Lockerbie: Timelie of Libyan Blame

[Buncrana]

I think anyone, even with the most tenuous connection as with Megrahi, who have had any kind of association with Bollier and Mebo would naturally attract the attention of any number of security and intelligence agencies.

The Maltese Double Cross illustrated the dubious and unsavoury activities and clients involved with Mebo, and given Edwins involvement in the immediate aftermath of 103, I think he's a significant cog in the Megrahi/Libya fit up. Wherever the $$ lay is the truth for the Swissmeister. I think it's only when he realised that he himself may well become an accused component (possibly indicted along with Megrahi/Fhimah) that he decided a volte face, now claiming intimidation, tampering of the MST and now Megrahi's innocence while reaffirming his loyalty to Gaddafi.

Nevertheless, as you show above Rolfe, Megrahi's presence on Malta hardly strikes of a man who has already bought locally sourced clothes 2 weeks earlier, and with them, is about to construct a bomb and load it at Malta intending to blow up a 747 from London.

Who trained Megrahi as this super seekrit terrorist, Frank Spencer?

Oh no of course, I forgot, virtually the island of Malta in it's entirety would provide the necessary cover and lies for the dastardly deed he was about to commit..which is why there would seem to be no evidence of him buying clothes or loading a bomb.

Deary me.

It seem to me it might be simply that even although Megrahi would have been known to various intelligence agencies, much like the tracing of the timer fragment, rather than pushing the investigation down a particular path, they would lead the investigation towards the desired path in the hope the Scot's police would find the connection themselves. No pressures, no interference. Good ole honest investigation, and when the police found the elements of evidence they had been led to didn't quite fit, well things can become pliable when it comes to getting Megrahi and Libya.

They must've been all sitting tearing hair out while the Scot's spent months and months hunting high and low for a match for their 'fragment' of timer, until persuaded to hand over a photograph of it to Thurman, and it was matched with days. Meanwhile, the Scot's are hot on the trail of the PFLP gang, but bit by bit, Megrahi's name comes into the frame, contemporary photo's of Megrahi become available but no joy. However, then an older photo become available, and as it happens this one is somewhat more similiar to the photofit given, and Gauci's second attempt and prompting at an 'identification' is taken. The dates, times and actual identification of height, age and build are merely incidental. They've got their man, the Libyan, working for the govt and around Malta where the clothes cames from.

Well, perhaps that's somewhat stretching fantasy in most scenarios, but in this case what might appear at first utter fantasy is consequently found to be quite firmly based in horrible reality.


.

 

[Rolfe]

On one hand we have Megrahi, known to the security services shall we say, certainly Giaka had drawn the attention of his CIA handlers to him even before the bombing, in Malta that day with the most flimsy disguise imaginable. Never mind that the Abdusamad passport was traceable to him, all they had to do was check the hotel registers to find him.

Didn't they do that anyway, for the date of the bombing and the possible days of the clothes purchase? If they had, wouldn't Megrahi's name have popped out at an early stage?

And Megrahi was Libyan and we have this constant thread of Libya running through the affair right back to Reagan on 28th December wasn't it? Hindsight is a wonderful thing of course, but looked at in that light it almost seems negligent. Or wilfully blind.

On the other hand we have absolutely not a whisper of a suggestion that anyone called Megrahi was of any interest to anyone, right through into early 1991.

As you say, it's as if nobody could press the button on Megrahi until after the timer chip had been identified, even though it hardly seems necessary. Reagan wants to blame Libya by day 7. On day 30, Bollier delivers a letter blaming Libya. In May, the radio is identified as being one likely to have been bought in Libya. In September, Gauci obligingly describes the mystery shopper as Libyan.

By that stage, examination of hotel records could have established that Megrahi was on the island on the fateful day. They already knew he'd been there on 7th December thanks to Giaka.

Was this just idiocy, or was it some sort of deliberate strategy?

Can you make any sense at all of Edwins's story suggesting that he was being set up to go through Luqa airport that morning, but avoided the trap by rearranging his own itinerary on flights he'd been told were full? By this CT, Megrahi was deliberately set up, and Edwin was supposed to have been caught with him. Which is back to the MIHOP rubbish. If it is rubbish.

I've ordered Richard's book, though it chokes me to inflate his sales figures. I hope it might give a bit of insight as to just where the Megrahi connection actually came from, and when.

Rolfe.

 

[pete2]

According to RM,

When Henderson and I met with the CIA and BSS [in December 1990], the names of a number of suspects were surfaced. One name provided by the CIA that day was Abdel Baset Ali al Megrahi. According to the Maltese immigration records, he had been in Malta on December 7, 1988, the day the clothing was purchased at Mary's House. He had also been there on other dates, but had not been there on December 20 and 21, 1988. We had not yet located a photograph of Megrahi to show Tony Gauci. Megrahi had connections to Bollier, but that area had not yet been fully explored. Megrahi was alleged to be a member of the Libyan Intelligence Service.

In the meantime Bob Fanning, the FBI Legat in Bern, developed some interesting news. [He linked Bollier to his Fang-Brief of Jan 1989.]

(p73)

The following quotes show the discovery of the link to 'Abdusamad':

Although I was to leave for Switzerland late in the day on Monday, February 25, I was at work early, as was my practice. In the mid-morning my secure phone rang and it was Dick King, an analyst from an american intelligence agency near Washington...
King said his analysis concerning Megrahi showed connections to a man named Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad. He did not have much more information. This was a new name and since I had no idea how to access the computer system, I asked the name be run in the Maltese immigration database. The name Abdusamad hit immediately.

Abdusamad traveled from Tripoli to Malta on December 20, 1988, and returned the next morning. Here was a name worth exploration...

When I arrived at the LICC later [February 27], the place was vibrant. I learned from Henderson that the name Abdusamad, the one I had gotten from Dick King days before, had opened a new lock. A review of the embarkation cards in Malta determined that he stayed at the Holiday Inn on the night of December 20, 1988. The next morning Abdusamad had made one telephone call, to the Mosta area of Malta. Henderson said they did not have much else to go on at that time...

(p87)

[Thursday, March 17] The call Abdusamad placed on he morning of Dec 21 from the Holiday Inn was to the residence of Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, 3 st John Spring Street in Mosta. Fhimah had been not only an employee of LAA in 1988; he was the station manager at Luqa Airport in Malta. Fhimah had been the station manger in 1988, but had left Malta on Dec 29, 1988. Immigration records indicated Fhimah arrived in Malta on the night of Dec 20, 1988, on LAA (LN) flight 231, the same flight as Abdusamad. This could be the link to prove how the IED bag was introduced into the aviation system. What better way than to use an airline employee, who would know everyone and have access to luggage tags and the aircraft themselves?
...

[about a week later] Jourdan also told me the Scots were of the opinion that Abdusamad and Megrahi were the same person...

(p91)

[At the end of May] Tony Matthews of the BSS told me the status of the immigration and hotel record handwriting and fingerprint analysis. He had become an indispensable part of the investigation team. He said the handwriting analysis had been completed with a preliminary assessment that the cards filled out by Abdusamad and Megrahi were completed by the same person.

(p116)

On November 16, McCulloch briefed the FBI on his trip to Libya; he believed they had been surveilled (sic) there. When the Scots presented a list of persons with whom they wanted to speak, they denied knowing who some of them were. It was only after McCulloch told them these men were high ranking Libyan officials did they allow them to be interviewed. The most interesting revelation had to do with their investigation at the passport office. The records for Fhimah and Megrahi contained routine information. The file for Abdusamad contained only one document, a letter from the Libyan Intelligence Service to the Passport Office. This single piece of correspondence requested a coded (false) passport for Megrahi and requested it be in the name of Abdusamad.

(p190)

Some interesting points emerge from this. Firstly, on February 15, Henderson was already celebrating the solution of the case with a wee dram, based on Megrahi being a Libyan agent who knew Bollier and on Tony Gauci's supposed identification of him. The later discovery that Megrahi passed through Luqa as Abdusamad must have sent their imagination into overdrive. And, can you believe it, he's travelling with Fhimah, who still has his airside pass, which means that in a small airport he can walk right up to any plane with a bomb (one of the round black ones with a fuse sticking out of the top) and no-one will notice.
It just shows how easy it is to back up a completely wrong theory by looking determinedly in the wrong place.

Secondly, the link with Abdusamad was made without ever seeing the passport, which, according to RM, they saw for the first time when Megrahi brought it with him to Zeist. (A strange thing to do if he had anything to hide concerning its use.)

(Quotes from Evidence and the Scotbom Inquiry extracted, sometimes painfully, from Google books.)

 

[pete2]

I've ordered Richard's book, though it chokes me to inflate his sales figures.

I wish you well. I've read quite a bit of it online, and it's hard work at times. Richard's style is unrelentingly staccato, and it's very repetitive. It is informative, though, when it's based on his diary.

On the other hand, Richard isn't above a bit of dissembling. The best bit I've found is his account of Major Joseph Mifsud's evidence at Zeist:

Joseph Mifsud, a Maltese meteorologist, was called in to dispute Gauci's testimony that it was raining on the day Megrahi was alleged to have bought the clothing contained in the IED suitcase (December 7). The defense had always contended the purchase had occurred on a date when there was no documentary evidence Megrahi had been on Malta, specifically November 23, 1988. Mifsud testified that there had been constant rain at Luqa on December 8, 1988, but on the previous day there had been only light rain, a trace in the morning. There could be differences in rain accumulation on different places on the island. The forecast for December 7 was a 90% chance of showers, but no rain. The judges would have to decide whether to believe the recollections of Gauci, who said it had been raining in the late afternoon when the clothing and umbrella were purchased.

Twice Richard says that Mifsud was called in order to discredit Gauci, whereas of course the starting point was Gauci's statement that it had rained that evening. A weather forecast can be unreliable, but Maj. Mifsud referred to the records of what actually took place. To most readers, 'showers but no rain' would sound like intermittent (but possibly heavy) rain, as opposed to continuous rainfall. Mifsud had actually said it had not rained in Sliema; when pushed he allowed a 10% chance that there may have been light drizzle. Richard manages to make a 90% chance that there was no rain sound like a 90% chance of rain of some sort.

 

[Rolfe]

Thanks very much Pete. The book arrived this morning, along with the new one just published, The Truth Never Dies. I read the latter first, and it's garbage. The author is all over the place and factually inaccurate in a lot of important places. He almost has a different theory for each chapter, and never tries to reconcile them. So when he does come out with things that seem interesting, I'm inclined to suspect they're just more inaccuracies or speculation.

One representative example. His account of how the cops got hold of the Erac printout is wildly confused, and he actually states that the printout contained a list of the passengers' names. He does reproduce a picture of part of the thing, but he doesn't seem to know what it is - it's captioned "Flight board numbers".

The book has a publisher, but I'm beginning to suspect Melrose Books of being a vanity publisher. Certainly the book appears to be print-on-demand, and it's riddled with misprints and formatting errors. The hand of an editor (badly needed) has quite obviously never been near the text. Don't waste your money.

So, I'll lay it aside as a bad buy, and start on Richard.

I realise he's wildly partisan, but I know there are factual gems in there, the significance of which he doesn't seem to have realised. I hope to find some more.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I've only started Richard's book, but in terms of competent writing and general production values, it's a joy compared to Booth. Either he has a competent editor, or he's a lot more rigorous than the average memoirs-scribbler.

One thing I noticed when perusing the Google Books version was that where testimony varies, he cherry-picks like mad. It's worst with Gauci of course. I take the view that the earlier Gauci said something, the more likely it is to be reliable. But then of course he kept changing his story, at first to please these nice policemen, and latterly with a sniff of a share of $4 million to inspire him. And item after item changed to suit the case against Megrahi.

The Christmas lights weren't up, then they were. At first it was simply raining, no qualification, then it was just dripping. The man was six feet tall or more, then he was under six feet. He didn't buy a shirt, then he bought two. And so on. Richard just "forgets" the original versions, and claims the later ones as Tony's unbiassed recollection.

One thing really leaped out at me though, just leafing through the book. He says in chapter 14 that they had had no clue that Megrahi was Abdusamad at the time they showed Tony Gauci the photospread. He even has them still trying to prove it as late as the run-up to the trial.

This is what you've quoted above of course, but I hadn't quite twigged. Your 25th February is 1991 - the photospread was on 14th February.

But this doesn't make sense with what we know now about the availability of the photographs. This is from the appeal documents on Megrahi's web site.

Extract from DCI Bell Diary (22/1/91) (HOLMES version) "They, the FBI, have supplied photocopies of photographs of Abdelbaset [....] and in the margin the summary: "Reference to Americans having photocopies of Abdelbaset's photograph.”
The Manuscript Version suggests that 2 photographs of the appellant were supplied: “… they have supplied photocopies of photographs of Abdelbaset (2)”

Extract from DCI Bell Diary (11/2/91): “Attended US Embassy with McAdam. Met with SA Reid who produced a number of photos… Two photos of Abdelbaset one with collar/tie, one with open shirt. [....]

Memo M2618 from SIO to WMFO (11/2/91): [....] It is imperative to determine which photograph of Abdelbaset is the best reproduction of how he looked in December 1988 before the photograph selection is shown to Gauci. Is it the one with the collar and tie or the one with the open neck shirt? [....]

HOLMES Statement S609BG DC John Crawford (14/2/91): Compilation of photospread DC912 and covering portion of photographs to conceal fact that appellant’s photograph shows him wearing a tie.

Extract from DCI Bell Diary (15/2/91): [....] Reid has been worried in case there is no identification made by the witness because [the photo]of Baset we have is too young. I explained that as we have no other and no indication that we will ever get one, then we can only proceed with what we have. If no identification is made and we later get a better photograph showing his true age and appearance in December '88, then the Lord Advocate may accept an argument for showing this to the witness.

There's no doubt in my mind that the photo with the open shirt must be the Abdusamad picture, "supplied by the Americans". The other one is obviously the one used in the photospread, because it can be seen it has been cropped to remove the collar and tie. There is reference to both being photocopies so perhaps the difference in quality wasn't as marked as it seems to us, with what we're seeing as a good colour photo also being a black-and-white photocopy.

This could perhaps excuse the choice of photo a bit, if they were of similar quality and the investigators didn't know what Megrahi actually looked like. But the fact remains that they had the Abdusamad photo, and they were presenting it as a pic of Megrahi. So how come they didn't know Megrahi was Abdusamad again?

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Wow, cool stuff here. Thanks or the book review, Rolfe. I was wondering about the new one by the hotelier (is it?) in Lockerbie. I'm too broke to buy anything much, let alone something less than amazing. I agree Melrose looks at least unimpressive, and vanity publisher seems likely.

On the timeline, I've said before I think they started with Megrahi on Malta and fit everything else together, early on, with the intent of pointing right to him. Per the above:

it's as if nobody could press the button on Megrahi until after the timer chip had been identified, even though it hardly seems necessary. Reagan wants to blame Libya by day 7. On day 30, Bollier delivers a letter blaming Libya. In May, the radio is identified as being one likely to have been bought in Libya. In September, Gauci obligingly describes the mystery shopper as Libyan.

By that stage, examination of hotel records could have established that Megrahi was on the island on the fateful day. They already knew he'd been there on 7th December thanks to Giaka.

Was this just idiocy, or was it some sort of deliberate strategy?

I usually say strategy, and with good reason, in cases like this. Same here.

It is as if they had all they needed for the case early on, except physical evidence connecting to Libya directly. After the radio and the timer were IDd, a crucial point was passed. It wasn't just intel, names and numbers and stories put on paper, that put it all together. By the middle of 1990, "hard science" also linked debris "from the IED" with Libya in two fairly clear ways. Only then does it seem really justified to discover (re-discover) the guy on Malta, his alias, movements, and so on - all these leads are Libyan, and fit the luggage track evidence from Malta, AND the science of the bomb says Libyan is most likely, just like Tony Gauci did for the clothes.

It might not be necessary to go this far, but it's pretty clear that it helps a lot. People routinely cite the hard-science timer fragment as the smoking gun proof of Libyan involvement, and to be honest, I can't think of any Libyan agents who fit the (alleged, Malta-centered) crime better than he does.

ETA:

This could perhaps excuse the choice of photo a bit, if they were of similar quality and the investigators didn't know what Megrahi actually looked like. But the fact remains that they had the Abdusamad photo, and they were presenting it as a pic of Megrahi. So how come they didn't know Megrahi was Abdusamad again?

I'm pretty sure that's an excellent question. And if I'm reading the excerpts right, Bell records in his own diary receiving and seeing both photos, and then later he himself explains to SA Reid how there's only the one, and there won't be any more, so they have to show this cropped collar photo to Gauci?

 

[Rolfe]

I don't know, but I hope reading Marquise will help. The trouble is, he was being fed stuff from the CIA, and I don't see Orkin writing his memoirs in much of a hurry. We know the CIA only passed on what they wanted to pass on.

Rolfe.

 

[SnidelyW]

Fascinating thread with some really compelling stuff. I love it. I'm torn on getting the Marquise book. I have zero little trust in what he says.

I know this probably isn't the most appropriate thread for the following, but I just wanted to get this idea on the record.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/u...talks-with-10-more-gaddafi-aides-2258900.html

Given the ideas postulated in this thread and others, is it worth noting that it's the UK offering a home to as many Libyan spies as they can fly in on private jets?

IF Libya were the architects (as a UK court DID convict them, BTW) of the bombing of Pan Am 103, why would the UK want to offer the possible mastermind of the plan a home, along with his lapdogs? In the context of Lockerbie, it seems like a very strange turn of events. Either the U.K. wishes to mine the information the Libyans can offer, or bury it.

 

[Rolfe]

Or "persuade" them to sign statements confirming that Megrahi (and probably Fhimah as well) really did do it, I think.

And for a bonus point, pay out even more millions to the bereaved families.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I'm beginning to catch on, maybe. The CIA fed the investigation (including the FBI) the name of Megrahi in December 1990. In January 1991 the FBI also passed over two photocopied pictures said to be of Megrahi, leaving Bell et al. with the problem of deciding which one to show to Tony.

​

The left-hand image is the Abdusamad photo, in a form which is kicking around in several places on the net. I believe it was published in the Italian magazine Il Torca in February/March 1999, and was one of the images Tony was said to have seen before he went to Zeist. (He would also have had access to the 1992 press photos from Megrahi's arrest in Libya, the interview in The Maltese Double Cross (1994), and the 1998 Raef/Alsheikhly interview which is on YouTube. Just to make it easier for him.)

I wondered why that degraded version was around, but it's now pretty obvious it was the second picture Bell didn't use in February 1991. I have little idea why he said at the same time that he only had one picture, although it could perhaps be that he meant that he didn't have anything better, as in an obviously older picture.

This makes the choice of the Czech photo rather less inexplicable, as the quality difference is nowhere near so marked as it is when the colour original of the Abdusamad photo is available. And Pete says they never saw the Abdusamad passport until Megrahi brought it with him to Zeist. Yeah right. They had a photocopy of the Abdusamad passport photo in 1991, and they knew it was Megrahi - though it looks as if they later tried to conceal that.

It wasn't until ten days after the successful Clever Hans exercise that US intelligence agencies then passed over the name Abdusamad, saying there was some connection with Megrahi.

It seems to be as Buncrana suggests. They (the CIA) had fed PC McPlod the faked-up timer fragment, and expected it to be identified within a reasonable time frame, or if it wasn't, for it to be passed back to them for help. They were obviously frustrated when neither of these things happened.

Similarly, they knew about Megrahi/Abdusamad, and since Megrahi wasn't really concealing himself so's you'd notice, they expected the investigators to trawl him up. Except they didn't, they weren't paying attention to the Libya clues, and they obviously hadn't been round the hotels looking for possible suspects on the dates in question, so in the end they had to be fed the information on that as well.

I think. This still doesn't tell us when the CIA knew about Megrahi. Just how far back does this frame-up really go?

I need to read Marquise for myself, but actually I was on a buying spree and Cover-up of Convenience showed up today, and it's a lot more entertaining even with the necessary pinch of salt....

Rolfe.

 

[yodaluver28]

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/u...talks-with-10-more-gaddafi-aides-2258900.html

Given the ideas postulated in this thread and others, is it worth noting that it's the UK offering a home to as many Libyan spies as they can fly in on private jets?

IF Libya were the architects (as a UK court DID convict them, BTW) of the bombing of Pan Am 103, why would the UK want to offer the possible mastermind of the plan a home, along with his lapdogs? In the context of Lockerbie, it seems like a very strange turn of events. Either the U.K. wishes to mine the information the Libyans can offer, or bury it.

It's called pragmatism and dealing with the present and future instead of sacrificing those by wallowing in the past. Whatever happened, Lockerbie is well over 20 years in the past and was handed off by the intelligence and military sectors to be dealt with by the courts. The push to topple Gaddafi is happening now and is an intelligence and military situation. Garnering cooperation from his former inner circle could be crucial to that endeavor.

The idea that they're doing this in order to cover-up information about Lockerbie is absurd. Other than the families of the victims, who will never forget Lockerbie and for whom, sadly, there will never be enough justice, the rest of the world has moved on and must deal with current crises. Unfortunately that frequently involves cutting deals with people you despise and who have attacked you in the past. International relations often involves allies becoming enemies and enemies becoming allies, if only for a short time or to achieve one specific goal.

 

[Rolfe]

I'd like to believe you, however actual events surrounding Jalil, Abu Nidal, Musa Kusa and so on, say different. Not to mention the (illegal) rabid, foam-flecked demands that Megrahi be kidnapped from Tripoli and flown to the USA to be tried all over again and given the death penalty.

Look, this is a total derail. The thread is about the timeline of the Lockerbie investigation's interest in Libya in general and the Libyan suspects in particular. There is already a thread about the Libyan defectors and their stories about Lockerbie. If people want to talk about that, could I suggest moving to that thread?

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=201714

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

Back on topic, I've noticed something else that supports my contention that the black-and-white version of the Abdusamad photo is not simply a degraded version of the colour print, manipulated for some unknown purpose by a blogger perhaps, but represents an earlier version of the image.

Look at the colour photo. There is a very clear stamp visible on it, which does not appear on the photocopy. I don't know what the stamp is or at what point it was applied to the passport, but it looks to me as if the photocopy was taken before the stamp was placed there.

Rolfe.

 

[Bunntamas]

Edited. See next comment

 

[Bunntamas]

Edited by kmortis: 

Removed personal remarks

 

[Caustic Logic]

Hmm.

 

[Buncrana]

Back on topic, I've noticed something else that supports my contention that the black-and-white version of the Abdusamad photo is not simply a degraded version of the colour print, manipulated for some unknown purpose by a blogger perhaps, but represents an earlier version of the image.

Look at the colour photo. There is a very clear stamp visible on it, which does not appear on the photocopy. I don't know what the stamp is or at what point it was applied to the passport, but it looks to me as if the photocopy was taken before the stamp was placed there.

Rolfe.

That is odd. Could it simply be that the stamp wasn't picked up in the photocopy or just changed by the blogger? I don't know.

As an aside, it worth remembering the CIA,FBI and Scottish police definitely had a colour copy of the Abdusamad photo in the early 1990's as it was this photo that was used in the '$4,000,000 Reward' posters and adverts.

IIRC, from Foot's 'Flight from Justice', I think those ads and posters were from around 1994.

I've some other comments but I think they're better suited in the Tony Gauci thread.

 

[Rolfe]

Hmmm, so it is. That's a different poster from the ones I've seen previously. This certainly indicates they had an original print of that photo well before Megrahi arrived at Zeist bearing the passport. It also suggests they realised it was a much better likeness of Megrahi than the one they showed to Tony.

Nevertheless Bell's diary does indicate that what they had in January 1991 was a photocopy, which would almost certainly have been black and white. In addition, the picture Valentine describes as being published in Il Torca also sounds like a poor-ish black-and-white photocopy of the same thing, as he merely notes it as being a similar picture to the one that was shown to Tony.

Obviously I need to read some more.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I also believe these posters were from 1994. It seems to have been a weird situation. The indictments were issued three years earlier, and to get the indictments they had to have sufficient evidence to bring a case. In theory anyway. So what were they doing offering a reward of $4 million for information against named suspects who were already indicted?

The subtext was that the reward was actually intended to incentivise people who knew the pair to inform about their whereabouts so that a US kidnap team could snatch them and deliver them forcibly to the courts. What it actually seems to have achieved is a parade of petty informants coming forward with fictional tales purporting to implicate either or both in the attack, apparently in the hope that if they were lucky and their fairy-story turned out to be a decent fit for the actual evidence, they might cop the reward.

But really, it was entirely improper for these posters to have been produced, particularly as regards Megrahi's picture. This was a case in which an eye-witness identification was crucial. In such cases it is absolutely verboten to publish a picture of the accused before the trial. Of course the courts couldn't stop Italian and German magazines from doing it, but for the authorities themselves to do it was inexcusable. Under normal circumstances that poster itself, with a picture identifying Megrahi as one of the accused, should have caused Tony Gauci's evidence to be summarily thrown out of court.

So, in January 1991 the US authorities supplied photocopies of the Czech photo and the Abdusamad photo to the investigation, after having supplied Megrahi's name the previous month. It seems likely the quality of the latter photo wasn't a whole lot better than that of the former, or even Bell would have known which one to use.

They used the Czech photo, for whatever reason, and even at the time Bell was already backtracking on the very existence of the Abdusamad image.

They weren't tipped the wink about the Abdusamad connection until ten days after the photospread exercise, even though the fact that the Abdusamad image was apparently being presented as a picture of Megrahi suggests the people at the other end of the wink-tipping chain knew perfectly well who he was.

By 1994, at the latest, they had an original colour print of the picture (and one of Fhimah's passport photo). So what did they do with it? Realise that it must be a far better likeness of Megrahi than the ghastly smear they showed to Tony, and re-stage the photo-id parade with the better photo to get a more reliable identification? Did they hell. They were -scared of Tony NOT identifying the decent likeness, and ran a mile from the very idea. Instead they plastered the decent likeness all over a bunch of "Wanted" posters, which is technically contempt of court.



Rolfe.