
 
As W. rejected significant amounts of his early work later in life, you probably shouldn't use "Argument from Authority" to justify quotes from Tractus.
I don't think he rejected his picture theory of propositions nor the foundations of logic though he did reject the notion that any logical statement had any meaning or was true beyond any human construction.
 
I haven't been terribly clear. I'm referring to inputs and outputs as components of a control mechanism, as opposed to actual data flow during use. They are the sine qua non of a control mechanism. Even a dormant one. They have no needs as in desires, obviously, nor does contentment apply.


Machines need maintaining, no doubt about that, and ain't nobody but us gonna do it. It would indeed be odd for someone to bother pointing that out. Not on this occasion, of course, since I was prompted.


"Need", a good old simple word.
Thanks for the clarification... can I ask for further clarification. I don't need ;) it but would appreciate it before going further...

Consider the two statements:
1. "The car needs gas."
2. "We need to put gas in the car."

These are both normal statements in English, and we wouldn't be confused to hear it put either way. The general idea in both statements is the same: "refueling the car is a condition of our continued use of said car" (who talks like that - but I trust you get the idea).

Do you agree, however, that in (1) the use of the word "need" involves an anthropomorphism, while (2) does not?
 
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stillthinkin said:
Gravity is a fact, not a mathematical result.
I see. What mathematical results do you propose have meaning ... if they cannot be substantiated by an observer vis-a-vis reality?
stillthinkin said:
It is impossible to verify empirically:
1. the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square
2. the pythagorean theorem
Both are easy to prove. Neither can be demonstrated empirically.
So in what we perceive as physical, measurement errors occur and/or Heisenberg was right. What is your point?
You asked for an example of a mathematical result which has meaning but which cannot be substantiated vis-a-vis reality. What was your point in asking for an example if, when provided, you ask me what my point was in providing it?
 
Try it this way: if every living thing were eliminated from the universe, wouldn't A still equal A and A not equal B? Even if no one was around to realize it? The tree falling in the woods still makes a sound.
 
You asked for an example of a mathematical result which has meaning but which cannot be substantiated vis-a-vis reality. What was your point in asking for an example if, when provided, you ask me what my point was in providing it?
Maybe this will help. Substantiated vis-a-vis reality, within acceptable measurement error, down to the point where Heisenberg reigns and downward from there until we are less than Planck length.

Now, what was your point? Shall we discuss what the meaning of is is? Vis-a-vis anthropomorphism, perhaps.

Or shall I just conclude {late} Wittgenstein is now operative and language is meaningless?
 
Maybe this will help. Substantiated vis-a-vis reality, within acceptable measurement error, down to the point where Heisenberg reigns and downward from there until we are less than Planck length.
The pythagorean theorem and the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side are established vis-a-vis reality, quite well within empircal limits... but they are proven to be true well beyond those limits too.

Now, what was your point? Shall we discuss what the meaning of is is? Vis-a-vis anthropomorphism, perhaps.
I promise not to run for President. Cant anyways, I am Canadian.

Or shall I just conclude {late} Wittgenstein is now operative and language is meaningless?
No - let's not conclude that.
 
So... are you ready to state your argument, in proper format? Premises - arguments - conclusions... etc.?

We're ready to listen...
 
I don't think he rejected his picture theory of propositions nor the foundations of logic though he did reject the notion that any logical statement had any meaning or was true beyond any human construction.
If you've consider it than that's fair enough. I still haven't got round to reading it although I do mean to.

Thanks for the clarification... can I ask for further clarification. I don't need ;) it but would appreciate it before going further...

Consider the two statements:
1. "The car needs gas."
2. "We need to put gas in the car."
....
Do you agree, however, that in (1) the use of the word "need" involves an anthropomorphism, while (2) does not?

No. Statement 1 is a shortened version of "The car needs gas (in order to keep running)."
 
I think the question is, "what is non-mechanistic about the human person". This is a very interesting question. If matter is entirely mechanistic (deterministic), and human beings are not entirely deterministic, then something about humans has to be non-material.
If this is a premise of your argument then I reject it and I think many other people here would too.

Specifically, I don't agree that human beings are any less deterministic than the rest of the physical world (we could argue about exactly how deterministic that is due to quantum randomness). If they were then this would be empirically detectable - it would mean that human brain cells violated the known laws of physics.
 
I would be glad if you can provide the quotes, in their original languages as well as an English translation, in some of the author's context as well.
Damn, Tractatus was originally published in both German and English. I did not know that.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Hypertext of the Ogden bilingual edition

1 The world is everything that is the case. *
2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
3 The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
4 The thought is the significant proposition.
5 Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
6 The general form of truth-function is: [
lcpbar.gif
,
lcxibar.gif
, N(
lcxibar.gif
)].
This is the general form of proposition.
7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.


1 Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist. *
2 Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.
3 Das logische Bild der Tatsache ist der Gedanke.
4 Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz.
5 Der Satz ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion der Elementarsätze.
(Der Elementarsatz ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion seiner selbst.)
6 Die allgemeine Form der Wahrheitsfunktion ist: [
lcpbar.gif
,
lcxibar.gif
, N(
lcxibar.gif
)].
Dies ist die allgemeine Form des Satzes.
7 Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.

ETA: It is my understanding that Tractatus was published in both German and English side by side. Presumably the author had a hand in the translation process and/or editing.
 
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