Materealism and morality

[L The Detective]

I have a question to all of you. I think that the mind is a logically separate, (though causally dependant) entity from the brain, and not a property of it.

You claim the opposite. So far I have argued for my views. But do you have any argument for yours?

(Assuming that we agree that scientific evidence can justify both your position and mind, not giving one advantage over the other)

Hi again! I'd like to answer your question.

First of all, we both agree that there is a causal relationship between brain and what we perceive as "mind." That's what science tells us, and it seems you and I both agree on that. So now we have established that point.

Since that is the case, these are the two most likely conclusions: 1. Mind is a property of the brain. 2. Mind is an entity with a direct causal relationship to the brain. Of course, it's possible there are other convoluted explanations, like "we are in the Matrix," but let's ignore those and focus only on the 2 most obvious ones, as you have done also. I'm pretty sure you agree with me so far about the conclusions I have made, correct? Then we have established another point.

Now, I choose number 1 as the most likely. You ask me for my argument as to why... how about Occam's razor? Choice 2 requires the existence of a separate entity, for which we have no evidence. Choice 1 does not require this entity, and yet still explains everything we know about the brain. That is my answer.

However, I realize that this has already occured to you, and yet you prefer choice 2. Furthermore, this entire thread has been a defense and explanation for why you have made this choice. Am I right?

Then, from what I've gathered from reading your responses, I have formed an opinion on why I think you prefer choice 2. It's because, to you, it *feels* as though they are separate entities. That is my opinion, here are my reasons: 1. I can understand this point of view, and furthermore I would actually agree that it does feel like they are separate entities. Or rather, I can understand why there is a natural urge to resist the idea that your thoughts, ideas, personality, everything about you is the result of your brain, and that there's nothing more. This is understandable. 2. The language you have used seems to be a clue. For example, the word "conceive." The fact that you are basing all of your logic around something which is subjective, is a clue that the real core of your ideas here are emotional, not logical. 3. The fact that you are having a hard time articulating your views. You keep shifting between arguments and analogies. This is a clue that you are trying to defend something that you *feel* is right, even if you aren't exactly sure that the logic supports it. Although, you seem to be a very logical person. It seems you may have made the mistake in thinking that if you feel something is right, there must be a logic somewhere which proves it.

There, that's my analysis of why I think you gravitate towards "entity" rather than "property." These are just mere guesses, and maybe they're entirely wrong... and of course I welcome you to correct me.

Oh, and I also want to point out a little more about myself, and my own beliefs... the reason why I side with "property," and "materialism," is because these choices seem the most likely to me. But I am hardly married to this idea. To be perfectly honest with you, I don't really care whether materialism or dualism is true. I don't care if I have a soul, if I will be reincarnated or whatever. In fact, I actually think that if there is nothing after death but emptiness, it gives my life *more* meaning than the alternative. But in any case, live the life you have and don't worry so much about what comes next is my philosophy.

I'm not telling you that to belittle our discussion... I think it is interesting and I like talking about ideas like this. I just want to make the point that I have no emotional investment into materialism, or whatever you want to call it. The only reason I think materialism is more likely is because, logically that seems to be true. Of course, I am only human and maybe my logic is flawed, but everything I have read so far tends to make me think it is sound.

 

[L The Detective]

Jetleg, we can keep this up all day long.

I have answered you. The answer is "Cause and effect." Your straw man is irrelevant and I am not going to give in to it.

Spend more time trying to understand the answer than in trying to dream up a way to support your claim.

Sorry, I don't really understand your point either. Maybe it's just me, maybe I'm slow, but if you're simply trying to point out that there is a causal relationship between "brain" and "mind," well I'm pretty sure Jetleg already agreed to that.

 

[Neverfly]

Sorry, I don't really understand your point either. Maybe it's just me, maybe I'm slow, but if you're simply trying to point out that there is a causal relationship between "brain" and "mind," well I'm pretty sure Jetleg already agreed to that.

He makes the sounds but is not agreeing. If he really understood it, he would not be so fervently pushing his case.

 

[HansMustermann]

Sorry, I don't really understand your point either. Maybe it's just me, maybe I'm slow, but if you're simply trying to point out that there is a causal relationship between "brain" and "mind," well I'm pretty sure Jetleg already agreed to that.

He agreed to _some_ causality, but then comes and says things like that the brain's actual wiring doesn't matter for the mind. Considering that the "wiring" is how the brain works, that seems to reduce the brain to merely some kind of support or such.

But again, I'm not sure he fully figured out what he's claiming.

 

[JetLeg]

Hi again! I'd like to answer your question.

First of all, we both agree that there is a causal relationship between brain and what we perceive as "mind." That's what science tells us, and it seems you and I both agree on that. So now we have established that point.

Yes. This

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dualism.png

is a very useful drawing of the possible types of causality. Hans, since he seems to believe that the mind influences the brain is an interactionists. We are both defending epiphenomenalism so far.

I would say that Hans is a materealist interactionist, that I am a dualist epiphenomenalist, and that you (and probably Joe) are materealist epiphenomenalists.

Since that is the case, these are the two most likely conclusions: 1. Mind is a property of the brain. 2. Mind is an entity with a direct causal relationship to the brain. Of course, it's possible there are other convoluted explanations, like "we are in the Matrix," but let's ignore those and focus only on the 2 most obvious ones, as you have done also. I'm pretty sure you agree with me so far about the conclusions I have made, correct? Then we have established another point.

Yes, precisely.

However, I realize that this has already occured to you, and yet you prefer choice 2. Furthermore, this entire thread has been a defense and e
explanation for why you have made this choice. Am I right?

Yes, again.

Then, from what I've gathered from reading your responses, I have formed an opinion on why I think you prefer choice 2. It's because, to you, it *feels* as though they are separate entities. That is my opinion, here are my reasons: 1. I can understand this point of view, and furthermore I would actually agree that it does feel like they are separate entities.


Or rather, I can understand why there is a natural urge to resist the idea that your thoughts, ideas, personality, everything about you is the result of your brain, and that there's nothing more. This is understandable.

But epiphenomenalism _does_ say, and this is what I am defending - that my thoughts, ideas, personality, and so on are a result of my brain. A result, but _not_ a property, nor a process of it.If you don't understand it, you don't understand my position.

2. The language you have used seems to be a clue. For example, the word "conceive." The fact that you are basing all of your logic around something which is subjective, is a clue that the real core of your ideas here are emotional, not logical.

Conceive was not a good word. This came in the context where I tried to argue that mind is not a property of the brain since it is possible to conceive of it as being separate and it is not so with the case of the roundness of a ball. I should have said - there is no logical contradiction in a disembodied consciousness, while there is one in the case of "roundness of a ball, without a ball". This is 100% a logical argument.

3. The fact that you are having a hard time articulating your views. You keep shifting between arguments and analogies. This is a clue that you are trying to defend something that you *feel* is right, even if you aren't exactly sure that the logic supports it. Although, you seem to be a very logical person. It seems you may have made the mistake in thinking that if you feel something is right, there must be a logic somewhere which proves it.

There, that's my analysis of why I think you gravitate towards "entity" rather than "property." These are just mere guesses, and maybe they're entirely wrong... and of course I welcome you to correct me.

Well... I doubt that epiphenomenalism (even if it is a dualistic one) is really such a comforting emotionally view to have. I am actually emotionally biased _against_ epiphenomenalism, in favor of interactionism. But I am an epiphenomenalist despite I would prefer something else to be true...


I will give my guess why dualism seems obvious to me, but not to you : you seem to think about your _brain_ and think how complex it is, and so on - and when you think of your brain, you think "perhaps the mind is just the property of it".

I also use introspection. Introspection is the _only_ tool we have (and that we will probably ever have) to inspect the subjective mind.
So I look at it and I think "wow, it is so different from the brain. I remember a house where I grew up, and I see a form, but this form is not composed of atoms. There is a color. But it is an immaterial color. wow".

Now, I choose number 1 as the most likely. You ask me for my argument as to why... how about Occam's razor? Choice 2 requires the existence of a separate entity, for which we have no evidence. Choice 1 does not require this entity, and yet still explains everything we know about the brain. That is my answer.

Changed the order of your post a bit. I don't think occam's razor strictly applies here. The conclusion of Occam's razor is "And therefore, there is no good reason to suppose the *existance* of entity X". Your conclusion is "And therefore, even though we agree that X exists, there is no good reason to think that it is an entity and not a property". I don't think you can use occam's razor in such a way.

I will give you a bad analogy, just for illustrative purposes - Occam's razor is a good argument against god. We can understand how everything functions without a god, so there is no reason to suppose one. But what you do, is in a case when we would know that there is a god argue "Well, god exists, but god is probably just a property/process of the physical universe". To this I would say "eh?".

I have 3 main arguments.

One is that it is logically possible for disembodied consciousness and p-zombies to exist, and it wouldn't be so had the mind been a property.

I have refuted Joe's argument against dis-consciousness at page 11. I am also unimpressed with his argument against p-zombies. This is why :

We all agree that a human being is composed of 2 things : objective + subjective. I argue - well, yes, and you can logically think of the objective existing without the subjective, and vice versa.

Joe takes my argument on p-zombies, and argues that by every _objective_ measurement they are the same as a human being, therefore my argument is meaningless.

To this - I say : well, duh! If there is a being that is objective + subjective, you take only his objective part, and create a p-zombie, where is the big surprise that by *objective* measurements he will be the same as our "objective+subjective" being? This is almost as if you have restated the parameters of the thought experiment, not refuted it. We don't have an access to another person's subjectivity, tough luck. But the limitations on the human knowledge aren't limitations on what exists. A mind-reader, or an omniscient being, if they existed, _would_ know the difference between a human being a p-zombie. (Again, all that I need for my argument is to show the logical possibility of separateness, that is not possible with a ball and its roundness, so the actual existence of omniscient beings and mind readers says nothing).

(To Joe - I didn't understand your argument against how a mind-reader could know a p-zombie, sorry).


Second, if the mind is a process of the brain... Well... See my post to Hans above. One should understand a process in terms of its constituents. A chemist looks at molecules, and from his understanding of them and chemical forces can explain why a certain process happens a certain way. But the mind is _subjective_. What is explanation from objective phenomena to subjective phenomena??? Now, we know experimentally that the brain does influence the mind. It is just a fact. So I am not going to deny this. But since there seems to be no link that explains what are the constituents in the objective universe that _necessarily_ give rise to subjective experience, I am not going to call subjective experience a "property"/process of the objective.


Third, again - mind is subjective. Only you can know your pain. But the neurons are available to everyone. Now you claim that subjectivity is a "property" of matter???? That matter (which is objective) has a "property" that is subjective???? Sorry, but I can hardly grasp the meaning of it.


And lastly, I will notice that the mere fact that something objective AND something subjective exist in our world is almost enough to establish substance dualism. The fact that you argue "Well, the subjective is just a property of something objective" does very little to the fact that two radical categories of existance exist - the subjective and the objective.

Oh, and I also want to point out a little more about myself, and my own beliefs... the reason why I side with "property," and "materialism," is because these choices seem the most likely to me. But I am hardly married to this idea. To be perfectly honest with you, I don't really care whether materialism or dualism is true. I don't care if I have a soul, if I will be reincarnated or whatever.

Soul and reincarnation have little to do with our discussion.

In fact, I actually think that if there is nothing after death but emptiness, it gives my life *more* meaning than the alternative.

By the way - why? But in any case, live the life you have and don't worry so much about what comes next is my philosophy.

I'm not telling you that to belittle our discussion... I think it is interesting and I like talking about ideas like this. I just want to make the point that I have no emotional investment into materialism, or whatever you want to call it. The only reason I think materialism is more likely is because, logically that seems to be true. Of course, I am only human and maybe my logic is flawed, but everything I have read so far tends to make me think it is sound.

I feel that our discussion is coming to an end, we have said almost all of our arguments and rebuttals. It was a pleasant one, I agree. Do you have something to reply to this post?

 

[JetLeg]

Unfortunately that's many words and very little claim to either defend or attack. What would be a falsifiable prediction based on that position?

Hans, I don't think that there is any falsifiable prediction that can decide whether materialistic epiphnomenalism (Joe's and L's position) or dualistic phenomenalism (my position) is true. Sorry.

 

[L The Detective]

But epiphenomenalism _does_ say, and this is what I am defending - that my thoughts, ideas, personality, and so on are a result of my brain. A result, but _not_ a property, nor a process of it.

Right, I used a bad choice of words. I should have said "process" and not "result."

Conceive was not a good word. This came in the context where I tried to argue that mind is not a property of the brain since it is possible to conceive of it as being separate and it is not so with the case of the roundness of a ball. I should have said - there is no logical contradiction in a disembodied consciousness, while there is one in the case of "roundness of a ball, without a ball". This is 100% a logical argument.

Not sure if I can agree with that. It depends on how you define "logical contradiction," logically speaking we should include scientific knowledge in determining a contradiction. If by "logical contradiction" you mean "obvious contradiction," then I could agree with you. However, if you define "disembodied consciousness" as consciousness without any sort of functions that we know comes from the brain, like memory, thoughts, emotions, all of that, then I think you might be right.

I also use introspection. Introspection is the _only_ tool we have (and that we will probably ever have) to inspect the subjective mind.So I look at it and I think "wow, it is so different from the brain. I remember a house where I grew up, and I see a form, but this form is not composed of atoms. There is a color. But it is an immaterial color. wow".

I see. Well, it seems to me like this is pretty close to what I said, basically. Isn't introspection another way to say "it *feels* like my brain and my mind are different things?" How is it different, exactly?

I don't think occam's razor strictly applies here. The conclusion of Occam's razor is "And therefore, there is no good reason to suppose the *existance* of entity X". Your conclusion is "And therefore, even though we agree that X exists, there is no good reason to think that it is an entity and not a property". I don't think you can use occam's razor in such a way.

Really? I don't understand why not. The problem with the "entity" explanation is that it posits the existence of a separate entity, for which there is no evidence. The other explanation, "property," does not require this. Isn't Occam's Razor just about picking the simpler of two explanations?

I have 3 main arguments.

One is that it is logically possible for disembodied consciousness and p-zombies to exist, and it wouldn't be so had the mind been a property.

I agree that it is logically possible for disembodied consciousness and p-zombies to exist, although I think it seems highly unlikely in light of scientific knowledge. However, I don't see how that by itself establishes that the mind is not a property. Wouldn't we first have to *know* they existed, in order to establish that?

A mind-reader, or an omniscient being, if they existed, _would_ know the difference between a human being a p-zombie.

I'm a little confused as to what you assert that so strongly. We don't even know if "mind-readers" exist, (evidence seems to strongly point to no) so there's no way to know if what they are actually reading would be the "objective" part or the "subjective" part, correct? Couldn't it be either way?

Second, if the mind is a process of the brain... Well... See my post to Hans above. One should understand a process in terms of its constituents. A chemist looks at molecules, and from his understanding of them and chemical forces can explain why a certain process happens a certain way. But the mind is _subjective_. What is explanation from objective phenomena to subjective phenomena???

Well... what makes it "subjective" is the fact that our experiences can't be experienced by others. But that doesn't necessarily mean that what we are experiencing isn't the same; it just means that there's no way to know for sure.

But then again, we are only guessing that there's no way to know. Who knows, maybe it is actually possible for me to get inside your head and experience everything you experience. You never know what we might discover in the future.

Now, we know experimentally that the brain does influence the mind. It is just a fact. So I am not going to deny this. But since there seems to be no link that explains what are the constituents in the objective universe that _necessarily_ give rise to subjective experience, I am not going to call subjective experience a "property"/process of the objective.

Hmm. Well, we know that the brain causes us to feel things like emotions, physical pain, and these are subjective experiences. So we know that the objective universe does cause our subjective experiences, at least in those examples.

And lastly, I will notice that the mere fact that something objective AND something subjective exist in our world is almost enough to establish substance dualism. The fact that you argue "Well, the subjective is just a property of something objective" does very little to the fact that two radical categories of existance exist - the subjective and the objective.

This word "subjective" is kind of giving me a headache. I generally think of the word "subjective" as meaning something akin to "fluid," or something that can't be set in stone. For example, my opinion on what movies are awesome is subjective, it's different from a fact in that there is no way to measure it. So even if we mostly agree that some movies are awesome and some are crap, that will always be "fluid" and never set in stone.

I agree that our personal experiences are the same way, they are not set in stone, because there seems to be no way for us to experience things from another's point of view. However, that seems like a different kind of "subjective" to me than the one above. Maybe that's why I'm having a hard time following your logic here.

By the way - why? But in any case, live the life you have and don't worry so much about what comes next is my philosophy.

Mine too, I agree completely. The reason I say that I think our lives have more meaning if there is no afterlife, is because I think life is inherently more meaningful if it is finite. People always say it's about the journey and not the destination, and I agree with that sentiment, however I think there has to be a destination in order for the journey to have meaning. But, that's just me.

I feel that our discussion is coming to an end, we have said almost all of our arguments and rebuttals. It was a pleasant one, I agree. Do you have something to reply to this post?

Well, yes, as you can see! I feel like we're making good progress in this discussion, but I'm not really satisfied yet. Feel free to respond to what you like, though. If you're getting tired of this discussion, I understand.

(Edited because my initial response was way too damn long! Sorry, I hope you'll understand if I took out all the parts where I said "I agree," or because it was redundant.)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Joe, see page 11 for some questions to you.

Sorry, JL. You're just repeating the same points even though the flaws in your thinking have been pointed out to you.

You still claim you can conceive of a mind without a body, even though I've shown that without a body nothing remotely like a mind is possible (it can have no language, no memory, no sensory inputs, no gender, no name, no location, etc.)

I'm certain that when you claim to conceive of a disembodied mind that you're claiming some of those properties. Neuroscience can absolutely unequivocally prove that your idea is impossible. (For example, you can't have a discorporate mind that can interact with and see light. Without matter or energy, this disembodied "thing" can't have a location, or an extension, or a duration of time. Yet it's obvious that when you claim to conceive of a disembodied mind, you're imagining those impossible things. The typical OBE is floating above the operating table and gazing back down at the body, for example.)

You ask me to provide an alternate explanation to the contrary-to-fact hypothetical about a successful result for an OBE-type of experiment. The fact is, I don't have to come up with alternate explanations to show that the disembodied mind hypothesis wouldn't be proven (even if this contrary-to-fact event had happened). You're trying to make an argument from ignorance. That is, you're hypothesizing something which is contrary to reality and claiming that my inability to explain such a thing--that is my ignorance--somehow proves that your hypothesis is possible and therefore conceivable.

And, as I've mentioned several times, the same problem you claim is at the heart of the problem of mind for neuroscience is a problem for your hypothetical. That is, since you can't experience the subjective experience of another, you have no idea that the phenomenon you're trying to explain is "mind" either.

So, if you can't actually make a positive case for dualism, I suggest you either drop it, or treat it as a matter of faith. The "conceivable" argument just doesn't work.

Joe, please respond to post #385

See my post number 416. But again, I don't have to provide such explanations to show that flaws in your thinking.

I just see you repeating the same stuff. I also see you refusing to settle on a definition of "conceivable" even though your entire argument depends on it.

Both L and Hans have been making some spot on comments, and you don't seem to be "hearing" them either.

So. . . I'm pretty much done with this unless and until you can show any sign that you're internalizing anything that's being said to you.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I have 3 main arguments.

One is that it is logically possible for disembodied consciousness and p-zombies to exist, and it wouldn't be so had the mind been a property.

But just asserting that they are possible does not make them possible. I've shown plenty of evidence from neuroscience that the disembodied mind is not possible. As for p-zombies, that's just asking me to stipulate that there is a difference between a p-zombie and a regular human (even though there is no discernible difference), which is just begging the question of dualism.

We all agree that a human being is composed of 2 things : objective + subjective. I argue - well, yes, and you can logically think of the objective existing without the subjective, and vice versa.

So what? The existence of subjective experience (the mind or consciousness or feeling) is consistent with materialism. It is merely an emergent phenomenon or process or function or property of the material.

Joe takes my argument on p-zombies, and argues that by every _objective_ measurement they are the same as a human being, therefore my argument is meaningless.

No. Part of the hypothetical of p-zombies is that they look just like normal humans. Any measurement you take, MRIs, EEGs, etc., their response to drugs or brain trauma, their self-reporting is indistinguishable from normal humans. It's just stipulated that they don't actually have subjective experience (or something). As I said, that's simply begging the question.

To this - I say : well, duh! If there is a being that is objective + subjective, you take only his objective part, and create a p-zombie, where is the big surprise that by *objective* measurements he will be the same as our "objective+subjective" being?

How could you possible know whether a person is a normal human (having both subjective and objective parts) or a zombie (lacking the subjective)? The only way you can "know" this is by stipulating that it is so. That's just begging the question. In fact, dualism doesn't resolve the problem that you can't share another person's subjective experience any more than neuroscience can. However, neuroscience has a pretty good explanation that holds up by correlation (that is, certain brain events correlate remarkably well with people's reported subjective experience).

Dualism, on the other hand, has nothing.

This is almost as if you have restated the parameters of the thought experiment, not refuted it. We don't have an access to another person's subjectivity, tough luck.

But the limitations on the human knowledge aren't limitations on what exists. A mind-reader, or an omniscient being, if they existed, _would_ know the difference between a human being a p-zombie.

An omniscient being could, but a mind reader couldn't. I have already addressed this. Whatever it is a mind reader is reading is no more the direct experience of someone else's subjective experience than an MRI.

Really! You just said it--"We don't have access to another person's subjectivity, tough luck". So hypothesizing a mind-reader who somehow could is not logical.

(Again, all that I need for my argument is to show the logical possibility of separateness, that is not possible with a ball and its roundness, so the actual existence of omniscient beings and mind readers says nothing).

Actually no. If you want to make an argument in support of dualism, it is not enough to prove that dualism is logically possible. At any rate, you've failed utterly to do even that.

(To Joe - I didn't understand your argument against how a mind-reader could know a p-zombie, sorry).

A mind reader does nothing to get around the issue of subjectivity: "We don't have access to another person's subjectivity, tough luck". If you're claiming a mind-reader somehow can get around that issue, you're just making a logical contradiction.

In fact, some recent neuroscience is effectively "mind reading" with fMRIs and such. In certain circumstances, we can tell by the MRI what is happening with the person's subjective experience. We can get a high correlation in those events. A mind reader would be nothing more than a 100% correlation, but you still can't share another person's subjective experience.

Second, if the mind is a process of the brain... Well... See my post to Hans above. One should understand a process in terms of its constituents. A chemist looks at molecules, and from his understanding of them and chemical forces can explain why a certain process happens a certain way. But the mind is _subjective_. What is explanation from objective phenomena to subjective phenomena??? Now, we know experimentally that the brain does influence the mind. It is just a fact. So I am not going to deny this. But since there seems to be no link that explains what are the constituents in the objective universe that _necessarily_ give rise to subjective experience, I am not going to call subjective experience a "property"/process of the objective.

Then I suggest you read up on neuroscience.

Third, again - mind is subjective. Only you can know your pain. But the neurons are available to everyone. Now you claim that subjectivity is a "property" of matter???? That matter (which is objective) has a "property" that is subjective???? Sorry, but I can hardly grasp the meaning of it.

It's a shame that you can't. As has been explained, it is not a property of matter at lower levels of organization (like atom, molecule, or cell), but at much higher and more complex levels of organization. Remember, some pages ago when I patiently explained what "emergent property" means despite the fact that you could have put those words in Google and learned about it on your own?

And lastly, I will notice that the mere fact that something objective AND something subjective exist in our world is almost enough to establish substance dualism.

That's a false statement. Materialism does not deny subjective phenomena. In most of the neuroscience experiments related to these, we simply rely on self-reporting of what that subjective experience is. (In dream studies, for example, when the EEG shows characteristic patterns, we are reasonably sure the subject is having the subjective experience of a dream, and if we wake them at that moment, they invariably report just that.)

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I just saw a pretty cool episode of PBS's Science Frontiers (hosted by Alan Alda) this evening. The theme was "changing your mind", but the stories themselves were all independent. On-line, they only have the title of each story. The bottom three on this page were part of the episode tonight.

The experiment described in "Monastery of the Mind" was quite cool. They studied "consciousness" or the "subjective experience" by showing a pattern of horizontal stripes in one color and vertical stripes of a different color to a subject wearing colored lenses (so that one eye sees only the horizontal and one eye sees only the vertical). What happens, subjectively, is that you "see" one set of stripes at a time alternating after a little while. That is, you subjectively see only the vertical stripes for say half a minute--or whatever--and then it "flips" and you see just the horizontal stripes. Physiological measurements (IIRC, it was a kind of EEG) correlate reliably with the changes in purely subjective experience. (The actual pattern displayed doesn't change--just the subjective awareness of one or the other.)

NB: I enjoy Scientific Frontiers very much, but they seldom point out that what's being done with Alan Alda is merely a demonstration. They don't observe actual experimental protocols. I wish they'd mention that now and again.

 

[HansMustermann]

Hans, since he seems to believe that the mind influences the brain is an interactionists.

It's not just a matter of belief, but of evidence.

You can give yourself a fight-or-flight response, for example, by just imagining a situation that warrants one. All in your mind. ETA: and it actually involves the release of adrenaline, which influences the physical brain.

You can trigger, say, the release of canabinoids or dopamine in the brain by just being happy about something that happened just in your brain. (E.g., an "Eureka!" moment when figuring out something.) In fact that's what makes you happy there.

Heck, the whole "OMG, computer games are addictive!" thing is _based_ on evidence that those little achievements that exist only in your mind (based on interpreting what's going on on the screen) trigger the release of such chemicals in the brain. That's what makes you happy when, say, you solved a quest in WoW or built another spaceship component in Civilization IV.

You can even remove the computer screen, and replace the whole thing with a pen-or-paper D&D game. The whole adventure isn't even really represented anywhere, it exists in your mind, after the GM described it. It triggers the release of those mediators anyway. Otherwise, again, you physically -- or rather chemically -- couldn't be happy or sad about something that happens in that campaign.

And it's things based on you subjective perceptions and priorities (e.g., I might care about my fictive character more than you care about yours), that trigger physically measurable effects in the brain.

I don't bloody see how that can possibly be a one way street.

The only way to avoid the fact that the mind triggers effects in the brain, if you see them as fundamentally separate entities, would be to argue that the physical brain processes that same situation too and guesses when the mind will need that "I'm happy" shot. In which case, why do you need a separate mind, if the brain reaches the same conclusions anyway?

 

[HansMustermann]

Also, I don't think you really "get" Joe's objection to your disembodied mind experiment.

_Can_ you really imagine _only_ a disembodied mind there? Because it seems to me like you based that example on _not_ imagining that, but something completely different.

How would a floating mind _see_ something? It seems to me like you're imagining some ethereal eyes there too.

Add some other details from OOB experiences, and it seems to me like you're imagining a whole body there. E.g., they often hear what people in the room say (e.g., the doctors), so that would involve some kind of ears. They seem to still have a concept of up, down and generally don't get dizzy and confused moving around, and that's sensors in the inner ear that do that. They feel warm or cold, and that's a function of other sensors in the physical body. Etc.

So basically what's really imagined there isn't just a floating mind at all. What those people thought they experienced was an ethereal invisible _body_. Subtly different concept.

So how do you know that doesn't also involve an ethereal invisible brain in that body, to "run" that mind?

 

[Belz...]

I have a question to all of you. I think that the mind is a logically separate, (though causally dependant) entity from the brain, and not a property of it.

And you have no evidence for this.

You claim the opposite.

And we have evidence for it.


The conclusion is not hard to reach.

 

[L The Detective]

Heck, the whole "OMG, computer games are addictive!" thing is _based_ on evidence that those little achievements that exist only in your mind (based on interpreting what's going on on the screen) trigger the release of such chemicals in the brain. That's what makes you happy when, say, you solved a quest in WoW or built another spaceship component in Civilization IV.

Darn those video games... I know this all too well!

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

JL, mind-reading is usually thought of as "hearing" someone's thoughts inside your own head. How does that give you any greater access to subjective consciousness than either self-reporting (thoughts expressed out loud) or any number of brain scans that correlate with and can predict subjective experience?

Seriously, if you go to sleep attached to an EEG in a sleep lab, we can tell exactly when you're having the subjective experience of a dream. We can wake you at that moment, and you'll report that you were in the middle of a dream. Yet you claim something about dualism somehow resolves what you perceive as neuroscience's inability to account for subjective experience.

How about this approach: Do you agree that I don't need to be accelerating at 5 Gs for me to be able to measure someone else experiencing 5 Gs of acceleration?

 

[JetLeg]

You claim that disembodied consciousness is impossible, because that would imply a mind that doesn't have any sensory input/language and still functions. In post #425, I gave a specific example that doesn't have any input and still functions.

L The Detective (do you mind if this is shortened to L?), by "subjective" in this context, I mean "private". Neurons are non-private, everyone can use instruments to measure them. No one is privileged. With regards to pain, someone _is_ privileged - you are. How does an "objective" (non-private) thing have a private "property"? Beyond my understanding. How does this private property logically arise from objective properties?

I think you missed my objection to Occam's razor. Again, with the classic Occam's razor, we do not know whether something exists or not. This is the beginning point of the occam's razor. Here, we do know that the mind exists. What we argue about is whether it exists as an entity or as a process.

To me, it is more understandable that something which is private is a separate entity, though causually related, than it is a "property" of something subjective.

Perhaps you could explain what you mean by 'entity'?

 

[JetLeg]

JL, mind-reading is usually thought of as "hearing" someone's thoughts inside your own head. How does that give you any greater access to subjective consciousness than either self-reporting (thoughts expressed out loud) or any number of brain scans that correlate with and can predict subjective experience?

Seriously, if you go to sleep attached to an EEG in a sleep lab, we can tell exactly when you're having the subjective experience of a dream. We can wake you at that moment, and you'll report that you were in the middle of a dream. Yet you claim something about dualism somehow resolves what you perceive as neuroscience's inability to account for subjective experience.

How about this approach: Do you agree that I don't need to be accelerating at 5 Gs for me to be able to measure someone else experiencing 5 Gs of acceleration?

Listen, my argument doesn't stand or fall on the issue of the mind-reader. You yourself agreed that an omniscient being could distinguish a p-zombie from a human. So there you go, p-zombie is a logical possibility.

 

[JetLeg]

It's not just a matter of belief, but of evidence.

(1) You can give yourself a fight-or-flight response, for example, by just imagining a situation that warrants one. All in your mind. ETA: and it actually involves the release of adrenaline, which influences the physical brain.

(2) You can trigger, say, the release of canabinoids or dopamine in the brain by just being happy about something that happened just in your brain. (E.g., an "Eureka!" moment when figuring out something.) In fact that's what makes you happy there.

Heck, the whole "OMG, computer games are addictive!" thing is _based_ on evidence that those little achievements that exist only in your mind (based on interpreting what's going on on the screen) trigger the release of such chemicals in the brain. That's what makes you happy when, say, you solved a quest in WoW or built another spaceship component in Civilization IV.

(3) You can even remove the computer screen, and replace the whole thing with a pen-or-paper D&D game. The whole adventure isn't even really represented anywhere, it exists in your mind, after the GM described it. It triggers the release of those mediators anyway. Otherwise, again, you physically -- or rather chemically -- couldn't be happy or sad about something that happens in that campaign.

And it's things based on you subjective perceptions and priorities (e.g., I might care about my fictive character more than you care about yours), that trigger physically measurable effects in the brain.

I don't bloody see how that can possibly be a one way street.

The only way to avoid the fact that the mind triggers effects in the brain, if you see them as fundamentally separate entities, would be to argue that the physical brain processes that same situation too and guesses when the mind will need that "I'm happy" shot. In which case, why do you need a separate mind, if the brain reaches the same conclusions anyway?

Hans, can you provide links to studies on 1,2,3 ?

 

[HansMustermann]

For example, dopamine release while you're playing video games:

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v393/n6682/abs/393266a0.html

http://www.biomedexperts.com/Abstra...striatal_dopamine_release_during_a_video_game

Showing someone in love a picture of their loved one causes an increase in adrenalin and dopamine levels, and a decrease in serotonin levels:

http://www.sprymag.com/features/chemical_romance.php

(It also showed activating the brain zone associated with pain when showing those people a photo of their ex.)

Video games as basically anesthesia:

http://mentalhealth.about.com/library/sci/0303/blpain303.htm

http://chronicle.com/wiredcampus/ar...combat-deal-with-pain-during-physical-therapy

The activation of the brain structure associated with rewards (and addiction) when winning territory in a video game. (Note that such concepts as winning territory are a subjective thing in your _mind_, not something that is objectively measured by some sensory inputs. There is nothing about a vertical line to mean "territory" or trigger certain brain areas, until the players have been told what it represents, i.e., it becomes a concept in their _mind_.):

http://www.spectroscopynow.com/coi/cda/detail.cda?id=18209&type=Feature&chId=3&page=1

A summary of several studies about brain response when viewing violent boxing matches or playing video games, including activating the brain areas associated with fight-or-flight response. (Basically, you brain goes to DEFCON 3, so to speak, even just when you're watching violence.)

http://www.youngmedia.org.au/pdf/agsvg08jpm.pdf

Reward signals in the brain. Note that these are the signals that give you a "reward" regardless of the problem at hand, from purely abstract calculus problems in your head to getting a present IRL:

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Reward_signals

Etc.

 

[L The Detective]

L The Detective (do you mind if this is shortened to L?), by "subjective" in this context, I mean "private". Neurons are non-private, everyone can use instruments to measure them. No one is privileged. With regards to pain, someone _is_ privileged - you are. How does an "objective" (non-private) thing have a private "property"? Beyond my understanding. How does this private property logically arise from objective properties?

L is fine. I guess I don't understand where the contradiction is? You say "how can something private arise from something measurable," and I say "why not?" Why specifically does that bother you?

ETA: Are you saying that all properties should be measurable? I guess I'm not sure if that is the case. To be honest with you, I'm not 100% sure that the mind truly is 100% "private." Like I said before, I don't think it's impossible that technology won't one day allow us to share experiences with each other. That doesn't mean you're not right, it could be impossible, but I don't think we can rule that out yet.

I think you missed my objection to Occam's razor. Again, with the classic Occam's razor, we do not know whether something exists or not. This is the beginning point of the occam's razor. Here, we do know that the mind exists. What we argue about is whether it exists as an entity or as a process.

To me, it is more understandable that something which is private is a separate entity, though causually related, than it is a "property" of something subjective.

Perhaps you could explain what you mean by 'entity'?

So, for something that is "private," you feel it makes more sense that it is a separate entity. I see. I guess I'm having a hard time understanding why exactly you feel that way. As far as I can tell, your reasoning seems to basically have at it's core: "I just feel like they are separate. I don't feel like it's a property." Now, if that is the way you feel, that's entirely subjective, and there's nothing I can do further to persuade you. (But then again, maybe your answer to the question above will illuminate something for me.)

When you say "mind exists," I guess I have to disagree with you. It seems as though you're using the term "mind" differently than I am, technically I would say "roundness exists," even if it does not exist as a tangible thing, it exists as a concept. So if I say that "mind" exists, please understand I mean it the same way, that it at least exists as a "concept" in the same way that "roundness" exists, and possibly as an entity. That's the whole point of using Occam's Razor here, to see which is more likely, "property," or "entity."

So when you say "we know mind exists," if you mean we already know it exists as a tangible thing, then it's pointless for you to use Occam's Razor because you apparently have already decided on one of the choices. But please understand, for me, I don't see any evidence that the mind is an "entity." That's why I need to use Occam's Razor here. I don't already assume that the mind exists as an entity, like you do. I consider both "property" and "entity" as valid explanations, but I consider "property" to be more logical because it is simpler.

I think what I mean by "entity" is pretty clear... in other words, that mind is a separate substance than brain. I'm pretty sure that's what you're arguing for, correct?