• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Materialism and Immaterialism

Stimpson,

...because the bit about it being neither deterministic nor random does not seem to actually be part of his definition of free-will,...
You're being very generous here.

I don't think it really makes any difference either way.
Very true.
 
Another possible point of interest regarding my weather/human comparison involves a little toy on my desk. It is a deceptively simple little toy, consisting of a wooden block on which are mounted two rotors. Each rotor is relatively frictionless and has three radial arms spaced at 120 degrees apart. At the end of each arm is a small magnet.

Spin one of the rotors with sufficient velocity, under the right initial conditions, and it spins as expected, with the other rotor slowly "shuddering."

Lower the velocity (or change the initial conditions a bit) and the rotor you push causes the other rotor to rotate in the opposite direction.

But not always, for a small change in the initial conditions will cause that opposite rotation for a while, followed by a slowing of one rotor or the other and a reversal of direction. That will go on for a while until the other rotor slows down and then reverses direction.

Then there are other times when the initial conditions are just right so that the rotor you spin doesn't quite smoothly rotate and causes the other rotor to spin as if it is a stepping motor. Click, click, click; one-third of a rotation with each step.

Then there are yet other times when the first rotor switches all of its momentum to the other rotor. The one you had spun goes into that slow "shuddering" while the other rotor spins about.

Are we to say the magnetron has free will?


Corno physics project
 
BillHoyt said:
Another possible point of interest regarding my weather/human comparison involves a little toy on my desk. It is a deceptively simple little toy, consisting of a wooden block on which are mounted two rotors. Each rotor is relatively frictionless and has three radial arms spaced at 120 degrees apart. At the end of each arm is a small magnet.

Sounds like a pretty cool toy. Where can I get one?
 
BillHoyt said:

I ask you, dear reader, to pause for a moment or two so that you may breathe the full, raw scent of extreme irony here.


Ian, a human is a complex critter. A very complex critter. I know of no human who could be given almost any such test and who would be guaranteed to produce exactly the same reaction from the first such trial to the nth such trial.

Similarly, the weather system is a complex critter. A very complex critter. I know of no weather pattern that can be given any such test and which would be guaranteed to produce exactly the same reaction from the first such trial to the nth such trial.

Are we to conclude, therefore, that the weather system has free will?

Huh?? What relevance has this got?? Chaos theory kicks in here. It really doesn't matter if in actual fact someone could always know what you would do in any given circumstance. It's a thought experiment to illustrate a point! As I say, pretend I'm talking about an omniscient God if you like.
 
BillHoyt said:
Another possible point of interest regarding my weather/human comparison involves a little toy on my desk. It is a deceptively simple little toy, consisting of a wooden block on which are mounted two rotors. Each rotor is relatively frictionless and has three radial arms spaced at 120 degrees apart. At the end of each arm is a small magnet.

Spin one of the rotors with sufficient velocity, under the right initial conditions, and it spins as expected, with the other rotor slowly "shuddering."

Lower the velocity (or change the initial conditions a bit) and the rotor you push causes the other rotor to rotate in the opposite direction.

But not always, for a small change in the initial conditions will cause that opposite rotation for a while, followed by a slowing of one rotor or the other and a reversal of direction. That will go on for a while until the other rotor slows down and then reverses direction.

Then there are other times when the initial conditions are just right so that the rotor you spin doesn't quite smoothly rotate and causes the other rotor to spin as if it is a stepping motor. Click, click, click; one-third of a rotation with each step.

Then there are yet other times when the first rotor switches all of its momentum to the other rotor. The one you had spun goes into that slow "shuddering" while the other rotor spins about.

Are we to say the magnetron has free will?


Corno physics project

This is all completely irrelevant. Perhaps you're misunderstanding me. In fact I absolutely completely agree with you if my understanding of what you're getting at is correct. This hopefully will become apparent once I've addressed Stimp's response.
 
Loki said:
Stimp
...because the bit about it being neither deterministic nor random does not seem to actually be part of his definition of free-will,...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


You're being very generous here

Well, it's very easy to understand how in fact those that espouse compatibilist free will, and those who espouse libertarian free will, actually might be talking at cross purposes. Indeed it seems plausible that libertarians in respect of free will are not really understanding the compatibilist position. But I do not believe that the dispute between libertarian and compatibilist free will rests on a confusion. Moreover, I believe that I do understand the compatibilist position, and I believe I disagree with it.
 
Stimpy,
Would you agree that a probabilistic model for human behavior should be possible? Keep in mind that I am probably every bit as convinced as you are that human behavior is not deterministic

How is so?
Do you think that a deterministic model of the brain is impossible?
In my experience with artificial neuronal nets, complexity arises from the model, which is fully deterministic.
Do you think quantum indeterminism plays any meaningful role in brain's behaviour?
 
Interesting Ian said:


This is all completely irrelevant. Perhaps you're misunderstanding me. In fact I absolutely completely agree with you if my understanding of what you're getting at is correct. This hopefully will become apparent once I've addressed Stimp's response.
The point I am making, Ian, is that the underlying equations may very well be deterministic and yet the aggregate behavior chaotic and, therefore, unpredictable except in a probabilistic sense. The thought experiment you posed, then, is in error. We can have a deterministic model of someone's behavior and yet be unable to say (except probabilistically) what they will have for breakfast We will still be reduced to saying p=.85 eggs, .10 eggs and bacon, .02 Cap'n Crunch and a banana, .03 crappy cake donut from the yucky chain donut shop. Just like the weather, though its underlying equations are deterministic. Just like the magnetron, though its underlying equations are deterministic.
 
Ian,

If hypothetically someone had in their possession all possible knowledge about you, and how you would react under any given circumstance (or alternatively consider an omniscient God), and therefore could, with 100% accuracy (or very close to it if we consider the intrinsic randomness), would this by definition mean that all your behaviour is "determined" or follows rules?

Well, since there intrinsic randomness, no. But if, for purposes of the thought experiment, we ignore that, then yes.

Also, suppose someone were to choose to move their limbs in an arbitrary manner (not randomly, we cannot act randomly). Would you still maintain their behaviour is following some rule?

I don't understand the question. If that person is not acting randomly, then what is arbitrary about his movements? You even cited arbitrariness of choices as your definition of random.

Now here's a thought experiment for you:

Imagine you are in a situation where you have two choices (A and B). Let's say you use your free-will to select choice A.

Now, you claim that this selection process is not deterministic, since that would imply that it was inevitable that you would choose A, and not B. Your conception of free-will is that even though you chose A, you could have chosen B instead.

You also claim that the selection process is not random, because that would imply that the choice was made arbitrarily, within the constraints of some relative probability for the two choices.

But what does it mean to say that the choice was not arbitrary? Would you agree that this simply means that there was a reason you chose A, rather than B?

And if that is the case, then how was the selection of A not inevitable? If the reason that you chose A did not logically imply that you would choose A, then in what sense can you claim that it is, in fact, the reason that you chose A?

Either the choice was arbitrary, or there was a reason for it, in which case it was inevitable. This has nothing to do with naturalism, or with any assumptions of being able to model the process based on our observations. It is simply a logical statement that is true for any hypothetical selection process.


Loki,

...because the bit about it being neither deterministic nor random does not seem to actually be part of his definition of free-will,...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You're being very generous here.

I think I am just being consistent. I criticized Ian before on the basis that saying "Free will is neither deterministic nor random" is not a definition of free-will, but rather simply a statement about what it. Now I am simply sticking to that position. He has asserted that his conception of free-will is that an immaterial "self", which is not part of this Universe, interacts with the brain, and makes our decisions. I think that we need to acknowledge this definition before we can make any progress in determining whether any additional statements he makes about it are coherent or not.


Peskanov,

Would you agree that a probabilistic model for human behavior should be possible? Keep in mind that I am probably every bit as convinced as you are that human behavior is not deterministic
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

How is so?
Do you think that a deterministic model of the brain is impossible?

That depends on how accurate you want the model to be. Even an individual neuron cannot be accurately modelled without taking noise into account. And there are many examples of statistical mechanics playing a major role in brain processes. For example, the visual system exhibits a behavior known as stochastic resonance, which is a well-known property of noisy nonlinear systems.

In my experience with artificial neuronal nets, complexity arises from the model, which is fully deterministic.
Do you think quantum indeterminism plays any meaningful role in brain's behaviour?

Not as such. What I am talking about is just ordinary thermal fluctuations. A neuron operates by transferring ions across membranes. Those individual ions are subject to thermal noise, and operate according to statistical mechanics. This has the net result of making the firing timing of the neuron a stochastic process, rather than a deterministic one. In some cases, it even results in the neuron firing when it otherwise would not.

Now, we could always model this noise by coupling our neural network to a pseudo-random number generator, but I submit that for all practical purposes, that is still a stochastic model. In fact, that is exactly how we model stochastic differential equations in practice, right now. Also, it is entirely possible that we may be able to construct a deterministic AI, but that would not be a model of the human brain. It would be something else.


Dr. Stupid
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
Also, it is entirely possible that we may be able to construct a deterministic AI, but that would not be a model of the human brain. It would be something else.

LOL. Would the missing part be "immaterial"? If so one would need to be a (closet?) dualist. Idealism is an easier choice.
 
hammegk said:


LOL. Would the missing part be "immaterial"? If so one would need to be a (closet?) dualist. Idealism is an easier choice.

I think you have misunderstood the good Doctor, he didn't say anything missing, just different.
 
Hammegk,

Also, it is entirely possible that we may be able to construct a deterministic AI, but that would not be a model of the human brain. It would be something else.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LOL. Would the missing part be "immaterial"? If so one would need to be a (closet?) dualist. Idealism is an easier choice.

As Darat said, it is not a matter of anything missing. If I write a deterministic AI program, then what I have is a deterministic AI program, not a model for the human brain. An accurate model of the human brain would also be an AI, but that does not mean that there is something missing from the other AI that you could add in order to make it a model of the brain, anymore than there is something you could add to a toaster to make it a television.

In any event, I see no reason to think that an accurate model of the human brain would require anything "immaterial".


Dr. Stupid
 
If the perceived world (including the human brain) is "material", neither would I. I'll remain a monist. :p
 
gentlehorse said:
You don't see irony in simultaneously arguing for free will and predicting Stimpy's responses? It is an ironic self-contradiction.
 
BillHoyt said:

The point I am making, Ian, is that the underlying equations may very well be deterministic and yet the aggregate behavior chaotic and, therefore, unpredictable except in a probabilistic sense. The thought experiment you posed, then, is in error. We can have a deterministic model of someone's behavior and yet be unable to say (except probabilistically) what they will have for breakfast We will still be reduced to saying p=.85 eggs, .10 eggs and bacon, .02 Cap'n Crunch and a banana, .03 crappy cake donut from the yucky chain donut shop. Just like the weather, though its underlying equations are deterministic. Just like the magnetron, though its underlying equations are deterministic.

Unpredictable in practise, not in principle. Anyway, this isn't important.

Edit to add: And don't introduce QM. It's not important. Just imagine the world operates on classical principles.
 
That depends on how accurate you want the model to be. Even an individual neuron cannot be accurately modelled without taking noise into account. And there are many examples of statistical mechanics playing a major role in brain processes. For example, the visual system exhibits a behavior known as stochastic resonance, which is a well-known property of noisy nonlinear systems.

Of course; I know of the presence of noise in brain neural nets (although I did not knew the origin of this noise, thx for the info). But please note that the visual cortex (for example) performs a set of well defined functions with small error. Yes, the system has a strong stochastic component, but also it is probably highly redundant in order to ensure correct function.

What puzzles me about your post is that you talk about "stochastic rather than deterministic".

If you use "stochastic" in the sense of random, I disagree about this being an important factor of brain working.
If you use "stochastic" in the sense of "noisy", I agree about this being an important factor of brain working. However, note that "noise" is not incompatible with "deterministic"!
 
BillHoyt said:

You don't see irony in simultaneously arguing for free will and predicting Stimpy's responses? It is an ironic self-contradiction.

There's no contradiction at all between being able to predict someones behaviour very accurately and free will. And yes, I'm talking about my definition of free will ie libertarian free will. Indeed there is nothing inconsistent about an omniscient God being able to predict everything you ever do and libertarian free will. Well, at least I don't think so. I don't know if philosophers disagree. Never really read anything about the free will problem.
 
Interesting Ian said:


Unpredictable in practise, not in principle. Anyway, this isn't important.
It is absolutely important, sir. This misunderstanding seems to be at the root here. We cannot predict, except probabilistically, the outcome.
 

Back
Top Bottom