Materealism and morality

[HansMustermann]

So, basically, your problem is just with calling it a property? How about calling it a process, then? The mind is what the brain does for a living.

 

[JetLeg]

So, basically, your problem is just with calling it a property? How about calling it a process, then?

I don't know. Would you say that it is possible to conceive of a process existing separately from the thing that it is a process of? Seems to me that it is inconceivable (in the strict sense of the term), so it has the same problem.


But the important issue is that I believe that qualia exists. The mind has different properties than the brain - it is subjective, while the brain is objective. The important issue is whether they have radically different natures -> objective vs. subjective.

 

[HansMustermann]

Why does it have to exist without a mind?

Look, let's put it like this:

Let's say we take a tribesman from the amazon and show him a clock on the wall. There are all these numbers and these-like needle things rotating around the centre, and it's all very mysterious.

I'm saying, if when you take it apart you see these cogs and springs that move the hands, then logically the moving of the hands is just a result of that. It's what that mechanism does.

You seem to imply that timekeeping is a different concept, nay, entity, and you could imagine clock hands moving without a clock.

Why?

 

[JetLeg]

Why does it have to exist without a mind?

Look, let's put it like this:

Let's say we take a tribesman from the amazon and show him a clock on the wall. There are all these numbers and these-like needle things rotating around the centre, and it's all very mysterious.

I'm saying, if when you take it apart you see these cogs and springs that move the hands, then logically the moving of the hands is just a result of that. It's what that mechanism does.

You seem to imply that timekeeping is a different concept, nay, entity, and you could imagine clock hands moving without a clock.

Why?

I am ok with saying that the mind is a "result" of the brain, but you have to be alert that it is a radically different thing.

It is subjective, not objective.


Take pain. Nobody but you can experience your own pain. Even if it were possible to know perfectly well when you are in pain, and perhaps introduce a similar level of pain into other people, your pain is still "only known to you".

Now, that's radically different from your brain -> to which everyone, including you have the same level of access -> objective evidence.

So that is a major issue. One cannot think of what reality is like, and miss this vital point.

Read the links on qualia.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Take pain. Nobody but you can experience your own pain. Even if it were possible to know perfectly well when you are in pain, and perhaps introduce a similar level of pain into other people, your pain is still "only known to you".

Again, the "problem" of subjectivity (or the solipsism problem) is not resolved by dualism. Saying they're two different things doesn't make it any more possible to prove the existence of "mind" as a logically separate thing.

In fact, you could make the argument that this approach goes against dualism because it argues that I can't prove that minds (other than my own) exist at all.

For neuroscience, this isn't a problem. I can't get inside someone's head to know what the experience of seeing the color red is like for them, but I know that they can experience the color red. I can prove that with an objective test.

Further, saying that one thing is subjective and the other is objective is NOT in itself an argument for dualism anyway. The property ("mind" or "consciousness" or whatever) can be subjective but the object (body) objective. Similarly, some properties can be quantitative yet the object is not itself a quantity.

ETA:

Take pain. Nobody but you can experience your own pain. Even if it were possible to know perfectly well when you are in pain, and perhaps introduce a similar level of pain into other people, your pain is still "only known to you".

Now, that's radically different from your brain -> to which everyone, including you have the same level of access -> objective evidence.

Now you're back to making the straw man argument you started out with. Materialists do not say that brain and mind are the same thing. (The latter is a property or function of the former.)

By arguing that "radically different" means the same thing as "is a logically separate entity", you're implying that for a thing to be a property or function of an object the two must be fundamentally identical, and that's not so.

I accept that a property is radically different than the object it's a property of. It's still not a separate thing.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

So, basically, your problem is just with calling it a property? How about calling it a process, then? The mind is what the brain does for a living.

Yes.

I tried to stick to "property or function", but just started using "property" because it got cumbersome.

As I said earlier, mind is to brain as running is to legs. It's one of the things that that structure does.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Read the links on qualia.

I see your links, and raise you one:

http://cogprints.org/254/0/quinqual.htm (Dennett's "Quining Qualia")

 

[L The Detective]

Well, your example with the ball seems a really bad one. What you say is :

They make a change in B, and observe a change in A. Therefore they conclude that A is a property of B.

Look at that line of reasoning abstractly - it doesn't work at all!

They make a change in B (oxygen), and observe a change in A (a person dies because of a lack of oxygen). Therefore they conclude that a person is a property of oxygen.

They make a change in B (ammount of money a person has) and observe a change in A (a person's level of happiness). Therefore they conclude that a person's level of happiness is a property (??) of money.

You're right, but my example wasn't meant to be a scientific equation in which you can plug in any values and have it work. Wouldn't you also say the same thing about your initial example?

I think so because what scientific expirements establish is exactly that B is caused by A. They make a change in B, and observe a change in A. They do it a lot, and conclude that B as a whole is caused by A.

They make a change in B (ball), and observe a change in A (roundness.) They conclude that "roundness" as a whole is caused by the ball.

You see, if I plug those variables into your example, yours doesn't work either. Mine was not meant to be a scientific equation, I'm just trying to show you that both of our interpretations are equally valid.

The reason why I think that the mind is caused by the brain is that it conforms to the logical process we carry everywhere else. They make a change in B, and observe a change in A, therefore they conclude that B causes A. That's what any textbook would say, I believe, and I see no reason to treat brain and mind differently.

Maybe that's because in most cases, there is no dispute as to whether A is an entity or a property.

If there *was* a dispute as to whether "roundness" is a property or an entity, then we'd be having this same discussion, and I'd be saying there's no evidence that "roundness" is a separate entity, and you could make the exact same argument:

"The reason why I think that "roundness" is caused by the ball is that it conforms to the logical process we carry everywhere else. They make a change in the ball, and observe a change in roundness, therefore they conclude that the ball causes roundness. That's what any textbook would say, I believe, and I see no reason to treat ball and roundness differently."

Why don't you make this argument about "roundness" and "ball?" The answer of course is obvious, it's silly. But maybe it wouldn't seem so silly if there were entire religions based around the concept of "roundness", and how special it is, etc etc. Do you see my point?

In other words, first science has to settle the dispute between whether "mind" is a property or an entity before science can conclude that "B causes A."

Your example does raise an interesting question - what is the logical procedure needed to establish that A is a property of B?

A rough, far from perfect suggestion which I had in this thread is to add to your examples an additional statement " 'A' logically cannot exist apart from 'B' "

Changing B causes a change in A AND A logically cannot exist apart from B.

Seems to me that it would establish a thing-property relationship.

Well, on the surface this idea seems to make sense.

Which is why I consider JoeTheJuggler's attempt to show that disembodied consciousness and p-zombies are inherently self-contradictory as the right way to approach this question (only I think he doesn't manage to show that).

Well he is smarter than me. The only reason I am approaching your arguments this way, is because it just seems to me like there are logical flaws in your arguments, and I'm just trying to pinpoint what exactly they may be.

And you really don't think that he manages to show a contradiction? Not that I feel like repeating all his arguments, but *I'm* pretty convinced...

And generally speaking, I think the burden of proof is on you, not on me. "B causes a change in A, thus B causes A" is the standard way of thinking. The burden is on you to find proof that A is a property of B, and the line of reasoning above is not enough.

I don't think that's true, for the reasons that I have stated above. "B causes A" is not the default assumption, I don't think it could be considered as such unless you have already established that A is an entity. The "standard" way of thinking assumes that we already know A is an entity.

I can't think of any good reason to suggest it, because I can't think of any thing that could stand for C. (Unless you posit some very-very-very-weird notion of a god that is busy observing the brain, and creating the mind according to the changes in it.. ) But would that type of scenario be even _possible_ if A were a property of B? Even if it were possible, somehow it seem to point me in the direction of causality.

The reason I will go along with you and say it is possible is because I don't want to say that "mind is a property of brain" is 100% proven. A mountain of evidence seems to suggest that this is the case, and without evidence to the contrary that is good enough for me. But that's not the same as 100% proven. I acknowledge that your "C" theory is possible in the same sense that I acknowledge that we all might be living in the Matrix... except, okay, I guess your "C" theory is slightly more likely?

But regardless, that doesn't make it a useful theory. It's just 1 in a sea of a million possibilities, which doesn't become useful without evidence to support it. That's the way I look at it.

What is the difference for you between "logically" and "possibly" in this context? An example?

In order for you to say they are "logically" separate, I think you first have to establish that "mind" is a separate entity. I'm not saying that it's not a separate entity, just that this hasn't been clearly established. But if you merely say that it's "possibly" separate, then I can agree, because you are acknowledging that your point of view is merely one possibility, and I agree with that.

 

[HansMustermann]

I am ok with saying that the mind is a "result" of the brain, but you have to be alert that it is a radically different thing.

A different concept, yes.

It is subjective, not objective.

Dude, there was, like this low sound, and the speakers were, like, way high on the bookshelf. One is low, the others is high, ya know? There's no way it could be just a function of those speakers. 'Cause they were, like way up, and the notes played were waay down, man

Take pain. Nobody but you can experience your own pain. Even if it were possible to know perfectly well when you are in pain, and perhaps introduce a similar level of pain into other people, your pain is still "only known to you".

I would think that if you excite the same neurons in the same way, it would be a pretty good approximation.

Plus, ok, let's say that different brains process that signal differently. I fail to see why that makes as fundamental a difference as to justify a mind without a brain.

I mean, WTH, then you could use the same line of reason to justify a software without a computer. See, modern CPUs are very complex things. Even if you run the same game on two identical computers, you can make a case that they execute it slightly differently. Maybe one gets the HDD interrupt in the middle of another instruction, maybe one gets a packet dropped on its internet connection when another one doesn't, or the user took a different path. And at any rate you can expect the cache, register mappings (an x86 program may _see_ only 8 general purpose registers, but they're actually mapped to a much larger set of registers internally), entries in the branch prediction table, etc, to be different.

Do those subtle differences make it subjective? Does it justify going as far as to imagine program execution to be fundamentally separated from the CPU? Do we really need to get philosophical about a program execution without a computer?

Now, that's radically different from your brain -> to which everyone, including you have the same level of access -> objective evidence.

I'm not even sure what you mean with that.

So that is a major issue. One cannot think of what reality is like, and miss this vital point.

That we all live in our own representation of reality, is pretty well documented by now. I still don't see how that disconnects the mind from the brain -- to the point of seriously talking about a mind without a brain -- when that very representation, modelling and filtering are done by the brain.

 

[JetLeg]

They make a change in B (ball), and observe a change in A (roundness.) They conclude that "roundness" as a whole is caused by the ball.

You see, if I plug those variables into your example, yours doesn't work either.

Ehm... You're right about that.




B causes a change in A, suggests that B is a cause of A. Unless, it is inconceivable that A can exist in the absence of B. In the latter case, A is said to be a property of B.


But who has the burden of proof???

The argument from subjectivity (your mind is subjective. nobody can know your pain) establish that these are radically different things.

The fact that these are radically different things seems to indicate that the BOP is on you.

There nothing that science gives us to suggest that one is a property of the other. But the fact that these are radically different, seem to me a hint to the direction that one isn't a property of the other, and therefore, the BOP seems to be on you.

Maybe that's because in most cases, there is no dispute as to whether A is an entity or a property.

Maybe. But it leads me to think in the following direction - how do we at all establish that B is a property of A? Certainly, I cannot think of any area other than this debate, whether there is a debate if something is a property or a cause of another thing. Anyone to the rescue? (And PLEASE, simple examples would be welcome. It won't help me if someone tells me something from quantum physics for example.



-----------------------------------

L The Detective, Do we agree that it is a matter of logic whether they are a property or a cause-and-effect, and not of more science?

And what do you think of qualia?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

The argument from subjectivity (your mind is subjective. nobody can know your pain) establish that these are radically different things.

You must've missed my post where I addressed this. You're back to the strawman argument that materialism says that mind is equal to brain. No one's saying that. No one is arguing that a property or function of an object is the same thing as the object itself.

We all recognize that "height" is a different thing from "man". Yet "height" is not a "logically separate entity". Height is a property of man.

There is no issue of burden of proof, except that you have yet to make a good case for dualism, and there is an abundance of evidence to support materialism/neuroscience as the correct explanation of the collection of phenomena we call "mind".

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Certainly, I cannot think of any area other than this debate, whether there is a debate if something is a property or a cause of another thing. Anyone to the rescue? (And PLEASE, simple examples would be welcome. It won't help me if someone tells me something from quantum physics for example.

This may or may not be helpful:

The programming language C was largely function-based (even though it had the idea of a structure that was mostly just a grouping of variables of various data types), but then C++ made the move to an Object Oriented Programming language (OOP). You could learn about the relationship between objects and properties/functions that way.

Dog is an object, but bark is a property or function.

(It would also be a good way to learn about the term "classes" as mentioned in the other thread.)

 

[JetLeg]

You must've missed my post where I addressed this. You're back to the strawman argument that materialism says that mind is equal to brain. No one's saying that. No one is arguing that a property or function of an object is the same thing as the object itself.

We all recognize that "height" is a different thing from "man". Yet "height" is not a "logically separate entity". Height is a property of man.

There is no issue of burden of proof, except that you have yet to make a good case for dualism, and there is an abundance of evidence to support materialism/neuroscience as the correct explanation of the collection of phenomena we call "mind".

No, there is a case of a burden of proof. Is the BOP on me to prove that the mind is a logically separate entity, or on you to prove that it is not a logically separate entity.

See the context of the subjectivity argument. I did not establish by this that the mind is a logically separate entity. I just said it makes it tentative to think that it is not a property, since it is radically different from its object. Just tentative enough to put the BOP on you.

As to evidence - I thought we agreed that neuroscience can support equally well the hypothesis that the mind is a logically separate entity, as well the hypothesis that it is a property. So the reasons have to be more philosophic.



And I have a question -> There were scientific tests in which a person lay on a bed. Above the bed there was a shelf. On the shelf there was a random card. The person tried to enter an out of body experience, and to see the card. If he would know it rightly, that would be evidence of a disembodied consciousness that "sees" the card. (I think such tests were done by Susan Blackmore).

Do you agree that if these tests would succeed, that would be evidence of a disembodied consciousness that somehow "sees" the card?

And if you do, then you must agree that its conceivable...

 

[L The Detective]

Ehm... You're right about that.

Okay, cool. I'm glad we agree.

B causes a change in A, suggests that B is a cause of A. Unless, it is inconceivable that A can exist in the absence of B. In the latter case, A is said to be a property of B.

Well... I think that seems basically right.

But who has the burden of proof???

The argument from subjectivity (your mind is subjective. nobody can know your pain) establish that these are radically different things.

The fact that these are radically different things seems to indicate that the BOP is on you.

Okay, it seems you're changing your tact a little. Let me see if I can process what you're saying.

So you're saying that "mind" is subjective. I sort of agree with you, except I think you are saying is more philosophical than scientific. While I may never be able to experience the world from your point of view, that doesn't necessarily mean that pain for you is a different feeling than pain for me. Of course, there's no way to know that for sure, but logically it makes sense to assume that these feelings are probably the same from person to person, correct?

There nothing that science gives us to suggest that one is a property of the other. But the fact that these are radically different, seem to me a hint to the direction that one isn't a property of the other, and therefore, the BOP seems to be on you.

That's one way of looking at it. But, upon reflecting about this, I think that word you are using *seems* is key to our conversation. Correct me if you're wrong, but your main point can basically be boiled down to "brain and mind *seem* to be different things." You're not saying that you *know* they are different things, you are saying that they *seem* to be different, *to you*, right? Well, if that's the case, then isn't that the reason you think that the burden of proof *seems* to be on me?

In other words, what we're really talking about here is two different ways of looking at the same thing. You want to look at it one way, and I want to look at it another. Perhaps this is why the logic in your arguments is breaking down upon examination... because at their core, your arguments themselves are not logical, they are subjective.

If that's the case, then your may as well be trying to convince me that *logically* Back to the Future is the best movie ever made.

Maybe. But it leads me to think in the following direction - how do we at all establish that B is a property of A? Certainly, I cannot think of any area other than this debate, whether there is a debate if something is a property or a cause of another thing. Anyone to the rescue? (And PLEASE, simple examples would be welcome. It won't help me if someone tells me something from quantum physics for example.

Sorry... I can't think of any either. The human mind may very well be unique in this respect. Perhaps that's because, as you pointed out, so much about our experiences is subjective, and this clouds our ability to analyze our experiences rationally.

L The Detective, Do we agree that it is a matter of logic whether they are a property or a cause-and-effect, and not of more science?

And what do you think of qualia?

Sorry... I don't know anything about qualia other than what I've read in this thread. I took a quick look at the link you provided, but I just didn't feel like combing through it. I'm just trying to take your arguments at face value and answer them honestly.

I do agree that it is a matter of "logic," but logic is just the glue of ideas so I think that goes without saying. I don't think that you can logically answer that question until you have answered a different question first, "is the mind a separate entity." And it seems like science can help us find answers to that question.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

No, there is a case of a burden of proof. Is the BOP on me to prove that the mind is a logically separate entity, or on you to prove that it is not a logically separate entity.

If you want to make the case for dualism, it is your burden to make the case.

I've already shown an abundance of evidence for the materialist position.

See the context of the subjectivity argument. I did not establish by this that the mind is a logically separate entity. I just said it makes it tentative to think that it is not a property, since it is radically different from its object. Just tentative enough to put the BOP on you.

I think my "tentative" you mean that you have made the prima facie case that it is not a property. The problem is, you most definitely have not.

I've shown that all you've said is that the mind is different than the brain. It's a strawman that says materialism says that the mind is equal to the brain. All properties and functions are fundamentally different from their objects.

As to evidence - I thought we agreed that neuroscience can support equally well the hypothesis that the mind is a logically separate entity, as well the hypothesis that it is a property.

What? I never agreed to any such thing. What evidence of neuroscience supports dualism?

ETA: And I would never say that it makes sense to ignore empirical evidence and just rely on philosophy.

And I have a question -> There were scientific tests in which a person lay on a bed. Above the bed there was a shelf. On the shelf there was a random card. The person tried to enter an out of body experience, and to see the card. If he would know it rightly, that would be evidence of a disembodied consciousness that "sees" the card. (I think such tests were done by Susan Blackmore).

Do you agree that if these tests would succeed, that would be evidence of a disembodied consciousness that somehow "sees" the card?

No. I do not. If such tests succeeded (and they most definitely did not), there would have to be another explanation. If such tests were well designed and controlled (and double blinded) and the results were reproducible, I would then say that there an unexplained phenomenon. I don't think seeing without eyes is conceivable.

 

[JetLeg]

What? I never agreed to any such thing. What evidence of neuroscience supports dualism?

As L noted, all evidence can be interpreted to mean that the brain causes the mind, or also that the mind is a property of the brain.

No. I do not. If such tests succeeded (and they most definitely did not), there would have to be another explanation. If such tests were well designed and controlled (and double blinded) and the results were reproducible, I would then say that there an unexplained phenomenon. I don't think seeing without eyes is conceivable.

1) Well, what phenomenon would that be?

2) Are you ready to make the strong claim that there it is impossible to think of a test that would establish a disembodied-consciousness that is able to see something?

 

[L The Detective]

As L noted, all evidence can be interpreted to mean that the brain causes the mind, and also that the mind is a property of the brain.

I don't think that's quite what I meant. Change that "and also that" to an "or" and I might agree. I may have have said it the wrong way, but I was simply trying to say that your interpretation is not necessarily better than mine.

Please don't mention me to Joe, he's just going to say something like "I don't care what L thinks, L stands for Loser!" Just pretend I'm like your imaginary friend who you need to keep secret to everyone else or they'll think you're crazy. Pretend like I'm a subjective experience, that no one else can understand!

2) Are you ready to make the strong claim that there it is impossible to think of a test that would establish a disembodied-consciousness that is able to see something?

I guess I may as well answer that, too. I won't make that strong a claim, but I will acknowledge that if such a test were repeatable, then one possible explanation is body of body experiences. However, it is hard for me to conceive of such a thing happening, since it would seem to contradict what we already know about the brain/mind relationship. So I don't expect it would happen.

If it did happen, we might have to go back to your A>B>C thing. And I don't care for that... too many letters.

 

[JetLeg]

I don't think that's quite what I meant. Change that "and also that" to an "or" and I might agree. I may have have said it the wrong way, but I was simply trying to say that your interpretation is not necessarily better than mine.

I am tired. I didn't wrote what I meant to write. Fixed it.

I guess I may as well answer that, too. I won't make that strong a claim, but I will acknowledge that if such a test were repeatable, then one possible explanation is body of body experiences. However, it is hard for me to conceive of such a thing happening, since it would seem to contradict what we already know about the brain/mind relationship. So I don't expect it would happen.

body of body experiences? I didn't get that.

And yes, it is highly unlikely, but my point is that it is conceivable that there is a disembodied consciousness, and thus the mind is not a property. If (a scientific expirement that would prove a disembodied consciousness) is possible, then this concept is conceivable.

 

[L The Detective]

I am tired. I didn't wrote what I meant to write. Fixed it.

No problem.

body of body experiences? I didn't get that.

And yes, it is highly unlikely, but my point is that it is conceivable that there is a disembodied consciousness, and thus the mind is not a property. If (a scientific expirement that would prove a disembodied consciousness) is possible, then this concept is conceivable.

Sorry, that is supposed to read out of body experiences.

Yes, I realize that your point is that it is conceivable, and I agree with you. But I still don't understand how that shows the mind is not a property. What is "conceivable" is itself subjective, so you can't use that to establish what is "logically separate."

You're mixing up objective with subjective, that's where I think you're going wrong.

 

[L The Detective]

As L noted, all evidence can be interpreted to mean that the brain causes the mind, or also that the mind is a property of the brain.

This is still not quite right, should take the "also" out of there. It's either one or the other... probably not both.

And to be a bit more clear about what I meant, what I was trying to say is that without evidence, both of those conclusions are up to your personal interpretation. Neither one can be reached with logic alone. I think that the only logical reason to favor one over the other is scientific evidence.