Materealism and morality

[L The Detective]

Thanks, Skeptigirl. Those are very good points.

And Joe, I see what you mean about Dualism now. Maybe you're right.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Why do we need to create one to know something? Chemicals modify feelings. This is a fact. Further, we know how some of these chemicals interact with the physical brain. Moreover, we can reproduce our experiments and obtain consistent results. Either a) 'emotions' and 'feelings' and other such things are a direct product of the brain, or b) they are indistinguishable from being direct products of the brain.

[...]


Perhaps. But notice I did not give specifics as to these elements? That is because we do not know them yet. Clearly a single celled organism doesn't have feelings, as the brain is a multi-cellular structure. These computational elements are obviously going to be vastly more complex then what is possible in a single cell.

I agree that single celled organisms in all likelihood do not posses "feelings" in the sense that humans or dogs may -- if they can be said to have any at all. My point in mentioning them is that we can only infer as to whether or not they subjectively experience anything. For all we know they might posses some rudimentary subjective experience of "good"/"bad" as they move toward positive stimuli and away from negative. In other words, we haven't reached the point where we can conclusively say yea or nay whether an entity has some experiential existence of some sort.

Are they? I disagree. A brain is markedly more complex then a single celled organism. Yes, we don't nearly know enough about this field, but why do you think that a brain and a single celled organism have the same level of complexity?

I don't believe that they are the same level of complexity. In fact, when it comes to the question of feeling and not feeling, I'm inclined to believe that single celled organisms don't have it, and ones with brains actually do. The problem is that neither you, I, or anyone else can satisfactorily rule out the possibility that any organism "feels" in some sense. Its a deep epistemological problem that shows just how little we actually understand about the subject. Me bringing up plants and bacteria wasn't so much to tout their complexity but to highlight this problem.

Accepted. Perhaps we should talk about sentience and non-sentience instead of animate and inanimate. This isn't really the topic of this discussion, though.

To try and relate this to the topic of the OP, its seems that once we've gotten to the point where we can answer such questions the 'materialist' view will be, by extension, much stronger in dealing with certain questions of morality. For instance, the OP makes reference to robots. At what point can we say that a robot or AI of some sort or another is truly sentient and worthy of some moral consideration?

Define "feel" for me.

Hmm...I suppose I would have to broadly define it as all classes of subjective experience. Under this definition seeing could be considered a "feeling", as would taste and emotion. A digital camera takes in light and creates images but one would be hard pressed to argue that it actually sees anything itself.

I think that once an entity can be put into the category of "feeling" then its crossed into the realm of moral consideration. Tho, I don't think sentient perception in itself would be sufficient grounds for such treatment it seems like a necessary prerequisite.

I never said we could. I said we could affect feelings using understood physical interactions of chemicals. I said it is possible to create a machine that "feels". Where did I claim we already could do so?

Granted. I agree that in principle it should be possible to create such things. But I think the original contention of the OP that we are unable to draw a non-arbitrary line as to where the realm of feeling starts is still valid. I didn't mean to imply that you personally were proposing that we could create a sentient machine today. My point was to show that our inability to propose a solid principle of how one would could create a feeling entity only serves to highlight the "hard problem".

You misunderstand my statements. Chemicals affect feelings. They can create feelings, modify feelings, etc. Antidepressants are the example I have given. This is evidence that feelings are the result of physical process within the brain. Also, what I meant was that I never claimed specific knowledge of which chemicals create which specific feelings, as you seemed to be suggesting.

Ack! Sorry, about the confusion -- my badnik. In regards to neurochemistry, I was mainly trying to argue along that lines that "feeling" is more correlated with rather than necessarily caused by specific brain chemicals. I was under the mistaken impression that you we taking the position that feeling is necessarily identical to brain chemistry. Again, my bad.

 

[Taffer]

I agree that single celled organisms in all likelihood do not posses "feelings" in the sense that humans or dogs may -- if they can be said to have any at all. My point in mentioning them is that we can only infer as to whether or not they subjectively experience anything. For all we know they might posses some rudimentary subjective experience of "good"/"bad" as they move toward positive stimuli and away from negative. In other words, we haven't reached the point where we can conclusively say yea or nay whether an entity has some experiential existence of some sort.

Then we are in agreement.

I don't believe that they are the same level of complexity. In fact, when it comes to the question of feeling and not feeling, I'm inclined to believe that single celled organisms don't have it, and ones with brains actually do. The problem is that neither you, I, or anyone else can satisfactorily rule out the possibility that any organism "feels" in some sense. Its a deep epistemological problem that shows just how little we actually understand about the subject. Me bringing up plants and bacteria wasn't so much to tout their complexity but to highlight this problem.

I see. You are right, of course. It'd rather not get into an argument about zombies, though.

I would contend that it isn't a deep epistemological problem, only a slight one. We can assume plants don't experience feelings because we can identify each part of a plant, and none seem to play the role of a nervous system. However, I admit we cannot rule out the possibility.

To try and relate this to the topic of the OP, its seems that once we've gotten to the point where we can answer such questions the 'materialist' view will be, by extension, much stronger in dealing with certain questions of morality. For instance, the OP makes reference to robots. At what point can we say that a robot or AI of some sort or another is truly sentient and worthy of some moral consideration?

I can discuss this if you like. In short, there is no reason to treat a robot or AI any differently then any other human. We should apply the same standards as to determining whether another human is sentient or, for example, in a vegetative state. I do not distinguish between "appearance of sentience" and "sentience".

Hmm...I suppose I would have to broadly define it as all classes of subjective experience. Under this definition seeing could be considered a "feeling", as would taste and emotion. A digital camera takes in light and creates images but one would be hard pressed to argue that it actually sees anything itself.

Only because we are predisposed to use words like "subjective experience" and "feels". This is, in part, a limitation of language rather then of reality. For your definition to hold (please note I don't necessarily disagree with it), you would further have to define "subjective" and "experience". All you've really done is changed the word "feeling" to "subjective experience", which isn't really a definition at all.

I think that once an entity can be put into the category of "feeling" then its crossed into the realm of moral consideration. Tho, I don't think sentient perception in itself would be sufficient grounds for such treatment it seems like a necessary prerequisite.

And as you rightly point out, we can only know whether an entity has crossed that 'realm' through external observation. The same is true for every person other then yourself. You assume your neighbour is sentient and moral through observation of their actions. They could be a very good simulation, however, and not "truly" sentient or moral. How do you tell the difference? You can't, because there is none.

My basic point is that to determine if something is sentient, or experiences feelings, you have to decide upon an objective criteria.

Granted. I agree that in principle it should be possible to create such things. But I think the original contention of the OP that we are unable to draw a non-arbitrary line as to where the realm of feeling starts is still valid. I didn't mean to imply that you personally were proposing that we could create a sentient machine today. My point was to show that our inability to propose a solid principle of how one would could create a feeling entity only serves to highlight the "hard problem".

Ah, ok, that is clearer. The problem, however, is that we assume there is a 'hard and fast' line between "sentient" and "non-sentient". An entirely physical and material definition of "sentience" does not require this line to exist.

Ack! Sorry, about the confusion -- my badnik. In regards to neurochemistry, I was mainly trying to argue along that lines that "feeling" is more correlated with rather than necessarily caused by specific brain chemicals. I was under the mistaken impression that you we taking the position that feeling is necessarily identical to brain chemistry. Again, my bad.

No worries.

ETA: I've really enjoyed this discussion AkuManiMani, btw.

 

[Dancing David]

by AkuManiMani





Feeling is special. In all the vastness of space, the only entities that we conclusively know posses it exist on this infinitesimal blue speck of dust we call the earth. There is not a single living person alive today that can explain how neurophysiology produces subjective experiences like sweetness, bitterness, nausea, dizziness, redness, greenness, ugliness, silliness or the whole panoply of subjective "nesses". There is also not a single person alive today who knows how to artificially recreate any of those qualitative experience. The only arm-waving being done is by those claiming that they actually do know how to reproduce such things. All we have are the barest beginnings of some working knowledge of how it happens, and even that may be a generous estimate.

I think our attempts to recreate such things is comparable to the efforts of alchemists of ages past. They were essentially right in their belief that its possible to transmute other elements into gold -- they just didn't know that such a thing is only accomplished in super-massive stars or why this is the case. In hindsight, we know that their efforts were futile but, in principle, not necessarily impossible. That's pretty much the situation that AI researchers are in now, methinks. Our knowledge base simply isn't deep enough yet to allow us to accomplish the feat we wish to; namely, to create a feeling conscious entity.

Consciousness is probably one of the deepest scientific mysteries facing us today -- it ranks up there with the origin of the big bang and the genesis of life. To wave it off as a simple technical feat that any current technician knows how to reproduce is beyond hubris -- its downright absurd.

[\quote]

This is just silly AkuManiMani, you can't show that there is anything superordinary to consciousness, there is nothing special about it unless you are some sort of dualist.

This is all just semantics claiming that consciousness is priviledged and it is not. It may be a special patterns of material interactions and that seems likely, until someone shows consciousness not associated with special material patterns,

But I will use substitution to show why your statements are just about priviledge that you want to impose upon something.

But really you show why there is something 'so special' about feelings and consciousness, then you will make your point. Otherwise you might as well recite poetry. (Not that there is anything wrong with poetry)


"Organic chemistry is special. In all the vastness of space, the only entities that we conclusively know posses it exist on this infinitesimal blue speck of dust we call the earth."

This statement appears true on the surface as well, and it was very true up until 50 years ago. But until we detected organic compound in molecular clouds it stayed true. It is a god of the gaps statement and one that is anthropocentric.

Your statement

There is not a single living person alive today that can explain how neurophysiology produces subjective experiences like sweetness, bitterness, nausea, dizziness, redness, greenness, ugliness, silliness or the whole panoply of subjective "nesses".

Is true worthy of it’s own thread, this is so loaded with ignorance of modern psychology it is just amazing, and then it veers off into philosophical assertions that you have not demonstrated. Just because you want to pretend that you know nada about sensations and perception does not mean that there are not partial understandings of things.

But here is the substitution for you:
“There is not a single living person alive today that can explain how organisms produces offspring like flowers, flies, dogs, mushrooms, trees, fish, lizards, butterflies or the whole panoply of subjective "beings".”

This statement was true up until the 17th century and really has only been understood well in the last thirty years.

Then your editorial piece delves into true spinning:

I think our attempts to recreate such things is comparable to the efforts of alchemists of ages past.

Sure AMM, just make up whatever you want, that is the way to have a debate, are you kidding?

Do you ever read at all, or do you just like to make things up?
We can model simple parts of systems, including fuzzy logic and feedback to motivate insect style limbs. We can model the way neurons work better and better.

So please, just assert and never show your evidence!

More later.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Only because we are predisposed to use words like "subjective experience" and "feels". This is, in part, a limitation of language rather then of reality. For your definition to hold (please note I don't necessarily disagree with it), you would further have to define "subjective" and "experience". All you've really done is changed the word "feeling" to "subjective experience", which isn't really a definition at all.

I'd say its as good a definition as one can get. Its just that the definition its no substitute for the actual thing. Subjective experience is qualitative and can only be experienced directly or share empathicly.

And as you rightly point out, we can only know whether an entity has crossed that 'realm' through external observation. The same is true for every person other then yourself. You assume your neighbour is sentient and moral through observation of their actions. They could be a very good simulation, however, and not "truly" sentient or moral. How do you tell the difference? You can't, because there is none.

My basic point is that to determine if something is sentient, or experiences feelings, you have to decide upon an objective criteria.

Its extremely fortunate that since we evolved from the same mold we have the capacity to have some overlap in our experience. All the things that we most reasonably assume are sentient appear to be using the same subjective operating system as us so we can atleast meaningfully express our experiences thru language. The very fact that we have mirror neurons is very strong evidence that our private experiences are public in some sense; the capacity for empathy is hardwired into us. For this reason we know that we atleast have some overlap of subjective experience with critters in our own branch of the phylogenetic tree.

The only real conundrum would arise if we encountered a truly alien sentience. Any robots we make would mostly likely be an attempt to model ourselves but for all we know, the stimuli that we programed to elicit neutral or positive responses in the robot could, from its perspective, be excruciating.

Ah, ok, that is clearer. The problem, however, is that we assume there is a 'hard and fast' line between "sentient" and "non-sentient". An entirely physical and material definition of "sentience" does not require this line to exist.

Perhaps the reason why dualism arises so much in these discussions is because when trying to meaning fully speak of mind vs. brain one is virtually forced to speak of it in dualistic terms. For instance, if one is speaking in common parlance or in psychology one would speak of an experience from the subjective view -- the "inside" perspective ["that apple tastes bitter", "that documentary is distressing" etc. From from the 'materialist' or neurological stand point one simply describes the experience from the "outside" objective viewpoint [i.e. describing the neural and chemical activities that accompany the subjective experience].

I'm willing to propose that that this apparent duality isn't merely an artifact of language but also reflects something basic about reality. Perhaps the 'internal' realm and external world are complementary aspects of reality analogous to the wave/particle duality.

For instance, we as human beings have the ability to dream up different scenarios which can elicit emotional and even physiological response within out bodies. At the same time these responses can also be elicited by 'outside' factors like electrodes on specific parts of the brain, drugs, or what have you. In a sense, the dreamt up scenarios are as 'real' as the external stimuli in that they have a real causal effect. But as we know, the thought or dream of a scenario is fundamentally different from the physical occurrence of the actual event. Even our powers of abstraction of philosophizing can't meaning fully be described in terms of action potentials on neurons even though ones thoughts clearly influences their actions. This isn't to say thoughts have nothing to do with brains or neurons but that depending on what your focus is you can only examine and speak of them from one 'side' of the coin or the other.

I suppose the analogy that I'm trying to get at is that what is called the mind could be considered the 'wave' aspect and physiology the 'particle' aspect. Of course, I can't really say how direct an analogy it is but I can't shake the intuition that in some real way there may be more than just a metaphorical connection.

ETA: I've really enjoyed this discussion AkuManiMani, btw.

Me too.

 

[Taffer]

I'd say its as good a definition as one can get. Its just that the definition its no substitute for the actual thing. Subjective experience is qualitative and can only be experienced directly or share empathicly.

Unfortunately, I disagree. I don't think it is a definition at all, unless you tell me what you mean by "internal" and "experience". The fact that it is hard to define should be a clue.

Its extremely fortunate that since we evolved from the same mold we have the capacity to have some overlap in our experience. All the things that we most reasonably assume are sentient appear to be using the same subjective operating system as us so we can atleast meaningfully express our experiences thru language. The very fact that we have mirror neurons is very strong evidence that our private experiences are public in some sense; the capacity for empathy is hardwired into us. For this reason we know that we atleast have some overlap of subjective experience with critters in our own branch of the phylogenetic tree.

The only real conundrum would arise if we encountered a truly alien sentience. Any robots we make would mostly likely be an attempt to model ourselves but for all we know, the stimuli that we programed to elicit neutral or positive responses in the robot could, from its perspective, be excruciating.

But we don't know we have any overlap at all. All we know for certain is that other beings appear to behave in a way which they would if they had similar "internal experiences" as us. It is often argued that "the appearance of" is not the same as the actual thing. It is often argued (as I think you are doing) that there is some distinction between the appearance of sentience and actual sentience. If you hold the view that sentience is not entirely physical and material in nature, then you must admit that we cannot say for certain that any other being is actually sentient, or is simply programmed to behave in a way to appear sentient.

If, however, you hold the view that sentience is entirely physical and material in nature (or, I suppose, in cause), then you must see that there is no meaningful distinction between "appearance of sentience" and "sentience". That is to say, if someone creates a robot that is programmed to perfectly emulate a conscious being, then it is indistinguishable
and identical from a being that "actually is conscious".

Perhaps the reason why dualism arises so much in these discussions is because when trying to meaning fully speak of mind vs. brain one is virtually forced to speak of it in dualistic terms. For instance, if one is speaking in common parlance or in psychology one would speak of an experience from the subjective view -- the "inside" perspective ["that apple tastes bitter", "that documentary is distressing" etc. From from the 'materialist' or neurological stand point one simply describes the experience from the "outside" objective viewpoint [i.e. describing the neural and chemical activities that accompany the subjective experience].

I'm willing to propose that that this apparent duality isn't merely an artifact of language but also reflects something basic about reality. Perhaps the 'internal' realm and external world are complementary aspects of reality analogous to the wave/particle duality.

I'm not. My reason is thus: If this "internal realm" exists, and if it interacts with the "material realm", then it is by definition a part of the "material realm". If it does not interact with the "material realm", then it is indistinguishable from its non-existence. Therefore, either all that we observe about sentience and consciousness is material and physical in nature, or there is no such thing as consciousness and sentience as a special, physical, entity, and it is rather an informational emergent property of matter.

You can probably tell that I think our usage of dualistic language is simply an artefact of our language, the way our brain is wired, and social factors.

For instance, we as human beings have the ability to dream up different scenarios which can elicit emotional and even physiological response within out bodies. At the same time these responses can also be elicited by 'outside' factors like electrodes on specific parts of the brain, drugs, or what have you. In a sense, the dreamt up scenarios are as 'real' as the external stimuli in that they have a real causal effect. But as we know, the thought or dream of a scenario is fundamentally different from the physical occurrence of the actual event. Even our powers of abstraction of philosophizing can't meaning fully be described in terms of action potentials on neurons even though ones thoughts clearly influences their actions. This isn't to say thoughts have nothing to do with brains or neurons but that depending on what your focus is you can only examine and speak of them from one 'side' of the coin or the other.

Hold on a minute here. Why are they "fundamentally different"? I see no reason for this to be so. A feedback loop in an interacting system can create effects within itself that may also be created through external stimuli. I honestly do not see what your disagreement here can be. I cannot think of anything in science or in philosophy which requires the "internal realm" to be anything more then feedback loops, etc.

I suppose the analogy that I'm trying to get at is that what is called the mind could be considered the 'wave' aspect and physiology the 'particle' aspect. Of course, I can't really say how direct an analogy it is but I can't shake the intuition that in some real way there may be more than just a metaphorical connection.

That is actually a good analogy, but not for the reason you think.

Unless I misunderstand (I am a biologist, not a physicist), wave/particle duality comes from the observation that a particle exhibits properties of both a wave and a particle. In our analogy, does this not simply say that consciousness and sentience exhibit two different phenomenon: internal and external interaction? It shows that, while we see properties of both phenomenon, we still know it is only one thing. In the case of a particle, it is still a photon (for example). In the case of consciousness, it is still a brain phenomenon. There is no reason to suppose that a photon is actually, physically, both a particle and a wave. Similarly, there is no reason to invoke a separate "mind" concept to explain anything.

Disclaimer: If I'm horribly wrong about the physics of the above, I'm sorry!

 

[Dancing David]

For instance, we as human beings have the ability to dream up different scenarios which can elicit emotional and even physiological response within out bodies. At the same time these responses can also be elicited by 'outside' factors like electrodes on specific parts of the brain, drugs, or what have you. In a sense, the dreamt up scenarios are as 'real' as the external stimuli in that they have a real causal effect.

That is because perceptions are interanl, they are manufactured out of sensations, wholesale.

But as we know, the thought or dream of a scenario is fundamentally different from the physical occurrence of the actual event. Even our powers of abstraction of philosophizing can't meaning fully be described in terms of action potentials on neurons even though ones thoughts clearly influences their actions.

More assertion, no evidence.
Take away the brain or get it really drunk and it stops philosophising. Neural action is in neurotranmitter release action potential just signal to release.

This isn't to say thoughts have nothing to do with brains or neurons but that depending on what your focus is you can only examine and speak of them from one 'side' of the coin or the other.

Wow what interesting thinking all in one huge paragraph.

The fact that thoughts and emotions are paired and associated with each other is only a problem for dualist

It all hinges on one unsupported statement this one here.
“But as we know, the thought or dream of a scenario is fundamentally different from the physical occurrence of the actual event. “

That means what? Nothing. Perceptions are internal events created out of the stimuli and added to by brain process. So a visualization of a dog is related (but not directly mapped) to the perceptual experience of a dog.

Where is your huge gap here?

The action of the brain is very similar in both circumstances.

What physiological basis do you have for saying that “fundamentally different from the physical occurrence” has any meaning at all?

1. At the level of external stimuli, yes.
2. At the level of internal/ private behaviors associated with events, maybe.
3. At the level of internal events solely, no.

Why does desensitization work? If a person has a fear of bridges, why can they learn to cope with that fear by imagining a bridge and then practicing relaxation?

If it is ‘fundamentally different’ then this well established fact would not happen.

I suppose the analogy that I'm trying to get at is that what is called the mind could be considered the 'wave' aspect and physiology the 'particle' aspect. Of course, I can't really say how direct an analogy it is but I can't shake the intuition that in some real way there may be more than just a metaphorical connection.

This unfortunately is easily resolved, there is no particle aspect of energy waves, it just happens that at higher energies the wave forms tend to intersect in smaller sections.

There is no wave/particle duality. They are waves all the time.

 

[JetLeg]

The reason I like this thread--I'm learning new stuff too.

I suppose this is the way Jetleg is using "substance":

Wikipedia.

Exactly.

Only I dislike the term "soul". It comes from a theistic background, and carries lots of unnecessary assumptions. I prefer "consciousness", "qualia", et cetera.

 

[JetLeg]

It's an interesting question - how are things to be defined? Invariably, in terms of other things. And how are those things to be defined? We are in the paradoxical situation where all the words in the dictionary are defined by other words in the dictionary. There is no inherent meaning to be found.

I agree with that. This is why sometimes a more simple approach to definition can be used. I can say "love is what you feel when you see your children". Or "hatred is what you feel towards people that want to hurt your children".

The above approach doesn't clarify the meaning of the term, doesn't draw its boundaries, like a good definition does.

But it does something more simple - makes sure that we are both talking of the same thing, _even_ if we both have no idea how to define it.

 

[JetLeg]

That's a very nice, terse answer. But it is, in fact, an answer that explains very little.

There are very many questions that arise from all of these observations. What is it about these particular chemical interactions that causes them to have this property of "feeling"? Do they have this quality outside of the context of the brain -- say in an animal without a brain? Does a single cell have any kind of subjective experience? For what is the brain, but a huge collection of such cells working in concert?

Is it just a very specific class of organic reactions that give rise to subjective experience? Does it really matter what chemicals are interacting? Does it come from them simply being organized in a certain way (i.e. context dependent)? Could you, say, have an inanimate object experience pain or some other sensation or feeling? Is the capacity for subjective experience something fundamental to existence or is it purely an emergent phenomenon? What is the subjective experience of feeling, anyway?

The understandings obtained from current neuroscience, while greatly invaluable, are only surface knowledge of a much deeper mystery; it's barely scratched the surface. It's one thing to say that X class of chemical is associated with Y feeling, but quite another to explain why that is so or even help understand how there is such a thing as feeling in the first place. With that in mind, its more that premature to conclusively say that feeling is identical with a certain class of chemical reactions. All we know is that there is a correlation; we don't know if it is a necessary correlation or even if it is a causal relation.

Hi AkuMani.

I am impressed. Usually skeptics totally miss the point of how complex the problem of consciousness really is.

I would like to ask you - are these ideas totally your own? By whom have you been influenced?

You see, I respect science, and I think it can tell us a lot about our subjective experience. But we should also be very careful not to go beyond the evidence that we have, and confuse philosophic and scientific problems.

I would be immensely interested in a book that explains the scientific findings, keeping in mind the real problems of subjectivity. Can you recommend any? Explaining the scientific findings from the perspective of rational dualism would be also very interesting to me.

(I developed my ideas from the influence of buddhist writers - Alexander Berzin, the Dalai Lama, and Prof. Yeshayahu Leibovich - a brilliant philosopher, probably untranslated to english from hebrew).



As to your last paragraph - what do you mean by a "necessary correlation"? Regarding "causal correlation" - do you see any alternative?


By the way - I have stated that I was wrong in the OP, since my understanding of materialism, as the term is commonly used was wrong. So feel free to derail the post.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Unfortunately, I disagree. I don't think it is a definition at all, unless you tell me what you mean by "internal" and "experience". The fact that it is hard to define should be a clue.

Ah ha! I see what you're getting at

The clue you're referring to is that the terms "inside" and "outside" imply that what is being referred is whats going inside as opposed outside of the brain, right? That's pretty much what I inferred to start with but I've been thinking and reading on the subject for a while and I'm beginning to suspect that the clue may be hinting at something a bit more subtle than that. First, I'm going to try and explain my reasoning for this.

Its been pointed out before that when studying the brain one finds that there is no discernible observer or "master center" of the brain. This has been interpreted in some school of thought to imply that the "I"/self/mind [whatever one wants to call it] is simply an illusion created by neural activity and brain chemistry. At first glance this is a very sensible conclusion until one stops and realizes that even invoking the word 'illusion' inherently implies an observer of some sort; how can there be an illusion of anything unless there's is someone to perceive it? Since one cannot pinpoint the location of an observer, and to claim that there is no observer is paradoxical one must infer that the observer is nonlocal.

So when I say "inside", I don't necessarily mean literally inside the brain I mean a literal subjective side of reality. I propose that Descartes's duality isn't so much describing two independent realms but two complementary sides of reality. In this view there is no interaction paradox because the mind/body are simply two dialectical aspects of the whole of reality.

I know that QM tends to be used to support a lot of mistaken claims or downright "woo" but invoking some aspects of it seems unavoidable in the case of the mind. Aside from the implied nonlocality of the 'self', there is also the observer effect, where simply observing a phenomenon affects what kind of outcome will result from it (for example, the famous double slit experiment). This also implies something special about sentience; namely, that is not merely an incidental phenomenon but based upon something fundamental in nature.

But we don't know we have any overlap at all. All we know for certain is that other beings appear to behave in a way which they would if they had similar "internal experiences" as us. It is often argued that "the appearance of" is not the same as the actual thing. It is often argued (as I think you are doing) that there is some distinction between the appearance of sentience and actual sentience. If you hold the view that sentience is not entirely physical and material in nature, then you must admit that we cannot say for certain that any other being is actually sentient, or is simply programmed to behave in a way to appear sentient.

If, however, you hold the view that sentience is entirely physical and material in nature (or, I suppose, in cause), then you must see that there is no meaningful distinction between "appearance of sentience" and "sentience". That is to say, if someone creates a robot that is programmed to perfectly emulate a conscious being, then it is indistinguishable
and identical from a being that "actually is conscious".

I would say even tho sentience has a material nature, there can still be a distinction between appearance and actual sentience.

Perhaps the reason why dualism arises so much in these discussions is because when trying to meaning fully speak of mind vs. brain one is virtually forced to speak of it in dualistic terms. For instance, if one is speaking in common parlance or in psychology one would speak of an experience from the subjective view -- the "inside" perspective ["that apple tastes bitter", "that documentary is distressing" etc. From from the 'materialist' or neurological stand point one simply describes the experience from the "outside" objective viewpoint [i.e. describing the neural and chemical activities that accompany the subjective experience].

I'm willing to propose that that this apparent duality isn't merely an artifact of language but also reflects something basic about reality. Perhaps the 'internal' realm and external world are complementary aspects of reality analogous to the wave/particle duality.

I'm not. My reason is thus: If this "internal realm" exists, and if it interacts with the "material realm", then it is by definition a part of the "material realm". If it does not interact with the "material realm", then it is indistinguishable from its non-existence. Therefore, either all that we observe about sentience and consciousness is material and physical in nature, or there is no such thing as consciousness and sentience as a special, physical, entity, and it is rather an informational emergent property of matter.

Well, one can look at the same problem and come to the opposite conclusion. An idealist would argue that since the subjective is the only aspect of reality that we experience directly, and that the "outside" material world is perceived only indirectly then the fundamental nature of reality is mental and "matter" is just an illusory part of it.

Mind you, I don't fully accept this claim but I also don't fully accept the conventional interpretation of materialism either. I suspect that neither aspects are more fundamental than the other; I would argue that mind and matter are themselves simply emergent aspects of a deeper reality that we don't fully understand. In this sense mind and matter aren't so much mutually exclusive realities but emergent categories of reality.

In a previous discussion on a related topic someone pointed out to me that my position resembles some variety of neutral monism. After reading up on the subject a bit more, I would say that I've found my views to fall more specifically in line with dialectical monism which states that while reality is one ontological whole it can only be perceived in dualistic terms [i.e. not limited to Cartesian dualism].

For instance, we as human beings have the ability to dream up different scenarios which can elicit emotional and even physiological response within out bodies. At the same time these responses can also be elicited by 'outside' factors like electrodes on specific parts of the brain, drugs, or what have you. In a sense, the dreamt up scenarios are as 'real' as the external stimuli in that they have a real causal effect. But as we know, the thought or dream of a scenario is fundamentally different from the physical occurrence of the actual event. Even our powers of abstraction of philosophizing can't meaning fully be described in terms of action potentials on neurons even though ones thoughts clearly influences their actions. This isn't to say thoughts have nothing to do with brains or neurons but that depending on what your focus is you can only examine and speak of them from one 'side' of the coin or the other.

Hold on a minute here. Why are they "fundamentally different"? I see no reason for this to be so. A feedback loop in an interacting system can create effects within itself that may also be created through external stimuli. I honestly do not see what your disagreement here can be. I cannot think of anything in science or in philosophy which requires the "internal realm" to be anything more then feedback loops, etc.

That fact that ideas are part of a feedback system is only incidental. The fact that an idea and the object the idea represents are two different things is what I was referring to. If thoughts and ideas were necessarily identical to external reality then there would be no such things as errors or misconceptions.

I suppose the analogy that I'm trying to get at is that what is called the mind could be considered the 'wave' aspect and physiology the 'particle' aspect. Of course, I can't really say how direct an analogy it is but I can't shake the intuition that in some real way there may be more than just a metaphorical connection.

That is actually a good analogy, but not for the reason you think.

Unless I misunderstand (I am a biologist, not a physicist), wave/particle duality comes from the observation that a particle exhibits properties of both a wave and a particle. In our analogy, does this not simply say that consciousness and sentience exhibit two different phenomenon: internal and external interaction? It shows that, while we see properties of both phenomenon, we still know it is only one thing. In the case of a particle, it is still a photon (for example). In the case of consciousness, it is still a brain phenomenon. There is no reason to suppose that a photon is actually, physically, both a particle and a wave. Similarly, there is no reason to invoke a separate "mind" concept to explain anything.

Disclaimer: If I'm horribly wrong about the physics of the above, I'm sorry!

Well, I'm not a Q-physicist myself either but I don't think you've got any of the physics wrong at all [ I just happen to obsessively read up on scientific literature -- a hobby of mine since I was little ^_^].

Like I said, I'm not certain of how deep the analogy goes. I'm not certain whether mind/brain complementarity is identical to the wave/particle relationship or if its indicative of some other relation that hasn't fully been considered yet; I'll have to do a lot more reading and thinking on the topic before I can personally settle on a conclusion.

I have a friend who's a bio major (what I'm working on, atm ) and also has a lot of exposure to QM. He and I have discussed an idea of his that we exist in "conceptual space" which is in some way analogous (or identical) to probability space as described in QM. Basically his idea is that our thoughts and concepts exist as wave functions in a kind of mental probability space. The idea or plan of a car doesn't physically exist as such but one can physically manifest it based upon a conceptual schema of how to make it. I suppose conceptual space is the private mini-universe that a self exists "in" where it can generate, manipulate, accumulate, and interpret information and concepts. I can't really elaborate on it much more than that since it's just the barest beginnings of an idea and hasn't really been developed yet.

Since we first started discussing this idea I've stumbled across some literature on something called holonomic brain theory. Basically the theory proposes that memories and thoughts are distributed across the brain in a manner similar to the way information and images can be stored onna holographic film. It seems from what I've read that there doesn't seem to be any reason to preclude the possibility that the entire body could, infact, store certain kinds of information this way (like in the case of morphogenesis or particular patterns of gene expression). Ack! I'm digressing o.<

Anyways, when I say 'matter' I go with the conventional definition of anything that has mass and volume. Since mind, thoughts, and feelings don't not meet this criteria I consider them, for ontological reasons, to be non-material [not synonymous with supernatural, mind you ].

 

[JetLeg]

Y
That's why I deny the existence of "zombies". If I'm presented with someone who has all the physiological correlates of feeling and he reports the subject experience of feeling, how can I assert that he is a zombie (somehow different from other people)? To me, it's absurd.

Hi Joe.

I will try to convince you of the conceivability of p-zombies, and disembodied consciousness. I will explain later the role of the conceivability of them in my worldview.

1) Disembodied consciousness - If the experiments that test out-of-body experience would succeed, they would _prove_ disembodied consciousess. If you lie on a bed, and you feel that you hover outside your body, and go to a safe, enter this safe, read the number that is written there - and you get it right - it would be proof of disembodied experience, provided that it were done with all the controls. I think Susan Blackmore was performing such tests for a long time.

I am not arguing that these experiments are successful - only that if they are, they establish disembodied consciousness. And therefore disembodied consciousness is conceivable.

2) I don't agree with the argument you presented above for the same reason I do not find Turing's test convincing. Do you find Turing's test a good test for intelligence?

By the way, IF mind-reading were real, then a mind-reader could tell a p-zombie from a human being... A p-zombie wouldn't have a mind to read.

3) I can invent a specific scenario for a p-zombie to exist. Remember, all I am arguing for now is the _conceivability_ of p-zombies, and disembodied consciousnesses.

Have you seen The Truman's Show? Imagine a whole civilization instead of being dedicated to watching Truman, dedicated to make a single p-zombie act like a human being. One million people would be responsible for his eye movements, another million, for his mouth movements, a milliard would be responsible for the movements of the cells of his brain... Can't you conceive of such a scenario?

4) After all these are you guys who claim that it is a scientific discovery that the brain causes the mind. If it a scientific discovery, then it must be conceivable that it wouldn't be the case, it must be conceivable that the brain wouldn't cause the mind, and that they would be separate. Otherwise, what type of a scientific discovery it is, the opposite of which is simply inconceivable?



Regarding "emergent properties", could you perhaps define it, or clarify it in some way? These words are vague to me. I understand what a property is, but what does it mean to call a property "emergent"?

Was it you that talked of running to legs as mind to brain? (sorry, lazy to go through all these posts).

 

[JetLeg]

Hi AkuMani,

We seem to agree on much, (though you are much more eloquent than I am), but it would be interesting to polish the parts we disagree on.

Ah ha! I see what you're getting at

So when I say "inside", I don't necessarily mean literally inside the brain I mean a literal subjective side of reality. I propose that Descartes's duality isn't so much describing two independent realms but two complementary sides of reality. In this view there is no interaction paradox because the mind/body are simply two dialectical aspects of the whole of reality.

So you want to say that a thought is another aspect of neuronal activity? If I get you right, that implies that there cannot be a causal type relationship between them. Causal relationship cannot exist between two aspects of the same thing.

I would say even tho sentience has a material nature, there can still be a distinction between appearance and actual sentience.

I don't understand it.

Mind you, I don't fully accept this claim but I also don't fully accept the conventional interpretation of materialism either. I suspect that neither aspects are more fundamental than the other; I would argue that mind and matter are themselves simply emergent aspects of a deeper reality that we don't fully understand. In this sense mind and matter aren't so much mutually exclusive realities but emergent categories of reality.

1) On what basis do you infer the "deeper reality that we don't fully understand"?

2) We see matter at least, and experience subjective phenomena. Isn't it horribly non-parsimonous to add third component?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Hi AkuMani.

I am impressed. Usually skeptics totally miss the point of how complex the problem of consciousness really is.

I would like to ask you - are these ideas totally your own? By whom have you been influenced?

Well I can't really put my finger on any particular source. I've read some works written by thinkers like Steven Pinker, and Daniel Dennett growing up along with lots of other philosophical and scientific literature on the mind and the brain. I cant say that any author's I've read come to the exact same conclusions I do so I guess they're my own /shrug

You see, I respect science, and I think it can tell us a lot about our subjective experience. But we should also be very careful not to go beyond the evidence that we have, and confuse philosophic and scientific problems.

I would be immensely interested in a book that explains the scientific findings, keeping in mind the real problems of subjectivity. Can you recommend any? Explaining the scientific findings from the perspective of rational dualism would be also very interesting to me.

(I developed my ideas from the influence of buddhist writers - Alexander Berzin, the Dalai Lama, and Prof. Yeshayahu Leibovich - a brilliant philosopher, probably untranslated to english from hebrew).

Well, IMO, science is a very fruitful branch of applied natural philosophy. With that said, I can't really think of any specific books with the considerations you have in mind, atm. I agree with you -- philosophy is great but its even better when its informed by good science. As a layman myself, I wouldn't recommend that you just jump into the most dense technical paper you can find but there are plenty of scientific authors out there who've presented huge amounts of accessible literature with the layperson in mind. It seems like you're the type of person whose already of a philosophical mindset so I would just suggest you do what I did: read up on the scientific literature yourself and try to reach your own conclusions.

As to your last paragraph - what do you mean by a "necessary correlation"? Regarding "causal correlation" - do you see any alternative?

Hmm...By "necessary correlation" I meant that specific feelings could only arise in conjunction with specific chemical reactions.

In the case of "causal" correlation I was referring to whether feeling (such as anger or sadness at the thought of something distressing) causes the release of chemicals associated with that distress or whether the chemicals themselves are the cause.

By the way - I have stated that I was wrong in the OP, since my understanding of materialism, as the term is commonly used was wrong. So feel free to derail the post.

Yay! Awsome! I have permission to cut loose!

 

[JetLeg]

Well I can't really put my finger on an one particular source. I've read some works written by thinkers like Steven Pinker, and Daniel Dennett growing up along with lots of other philosophical and scientific literature on the mind and the brain. I cant say that any author's I've read come to the exact same conclusions I do so I guess they're my own /shrug



Well, IMO, science is a very fruitful branch of applied natural philosophy. With that said, I can't really think of any specific books with the considerations you have in mind, atm. I agree with you -- philosophy is great but its even better when its informed by good science. As a layman myself, I wouldn't recommend that you just jump into the most dense technical paper you can find but there are plenty of scientific authors out there who've presented huge amounts of accessible literature with the layperson in mind. It seems like you're the type of person whose already of a philosophical mindset so I would just suggest you do what I did: read up on the scientific literature yourself and try to reach your own conclusions.




Hmm...By "necessary correlation" I meant that specific feelings could only arise in conjunction with specific chemical reactions.

In the case of "causal" correlation I was referring to whether feeling (such as anger or sadness at the thought of something distressing) causes the release of chemicals associated with that distress or whether the chemicals themselves are the cause.



Yay! Awsome! I have permission to cut loose!

Ah, I was disappointed. Have you read any dualist neurobiologist?

 

[AkuManiMani]

So when I say "inside", I don't necessarily mean literally inside the brain I mean a literal subjective side of reality. I propose that Descartes's duality isn't so much describing two independent realms but two complementary sides of reality. In this view there is no interaction paradox because the mind/body are simply two dialectical aspects of the whole of reality.

So you want to say that a thought is another aspect of neuronal activity? If I get you right, that implies that there cannot be a causal type relationship between them. Causal relationship cannot exist between two aspects of the same thing.

Well, I don't think that that is necessarily problematic. Neurons receive input from both within and outside of the body. There's sensory input, hormonal input from tissues in the body and then there's the mental contributions of the person. Earlier, I mentioned the fact that an emotional response can be created by an external situation or an imagined scenario created "internally" by the mind of a person. When a person is completely unconscious (such as when they're in deep sleep, comatose, etc) there is still neural activity but none that could be said to be initiated by the conscious mind of a person.

I would say even tho sentience has a material nature, there can still be a distinction between appearance and actual sentience.

I don't understand it.

A child could be fooled into thinking a robotic toy is really conscious and alive. The child's own consciousness may be based on real physical processes but that doesn't mean that the physical automaton the child sees is conscious.

The same would hold true for an adult viewing a more sophisticated construct. Until we conclusively know what specifically constitutes consciousness we're all pretty much in the same position as the child.

Mind you, I don't fully accept this claim but I also don't fully accept the conventional interpretation of materialism either. I suspect that neither aspects are more fundamental than the other; I would argue that mind and matter are themselves simply emergent aspects of a deeper reality that we don't fully understand. In this sense mind and matter aren't so much mutually exclusive realities but emergent categories of reality.

1) On what basis do you infer the "deeper reality that we don't fully understand"?

2) We see matter at least, and experience subjective phenomena. Isn't it horribly non-parsimonous to add third component?

Its not really un-parsimonious if you consider these two questions:

[Q1] Is matter as we know it [i.e. anything that has both mass and volume] basic to existence?

-There are entities that could be considered 'real' that don't necessarily meet the criteria for being matter. Therefore, we can conclude the matter is the not the basis for existence.

[Q2] Is the mind [i.e. subjective experience] basic to existence?

-Its very possible to conceive of a universe with no sentient beings in it. Therefore, mind is not the basis for existence.

For ontological reasons then, we can a priori come to the conclusion that since neither mind or matter constitute the basis for existence there must be a "third" candidate.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Ah, I was disappointed. Have you read any dualist neurobiologist?

Currently googling "neuroscience" and "dualism"... :-X

Edit: Okay, I've come across an abstract to a scientific paper directly addressing neuroscience and dualism:

"Scientific roots" of dualism in neuroscience.
Arshavsky YI.

Institute for Nonlinear Science, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0402, USA. yarshavs@ucsd.edu

Although the dualistic concept is unpopular among neuroscientists involved in experimental studies of the brain, neurophysiological literature is full of covert dualistic statements on the possibility of understanding neural mechanisms of human consciousness. Particularly, the covert dualistic attitude is exhibited in the unwillingness to discuss neural mechanisms of consciousness, leaving the problem of consciousness to psychologists and philosophers. This covert dualism seems to be rooted in the main paradigm of neuroscience that suggests that cognitive functions, such as language production and comprehension, face recognition, declarative memory, emotions, etc., are performed by neural networks consisting of simple elements. I argue that neural networks of any complexity consisting of neurons whose function is limited to the generation of electrical potentials and the transmission of signals to other neurons are hardly capable of producing human mental activity, including consciousness. Based on results obtained in physiological, morphological, clinical, and genetic studies of cognitive functions (mainly linguistic ones), I advocate the hypothesis that the performance of cognitive functions is based on complex cooperative activity of "complex" neurons that are carriers of "elementary cognition." The uniqueness of human cognitive functions, which has a genetic basis, is determined by the specificity of genes expressed by these "complex" neurons. The main goal of the review is to show that the identification of the genes implicated in cognitive functions and the understanding of a functional role of their products is a possible way to overcome covert dualism in neuroscience.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16935408

Also, If you're interested you could google "holonomic brain theory". While is not directly related to the topic of dualism I think you might find it a fascinating topic

 

[JetLeg]

So when I say "inside", I don't necessarily mean literally inside the brain I mean a literal subjective side of reality. I propose that Descartes's duality isn't so much describing two independent realms but two complementary sides of reality. In this view there is no interaction paradox because the mind/body are simply two dialectical aspects of the whole of reality.

I did not understand how the answer bellow explains my question. Perhaps I was unclear. I am a somewhat-Cartesian dualist. I think these are two independent realms, with causal links between them. Please explain more by what you mean by "two dialectical aspects of the whole". And - Can causal relationship occur between two aspects of the same thing. (The problem is logical here - two aspects of the same thing cannot have a causal relationship between them)

Well, I don't think that that is necessarily problematic. Neurons receive input from both within and outside of the body. There's sensory input, hormonal input from tissues in the body and then there's the mental contributions of the person. Earlier, I mentioned the fact that an emotional response can be created by an external situation or an imagined scenario created "internally" by the mind of a person. When a person is completely unconscious (such as when they're in deep sleep, comatose, etc) there is still neural activity but none that could be said to be initiated by the conscious mind of a person.

You seem to imply that mental contributions of a person influence the brain. Can you provide some evidence?

A child could be fooled into thinking a robotic toy is really conscious and alive. The child's own consciousness may be based on real physical processes but that doesn't mean that the physical automaton the child is seeing is conscious.

The same would hold true for an adult viewing a more sophisticated construct. Until we conclusively know what specifically constitutes consciousness we're all pretty much in the same position as the child.

Ah, ok.

Its not really un-parsimonious if you consider these two questions:

[Q1] Is matter as we know it [i.e. anything that has both mass and volume] a basic to existence?

-There are entities that could be considered 'real' that don't necessarily meet the criteria for being matter. Therefore, we can conclude the matter is the not the basis for existence.

[Q2] Is the mind [i.e. subjective experience] basic to existence?

-Its very possible to conceive of a universe with no sentient beings in it. Therefore, mind is not the basis for existence.

Just for the interest, what are entities that could be considered 'real' that don't necessarily meet the criteria for being matter?

What do you mean by "the basis for existence"? If, for something, it is conceivable that it doesn't exist (you say so in the paragraph about the mind), then it is not the basis of existence. Do you mean that the basis of existence is that which it is inconceivable to think of as non-existing?

What makes you think of the necessity of this "basis"? Everything could be conceived as not-existing. So what? I don't see any problem.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I did not understand how the answer bellow explains my question. Perhaps I was unclear. I am a somewhat-Cartesian dualist. I think these are two independent realms, with causal links between them.

I'm saying that even if you want to think of them as two realms its more logical to consider them interdependent rather than independent. Otherwise, how else could they interact?

Please explain more by what you mean by "two dialectical aspects of the whole". And - Can causal relationship occur between two aspects of the same thing. (The problem is logical here - two aspects of the same thing cannot have a causal relationship between them)

Okay, think of it this way. Matter and energy have been shown to be equivalent in some sense [I'm sure we're all familiar w/ Einsteins equation E=mc²]. For categorical reasons we make a distinction between matter and energy, but because they are equivalent in a more fundamental sense they can have causal interactions. Energy can be harnessed to move and manipulate matter; likewise, matter can be used to harness and manipulate energy.

They don't cause one another because they are basically the same thing but they can have causative interactions specifically because they have a common ontological basis.

You seem to imply that mental contributions of a person influence the brain. Can you provide some evidence?

I would assume you're familiar with meditation and the biofeedback, right? There is plenty of scientific literature on the subject if you want to look it up.

Another example would be chronic stress which can have major effects on the body of a person, affecting everything from the immune system, endocrine system, circulatory system, and obviously the nervous system. The kicker is that the cause of the stress may be purely psychological. In fact I've just recently been reading up stress illness. Very fascinating stuff

Then there is the very obvious example of simply choosing to take any action. Your decision to even lift a finger initiates waves of activity withing your brain and nervous system.

Just for the interest, what are entities that could be considered 'real' that don't necessarily meet the criteria for being matter?

Messenger particles, information, energy not in the form of atoms, a thought, what ever is the basis of time-space, etc...

What do you mean by "the basis for existence"? If, for something, it is conceivable that it doesn't exist (you say so in the paragraph about the mind), then it is not the basis of existence. Do you mean that the basis of existence is that which it is inconceivable to think of as non-existing?

What makes you think of the necessity of this "basis"? Everything could be conceived as not-existing. So what? I don't see any problem.

By "basis" I mean the sine qua non ("without which none") of whatever is in question.

I mentioned before that I'm a monist, meaning that I'm of the philosophical position that everything has a common basis. With that in mind if other things can exists in the absence of X then X is not the basis of those things.

 

[JetLeg]

I'm saying that even if you want to think of them as two realms its more logical to consider them interdependent rather than independent. Otherwise, how else could they interact?


Okay, think of it this way. Matter and energy have been shown to be equivalent in some sense [I'm sure we're all familiar w/ Einsteins equation E=mc²]. For categorical reasons we make a distinction between matter and energy, but because they are equivalent in a more fundamental sense they can have causal interactions. Energy can be harnessed to move and manipulate matter; likewise, matter can be used to harness and manipulate energy.

I think one shouldn't bring examples from physics. I studied just newtonian physics and cannot really understand what it means that matter and energy are one. Not that well that I can understand a concept that I do not know using these terms.


Can you give me examples from daily life? For examples are two sides of a coin interdependent? Or other examples?

They don't cause one another because they are basically the same thing but the can have causative interactions because they have a common ontological basis.

Sorry, I don't understand you. What is a common ontological basis?

I would assume you're familiar with meditation and the biofeedback, right? There is plenty of scientific literature on the subject if you want to look it up.

Chronic stress can have major effects on the body of a person, affecting everything from the immune system, endocrine system, circulatory system, and obviously the nervous system. The kicker is that the cause of the stress may be purely psychological.

Ah. But the problem is that when you look at the brain at the micro-level, the only effects you see are physical ones. There is no neuron that suddenly fires "because of a thought".


Because of that, we deduce that it is the brain that causes the stress, the meditation, and the change in itself, due to it.

By "basis" I mean the sine qua non ("without which none") of whatever is in question.

I mentioned before that I'm a monist meaning that I'm of the philosophical position that everything has a common basis. With that in mind if other things can exists in the absence of X then X is not the basis of those things or, by extension, reality.

Ok. What makes you think that there is such a thing X, than nothing can exist in the absence of it?