Malerin, what difference? Immaterialism is Moot

[Kevin_Lowe]

It's rather a daft thread.
What you have is a load of serial materialists (or if you prefer, anti-idealists) who spend quite a lot of time and effort in this forum arguing against idealism and in favour of materialism/physicalism (very often by either mistakenly or dishonestly doing their best to try to conflate idealism with solipsism).
And what are these materialists doing? They're trying to argue that there is no difference between materialism and idealism.
If that's the case why so much effort pro-materialism anti-idealism?

In the short history of this forum, most of the people articulating idealist arguments weren't doing so merely for philosophical exercise. Rather they were trying to build a case for some kind of woo-woo belief they held, in a kind of indirect and ill-thought-out way, by first attacking physicalism and then saying "Look, my woo-woo beliefs are no sillier than your belief in an external universe that exists regardless of whether or not you are looking at it!".

Thus responses have often taken the form of explanations of why physicalism is the most economical explanation of this universe we live in, which certainly appears to exist regardless of whether or not you are looking at it

Another tack to take with these woo-woos is to ask them how their kooky idealist universe would differ in any way from our physicalist universe. The smarter and more mendacious ones duck the question to avoid looking like kooks, but the truth when it comes out is something like "I reckon ESP/telepathy/magic/whatever could work in an idealist universe, so I want to believe I live in one".

Also, if that's the case, there should be roughly half of you arguing in favour of idealism.

If the materialism/idealism choice makes no difference why is it that someone like Malerin, who argues in favour of it, gets instantly pounced on from all sides?

Because we've seen his type around before, and we've got a pretty good idea where they are going.

Surely you guys can't be quite that dumb or deluded. It clearly makes a difference to you. Your own actions betray you.

On the contrary, we're well aware that there wouldn't be any difference between a rational idealism and physicalism in any way that mattered. We're also aware that idealism as presented in these forums is almost always a Trojan horse for some genuinely idiotic belief lurking inside it, and when the woo-woos try to explain why the distinction matters there's good chance the idiotic belief will reveal itself.

 

[Frozenwolf150]

In the short history of this forum, most of the people articulating idealist arguments weren't doing so merely for philosophical exercise. Rather they were trying to build a case for some kind of woo-woo belief they held, in a kind of indirect and ill-thought-out way, by first attacking physicalism and then saying "Look, my woo-woo beliefs are no sillier than your belief in an external universe that exists regardless of whether or not you are looking at it!".

I've noticed several key similarities between the reasoning behind immaterialist arguments and the reasoning behind other types of woo beliefs, specifically creationists, truthers, and alternative medicine advocates:

They believe that questioning the established theory is tantamount to proving it wrong.

They think that all alternative explanations are equally plausible, regardless of the weight of evidence behind them.

Furthermore, they think that the existing evidence applies to their pet beliefs just as much if not more so than it does to the established theory.

They accuse their opponents of being part of some conspiracy against them.

They regard all disagreement with their ideas as persecution of their beliefs, and use this as proof of said conspiracy.

They accuse their opponents of their own flaws, namely blind faith, dogmatism, and ignorance of science.

They argue from ignorance, shifting the burden of proof onto their opponents rather than establishing their own proof, as if the inability to prove evolution beyond the shadow of a doubt, for example, somehow proves creationism true.

They evoke special pleading for the object of their beliefs, whether it's God as the uncaused creator, Ron Paul, untested New Age therapies, or God as the prime thinking entity.

They believe they're privy to some special knowledge or revolutionary idea that nobody else has thought of.

They never act on their beliefs. Creationists never try to do any actual science or get a journal published, truthers would never try to hold an armed uprising against the government, alternative medicine advocates would never refuse conventional medicine for a life-threatening condition, and immaterialists would never act as if the world isn't real.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Please no insults, even from me.

Malerin, what difference does it make. Idealism and materialism are the same thing. There is no difference between the two.
You assert that it may be that sensations and external reality does not exist, and that may be we may all be
-Brains in Vats
-butterfly dreams
-thoughts of god
-compositions of quanta of energy


The outcome is exactly the same, you can NOT change the behavior of the reality in anyway by asserting that idealism could be a possibility.

So?

Being as how Malerin is having difficulty giving what the mods would consider a civil response, I'll give it a crack. I've given the topic some extra thought so it should be fun to see where this discussion goes from here

1. What difference would there be between a material world and an idealist one?

-In 'idealist' interpretations, abstractions like ideas are assumed to be as, or more, ontologically real than matter. In materialist perspectives the opposite tends to be held as true.

2. What test could be done to determine either state to be the ontological state of the universe.

Empirically, both positions are potentially valid in the domains that they focus on (idealist:abstract vs. materialist:concrete) but make flawed assumptions about the other. Philosophically, they're both flawed because they see the other perspective as mutually exclusive to the other when, infact they are complementary. There are certain insights that can be more readily gained from one perspective than the other.

3. Why does it matter?

Because having a flawed ontological/epistemological view can hamper scientific inquiry. For instance, if at the turn of the 20th century, every scientist proscribed to strict logical positivism it would have been much less likely that we would have gained scientific understanding of the atom as early as we did because few, if any, would have considered it a valid hypothesis to even pursue.

An individuals philosophy is the filter through which they view the world. Any quirks or flaws within a held philosophical view creates inherent cognitive biases which can hinder improvement in understanding and interacting with the world.

 

[athon]

Great response. I just have some small nit picks.

Because having a flawed ontological/epistemological view can hamper scientific inquiry. For instance, if at the turn of the 20th century, every scientist proscribed to strict logical positivism it would have been much less likely that we would have gained scientific understanding of the atom as early as we did because few, if any, would have considered it a valid hypothesis to even pursue.

I've read those criticisms elsewhere, and even though I can't anticipate what your stance is, in those I've found that they've been based on a strawman argument of logical positivism. I feel that the atom would most definitely have been found had logical positivism have been a philosophy of the time. While I have my own criticisms of it (namely to do with the language component of it), I feel that there's nothing in the positivist philosophy that would have prevented the initial meanderings into particle physics.

Athon

 

[AkuManiMani]

Great response. I just have some small nit picks.

Thank you. I'll try to address them as best I can

I've read those criticisms elsewhere, and even though I can't anticipate what your stance is, in those I've found that they've been based on a strawman argument of logical positivism. I feel that the atom would most definitely have been found had logical positivism have been a philosophy of the time. While I have my own criticisms of it (namely to do with the language component of it), I feel that there's nothing in the positivist philosophy that would have prevented the initial meanderings into particle physics.

Athon

To clarify, I was mainly using logical positivism as the most salient example I could think of off the top of my head. As to whether or not particle physics would have advanced, I'm also pretty sure science would have come around to it eventually. I'm just of the opinion that such a philosophical stance would have greatly slowed the progress if it had been universal. Correctly me if I'm wrong, but as far as I'm aware of, all of the scientists that were involved in the initial advancement into the world of atoms didn't proscribe to the strict positivist view.

 

[Malerin]

Being as how Malerin is having difficulty giving what the mods would consider a civil response, I'll give it a crack. I've given the topic some extra thought so it should be fun to see where this discussion goes from here



-In 'idealist' interpretations, abstractions like ideas are assumed to be as, or more, ontologically real than matter. In materialist perspectives the opposite tends to be held as true.



Empirically, both positions are potentially valid in the domains that they focus on (idealist:abstract vs. materialist:concrete) but make flawed assumptions about the other. Philosophically, they're both flawed because they see the other perspective as mutually exclusive to the other when, infact that are complementary. There are certain insights that can be more readily gained from one perspective than the other.



Because having a flawed ontological/epistemological view can hamper scientific inquiry. For instance, if at the turn of the 20th century, every scientist proscribed to strict logical positivism it would have been much less likely that we would have gained scientific understanding of the atom as early as we did because few, if any, would have considered it a valid hypothesis to even pursue.

An individuals philosophy is the filter through which they view the world. Any quirks or flaws within a held philosophical view creates inherent cognitive biases which can hinder improvement in understanding and interacting with the world.

You said it better than I ever could.

 

[AkuManiMani]

You said it better than I ever could.

/takes a bow

Thank you, Sir

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Empirically, both positions are potentially valid in the domains that they focus on (idealist:abstract vs. materialist:concrete) but make flawed assumptions about the other. Philosophically, they're both flawed because they see the other perspective as mutually exclusive to the other when, infact they are complementary. There are certain insights that can be more readily gained from one perspective than the other.

Like what?

An individuals philosophy is the filter through which they view the world. Any quirks or flaws within a held philosophical view creates inherent cognitive biases which can hinder improvement in understanding and interacting with the world.

I've seen this line of argument before, and not only from idealists, and I call it the "Mummy I'm helping!" argument. What evidence do you have that idealism is any use in understanding and interacting with the world, or that you can gain "certain insights" from it that are not otherwise available?

My philosophical view is that metaphysics is no use at all to scientists. Other branches of philosophy definitely are, of course.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Empirically, both positions are potentially valid in the domains that they focus on (idealist:abstract vs. materialist:concrete) but make flawed assumptions about the other. Philosophically, they're both flawed because they see the other perspective as mutually exclusive to the other when, infact they are complementary. There are certain insights that can be more readily gained from one perspective than the other.

Like what?

Hmm...I think one clear example is that trying to think about psychology in terms of particle physics wont get you very far, and vice versa. If one wanted to understand how political ideologies form and develop throughout history organic chemistry would not be very productive.

I hope that clarifies my position a bit.

An individuals philosophy is the filter through which they view the world. Any quirks or flaws within a held philosophical view creates inherent cognitive biases which can hinder improvement in understanding and interacting with the world.

I've seen this line of argument before, and not only from idealists, and I call it the "Mummy I'm helping!" argument. What evidence do you have that idealism is any use in understanding and interacting with the world, or that you can gain "certain insights" from it that are not otherwise available?

First off, I don't think idealism, in and of itself is very helpful in understanding the world. IMO, its primary benefit is as thought experiment to logically probe common assumptions about the nature of reality. I think Idealism is a useful starting point but, for reasons mentioned earlier, has flaws as a stand-alone view.

My philosophical view is that metaphysics is no use at all to scientists. Other branches of philosophy definitely are, of course.

I bet the differ on this point. Every cosmological paradigm (scientific or otherwise) is grounded within and/or shaped by some metaphysical assumptions; its how people orient what they empirically observe into some larger, unknown, framework. Ontological interpretations of a contemporary understanding of physics is an example of metaphysics being applied.

Newton based much of his work on metaphysical assumptions which provided a backdrop for scientific thinking for a good two centuries (for instance, the Newtonian view of the nature of time and space). It reflected how people of the time understood and interpreted their empirical observations of the world. Part of the reason why 20th century advances in physics, such as Relativity and QM, was because they practically re-invented much of the metaphysical framework thinkers operated from for centuries. In the case of QM, the varying interpretations of the theory is and example of different metaphysical views of what the theory is actually describing.

I'm even willing to argue that there's only a very fine line between pure theoretical physics and metaphysics which has become especially clear today w/ current physics. From what I've read, much of the domain being considered by string theorists deals with trying to understand what gave rise to the Big Bang and what we currently think of as the 'physical' universe. Its an example of a theory far outstripping what can currently be empirically verified and has merely extended the concept of whats considered 'physical' into what was once considered purely metaphysical.

 

[Nick227]

-In 'idealist' interpretations, abstractions like ideas are assumed to be as, or more, ontologically real than matter. In materialist perspectives the opposite tends to be held as true.

Empirically, both positions are potentially valid in the domains that they focus on (idealist:abstract vs. materialist:concrete) but make flawed assumptions about the other. Philosophically, they're both flawed because they see the other perspective as mutually exclusive to the other when, infact they are complementary. There are certain insights that can be more readily gained from one perspective than the other.

Would you not agree, though, that Idealism must be considered in trouble now that we know that...

* thoughts are the result of neural processing and emerge from this substrate
* pretty much every other conscious process studied can be seen to be highly dependent on material factors in the brain

We do not know what the material substance of the brain finally is. But we do know that a lot of the observations that allowed people to conclude the universe was mental are now overthrown.

Nick

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Hmm...I think one clear example is that trying to think about psychology in terms of particle physics wont get you very far, and vice versa. If one wanted to understand how political ideologies form and develop throughout history organic chemistry would not be very productive.

I hope that clarifies my position a bit.

OK, but that is not an issue concerning metaphysics. That only concerns approaches to systems problems. We have long distinguished between lower and higher level descriptions of events. I'm not sure how idealism helps this situation in any way.

I bet the differ on this point. Every cosmological paradigm (scientific or otherwise) is grounded within and/or shaped by some metaphysical assumptions; its how people orient what they empirically observe into some larger, unknown, framework. Ontological interpretations of a contemporary understanding of physics is an example of metaphysics being applied.

Newton based much of his work on metaphysical assumptions which provided a backdrop for scientific thinking for a good two centuries (for instance, the Newtonian view of the nature of time and space). It reflected how people of the time understood and interpreted their empirical observations of the world. Part of the reason why 20th century advances in physics, such as Relativity and QM, was because they practically re-invented much of the metaphysical framework thinkers operated from for centuries. In the case of QM, the varying interpretations of the theory is and example of different metaphysical views of what the theory is actually describing.

I'm even willing to argue that there's only a very fine line between pure theoretical physics and metaphysics which has become especially clear today w/ current physics. From what I've read, much of the domain being considered by string theorists deals with trying to understand what gave rise to the Big Bang and what we currently think of as the 'physical' universe. Its an example of a theory far outstripping what can currently be empirically verified and has merely extended the concept of whats considered 'physical' into what was once considered purely metaphysical.

It need not be the case that we make any ultimate metaphysical judgments when engaging in science. We need only assume that we can describe the rules of the game, so to speak -- that assumption is absolutely necessary for any progress. But the ultimate nature of reality? Why would it matter to a physicist if matter is ultimately vibrating strings of energy really or thoughts in the mind of God that look to us like vibrating strings of energy? we couldn't possibly tell the difference. All we can do is describe the boundaries of what we experience and the rules by which it works. If there is only one substance, then we can't even define it properly. The materialism/idealism "split" concerns the ultimate nature of reality. I think most of us are content to say "we can't get there from here" and leave it at that.

The important distinctions do not concern the ultimate nature of a single substance if monism is correct (because we can't even in theory get to the substance) but if there is one, two, or multiple ultimate substances. Most idealists I have met say they think there is one substance -- mind -- but argue as if they really think there are two, three, or more substances.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I propose that one week each year be set aside as Mindon Week. During that week, physicists and neurophysiologists have to assume that there is some sort of particle with mental attributes, tentatively called the mindon. They have to search the particle accelerator scatter diagrams for evidence of the mindon. They have to search the brain for evidence of the interface to the mindon. They have to propose hypotheses about how the mindon interacts with a bag of hammers. And they have to do the math on Dark Mentality.

After all, we wouldn't want Hegemonic Paradigmatic Big Science to get in the way of true understanding of reality.

~~ Paul

 

[AkuManiMani]

Would you not agree, though, that Idealism must be considered in trouble now that we know that...

* thoughts are the result of neural processing and emerge from this substrate
* pretty much every other conscious process studied can be seen to be highly dependent on material factors in the brain

Well that pretty much touches upon a point I made earlier about the whole idealism vs. materialism controversy. They both basically agree on there being one fundamental "stuff" upon which all existence is based off of but wrangle over what it should be called. The idealist would not argue that the brain does not exist; they would argue that it only exists only within the mind. The materialist says mind-from-brain while the idealist argues for brain-from-mind.

Just to reiterate, I don't hold to the idealist view nor, for that matter, to the strict materialist view. Since I probably haven't stated is explicitly, I'd like to make it clear that my views are much more along the lines of monism [everything that is has the same ontological root] and realism [reality is there even when no one is "looking"].

We do not know what the material substance of the brain finally is. But we do know that a lot of the observations that allowed people to conclude the universe was mental are now overthrown.

Nick

Well, assuming you're a monist, what ever is 'mental' must at root be equivalent to 'material'. If one assumes the above, then the statement that the universe is non-'mental' is meaningless.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I propose that one week each year be set aside as Mindon Week. During that week, physicists and neurophysiologists have to assume that there is some sort of particle with mental attributes, tentatively called the mindon. They have to search the particle accelerator scatter diagrams for evidence of the mindon. They have to search the brain for evidence of the interface to the mindon. They have to propose hypotheses about how the mindon interacts with a bag of hammers. And they have to do the math on Dark Mentality.

After all, we wouldn't want Hegemonic Paradigmatic Big Science to get in the way of true understanding of reality.

~~ Paul

LOL!

 

[AkuManiMani]

Hmm...I think one clear example is that trying to think about psychology in terms of particle physics wont get you very far, and vice versa. If one wanted to understand how political ideologies form and develop throughout history organic chemistry would not be very productive.

I hope that clarifies my position a bit.

OK, but that is not an issue concerning metaphysics. That only concerns approaches to systems problems. We have long distinguished between lower and higher level descriptions of events. I'm not sure how idealism helps this situation in any way.

I'm not sure if you noticed, but the above quote was an attempt to answer this exchange:

Empirically, both positions are potentially valid in the domains that they focus on (idealist:abstract vs. materialist:concrete) but make flawed assumptions about the other. Philosophically, they're both flawed because they see the other perspective as mutually exclusive to the other when, infact they are complementary. There are certain insights that can be more readily gained from one perspective than the other.

Like what?

I was citing examples of how trying to understand mental systems in terms of their material substrates, and vice versa, is not very productive. I didn't mean to give the impression that psychology and the like are the same as metaphysics

It need not be the case that we make any ultimate metaphysical judgments when engaging in science. We need only assume that we can describe the rules of the game, so to speak -- that assumption is absolutely necessary for any progress. But the ultimate nature of reality? Why would it matter to a physicist if matter is ultimately vibrating strings of energy really or thoughts in the mind of God that look to us like vibrating strings of energy? we couldn't possibly tell the difference. All we can do is describe the boundaries of what we experience and the rules by which it works. If there is only one substance, then we can't even define it properly. The materialism/idealism "split" concerns the ultimate nature of reality. I think most of us are content to say "we can't get there from here" and leave it at that.

The important distinctions do not concern the ultimate nature of a single substance if monism is correct (because we can't even in theory get to the substance) but if there is one, two, or multiple ultimate substances. Most idealists I have met say they think there is one substance -- mind -- but argue as if they really think there are two, three, or more substances.

For the most part, I agree. One does not necessarily have to assume "ultimate reality" when engaging in science. Where I differ is that I still consider ontological interpretations and assumptions highly significant in framing what kind of scientific questions we ask, what we investigate, and how we investigate it. I'll attempt to give a contemporary example.

Right now on the cutting edge theoretical physics the holographic principle is causing some researchers to rethink a lot of long held assumptions about the nature of reality. One of the implications of the theory is that information may be more fundamental than what we currently understand to be matter/energy. This is a very strong and profound ontological statement which, if it bears out, will have a major effect on how future physics is understood. Many of the ideas coming from cutting edge physics lies deep within the realm of what could arguably be considered 'metaphysical'.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

For the most part, I agree. One does not necessarily have to assume "ultimate reality" when engaging in science. Where I differ is that I still consider ontological interpretations and assumptions highly significant in framing what kind of scientific questions we ask, what we investigate, and how we investigate it. I'll attempt to give a contemporary example.

Right now on the cutting edge theoretical physics the holographic principle is causing some researchers to rethink a lot of long held assumptions about the nature of reality. One of the implications of the theory is that information may be more fundamental than what we currently understand to be matter/energy. This is a very strong and profound ontological statement which, if it bears out, will have a major effect on how future physics is understood. Many of the ideas coming from cutting edge physics lies deep within the realm of what could arguably be considered 'metaphysical'.

I find the whole area fascinating, but I don't think that really impacts "ultimate reality" or views of metaphysics. Viewing the important constituents as information means simply that we change the way we approach that set of issues. It still won't answer the question "what is really out there?" It will answer the question "How do we approach what is out there and make sense of it from our perspective?"

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Hmm...I think one clear example is that trying to think about psychology in terms of particle physics wont get you very far, and vice versa. If one wanted to understand how political ideologies form and develop throughout history organic chemistry would not be very productive.

I hope that clarifies my position a bit.

Not really, how is that relevant to idealism? When on Earth did anybody try to understand psychology in terms of particle physics in the first place? If all this idealism is good for is stopping people do dumb things they were never going to do in the first place, it's not good for much.

I bet the differ on this point. Every cosmological paradigm (scientific or otherwise) is grounded within and/or shaped by some metaphysical assumptions; its how people orient what they empirically observe into some larger, unknown, framework. Ontological interpretations of a contemporary understanding of physics is an example of metaphysics being applied.

No.

Newton based much of his work on metaphysical assumptions which provided a backdrop for scientific thinking for a good two centuries (for instance, the Newtonian view of the nature of time and space). It reflected how people of the time understood and interpreted their empirical observations of the world. Part of the reason why 20th century advances in physics, such as Relativity and QM, was because they practically re-invented much of the metaphysical framework thinkers operated from for centuries. In the case of QM, the varying interpretations of the theory is and example of different metaphysical views of what the theory is actually describing.

I'm even willing to argue that there's only a very fine line between pure theoretical physics and metaphysics which has become especially clear today w/ current physics. From what I've read, much of the domain being considered by string theorists deals with trying to understand what gave rise to the Big Bang and what we currently think of as the 'physical' universe. Its an example of a theory far outstripping what can currently be empirically verified and has merely extended the concept of whats considered 'physical' into what was once considered purely metaphysical.

Nope, that's just nonsense.

Physics does experiments to find out what the rules are.

Metaphysics sits in an armchair and makes stuff up.

Yes, physics is progressively taking over the traditional territory of metaphysics, in about the same way that psychology took over the territory of the philosophy of mind, but that doesn't retroactively endow metaphysics with usefulness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Hmm...I think one clear example is that trying to think about psychology in terms of particle physics wont get you very far, and vice versa. If one wanted to understand how political ideologies form and develop throughout history organic chemistry would not be very productive.

I hope that clarifies my position a bit.

Not really, how is that relevant to idealism?

Its not directly relevant to idealism. The above statement was in answer to a question you put to me earlier:

Empirically, both positions are potentially valid in the domains that they focus on (idealist:abstract vs. materialist:concrete) but make flawed assumptions about the other. Philosophically, they're both flawed because they see the other perspective as mutually exclusive to the other when, infact they are complementary. There are certain insights that can be more readily gained from one perspective than the other.

Like what?

To once again clarify, I was citing examples of how applying an abstract perspective is more effective than a material perspective in regards to certain areas, and vice versa.

When on Earth did anybody try to understand psychology in terms of particle physics in the first place?

At no time that I am aware of, and if they did it would not have been very fruitful, for obvious reasons.

If all this idealism is good for is stopping people do dumb things they were never going to do in the first place, it's not good for much.

Uhm...I think you've misread me at some point. It might be a good idea to carefully re-read what I said and what my position is.

I beg the differ on this point. Every cosmological paradigm (scientific or otherwise) is grounded within and/or shaped by some metaphysical assumptions; its how people orient what they empirically observe into some larger, unknown, framework. Ontological interpretations of a contemporary understanding of physics is an example of metaphysics being applied.

No.

No to what and why? Show your reasoning, please.

Newton based much of his work on metaphysical assumptions which provided a backdrop for scientific thinking for a good two centuries (for instance, the Newtonian view of the nature of time and space). It reflected how people of the time understood and interpreted their empirical observations of the world. Part of the reason why 20th century advances in physics, such as Relativity and QM, was because they practically re-invented much of the metaphysical framework thinkers operated from for centuries. In the case of QM, the varying interpretations of the theory is and example of different metaphysical views of what the theory is actually describing.

I'm even willing to argue that there's only a very fine line between pure theoretical physics and metaphysics which has become especially clear today w/ current physics. From what I've read, much of the domain being considered by string theorists deals with trying to understand what gave rise to the Big Bang and what we currently think of as the 'physical' universe. Its an example of a theory far outstripping what can currently be empirically verified and has merely extended the concept of whats considered 'physical' into what was once considered purely metaphysical.

Nope, that's just nonsense.

If it doesn't make sense to you then my apologies. Apparently I haven't been clear enough.

Physics does experiments to find out what the rules are.

Metaphysics sits in an armchair and makes stuff up.

There's quite a bit more to it than that, as I'm sure you're aware. Experiments, in physics or any other field of science, are to test hypotheses and theories [i.e. postulations]. Postulates do not appear out of a vacuum without any kind of context. They are essentially human inventions and the process of formulating theories and possible hypotheses is strongly influenced by individual(s) philosophical assumptions.

To cite a major example, both the theories of Special and General Relativity were formulated completely from 'armchair' musings and most of its predictions were only experimentally tested years after the fact.

Empirical investigation is absolutely vital to the scientific process, but abstraction is also indispensable. My point is, the process of formulating hypotheses is greatly influenced by philosophical considerations including, but not limited to, metaphysical concerns.

Yes, physics is progressively taking over the traditional territory of metaphysics, in about the same way that psychology took over the territory of the philosophy of mind, but that doesn't retroactively endow metaphysics with usefulness.

The differences between the varying interpretations of quantum mechanics [such as the Copenhagen interpretation, ensemble, many worlds, etc.] are all metaphysical. Physics isn't 'taking over' the territory of metaphysics. Physics, and the rest of science, is a branch of applied metaphysics: natural philosophy.

[FYI, psychology is, and always has been, applied philosophy of the mind]

 

[Dancing David]

Yuck, applied philosophy, on a subject (mind) that is a fiction. Sounds more like literature review than science. Sorry, AMM but the mind is a ghost in the machine, whatever that machine is made up of.

Some psychology, like the possible interpretation of QM is speculative.

Science is about what is observed and predicted.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Yuck, applied philosophy, on a subject (mind) that is a fiction. Sounds more like literature review than science. Sorry, AMM but the mind is a ghost in the machine, whatever that machine is made up of.

Some psychology, like the possible interpretation of QM is speculative.

Oh c'mon, Dave! Are you really trying to argue that schools of thought in psycology are not based on some underlying philosophy of how the human mind works and how it should be treated? Are you somehow arguing that the scientific method isn't based upon natural philosophy?

I'm sorry but you're really going to have to explain yourself on this one

Science is about what is observed and predicted.

That really doesn't contradict anything that I've said