If they're acknowledging two IED style bags in his story, that itself is interesting, as all other official and mainstream sources insist on turning it to one. But when it's convenient to suddenly remember there were two... and to ignore that the half-suitcase worth of debris we have seen is perhaps 10% of the bomb bag and 40% of the other Bedford case.
To be precise, it appears Bedford didn't say anything was a "Samsonite" in January 1989. He described a "maroony-brown hardshell suitcase". Whether he said "Samsonite type" I'm not sure. Actually, I rather recall almost using "Samsonite" as a synonym for "hardshell" at that time (like "Hoover" and "vacuum cleaner") because it was by far the dominant brand in that area. So he saw two hardshell suitcases. The second may have been a different colour, we don't really know.
The court maintains that, even if the maroon one was the bomb bag, if the stuff hadn't been moved around then the second case should have been one of the damaged ones and there wasn't a suitable hardshell candidate among the damaged luggage. So, according to them, it's just as easy to imagine that
both cases were moved out of blast range.
But again we come to the the two recurrent themes in the appeal judgement. First, that the trial judges did think about all this, and gave it due consideration when coming to their decision, so the appeal is unfounded in law. Second, the decision wasn't solely founded on the evidence relating to this particular item, but by the totality of the evidence as a whole. Thus, each disputable piece of evidence (the bag in tray B8849 may or may not have had the bomb in it, we decide that it did; the Bedford suitcase may or may not have been the bomb bag, we decide that it wasn't; Gauci's identification wasn't definite but we decide it'll do....) is decided in favour of the "Megrahi did it" theory as it comes up, partly because the
other points have been decided in favour of the same theory - on pretty much the same grounds!
And I will read up on this myself, but later on. The "twin anchors" construct is something I'll have to cite derisively.
I recommend you read it. It's not as daunting as it seems, to someone well versed in the issues of the case. It gives further insight into a lot of the evidence. And these guys were senior Law Lords, it doesn't do to underestimate them.
Yeah, workers ROUTINELY take bolt cutters with them to destroy property and leave the airport unsecured, just so they don't have to go the long way. In other news, security at Frankfurt is really bad, since the bomb came from there.
Well, again I suggest you read it. The evidence was unclear whether the padlock had been expertly cut, or simply forced. Initially, I think Mr. Manly just said it was forced, and there had been some assumption by the people he'd reported to that it was just someone taking an unauthorised short-cut. There was some hearsay that this had happened from time to time, and there was resentment about being forced to go a longer way round when these doors were locked at night.
Mr. Manly insisted in court that the padlock had been "cut like butter", but he was apparently a poor witness, and bad on a number of details. If you read Kochler's report, he says Manly was almost incoherent because of some medication he was on for a medical problem, and the nature of all that hadn't ever been made clear.
Anyway, I did rather admire the get-out. It was never a ground of the prosecution case that it would have been impossible to get the bomb bag airside into Heathrow; they accepted it was possible. So the existence of the broken padlock doesn't actually alter the weight of the evidence at all. You need to have gone to the very
best law schools to think of that one.
Cause it's the flight they targetted, dummies? Last of the day, lots of young people, extra-aged and brittle skin - whatever reason they knew and picked, they had picked 103. Breaking in so long before was probably because less people are around to catch you at night. Who said the two events should be close together anyway?
Oh, I can think of a few real goodies. I think PA103 was the only flight with the Frankfurt feeder coming in with the very tight connection. There could be all sorts of advantages to targeting the container designated for that baggage.
- confusion about which airport the bomb originated from
- possible extra confusion if the Frankfurt flight had been involved in officially-sanctioned drug smuggling
- a bunch of CIA, DIA or whatever Yank spies on the plane (and maybe some reason their luggage can be used to facilitate the introduction?)
- Bernt Carlsson
- getting the positioning of the bomb just right
I think Patrick must have been apoplectic at one sentence, actually.
appeal judgement said:
Yet there was no evidence that there was anything about flight PA103 or its passengers that singled it out as the target.
However, I want to mention one particular thing. The positioning of the bomb. We're frequently reminded that it was in the absolutely perfect place to destroy the plane, and we think of that as meaning its position in the container as regards height and closeness to the skin. However there's also the question of the positioning of the container itself.
I was reading the "
Plane Truth" web site, which is just one more guy with a kooky theory, a book he'd like you to buy about it, and a badly-designed web site. However, on
this page he has an interesting point I don't think I've seen discussed elsewhere, and which I don't think he himself quite appreciates.
He points out that the plane came apart vertically pretty much at the level of the bomb. He compares this to other incidents where the side of a plane has been blown out, and the plane has landed safely. He is postulating, with some reasonable evidence I think, that the 747 had a structural weakness at that level, which was where two large sections were joined during construction. Thus an explosion at this level caused the thing to break apart exactly as
Maid of the Seas did, with the nose section becoming completely detached.
Jibril's group were responsible for a failed bombing in the past, where a plane landed safely with a hole blown out of a baggage compartment. Suppose they (or any bomber, really, but Jibril had the form) had realised about the weakness in the 747 and was looking for a way to get the bomb right at the section 41/42 fuselage join?
If the bomb was left in the baggage build-up area, it could have gone on any container. Even with an interline transfer (to a different flight), if a number of containers were waiting together to go on, as might happen when there was plenty time between the flights, you might not be able to predict where any one container might end up. However, PA103 was quite unusual, I think, in having that feeder flight with such a tight connection that one container of luggage was fast-tracked from one plane to the other on the tarmac, when they were on adjacent stands.
There would be a routine for this, and I imagine it happened the same way every evening. Bedford's evidence indicates that. He'd get a container, label it for the flight, and put any interline luggage in it. It would sit there until PA103A appeared, then go out to get this fast-transfer luggage. By this time I suspect the other containers from the build-up area would all be on board already. And I strongly suspect the routine saw that interline/Frankfurt container end up at the same place on the 747 every time.
Just suppose someone rather clever noticed this, and realised this was an ideal chance to get a bomb in the right
horizontal position to break the plane in two?
Of course you could still fly it in from Frankfurt, but why risk it? You'd have to circumvent Maier, who was on the look-out for radio-cassette bombs. Some idiot baggage handler could put it on the wrong plane. Or leave it behind at Frankfurt. Or fail to get it off the 707 for the on-tarmac transfer. On the other hand, here is this container sitting in the interline shed, all labelled up for PA103, with a few bags in it, and it's going to end up right on the weak spot of the plane's structure. And we want the bomb low down in the container, so Heathrow is better for that, looks like an opportunity.
Closer to what, the break-in point? Who said that's where the bags were stashed for the 18 hour hide?
Who says the break-in was actually to get the bomb bag in anyway? Maybe it was to get the right tags. Or to get a terrorist airside. Who knows?
Another feature of that judgement is that if speculation suggests Megrahi didn't do it (for example, why send the bloody thing through three airports, why set the timer so early, why leave the tags on the clothes and so on) then it's just speculation and has no weight. But on the other hand if speculation might point the other way (for example, maybe the Bedford suitcase was moved to the other side of the container, maybe Maier just didn't notice the radio, why wouldn't the bomber just use a security pass to get into Heathrow and so on), then it's solemnly propounded as if it really influences the argument.
Seriously, read the judgement. It's a necessary insight.
Rolfe.
