Well, I'd think that would be an important factor in whether epiphenomenalism has any merit or not.
Epi..sm is a subset of dualism. I argued here for dualism.
It doesn't actually say anything really profound, as long as you insist on "conceive" as the test. It just makes it a different concept. Not much to argue there. Sure, "mind" is a different concept than "brain", same as "running" is a different concept than "legs."
And running depends on legs to exist.
...
So do legs on running.
The point is that it is logically impossible for running to exist without legs. Not that it is a different concept - but that it can logically exist separately.
An example I like more - > the roundness of a ball. The roundness of a ball is a property of a ball. Logically it cannot exist without a ball. Eliminate a ball, and you can't have roundness -> theoretically.
This is not the case with mind brain. Eliminate a brain, and theoretically you can have a mind. No logical contradiction. Eliminate the mind, and you can still have a brain. No logical contradiction.
Again, that it is a different concept is not the point. The point is that this concept doesn't logically depend on the other, as the roundness of a ball does on a ball.
I don't think anyone ever imagined a mole (as in, avogadro's number of mollecules) of running, so the similarity still holds.
The problem is that you insisted all along that it's somehow more special than that, and totally unlike a gazillion other such "dualisms". Which caused everyone to take a different guess at, basically, in which way is it more special and why?
So, ok, what is the profound claim there? Is there any falsifiable prediction you can make based on that?
Well...
First, notice that so far you haven't (and neither did Neverfly, and L The Detective) offer an argument why the mind is a property of the brain , and not just a cause of it. I have taken the burden of proof on myself, but I didn't have to do it.
Second, hm.
Well, in every example of physical proccesses that I managed to think about, there is some connection that I can see between the parts and the whole.
Take a cup. Break it into two parts. When I look at the left part, and at the right part, I can realize that combining them would result in a cup that would be able to hold water, right?
Another example is kynetic gas theory, that provides a logical link between the properties of each atom, and the behaviour of the gas as a whole.
It also holds for proccesses -> we can look at the property of each molecule, and then predict the reaction between them. There is a logical link.
We know that gravity exists between bodies, we know how it functions. And we can predict the existance of a system like the Solar system once we know how do the basic constituents function.
The reason I am a dualist, is because I do not see any logical link between the physical structure of the brain, and the qualities of the mind.
I quote from
"Choosing Reality: A Buddhist View of Physics and the Mind. " / Alan Wallace, chapter 23 :
When we inquire into our personal experience of physical and mental
events, we find that we encounter two types of phenomena that
bear distinct differences. Material objects characteristically have location
and may have mass, velocity, and physical dimensions. Thus,
they lend themselves to quantitative measurement and analysis. Some
mental events, such as physical pain, may be located in specific areas
in the body, but for others the notion of location seems inappropriate.
Where, for example, is affection located; or where are the recollections
of oneÕs childhood? It is possible to locate neurophysiological
processes that are associated with certain mental states, but science
has in no way demonstrated that the two are equivalent. It is possible
to trigger specific mental events by electrically stimulating areas of
the brain and to trigger specific neurological events by subjectively
stimulating the mind. This proves neither that the mental events can
be reduced to the physical nor the opposite. It is just as reasonable to
explain the evidence of introspection in its own subjective terms as it
is to explain the findings of objective science in its terms.
The concepts of mass, velocity, and physical dimension are all inappropriate
when discussing the whole range of mental events; nor
do they lend themselves to precise quantitative measurement. Just as
physical phenomena have their own unique attributes, so do mental
events have theirs. The dominant property of mental states is aware
ness. To define consciousness, we need not engage in mental gymnastics,
nor in abstract, philosophical speculation: it is that very event
of knowing, with which we are all familiar. The mental gymnastics
come in only when we try to define this firsthand event in terms of
noncognitive physical processes, configurations of matter, abstract behavioral
dispositions, emergent properties of the brain, and so on.
Mental events are modes of awareness, and it is this property that
distinguishes them from physical entities. Unless we allow our introspective
faculty to atrophy (for example, by subjecting ourselves to
the dictates of physical reductionism, which takes us away from experience,
not deeper into it) we must readily acknowledge that mental
events are every bit as real as physical events. Our thoughts, intentions,
and emotional states maneuver our bodies and thereby other
physical objects; likewise, material things are constantly influencing
our mental states. Subjective empirical examination of mental and
physical events indicates that both types of phenomena are in a constant
state of flux, both act as causal agents, and both are influenced
by causes that are themselves physical and mental.
I do not agree with everything he says. However, he does point nicely that mental states are radically different from material. Now, I agree that running is different from legs, but I can understand why is it that when legs come together, and move fast, and propel the person from the ground, running occurs. I see the link.
However, mind states are subjective - in the sense that they are _private_. (Like the post on pain. One cannot experience the pain of the other). If the mind is merely a "property"\"proccess" of the brain, I would like to know where is the link?
How do lots of atoms and molecules, which are objective, by the mere fact of coming together, produce something subjective? Where is the explanation of the property\proccess in terms of the atoms\molecules\neurons? I don't see any.
I am not going to deny the findings of neuroscience. However, since I don't see any type of relationship between the constituents of the proccess and the proccess \ the thing and its property, I am viewing it as a cause-effect relationship, and not as thing&property.
Am I clear? Even if you don't agree, do you see where I am coming from?
