Materialism and Immaterialism

[apoger]

Well, let's see; how about "thought", the perceived universe, and the universe as it actually is.

#1 - Why are you using the qualifier "how about"? Is this some sort of hypothetical game or is this really what you are offering as a definition?

#2 - Why is "thought" in quotes? Are we discussing thought or not?

#3 - If we use this definition your previous statement becomes:

scientist = 100% certain that rationalization can explain "thought, the perceived universe, and the universe as it actually is" with no need for god.

As we have explained before, a common definition of scientist would simply be someone that is a devotee of scientific method. Those who use science do not make 100% statments (at least not valid ones). Furthermore utilizing the scientific method requires no stance on the subject of god, unless of course you are using a non-standard definition for that as well.

Beyond this, why say "thought, the perceived universe, and the universe as it actually is"? When we say "the universe" adding in "as it actually is" is redundant. So we can reduce that to just "the universe". Thoughts and perceptions are part of the universe so mentioning them is redundant as well. Thus your whole definition of "what-is" is simply equal to "the universe". Is there any particular reason why you didn't just say "the universe" in the first (or second) place?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

I will realize that my position is untenable when somebody is able to coherently explain to me why it is untenable.
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I'm sick of doing so. You just ignore all my arguments. You've just done so again below.

I have not ignored any of your arguments. You can claim that I have misunderstood your arguments, or that my replies to them do not make sense, but to claim that I have ignored them, is simply a lie. A lie which this thread makes painfully obvious to anybody masochistic enough to bother reading it.

Why on Earth would you think that determinism claims that the will is causally inefficacious? That does not even make any sense! A determinist would be the last person to make such a claim!
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A physical determinist would which is what we are discussing. The world proceeds according to objective facts; to the actual objective processes occurring in the brain, or wherever. We do not need to refer to a will, just as we do not need to refer to a will for the Earth orbiting the Sun.

No, a physical determinist would not. A physical determinist would say that the will is, in fact, a physical process occurring in the brain, and therefore is causally efficacious. Your argument is based on the a-priori assumption that the will cannot be a brain process. This is an assumption which physical determinists do not make.

The Earth does not have a will. The Earth is not a complex decision making machine, like the brain is. The Earth does not make decisions at all. The brain does.
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What relevance has this got?? Clearly our Will is not required, otherwise you are denying materialism (and indeed naturalism).

Only if you make the a-priori assumption that the will is not a physical process. Materialists and naturalists do not make that assumption.

The will is a concept we use to intuitively describe aspects of our decision making process.
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How can the will be a description of a physical process. The will is utterly conceptually distinct from any physical processes, and it is not needed.

Your conception of the will is irrelevant. The things which makes our decisions, which seems to be what you are calling the will, is obviously necessary to describe our behavior. The fact that you insist, without any justification for doing so, that it must be non-physical, does not change that fact.

So what? Those concepts, and more specifically, the manner in which you have chosen to conceptualize consciousness, has no bearing on how those things actually work.
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But I've already provided my argument to show that it is crucial for how things work. I need to exercise my will in order to get out of bed. Thus physical determinism, and materialism, and naturalism, and epiphenomenalism are refuted.

No, only epiphenomenalism is refuted. I have no idea why you seem to think that materialism requires epiphenomenalism. The two position are mutually exclusive.

The vast majority of physical objects in the Universe do not have intentions, but yet they still happily obey physical laws.
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Again, so what?
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Therefore a causally efficacious will is not required for any object.

This has got to be one of the best examples of pseudo-logic I have ever seen. X is false for the majority of objects in the Universe, so X must be false for all of them? Are you serious?

A p-zombie will do everything that I do. But a p-zombie does not have intentions. So how come a p-zombie would get out of bed, but when not exercising my will, I stay in bed??

Ask somebody who thinks that p-zombies are a coherent concept.

The vast majority of physical objects in the universe also do not have properties like computation, or pattern matching, associated with them.
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These are all physical processes. A computer is no different in type from the Earth orbiting the Sun.

Could the fact that your argument amounts to nothing more than special pleading, be any more obvious? You presented an argument for why intentions must be non-physical, and when I state that the same argument could be applied to other things which are physical, you respond by saying "that is different, they are physical processes". Again, are you serious?

Does that mean that computers and neural networks have an immaterial self associated with them, to do these things? Of course not. It just means that complex systems are capable of doing things that simple systems cannot do. I am dumbfounded that you would not recognize the naivety of this line of argumentation.
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My argument appears to me to be watertight. If most objects do not require a will, why not all objects?

Because not all objects are complex information processing and decision making machines.

If you claim that objective facts are not sufficient to explain our behaviour, but we need a will as well, this then refutes materialism.

But I don't claim that. I have never claimed that. What I have claimed is that the Will itself can be explained by objective facts.

That is simply not true.
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It is according to materialism because it asserts only the physical exists, and all that is physical can be discerned from the third person perspective. Private experiences do not get a look in.

No, that is what you claim that materialism asserts. Actual materialists do not make assertions that presuppose such dualistic metaphysical assumptions.

Are you seriously claiming that one cannot understand a person's behaviour purely from facts gleamed from the third person perspective??

That depends on what you mean by "third person perspective". I think that a person's behavior can, at least in principle, be explained scientifically.

Contrary to your repeated assertions, it is a simple fact that psychology and neuroscience (which are the methodologies we use to understand our behavior), do take into account phenomenal experiences.
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Then they are presupposing materialism is false.

They are presupposing that your strawman version of materialism (which is just epiphenomenalism) is false.

The notion that human behavior can be explained in anything more than an extremely superficial manner, without taking phenomenal experience into consideration, is simply not tenable.
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Good, then you have denied materialism.

No, I have denied epiphenomenalism.

No, it is contrary to epiphenomenalism, which is itself contrary to materialism. You are attacking a strawman. That is not my position, nor it is the position of anybody who calls themselves a materialist.
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It's contrary to materialism as well. Both epiphenomenalists and materialists agree that behaviour can be understood by considering objective (3rd person) facts exclusively. Otherwise why would the Earth orbit around the Sun without you needing to introduce the Earth's intention of doing so?

But unlike epiphenomenalists, and you, materialists do not make the absurd, and wholly unjustified claim, that things like phenomenal experience, intention, and the process of making decisions, cannot be understood by considering only objective facts. All of your arguments against materialism presuppose that this is the case. A clearer example of circular reasoning would be difficult to find.

If you wish to justify your claim that these things cannot be understood by considering objective facts, then do so. But simply asserting that this is so, and pointing out that this leads to contradictions with materialism, is both trivial and irrelevant. We all know that this claim is not consistent with materialism. Prove your claim, and materialism is false.


Now, if you are done attacking epiphenomenalism, I believe the topic of this thread is materialism and immaterialism.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wrath said:
'Is' refers to "the state of being" or "that which interacts with whatever is being discussed". If the set of "the universe" contains it, it "is".

Contains it epistemologically or ontologically? Are we talking about what we can know about the universe, or what the universe "actually is"?

~~ Paul

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Are we talking about what we can know about the universe, or what the universe "actually is"?

Either, depending on the context.

As long as we keep in mind that what we think isn't necessarily what's true, there're no problems.

 

[DrMatt]

But determinism must mean more than predictable!

A basic discovery of the 1970's is that deterministic systems need not be predictable after all. This is because of the interaction between A) the limits of measurement and B) the capacity of slight distinctions in behavior to have gross consequences.

These findings shed light on the difficulty of predicting weather, predicting coin tosses using physics, modeling conciousness, making a crash-proof multitasking operating system, communicating large amounts of data across real physical media, electrophysiologic models of heartbeats, the soundmaking behavior of flutes, etc.

Many of the most unpredictable systems in the world, systems which depend upon upredictable global processes to function correctly, are well understood in terms of completely deterministic local processes.

 

[Interesting Ian]

{sighs}

Stimp I'll reply to you tomorrow.

 

[Dancing David]

Posted by Interesting Ian
Therefore a causally efficacious will is not required for any object. A p-zombie will do everything that I do. But a p-zombie does not have intentions. So how come a p-zombie would get out of bed, but when not exercising my will, I stay in bed??

Point of order: a p-zombie is not consiousness, so I suppose intention and consiousness are equal. How abou an ant, it has a limited consiousness and almost no intention?

The staying in bed argument doesn't work for me, could it not be that you are using your free will to stay in bed, and therby prove materialism to be true?

 

[Darat]

A basic discovery of the 1970's is that deterministic systems need not be predictable after all. This is because of the interaction between A) the limits of measurement and B) the capacity of slight distinctions in behavior to have gross consequences. ...snip...

I thought the definition of a deterministic system was that it is 100% predictable or perhaps better phrased, with the same input you will always get the same output?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Yes. That doesn't mean we can predict the system, though.

 

[DrMatt]

Getting "The same input" is difficult in the case of neural nets or other large cellular automatons, weather systems, etc.

 

[DrMatt]

The most popular popularizer of this topic these days is Stephen Wolfram.

 

[jj]

A basic discovery of the 1970's is that deterministic systems need not be predictable after all. This is because of the interaction between A) the limits of measurement and B) the capacity of slight distinctions in behavior to have gross consequences.


They are "predictable" if you can have PERFECT knowledge and PERFECT calculation, which of course are impossible, thank you Heisenberg.


These findings shed light on the difficulty of predicting weather,

True, although there is also a QM component (very small, but still there) in weather.

predicting coin tosses using physics, modeling conciousness,

Ditto and ditto.

making a crash-proof multitasking operating system,

Well, ditto, but very controlled and very very small, for the QM part. On the other hand, if you're talking about multiprocessor and multi-input, then there is another bit of basic physics that intrudes from the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle, addressing the problem of "which of these two events came first", that can create trouble as well. (No, I'm not talking about Heisenberg time scales, either... Just normal nanosecond/etc timescales)

communicating large amounts of data across real physical media,

Both QM and chaotic play a big part there.

electrophysiologic models of heartbeats,

Since it's a QM-specific process that starts the "wave" that makes the heartbeat happen, yeah, I'd say it's hard to model. There is a chaotic component and a QM component, and both are large here, yes?

the soundmaking behavior of flutes, etc.

That's primarily chaotic, I think, but QM does get involved, but just barely...

Many of the most unpredictable systems in the world, systems which depend upon upredictable global processes to function correctly, are well understood in terms of completely deterministic local processes.

You're not suggesting that heartbeats, etc, are completely deterministic local processes are you?

 

[hammegk]

'Is' refers to "the state of being" or "that which interacts with whatever is being discussed". If the set of "the universe" contains it, it "is".

There. That wasn't so bad, was it?

Nah. That was super. Perhaps the dictionaries will all be revised to reflect your brilliance in this matter.

is
v.
Third person singular present indicative of be.


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[Middle English, from Old English. See es- in Indo-European Roots.]

[Download or Buy Now]
Source: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition
Copyright © 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company.
Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

be ( P ) Pronunciation Key (b)
v. First and third person singular past indicative was, (wz, wz; wz when unstressed)second person singular and plural and first and third person plural past indicative were, (wûr)past subjunctive were,past participle been, (bn)present participle be·ing, (bng)first person singular present indicative am, (m)second person singular and plural and first and third person plural present indicative are, (är)third person singular present indicative is, (z)present subjunctive be
v. intr.
To exist in actuality; have life or reality: I think, therefore I am.

To occupy a specified position: The food is on the table.
To remain in a certain state or situation undisturbed, untouched, or unmolested: Let the children be.
To take place; occur: The test was yesterday.
To go or come: Have you ever been to Italy? Have you been home recently?
Used as a copula in such senses as:
To equal in identity: “To be a Christian was to be a Roman” (James Bryce).
To have a specified significance: A is excellent, C is passing. Let n be the unknown quantity.
To belong to a specified class or group: The human being is a primate.
To have or show a specified quality or characteristic: She is witty. All humans are mortal.
To seem to consist or be made of: The yard is all snow. He is all bluff and no bite.
To belong; befall: Peace be unto you. Woe is me.

v. aux.
Used with the past participle of a transitive verb to form the passive voice: The mayoral election is held annually.
Used with the present participle of a verb to express a continuing action: We are working to improve housing conditions.
Used with the infinitive of a verb to express intention, obligation, or future action: She was to call before she left. You are to make the necessary changes.
Archaic. Used with the past participle of certain intransitive verbs to form the perfect tense: “Where be those roses gone which sweetened so our eyes?” (Philip Sidney).

Originally posted by Stimpy

No. Please point it out for me. Be specific.

You actually don't agree that iff you are not 100% convinced of your (naturalistic/scientific) position you are either a dualist of some sort, or 100% in the opposite camp?



Dear apie: I hope you eventually receive answers to your questions. Words, and languages, being what they are, you must often be bemused.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

No. Please point it out for me. Be specific.
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You actually don't agree that iff you are not 100% convinced of your (naturalistic/scientific) position you are either a dualist of some sort, or 100% in the opposite camp?

No, I don't. For one thing, I have no idea what this opposite camp you speak of, would be. I am guessing that you mean idealism, but that is not really the opposite of my position. On the contrary, there are many similarities between idealism and my own position. There are also many differences.

I seriously don't understand this line of reasoning of yours at all. Only extremely dogmatic people are 100% certain of their positions, and my own position is such that to be 100% certain of it would be self-contradictory.

I also don't understand why you seem to think that the entire world of philosophical world-views can be divided into the three categories of metaphysical materialism, metaphysical dualism, and metaphysical idealism. Not only is it not the case that all philosophical world-views are metaphysical, but even metaphysical world-views are not exhausted by those options. Many metaphysical world-views do not even use the approach of ontological substances at all, rendering all three of those positions inapplicable.

I would also like to point out that rather than answering my question, you simply asked me another one. Any chance of you actually answering my question?


Dr. Stupid

 

[hammegk]

No, I don't. For one thing, I have no idea what this opposite camp you speak of, would be. I am guessing that you mean idealism, but that is not really the opposite of my position. On the contrary, there are many similarities between idealism and my own position. There are also many differences.

"Idealism" is a word often used.

Would you be willing to share the most significant difference between your stance and, say, objective idealism?

I also don't understand why you seem to think that the entire world of philosophical world-views can be divided into the three categories of metaphysical materialism, metaphysical dualism, and metaphysical idealism. Not only is it not the case that all philosophical world-views are metaphysical, but even metaphysical world-views are not exhausted by those options. Many metaphysical world-views do not even use the approach of ontological substances at all, rendering all three of those positions inapplicable.

I don't understand why you don't. Any position that I have interest in must accommodate scientific analysis. Nihilism and solipsism could I suppose, but either position is meaningless so far as I understand it.

The choices are A (materialism by whatever name you choose today), ~A (not-materialism) or both A and ~A simultaneously (dualism).

I would also like to point out that rather than answering my question, you simply asked me another one. Any chance of you actually answering my question?

I'm trying to better understand your actual question and how I might be able to answer it.




As an aside, doesn't deterministic just imply that given the same boundary conditions and future inputs, results will always be the same?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

No, I don't. For one thing, I have no idea what this opposite camp you speak of, would be. I am guessing that you mean idealism, but that is not really the opposite of my position. On the contrary, there are many similarities between idealism and my own position. There are also many differences.
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"Idealism" is a word often used.

Would you be willing to share the most significant difference between your stance and, say, objective idealism?

The most significant difference is that my position is an epistemological one, and objective idealism is a metaphysical one. Specifically, my position does not make claims about the existence of unverifiable things, nor does it assign unverifiable properties to things that exist.

I also don't understand why you seem to think that the entire world of philosophical world-views can be divided into the three categories of metaphysical materialism, metaphysical dualism, and metaphysical idealism. Not only is it not the case that all philosophical world-views are metaphysical, but even metaphysical world-views are not exhausted by those options. Many metaphysical world-views do not even use the approach of ontological substances at all, rendering all three of those positions inapplicable.
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I don't understand why you don't. Any position that I have interest in must accommodate scientific analysis. Nihilism and solipsism could I suppose, but either position is meaningless so far as I understand it.

The choices are A (materialism by whatever name you choose today), ~A (not-materialism) or both A and ~A simultaneously (dualism).

Do you mean A to be metaphysical materialism? Do you see the problem? Not all philosophical world-views are metaphysical, and as I already said, not all metaphysical world-views are based on ontological substences. You can create the two arbitrary catagories "metaphysical materialism and not metaphysical materialism", but not all positions can be clearly said to fit in one or the other, because for many positions, those catagories simply aren't relevant. You can make a square peg fit in a round hole if you push hard enough, but that does not mean that "round" is a good description of the peg.

My position is compatible with some forms of metaphysical materialism, as well as any other metaphysical position that does not contradict scientific epistemology. So does that put my position in category A, or catagory ~A? I say neither.

I would also like to point out that rather than answering my question, you simply asked me another one. Any chance of you actually answering my question?
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I'm trying to better understand your actual question and how I might be able to answer it.

My question was nothing more than asking you to specifically explain what you think the problem with my position is. If you don't understand the question, then why did you claim their was a problem with my position in the first place?

As an aside, doesn't deterministic just imply that given the same boundary conditions and future inputs, results will always be the same?

I am not going to play this game.

Explain to me what the problem with my position is, or retract your claim that there is one. Until then, don't bother addressing me at all.


Dr. Stupid

 

[hammegk]

I am not going to play this game.

Explain to me what the problem with my position is, or retract your claim that there is one. Until then, don't bother addressing me at all.

Chill, mon. The aside was not even directed at you, although I suspect you could answer it.

I'm doing my best to explain what I see as the problem with your position.

The most significant difference is that my position is an epistemological one, and objective idealism is a metaphysical one. Specifically, my position does not make claims about the existence of unverifiable things, nor does it assign unverifiable properties to things that exist.

I realize this must have actual meaning to you that eludes me. What do you think differentiates your epistemological position from the epistemology of objective idealism? And why does an unwillingness to take an ontological stance obviate ontology?

Unverifiable vs verifiable are squarely in the eye of the beholder. The significant lack of science I identify is its' absolute inability to define (or for that matter, identify) "energy".

Do you mean A to be metaphysical materialism? Do you see the problem? Not all philosophical world-views are metaphysical, and as I already said, not all metaphysical world-views are based on ontological substences. You can create the two arbitrary catagories "metaphysical materialism and not metaphysical materialism", but not all positions can be clearly said to fit in one or the other, because for many positions, those catagories simply aren't relevant. You can make a square peg fit in a round hole if you push hard enough, but that does not mean that "round" is a good description of the peg.

You've lost me. What philosophical worldview has no metaphysical component? I assume you will reply, "Mr. SJ Cat's", but why do you think that statement has meaning? Do you have other philosophical worldviews you cite as having no metaphysic?

And you say A is metaphysical materialism, I say it's epistemological and ontological materialism, and I say the (binary)categories are correct. At least I've never seen any position postulated that didn't collapse into A, ~A, or illogical dualism.

My position is compatible with some forms of metaphysical materialism, as well as any other metaphysical position that does not contradict scientific epistemology. So does that put my position in category A, or catagory ~A? I say neither.

Then why are you not (at least) an avowed dualist, since you admit your epistemology is not 100% certain?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Hammegk,

The most significant difference is that my position is an epistemological one, and objective idealism is a metaphysical one. Specifically, my position does not make claims about the existence of unverifiable things, nor does it assign unverifiable properties to things that exist.
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I realize this must have actual meaning to you that eludes me. What do you think differentiates your epistemological position from the epistemology of objective idealism?

I have no doubt that you could come up with a version of objective idealism whose epistemology is 100% compatible with my own. The same could be said for metaphysical materialism, metaphysical dualism, and an infinite number of other metaphysical positions. That's the whole point. My position simply omits the metaphysical claims.

And why does an unwillingness to take an ontological stance obviate ontology?

Who said it does? What does that even mean?

Unverifiable vs verifiable are squarely in the eye of the beholder.

Oh really? I suppose next you will claim that the fact that we are having this conversation does not constitute a verification of the scientific principles upon which computers are based? Scientific verifiability is based on scientific epistemology. In principle, other forms of verifiability could be invented, by basing them on other epistemologies. But so far, scientific epistemology, and scientific verification, are the only examples of this which can actually be demonstrated to work.

The significant lack of science I identify is its' absolute inability to define (or for that matter, identify) "energy".

Please, not this again... Science has absolutely no difficulty in defining the term "energy". What it cannot do, is give you some metaphysical explanation for what energy "is". That is because that is a metaphysical question, and science does not address such things.

You can invent a metaphysical explanation, if you want to, but what is the point? There is no way to ever determine if it is anything more than a fantasy you have dreamed up, and no reason to believe that it is anything more than that.

Do you mean A to be metaphysical materialism? Do you see the problem? Not all philosophical world-views are metaphysical, and as I already said, not all metaphysical world-views are based on ontological substances. You can create the two arbitrary categories "metaphysical materialism and not metaphysical materialism", but not all positions can be clearly said to fit in one or the other, because for many positions, those categories simply aren't relevant. You can make a square peg fit in a round hole if you push hard enough, but that does not mean that "round" is a good description of the peg.
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You've lost me. What philosophical worldview has no metaphysical component? I assume you will reply, "Mr. SJ Cat's", but why do you think that statement has meaning? Do you have other philosophical worldviews you cite as having no metaphysic?

Any philosophical position that is purely epistemological.

You can invent as many as you want. It's easy. Just take a metaphysical worldview, determine what its epistemological implications are, and then throw away the rest. Presto! Instant non-metaphysical philosophical world-view.

Anyway, the scientific epistemology is a philosophical world-view. It is not metaphysical.

And you say A is metaphysical materialism, I say it's epistemological and ontological materialism, and I say the (binary)categories are correct. At least I've never seen any position postulated that didn't collapse into A, ~A, or illogical dualism.

But you're clearly wrong, as evidenced by the fact that epistemological materialism is consistent with A, but not equivalent to it. It cannot be an element of ~A, because it is consistent with A, but is not A either.

Your binary categories only work if all philosophical world-views are defined in such a way as to specifically stipulate which category they fit in. As long as there are world-views which are consistent with both categories, your claim that every world-view must fit into one or the other, is false.

It's similar to what happens with formal logic. I could define set A to be all arithmetic systems in which the continuum hypothesis is true, and then set ~A would be all arithmetic systems in which it is not true. But ordinary set theory would not fit into either category, because it is consistent with both A and ~A.

My position is compatible with some forms of metaphysical materialism, as well as any other metaphysical position that does not contradict scientific epistemology. So does that put my position in category A, or category ~A? I say neither.
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Then why are you not (at least) an avowed dualist, since you admit your epistemology is not 100% certain?

Why would I be? What does dualism have to do with not being 100% sure that scientific epistemology is valid? I don't even see how there is any connection. Why would the fact that I am not 100% certain about an epistemological position, imply that I should adopt a specific metaphysical position?

Your reasoning here completely eludes me.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Loki]

hammegk,

At least I've never seen any position postulated that didn't collapse into A, ~A, or illogical dualism.

In your seemingly endless quest to be able to discuss this topic in posts of 5 words or less (you're not here yet, but getting closer), you seem to have boiled everything down to a meaningless puddle of syllables. - or at the very least your intended meaning is escaping me ...

(hammegk wrote) : You actually agree that at 100% certainty Science can rationalize all that is without need for god? If not, do you see your problem?

(Darat wrote ) : Can you please define "god" as you use it in the above question?

You really are going to have to define 'god' before this is an answerable question.

 

[Dancing David]

Hmm, I thouht that embracing A and -A was a unity of plurality. I say they are equivalent in thier wrongness. They are equaly wrong, so no duality, just nihil.

(Thirty word word puddle)