Materealism and morality

[JoeTheJuggler]

I can't experience the past either. I can't experience the core of the Earth or the center of a black hole. You have created an arbitrary category, "cannot experience" and applied it to a single thing, conscious thought, therefore you claim that thing is somehow not physical.

It doesn't fly.

Good point.

Another is the one I've made a couple of times that if the fact that we can't experience the subjective experience of another is a problem of neuroscience, it is a problem that dualism does nothing to resolve. So why bother with it? At best, it's a tu quoque argument.

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

... it is a problem that dualism does nothing to resolve. So why bother with it? ...

And a good point to you as well. I think this is another way of saying the same thing. But the more ways one looks at something the more clear it becomes. The problem is with the concept, the 'mind' is special, or conscious thought is special, or being a 'special' human as opposed to just an animal that can utilize technology but otherwise evolved like the rest of them,... all of these concepts I find not only useless, but they get in the way of discovering the nature of life in the Universe. It's taken a lot of work to overcome these original ideas that humans were unique in ways we really are not unique in.

We have complex language, but other animals have language. We use tools, lots of animals use tools. We problem solve, crows, squirrels and non-human primates problem solve. We have morals, so do other animals. All of these are things, which there is still a lingering collective belief even among some scientists, that supposedly were unique to humans and made us "special". It has slowed discovery. Why look for animal morality and language and tool use if you are already convinced only humans possess these things?

The idea conscious thought or the mind is somehow not material is the same theme. If conscious thought is 'special' and cannot be understood, why bother studying the function of consciousness? Yet it is of critical importance to study it. The revelations from this research are incredible.

Did you know that a person can be blind to "form" while being able to see perfectly well otherwise? A person with such a deficit can place their hand correctly oriented into a diagonal slit, but cannot hold their hand up and demonstrate the correct orientation or draw the correct orientation on paper. The hand can correctly move without conscious thought about where the eye is guiding it. I find that fascinating.

 

[JetLeg]

Hey again Jetlag. I have been following this thread but not posting in it, because frankly, I don't feel qualified to discuss neuroscience. And also Joe is doing a great job of carrying forth the discussion. But I wanted to ask you a few questions, because I'm a little confused about your point of view.

So you're saying that because "mind" and "brain" can concievably be different entities, this proves that they are logically separate? I was confused by this at first, because I thought by "logically separate" you meant that this proved that they were separate entities. But it seems like what you're actually saying is that this proves that it is *possible* that they are separate entities? In other words, you're trying to state that there is no obvious contradiction like there would be if we tried to claim that "roundness" could conceivably be separate from a ball. Have I interpreted what you are saying correctly?

Seems that you do, thanks for taking the effort to understand.

 

[JetLeg]

And what about all the other physical things that affect the mind? When you've had a few drinks, you actually experience a change in the subjective mental experience. (We call it "being drunk" or "intoxicated".) If the mind is a separate and independent entity, then why would it be affected by alcohol in this way?

Again, you misunderstand my position.

The mind is a logically seperate entity (a human being can be logically seperated from oxygen, food and water. But he is still dependent upon them to exist. But he is a different entity that oxygen food and water). But this logically seperate entity is not independent, perhaps it is even totally dependent on the brain to exist.

But it is not the same as the brain; nor is its property. A property of X cannot even be conceived to exist without X.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Again, you misunderstand my position.

The mind is a logically seperate entity (a human being can be logically seperated from oxygen, food and water. But he is still dependent upon them to exist. But he is a different entity that oxygen food and water). But this logically seperate entity is not independent, perhaps it is even totally dependent on the brain to exist.

But it is not the same as the brain; nor is its property. A property of X cannot even be conceived to exist without X.

In other words, you're saying that the mind isn't merely a property of the brain?

 

[JetLeg]

In other words, you're saying that the mind isn't merely a property of the brain?

Yes, the mind isn't. But it still is probably caused by the brain, and cannot exist if the brain dies.


Pain is something that is caused by neuronal activity. I will not believe for a second that it is possible to exist of a pain, without a body. But pain is still a different "substance" - it is subjective. A person can and never will be able to experience the pain of the other. Dualism has some hold even here. Neverthless, of course pain is caused by the body.

 

[JetLeg]

Good point.

Another is the one I've made a couple of times that if the fact that we can't experience the subjective experience of another is a problem of neuroscience, it is a problem that dualism does nothing to resolve. So why bother with it? At best, it's a tu quoque argument.

It isn't a tu quoque. It is a good point in favor of dualism. The brain is objective, while the mind is subjective. This is what dualism means, that tehre are two radically "things", one objective, one subjective. Even if the objective one causes the subjective one.

 

[HansMustermann]

So basically it's pretty much the same as the distinction between hardware and software? E.g., between the computer and the AI program running in it?

Well, that's not a bad distinction to make, but I'd think it also says less than it seems to.

 

[AkuManiMani]

It isn't a tu quoque. It is a good point in favor of dualism. The brain is objective, while the mind is subjective. This is what dualism means, that tehre are two radically "things", one objective, one subjective. Even if the objective one causes the subjective one.

Hey JetLeg, have you ever heard of brain/body dualism?

 

[JetLeg]

Hey JetLeg, have you ever heard of brain/body dualism?

I don't remember where it was. Someone regarded is as "the fallacious idea that the it is the brain that causes our mental experience, and not the whole of our body." Is that what you mean?


Why?

 

[JetLeg]

So basically it's pretty much the same as the distinction between hardware and software? E.g., between the computer and the AI program running in it?

Well, that's not a bad distinction to make, but I'd think it also says less than it seems to.

I am reluctant to go into it, since I do not understand too well how computers are built.

The key issue here is subjectivity - which the brain doesn't posses but the mind does. It is a more radical difference than it is in the case of computers.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I don't remember where it was. Someone regarded is as "the fallacious idea that the it is the brain that causes our mental experience, and not the whole of our body." Is that what you mean?


Why?

Well the brain is separate from the body, right? Its conceivable to have a body w/o a brain and a brain w/o a body so there must be a duality between the two, right?

 

[JetLeg]

Well the brain is separate from the body, right? Its conceivable to have a body w/o a brain and a brain w/o a body so there must be a duality between the two, right?

Hehe

It means what you mean by duality.

What you said above proves indeed that the brain is not the body (like some, though perhaps very simplistic materealists argue that the mind is the brain), and that the brain is not a property of the body (if it were, it would be impossible to conceive of it without the body).

The brain is a part of the body, and yes, it is possible to conceive of a part removed from the whole.


What my argument from conceivability tries to establish is that the mind is not a property of the brain, nor it is the brain itself.

An additional step to dualism is required -> to show that they have radically different properties. That is simple - the mind is subjective, the brain objective.

 

[HansMustermann]

I am reluctant to go into it, since I do not understand too well how computers are built.

The key issue here is subjectivity - which the brain doesn't posses but the mind does. It is a more radical difference than it is in the case of computers.

Are you sure?

An easy to imagine and implement program is one which guesses a noun by a number of yes/no questions. If it can't guess by the questions it already knows, it asks you to supply an extra question. E.g.,

Is it a plant? "No."
Is it an animal? "Yes."
Is it a pet? "Yes."
Does it have 4 legs? "Yes."
Is it a carnivore? "Yes"
Is it cold blooded? "No."
It's a dog, right? "No."
What is it? "a cat."
Ok, which question should I have asked to determine if it's a cat? "Does it meow?"

Then it saves that and next time it knows what to ask to guess a cat.

Essentially it builds a database of possible things, organized as a binary tree.

But different programs trained by asking different people, might learn vastly different ways to categorize things. E.g., if it asked a biologist, it might have learned instead that what distinguishes feliforms (cat-like carnivores) is that the auditory bullae are double-chambered, composed of two bones joined by a septum. In fact, it might end up with a more useful binary tree based on the scientific classification instead of "is it a pet?"

Same program, identical computers, it ended up dividing the world differently anyway.

 

[JetLeg]

Are you sure?

An easy to imagine and implement program is one which guesses a noun by a number of yes/no questions. If it can't guess by the questions it already knows, it asks you to supply an extra question. E.g.,

Is it a plant? "No."
Is it an animal? "Yes."
Is it a pet? "Yes."
Does it have 4 legs? "Yes."
Is it a carnivore? "Yes"
Is it cold blooded? "No."
It's a dog, right? "No."
What is it? "a cat."
Ok, which question should I have asked to determine if it's a cat? "Does it meow?"

Then it saves that and next time it knows what to ask to guess a cat.

Essentially it builds a database of possible things, organized as a binary tree.

But different programs trained by asking different people, might learn vastly different ways to categorize things. E.g., if it asked a biologist, it might have learned instead that what distinguishes feliforms (cat-like carnivores) is that the auditory bullae are double-chambered, composed of two bones joined by a septum. In fact, it might end up with a more useful binary tree based on the scientific classification instead of "is it a pet?"

Same program, identical computers, it ended up dividing the world differently anyway.

But what do you argue using this program analogy?

 

[drkitten]

But what do you argue using this program analogy?

That what you consider to be the "key issue" isn't necessarily correct.

I'd go further and say that it isn't necessarily even well-defined. Tell me again about your "subjectivity" detector? How do you determine whether or not I experience subjectivity? How do you determine that a computer does not experience subjectivity?

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Again, you misunderstand my position.

Not so. I understand your position perfectly well. It is just a bad argument.

You're saying that because you think it's conceivable that a mind can exist independently of a brain, therefore the mind and the brain are separate entities and that the mind is not merely a property or function of the brain.

As I've shown in great detail, that "therefore" doesn't follow. Even if it did, you're still begging the question. In other words, in order to prove dualism, you're asking me to concede that dualism is conceivable.

The mind is a logically seperate [sic] entity (a human being can be logically seperated [sic] from oxygen, food and water. But he is still dependent upon them to exist. But he is a different entity that [sic] oxygen food and water). But this logically seperate [sic] entity is not independent, perhaps it is even totally dependent on the brain to exist.

But it is not the same as the brain; nor is its property. A property of X cannot even be conceived to exist without X.

Again, you can't argue ANYTHING based on what you can conceive or imagine.

I understand the difference between logically separate and independent. Still, you've done nothing to support your assertion that the mind is not a property of the brain.

I've given you tons of evidence, but you just keep reasserting your position based on what you think is conceivable.

By the way, I've shown you that it is actually inconceivable. When you try to conceive of a mind without a brain, do you conceive of this mind with no sensory inputs and no motor outputs? (In the neuroscience model, that is, a mind with no afferent or efferent nerves?) You cannot conceive of such a mind.

When people conceive of a disembodied mind, they're basically just asserting a ghost body. In OBEs and NDEs, this discorporate mind can still see (as if it had inputs from eyes). They often report feeling "warm" yet there is no body to feel such a thing. So, in fact, it's inconceivable.

At the very least, it's as inconceivable as my zombie universe that doesn't actually have gravity (even though everything appears to work as if it did).

 

[HansMustermann]

But what do you argue using this program analogy?

Well, drkitten already blew my cover but for now I was just trying to get a more exact understanding of that duality you're proposing.

Human words can be awfully vague and we could argue back and forth based on just using slightly different meanings or understanding of what "mind" means. So I'm trying to peg it with a less ambiguous example. Is it the same kind of duality as there, or do you have something more profound in mind?

What I think so far, well, as I was saying, drkitten already said that. But I'm willing to give it another try once we define the question clearer.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

It isn't a tu quoque. It is a good point in favor of dualism.

Not in the least. The fact that the subject experience isn't something you can experience from outside is not resolved by dualism. If it's a problem in neuroscience, it is as much a problem with dualism.

The brain is objective, while the mind is subjective.

No. That's only an assertion of your position. You've done nothing to support it. In neuroscience, what you're calling the mind is a collection of mental processes. We know a great deal about them. As skeptigirl pointed out, these mental capacities aren't unique to humans. In many cases, we know exactly what brain structures are REQUIRED for those processes. (That is, if you remove or damage the structure, the mental process is lost or impaired.)

This is what dualism means, that tehre are two radically "things", one objective, one subjective. Even if the objective one causes the subjective one.

Yes, I understand what dualism means. But all you've done is assert it. You've done nothing to support it. The observation that we can't experience subjective experience from the outside is a tu quoque argument at best (and that's being generous). You're asserting that the subjective experience is something real and separate (and not merely a property or function of the brain). Stating that we can't experience that from outside does not support dualism in the least.

Finally, what good is dualism? I believe it developed as a way to accomodate religious belief. Its current form (the one you're asserting) is just a modification to do away with "soul", but there's no evidence to support it, and no utility in holding that position.

The materialist/neuroscience position is very useful and has led to incredible advances in our understanding of the collection of mental processes we call "mind".

By the way, please learn how to spell "separate".

 

[AkuManiMani]

Hehe

It means what you mean by duality.

What you said above proves indeed that the brain is not the body (like some, though perhaps very simplistic materealists argue that the mind is the brain), and that the brain is not a property of the body (if it were, it would be impossible to conceive of it without the body).

The brain is a part of the body, and yes, it is possible to conceive of a part removed from the whole.


What my argument from conceivability tries to establish is that the mind is not a property of the brain, nor it is the brain itself.

An additional step to dualism is required -> to show that they have radically different properties. That is simple - the mind is subjective, the brain objective.

[Well I was asking those questions as a way of helping you see what I mean by distinction instead of separation. There's a wiki article you might want to read that is somewhat related to what I'm talking about. It discusses a way of looking at parts and wholes that you may find enlightening ]

Anyways, back to the topic at hand.

The main reason 'materialists' object to Cartesian dualism is because it proposes that 'mental' and 'material' are metaphysically separate 'realms'. This kind of separation would preclude any kind of interaction between the two. We know that what we consider 'mental' is affected by the 'physical' (via perception) and the mental can affect the physical (via bodily action). It becomes apparent that, in drawing a metaphysical line between mind and matter, dualism creates a logical paradox. A paradox is a strong indicator that, somewhere, there's a false assumption in one's reasoning. There are different schools of thought that attempt to address and resolve this apparent paradox (one of them is epiphenomenalism, which we've already established is pure bunk).

Materialism has it's own resolution to the dualist paradox. Materialism is a monist ontology, which means that it views all things as being fundamentally the same "stuff". How it differs from other monist positions is that it views physical matter as the primary stuff from which all things arise. It's approach to resolving the dualistic paradox is to state that:

-All things are material.

-The material entity most clearly associated by evidence with the mental is the brain.

Therefore, the mental is merely a material phenomenon of the brain.



The Idealists also ascribe to the monist view but they flip the materialist argument on it's head. In their interpretation:

-The only thing that is ever experienced is the mental.

-The only way for us to perceive matter is if it is, in some sense, mental.

Therefore, all matter, including the brain, are merely mental phenomenon.

"Wait", the dualist might say to both, "Each of you ignores the fact that mental qualities and material objects have fundamentally different characteristics. The only logical solution is to conclude duality".

But, as I pointed out earlier, dualism introduces the interaction paradox which is a fatal flaw to the theory. The only way to resolve the paradox of dualism and overcome the shortcomings of the materialist/idealist dichotomy is to assume some form of neutral monism. The subjective and the objective must have a common metaphysical basis that is neither mental or material.