Materialism and Immaterialism

We are now at the black-box labeled for materialists - compatable and for immaterialists - libertarian.

will n.

1. The mental faculty by which one deliberately chooses or decides upon a course of action: championed freedom of will against a doctrine of predetermination.
2. The act of exercising the will.
3. Diligent purposefulness; determination: an athlete with the will to win.
4. Self-control; self-discipline: lacked the will to overcome the addiction.
5. A desire, purpose, or determination, especially of one in authority: It is the sovereign's will that the prisoner be spared.
6. Deliberate intention or wish: Let it be known that I took this course of action against my will.

Deterministic? Random? Or do you choose to have faith you have libertarian free-will rather than being a pre-determined computing machine?
 
We are now at the black-box labeled for materialists - compatable and for immaterialists - libertarian.

I'm sorry, could you explain that sentence?


I see your definitions of will. I do not understand how you arrive at the assertion that materialism denys it's existence.


Indeed, If I am reading you quote correctly, it says that this "black-box" is labled "for materialists - compatable". If it's compatable for materialists, isn't that a contradiction with your previous assertion?
 
apoger said:


..If it's compatable for materialists, isn't that a contradiction with your previous assertion?

Nope. Compatable is the best a materialist can arrive at, and it's directly replaceable by machine computation. Then we can discuss the subtleties of determinism vs random, since no other inputs are available.


Note I've never contended that immaterialism is a fix for the libertarian free-will problem, only that it offers a possibility of effect/affect actually occuring. Materialism is constrained by the deterministic/random problem, and dualism can have no possible effect/affect on material.
 
I do believe that our minds work in a mainly deterministic way, with some randomizing thrown in too.

I don't understand how a non-materialist conceives of any other way. Even if there is some non-material stuff at work, doesn't that also have to work deterministically (and maybe partially random)? I can't conceive of a third method. Even a universal consciousness linking everything together would still have to be either deterministic or random wouldn't it?
 
ra·tion·ale n.
1. Fundamental reasons; the basis.
2. An exposition of principles or reasons.

Yeah, I know materialists hate to admit random chance is all they have. Immaterialists cannot explain "will" -- the uncaused cause --but at least have the immaterial possibility that everything is "will-to-exist" rather than not-exist. Does anyone care to argue such a possibility for "material" having some will-to-exist rather than not-exist? Energy frozen into a material state doesn't appear energetic at least to me (of course nor do I think matter per se is an existant except as the perception of Mind.).
 
Wrath of the Swarm said:
Libertarian free-will is not incompatible with being a pre-determined computational device.

Oh yes it is. Compatibilist free will is so named, because it is compatible with determinism. Obviously non-compatibilist positions, such as libertarian free will, are not compatible! LOL
 
apoger said:


I'm sorry, could you explain that sentence?


I see your definitions of will. I do not understand how you arrive at the assertion that materialism denys it's existence.


Materialists hold that the physical world is closed. Therefore if materialism is correct then we cannot have libertarian free will.
 
ceptimus said:
I do believe that our minds work in a mainly deterministic way, with some randomizing thrown in too.

I don't understand how a non-materialist conceives of any other way. Even if there is some non-material stuff at work, doesn't that also have to work deterministically (and maybe partially random)?



Why?

I can't conceive of a third method. Even a universal consciousness linking everything together would still have to be either deterministic or random wouldn't it?

Perhaps you'd be good enough to define determinism?
 
Let's drop the word deterministic and use algorithmic instead. I can conceive of something operating algorithmically, with randomness thrown in. What is the third mechanism that the immaterialists postulate is at work? By what mechanism does my free will make decisions? Please avoid terms like desire and want in the explanation, which simply beg the question of what is the mechanism by which my desires form.

You might also considering addressing the issue of what it means to have free choice at one moment, then make a nonrandom choice at the next moment.

If you can't get enough of free will, try reading this monster:

http://216.239.57.104/search?q=cach...ertarian+free+will"+definition&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

Another interesting paper:

http://courses.ats.rochester.edu/nobis/papers/det.pdf

~~ Paul
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
Let's drop the word deterministic and use algorithmic instead.



Why? Surely you do not claim it means the same thing?? :eek:

I can conceive of something operating algorithmically, with randomness thrown in. What is the third mechanism that the immaterialists postulate is at work? By what mechanism does my free will make decisions? Please avoid terms like desire and want in the explanation, which simply beg the question of what is the mechanism by which my desires form.

If something operates algorithmically, does this mean from the retrospective sense? Or do you mean that somethings behaviour follows a unique given algorithm? Even if the latter, why is that somethings behaviour "determined"? Is this because that is what determined means?
 
I mean that the thing's behavior follows an algorithm, but possibly a stochastic one. You are suggesting there is some other mechanism, wholely or in part, by which my free will makes decisions. What is that other mechanism?

~~ Paul
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
I mean that the thing's behavior follows an algorithm, but possibly a stochastic one. You are suggesting there is some other mechanism, wholely or in part, by which my free will makes decisions. What is that other mechanism?

~~ Paul

No there is no mechanism. Our free will is teleologically oriented.

I do not know what a "stochastic" algorithm is.
 
There's your answer, Paul. There is no mechanism. Therefore free will is not a part of the chain of causality, and as such cannot by definition be a part of the universe. Ergo, it does not exist.
 
Paul C. Anagnostopoulos said:
I can conceive of something operating algorithmically, with randomness thrown in.
Me too. The challenge is getting something a) useful and b) self-maintaining:
a subatomic "particle" for example, or "life" for another.


What is the third mechanism that the immaterialists postulate is at work? By what mechanism does my free will make decisions?
I admit, again I at least don't know, but my observations allow me to have faith that life, and you and me, all exhibit it.
 
Wrath of the Swarm said:
There's your answer, Paul. There is no mechanism. Therefore free will is not a part of the chain of causality, and as such cannot by definition be a part of the universe. Ergo, it does not exist.

It only follows it is not part of the physical Universe. It only does not physically exist. Free will is an intrinsic attribute of the soul.
 
You've resorted to one of those question-begging terms again, Ian. If it's teleological, then it is related to the purpose of creation, right? So how is the purpose determined? It's okay to say "I don't have the foggiest notion."

A stochastic algorithm is one that involves randomness.

~~ Paul
 

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