Materealism and morality

[JetLeg]

Akumanimani, can you reply to post #196?

The essence of my argument is : If the brain would be influenced by our volition, it should be detectable by science. It isn't. Qed.

And perhaos:had the brain been influenced by our volition, physics would function differently inside the human brain that it does elsewhere (since it is the only place where physics is affected by volition). It doesn't, hence the brain is not influenced by our volition. Qed.

 

[Neverfly]

Akumanimani, can you reply to post #196?

The essence of my argument is : If the brain would be influenced by our volition, it should be detectable by science. It isn't. Qed.

And perhaos:had the brain been influenced by our volition, physics would function differently inside the human brain that it does elsewhere (since it is the only place where physics is affected by volition). It isn't. Qed.

The brain is subject to the same physics as everything else.

Your clear misconceptions about observer effect have no bearing on reality.

 

[paximperium]

Akumanimani, can you reply to post #196?

The essence of my argument is : If the brain would be influenced by our volition, it should be detectable by science. It isn't. Qed.

And perhaos:had the brain been influenced by our volition, physics would function differently inside the human brain that it does elsewhere (since it is the only place where physics is affected by volition). It isn't. Qed.

So basically, "You haven't proven me wrong therefore I'm right." ?

 

[JetLeg]

Akumani and paximperium, what do you think my argument tries to establish?

Seems that you misunderstood it.

 

[paximperium]

Your argument is that "volition"(or Freewill) has a Quantum Effect that are somehow capable of affecting neuronal ability therefore Determinism is wrong.

Am I correct?

 

[JetLeg]

Your argument is that "volition"(or Freewill) has a Quantum Effect that are somehow capable of affecting neuronal ability therefore Determinism is wrong.

Am I correct?

No.

What you understood isn't much related to what I said.

I argued that if volition would be able to affect the physical world, we would see those effects in the brain. We don't, hence it doesn't.

Also, it was in the context of epiphenomenalism versus interactionism, not in the context of determinism vs indeterminism.

 

[paximperium]

No.

The contrary. I argued that if volition would be able to affect the physical world, we would see those effects in the brain. We don't, hence it doesn't.

I stand corrected.
What was the question again?

 

[JetLeg]

I stand corrected.
What was the question again?

I argued that if our volition would affect our brain (a position I understand AkuManiMani to hold), then it would be detectable.

I am waiting for AkuManiMani's reply, since I understand him to think that our volition affects our brain.

I don't understand how can it be true, given that there are no evidences of the brain being affected by anything that is not physical.

 

[Neverfly]

I don't understand how can it be true, given that there are no evidences of the brain being affected by anything that is not physical.

I am personally very surprised to see you make this statement. I agree with the statement, but surprised you said it.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I will try to convince you of the conceivability of p-zombies, and disembodied consciousness. I will explain later the role of the conceivability of them in my worldview.

That something is conceivable isn't the problem. That what it's conceiving is pointless is the issue.

1) Disembodied consciousness - If the experiments that test out-of-body experience would succeed, they would _prove_ disembodied consciousess. If you lie on a bed, and you feel that you hover outside your body, and go to a safe, enter this safe, read the number that is written there - and you get it right - it would be proof of disembodied experience, provided that it were done with all the controls. I think Susan Blackmore was performing such tests for a long time.

I am not arguing that these experiments are successful - only that if they are, they establish disembodied consciousness. And therefore disembodied consciousness is conceivable.

How absurd. You're saying the lack of evidence for disembodied consciousness is somehow proof that disembodied consciousness exists?

2) I don't agree with the argument you presented above for the same reason I do not find Turing's test convincing. Do you find Turing's test a good test for intelligence?

I think the question of intelligence is wholly irrelevant to the topic of the subject experience of feelings or consciousness.

By the way, IF mind-reading were real, then a mind-reader could tell a p-zombie from a human being... A p-zombie wouldn't have a mind to read.

First, mind reading isn't real, so it's not. Even if it were, it would be no more conclusive of the subjective experience of consciousness or feelings than, for example, EEG readings or MRIs.

ETA: For that matter, how is mind-reading different than these actual measures that correlate with mental activity? In most fiction, mind-reading is shown as someone able to "hear" the thoughts as speech. Let's say you could do that. Would it be any more conclusive evidence of the subjective experience than EEGs, MRIs or for that matter speech? If your p zombie is different from a person, you still haven't said how. By the definition of such a zombie, someone who could "read minds" would be able to "hear" the thoughts of a p-zombie. If you want to support a theory of a soul, you should just come out and make your case for it. This zombie silliness just doesn't cut it.

3) I can invent a specific scenario for a p-zombie to exist. Remember, all I am arguing for now is the _conceivability_ of p-zombies, and disembodied consciousnesses.

You're missing the point. That you can conceive of something doesn't make that something real or useful in any way whatsoever.

Basically the zombie idea is that you're saying you can have a person that is just like a person in all ways except for it lacks that subjective experience we're discussing. You can't even prove that it lacks that, because in all measures (what the zombie-person self reports, MRIs, EEGs, and even--if it were possible--mind-reading) it looks just like a person.

About the only thing this thought experiment is useful for is demonstrating that you can't prove the subjective experience for anyone but yourself.

This inability to prove that subjective experience does nothing to support the idea of disembodied consciousness or dualism. Nothing at all.

4) After all these are you guys who claim that it is a scientific discovery that the brain causes the mind. If it a scientific discovery, then it must be conceivable that it wouldn't be the case, it must be conceivable that the brain wouldn't cause the mind, and that they would be separate. Otherwise, what type of a scientific discovery it is, the opposite of which is simply inconceivable?

This doesn't make sense at all. First, the idea that the mind is caused by (or is an emergent property of, or a function of) or wholly dependent on the brain isn't a "scientific discovery" but an hypothesis or theory. It makes predictions. We expect when you introduce certain drugs, you'll get the report of a different subjective experience of the mind. It predicts that certain EEG patterns will correlate with certain subjective experiences and mental states. Ditto, MRIs, fMRIs, brain damage, etc. It's a very robust theory.

There is no need to make an alternate theory that the mind can exist independently of the brain. If you want to make that hypothesis, go ahead. But it's up to you to provide some evidence to support it, and there is exactly none. (And as mentioned an abundance of evidence showing the mind-brain correlation.)

Regarding "emergent properties", could you perhaps define it, or clarify it in some way? These words are vague to me. I understand what a property is, but what does it mean to call a property "emergent"?

You could read up on it in any good introductory biology or chemistry textbook, but I'll give you a quick rundown:

You know the properties of the various atoms, right?
When they're organized into compounds or more complex molecules, you get brand new properties that were not a property of any of the component atoms. For example, elemental sodium is a metal, and elemental chlorine is a gas. But sodium chloride is table salt. Its properties are nothing like the properties of sodium or chloride.

When you organize molecules into cells, you get lots of properties that none of the molecules had. Organize cells into tissue, and you can get new properties. Tissues into organs--new properties. Organs into organ systems, new properties.

One example: the circulatory system has the property of being able to maintain some degree of homeostasis in the blood pressure. This is not something any one organ is solely responsible for--much less any tissue of any constituent organ, any cell of any of these tissues, any molecule of any of these cells and any atom of any of these molecules.

Was it you that talked of running to legs as mind to brain? (sorry, lazy to go through all these posts).

Yes. I said that was my response to someone who made a strawman characterization of materialism by saying materialists think that the mind is equal to the brain. It is no more so than "running" is equal to "legs".

 

[Neverfly]

How absurd. You're saying the lack of evidence for disembodied consciousness is somehow proof that disembodied consciousness exists?

What Jetleg is doing is obvious (asking "what if" questions...) however, this response is inaccurate. In spite of Jetlegs What If supposition, he made no such claim.

The only reason I am commenting on it is because it then creates the He Said/ He said opinionated debate in which one can claim that there is no definite answer.

I would suggest that it's preferable to make no assumptions as to intent or motive and to focus on what is actually said. It creates a better foundation that cannot be backpeddled later.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

By the way--quantum level events is not the place to look for volition. It is definitely a property of much higher levels of organization.

Just like you wouldn't look to an atom (or sub-atomic particle) to explain how the circulatory system regulates blood pressure.

As for volition, consciousness, or subjective experiences in general: if you doubt the self-reporting, then you're just saying you don't have proof that they exist. If that's so, you can't use their existence to prove that they are the result of something other than the material of the brain (especially given that there is a wealth of evidence showing a high correlation between brain events and mental events).

I can't even think of an analogy to this sort of argument. It absurd. It would be like saying that I question the existence of gravity because I can conceive of a "zombie" universe that has no gravity, but I then proceed to claim that gravity is caused by magic and is not a physical property of matter.

 

[JetLeg]

You totally missed the point of my post.

Jetleg:I will try to convince you of the conceivability of p-zombies, and disembodied consciousness. I will explain later the role of the conceivability of them in my worldview.

That something is conceivable isn't the problem. That what it's conceiving is pointless is the issue.

Like I said, you stated that you cannot think of a p-zombie. All I tried to argue for is that disembodied consciousness and p-zombies are conceivable. I said that later I will explain why. I am not going to argue that since it is conceivable it is true, but present a different argument that is based on its conceivability. So lets establish its conceivability meanwhile.

How absurd. You're saying the lack of evidence for disembodied consciousness is somehow proof that disembodied consciousness exists?

Thats not at all what I said! I said that the fact that expirements were made to test whether disembodied consciouness exist is a reason to think why this concept is conceivable. (Again, when we agree on this, I will explain why it is important for me).

I think the question of intelligence is wholly irrelevant to the topic of the subject experience of feelings or consciousness.

Re-read the context. I said that _your_ argument against p-zombies seems to fail for the same reason Turing's test fails. The fact that two things are the same by every test humans can test it doesn't mean that they are.

ETA: For that matter, how is mind-reading different than these actual measures that correlate with mental activity? In most fiction, mind-reading is shown as someone able to "hear" the thoughts as speech. Let's say you could do that. Would it be any more conclusive evidence of the subjective experience than EEGs, MRIs or for that matter speech? If your p zombie is different from a person, you still haven't said how. By the definition of such a zombie, someone who could "read minds" would be able to "hear" the thoughts of a p-zombie. If you want to support a theory of a soul, you should just come out and make your case for it. This zombie silliness just doesn't cut it.

Well, this is really theorizing, but if mind-reading were real, it could read directly the content of one's mind, not using the physical medium (doing an extrasensory fMRI, and then deciphering), but via mind to mind interactions. So it wouldn't be able to hear the thoughts of a zombie. But this is off-topic, and I don't think mind-reading exists.

You're missing the point. That you can conceive of something doesn't make that something real or useful in any way whatsoever.

I never implied that it can make it real. Bear with me, lets agree whether its conceivable, and then I'll explain you the importance of it.

Basically the zombie idea is that you're saying you can have a person that is just like a person in all ways except for it lacks that subjective experience we're discussing. You can't even prove that it lacks that, because in all measures (what the zombie-person self reports, MRIs, EEGs, and even--if it were possible--mind-reading) it looks just like a person.

But since when the possibility of something to be proven true has impact on its truth-status?

This doesn't make sense at all. First, the idea that the mind is caused by (or is an emergent property of, or a function of) or wholly dependent on the brain isn't a "scientific discovery" but an hypothesis or theory. It makes predictions. We expect when you introduce certain drugs, you'll get the report of a different subjective experience of the mind. It predicts that certain EEG patterns will correlate with certain subjective experiences and mental states. Ditto, MRIs, fMRIs, brain damage, etc. It's a very robust theory.

Ok. My point was that since it is a scientific theory that the mind is cause (or is an emergent property of, or a function of) by the brain -> then it should be at least conceiveable that it were not so. What kind of scientific theory it is that proves something when the other option is inconceivable.

[/QUOTE]

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

What Jetleg is doing is obvious (asking "what if" questions...) however, this response is inaccurate. In spite of Jetlegs What If supposition, he made no such claim.

First, he's doing more than a "what if". I've run into this line of thinking before, and I'm very familiar with it. He's arguing that because something is conceivable it somehow offers evidence about the real world.

Second, he said that it would be possible to find proof of disembodied consciousness. Even though we have found no such proof, "therefore disembodied consciousness is conceivable". These are his very words (see below). If I'm parsing this wrong, what does the "therefore" follow from?

I am not arguing that these experiments are successful - only that if they are, they establish disembodied consciousness. And therefore disembodied consciousness is conceivable.

The only reason I am commenting on it is because it then creates the He Said/ He said opinionated debate in which one can claim that there is no definite answer.

I would suggest that it's preferable to make no assumptions as to intent or motive and to focus on what is actually said. It creates a better foundation that cannot be backpeddled later.

I agree. But these really were his very words. And I'm reading them as best I can. I see no other way to make sense of them.

If he's saying that such evidence (that doesn't exist) would make the idea conceivable, it doesn't make much sense. Yes, evidence of something makes that idea conceivable. I think he's trying to say that it's conceivable now (without any evidence).

At any rate--arguing logically from something just because it is conceivable allows you to argue for ANY conceivable idea. That is, any argument you construct based on the conceivability of the thing you're arguing for is going to be a validating argument.

 

[JetLeg]

First, he's doing more than a "what if". I've run into this line of thinking before, and I'm very familiar with it. He's arguing that because something is conceivable it somehow offers evidence about the real world.

To be fair, I do make this argument sometimes.

But this is not at all the argument that I am going to present now.

 

[Neverfly]

JoeTheJuggler, I'm aware of it too, but it's a trap and that's why I was warning against it.

Let him trap himself.

Just a thought...

 

[JetLeg]

Second, he said that it would be possible to find proof of disembodied consciousness. Even though we have found no such proof, "therefore disembodied consciousness is conceivable". These are his very words (see below). If I'm parsing this wrong, what does the "therefore" follow from?

Exactly. It might be possible to find proof of disembodied consciousness -> therefore the concept is conceivable.

All I was arguing. No more.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

You totally missed the point of my post.

Nope. Not at all.

Like I said, you stated that you cannot think of a p-zombie. All I tried to argue for is that disembodied consciousness and p-zombies are conceivable. I said that later I will explain why. I am not going to argue that since it is conceivable it is true, but present a different argument that is based on its conceivability. So lets establish its conceivability meanwhile.

Look, I know exactly where you're going with this. I've heard this argument many times before.

That you can conceive of a p-zombie doesn't support the case for dualism at all.

You are going to try to argue that the conceivability of the p-zombie somehow supports dualism. It does not.

Believe me. I've heard it before.

Well, this is really theorizing, but if mind-reading were real, it could read directly the content of one's mind, not using the physical medium (doing an extrasensory fMRI, and then deciphering), but via mind to mind interactions. So it wouldn't be able to hear the thoughts of a zombie. But this is off-topic, and I don't think mind-reading exists.

No no no!

If mind-reading were real, you would have absolutely no more reason to KNOW that what you're reading is the subjective experience of the person than you would that the evidence of MRIs, EEGs or self-reporting indicates a subjective experience.

The same flaw that you point to in neuroscience exists with mind-reading.

The only way you could know the subjective experience of someone is to be that someone.

Neuroscience doesn't get hung up on that issue. You could imagine, as did Dwayne Hoover in Breakfast of Champions, that you're the only truly conscious person in all of creation, and all other people are p-zombies (or "robots" in Vonnegut's vocabulary). It's not a very useful approach to neuroscience.

Yes, there's an unproven assumption--that people are all capable of the same subjective experience as "I" am. I'm fine with that.

Again, if you want to make a case for dualism--just make it. (I've heard the zombie approach before, and I guarantee you it's flawed.)

 

[AkuManiMani]

Akumanimani, can you reply to post #196?

The essence of my argument is : If the brain would be influenced by our volition, it should be detectable by science. It isn't. Qed.

Detectable by science? What do you mean detectable by science. Are asking if it is empirically observed or if some authority says they observed it? Do you need me to provide a reference to a scientific study to confirm something you confirm yourself every waking moment? You might as well ask me whether apples falling is detectable by "science".

And perhaos:had the brain been influenced by our volition, physics would function differently inside the human brain that it does elsewhere (since it is the only place where physics is affected by volition). It doesn't, hence the brain is not influenced by our volition. Qed.

You have volition so clearly its a part of physics. You volition affects affects you nervous system and, by extension, the rest of your body, and by extension the rest of the world around you. Your claim that volition doesn't affect the world outside the brain is rather silly. Computers, power lines, and skyscrapers don't build themselves and cars and planes don't get up and go of their own accord. You're not making much sense right now

 

[JetLeg]

Nope. Not at all.


Look, I know exactly where you're going with this. I've heard this argument many times before.

That you can conceive of a p-zombie doesn't support the case for dualism at all.

You are going to try to argue that the conceivability of the p-zombie somehow supports dualism. It does not.

Believe me. I've heard it before.



No no no!

If mind-reading were real, you would have absolutely no more reason to KNOW that what you're reading is the subjective experience of the person than you would that the evidence of MRIs, EEGs or self-reporting indicates a subjective experience.

The same flaw that you point to in neuroscience exists with mind-reading.

The only way you could know the subjective experience of someone is to be that someone.

Neuroscience doesn't get hung up on that issue. You could imagine, as did Dwayne Hoover in Breakfast of Champions, that you're the only truly conscious person in all of creation, and all other people are p-zombies (or "robots" in Vonnegut's vocabulary). It's not a very useful approach to neuroscience.

Yes, there's an unproven assumption--that people are all capable of the same subjective experience as "I" am. I'm fine with that.

Again, if you want to make a case for dualism--just make it. (I've heard the zombie approach before, and I guarantee you it's flawed.)

Listen, it's not fair. I've written quiet a long post arguing for the conceivability of p-zombies and disembodied consciousness. I am going to argue for dualism on the basis of it, but the argument isn't "it's conceivable, so it's true". I want us to agree on the question of the conceivability first.


I want to hear your opinions on the arguments I have presented - do they support conceivability? You haven't told me that so far. And I am not going to be derailed in the discussion whether a mind-reader could read the mind of a p-zombie