Materialism and Immaterialism

[Wrath of the Swarm]

It's a common event on these boards for the terms 'materialist' and 'materialism' to be bandied about. Various other concepts are frequently associated with them, such as 'atheist', 'scientist', 'arrogance', and so forth. Several posters are even known for their habitual division of thought into 'materialism' and 'immaterialism', 'spiritualism', or 'idealism'.

But no one seems willing to actually define and explain what the difference between physical and nonphysical things actually is. Many posters seem to have the unspoken assumption that the category 'physical' is explicitly defined and limited to a known set of interactions.

I submit that 'physicality' is not limited to a set of specific interactions, but is determined by whether something can interact with something else. If it can, that thing - and that interaction - is a physical one. Postulating a previously unknown form of interaction doesn't and can't mean it's not physical, just that it wasn't previously present in our understanding of the physical world.

So: can anyone out there explain what they think distinguishes physical and non-physical things?

 

[BillHoyt]

It's a common event on these boards for the terms 'materialist' and 'materialism' to be bandied about. Various other concepts are frequently associated with them, such as 'atheist', 'scientist', 'arrogance', and so forth. Several posters are even known for their habitual division of thought into 'materialism' and 'immaterialism', 'spiritualism', or 'idealism'.

But no one seems willing to actually define and explain what the difference between physical and nonphysical things actually is. Many posters seem to have the unspoken assumption that the category 'physical' is explicitly defined and limited to a known set of interactions.

I submit that 'physicality' is not limited to a set of specific interactions, but is determined by whether something can interact with something else. If it can, that thing - and that interaction - is a physical one. Postulating a previously unknown form of interaction doesn't and can't mean it's not physical, just that it wasn't previously present in our understanding of the physical world.

So: can anyone out there explain what they think distinguishes physical and non-physical things?

I think you'll find that some of the posters are confusing materialism as a metaphysical position and the conclusions of science. The first point of confusion is the statement that science presumes such a metaphysic. It does not. It does take as axiomatic the assertion that there is a real, objective universe. It does it all of its truth-seeking through this real, objevtive universe. Somehow, this is viewed as a metaphysical presumption.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

My point is that there really isn't a metaphysical presumption in the first place.

If someone claimed that all events could be understood from the laws of electromagnetism and gravity, that would be a metaphysical claim. If we had defined the physical world by those laws, and then were able to show that there were interactions that didn't fit those laws, we would have shown that there were 'nonphysical' things in the universe.

 

[BillHoyt]

My point is that there really isn't a metaphysical presumption in the first place.

Of course, I agree with this. Some, though, think that the requirement for this "stuff" to interact with the physical universe bespeaks materialistic presuppositions. I find this bizarre, given that the basic argument from the other side is that "psi exists and I can use it to win the lottery" or "clearly you have a soul," etc., etc. Almost all of the claims speak to an effect that this "stuff" has on the universe. If so, then why the objection to science's requirement that we be able to detect, measure and test these effects? On the other hand, for those who take the position that there is "soul stuff" or some "other stuff" out there that does not affect the universe at all or not much, then I can only ask why we should concern ourselves with such lame ideations?

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

For something to exist, it must interact.

Things are defined by their properties, and if something doesn't interact, it has no other properties.

Let's imagine something that doesn't interact with our universe. Now let's presume it 'exists'. What conclusions can we arrive at that are different from those we reach when we presume it doesn't 'exist'?

None. We can quickly see that the two hypotheticals are equivalent in every way. Thus we conclude that when we talk about things 'existing' or 'not existing', what we mean is whether something can interact with us or not.

 

[hammegk]

It is an interesting dilemma, in that you say "It's all One, Material", and an idealist says, "It's all One, Immaterial".

The semantic minefield "exists and interacts" is applicable for either. We could begin to list attributes of material/immaterial and find items like inert/active, without intent/with intent, finite,bounded particle/infinite,unbounded field, etc.

Significant breakpoints as I identify them include non-life/life, machine computation/HPC, god-could-not-exist/god-could-exist, compatabilist free-will/actual free-will, and 3rd-person perception/1st-person thought.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

But to check the validity of your claims that those philosophies aren't only different, but that they give different answers when the issues you mentioned are concerned, we have to first establish what the properties of each philosophy are.

So: what does Immaterialism actually state that leads to the differences you assert? In what way is it different from Materialism? What does it mean to be material, or immaterial?

 

[Loki]

Wrath,

submit that 'physicality' is not limited to a set of specific interactions, but is determined by whether something can interact with something else.
...

So: can anyone out there explain what they think distinguishes physical and non-physical things?

As far as I can tell, the important detail that separates/defines physical and non-physical to people like Ian is 'who controls the interaction'. Under an Ian-like worldview :

1. No physical existent can "choose" to interact with a non-physical entity. ALL interactions within the "physical" world are 'observed' by the non-physical, but this observation is undetectable as a physical interaction.

2. Non-physical entities can choose to interact with physical existents. ALL interactions within the "non-physical" world are undetectable within the physical, with two exceptions :
(a) A conscious entity in the non-physical world 'decides' to interact with the physical (thus creating a new set of interactions in the physical world) - ghosts, spirit talking, etc;
(b) there is some 'accidental' leakage, where non-physical interactions temporarily and sporadically interact with the physical (NDEs, visions, etc).

The two worlds are separate because they differ in terms of "what/when interactions between them are possible".

The non-physical is the 'real' world because it is the master in the relationship.

 

[hammegk]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective_idealism

As I read II, he is a subjective idealist. Loki's comments imply some form of dualism imo.

I feel closest to objective idealism, having moved from some undefined (and illogical) form of dualism over the past months of participating here.


What all of us perhaps can agree to is that "absolute materialism" implies god cannot existent.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Idealism doesn't permit gods (as they are generally understood) either.

 

[hammegk]

Actually, idealism doesn't rule them out, but the probability of any such existing quickly approaches zero.

However, idealism does imply god in the Atman=Brahman sense(at least to me). I cannot see that absolute materialism could agree.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

No, idealism rules them out. They're simply not conceptually possible. Entities of incomprehensible power - possible, but those don't fit the general conception of gods.

Again: if you spent some time thinking about the nature of information and the implications of The UnitCell demonstration in Conway's Game of Life, your philosophy would be much the better for it.

 

[Loki]

hammegk,

As I read II, he is a subjective idealist. Loki's comments imply some form of dualism imo.

Well, that's because "subjective idealism" (or even "objective idealism") involve a clear requirement to separate "what is" into at least two camps. Whether you want to name the difference a 'category' or a 'substance' is just semantics, isn't it?

I feel closest to objective idealism

How does it differ from Dualism, in your words?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wrath et al,

Some of us, most especially Stimpson, spent a lot of time some months ago trying to make it clear that scientific materialism or naturalism or whatever the heck it's called makes certain epistemological assumptions, but no ontological ones. It had a lot to do with interactions, as Wrath mentioned above.

We could not convince the immaterialists that we were making no ontological assumptions. Granted, the entire box of frogs is quite difficult to pin down.

My claim ever since is that if the materialists and immaterialists could clearly define their metaphysic, the two would be equivalent and the only argument would be over whether the actual existent is physical stuff or mental stuff. And that argument is meaningless, since there is no way to know.

~~ Paul

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

I'll go even further, and state that the two are precisely the same thing.

Did you check out the Game of Life link? It's an amusing toy AND a subtle mathematical subject all in one.

 

[hammegk]

No, idealism rules them out. They're simply not conceptually possible.

Hmmm. I'd say 'possible', but not in the Atman=Brahman sense.

We could not convince the immaterialists that we were making no ontological assumptions. Granted, the entire box of frogs is quite difficult to pin down.

I sure agree, and can not understand why you think that failure to choose the essence of the monism (ontological) proves no ontological dichotomy exists.

.. the only argument would be over whether the actual existent is physical stuff or mental stuff. ..

And that is the argument.

And that argument is meaningless, since there is no way to know.
~~ Paul

In that science is not capable of answering the question, I agree, meaningless. That's why ontology depends on logical analysis within one's worldview. Is objective reality "physical stuff" or "mental stuff"; is compatabilist free-will correct and free-will does not exist; is it correct that god cannot exist or can god.

 

[Loki]

Wrath,

I'll go even further, and state that the two are precisely the same thing.

Perhaps in practical terms this is true, but the definition of the terms would not be the same. The difference being that the immaterialist worldview insists on a key third "kind" of causation - as well as 'determined' and 'random', you have 'willed'. The worldview requires the existence of this third type of "interaction trigger". Both might measure the same number of interactions, but they disagree on the possible causes.

(Paul wrote) : My claim ever since is that if the materialists and immaterialists could clearly define their metaphysic,...

Well, every conversation with Ian ends with him explaining that the truth is unknownable, and the mystery of it all exceeds us, so a "clear definition" appears unlikely.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

The difference being that the immaterialist worldview insists on a key third "kind" of causation - as well as 'determined' and 'random', you have 'willed'.

Meaningless. Either the mechanism of will is determinate, or random.

 

[hammegk]

.. The difference being that the immaterialist worldview insists on a key third "kind" of causation - as well as 'determined' and 'random', you have 'willed'. The worldview requires the existence of this third type of "interaction trigger". Both might measure the same number of interactions, but they disagree on the possible causes.

Or one might say that nothing is determined or random; every interaction contains the "ability? will? intent?" to respond, or to not respond, to a stimulus.

 

[Wrath of the Swarm]

Or one might say that nothing is determined or random; every interaction contains the "ability? will? intent?" to respond, or to not respond, to a stimulus.

And how is this choice made? If there is causality, it's determinate; if there isn't, it's random. There is no third possibility that can arise from the unformed.