CL, I know you've dealt pretty comprehensively with Bedford and Kamboj on the Divide, so forgive me if I appear to be simply echoing much of what you've already noted – I'm just rambling away with some thoughts in the feint hope we might just pick anything else out. Maybe even an odd seemingly irrelevant comment or detail that's been missed.
I found Walkers testimony and varying statements in the subsequent years very peculiar. I appreciate Rolfe's contention that, despite what we may perceive as notable instances, such as the matters of which are being discussing, are simply part of the mundane day-to-day practices that these baggage workers become all to accustomed to.
However, it would appear to someone like me who has zero experience of airport working methods, that at the very least we have Bedford, Kamboj and Walker not disputing some central facts about AVE4041:
that Bedford had initiated the loading of 4041; that the container was only partially loaded by Bedford with somewhere between 5-8 pieces of luggage; that container 4041 was assigned to meet 103a on it's arrival; that Bedford visited Walker during a break; and that Bedford left before 103A's arrival from Frankfurt.
(CL, you asked above about 103A's precise arrival time. The Frankfurt flight arrived at Heathrow's gate 16 at approx 1737)
Kamboj doesn't deny putting the 2 additional bags into container 4041, as Bedford claimed he had said on his return from his break, he states simply “
he can't remember”. He also wouldn't say that Bedford's assertion was “wrong” about his claim, simply he says again, “
couldn't remember”.
It also seems to me that the SOP to the baggage loaders, supervisors and examiners at Heathrow were, at best, lax and careless. One crucial piece I noticed while reading through Kamboj's testimony was that the loading belt for baggage to go to the Interline Shed, was actually outside the perimeter of the shed itself, was not guarded by security or indeed anyone to check the luggage that was being loaded onto the belt, and by whom this baggage was placed onto the belt by.
However, even allowing for the lack of experience or scrutiny applied by Kamboj in his x-raying of the luggage going into 4041, with which he himself concedes “if the radio looked normal, I would let it go”, the manager of Pan Am security at Heathrow (jointly with Mike Jones from
Maltese Double Cross) is absolutely adamant that the various Toshiba and bomb warnings received in the weeks preceding the 21st were widely known and circulated within the Heathrow Pan Am loaders and examiners;
Camp Zeist Transcript said:
10 Q Mr. Berwick, prior to the disaster, were
11 you aware of a warning which had been circulated which
12 became known as the Toshiba warning?
13 A I was, sir.
14 Q And did that relate to the finding of a
15 quantity of explosives apparently concealed in
16 transistor radio devices in Germany?
17 A Correct, sir, yes.
18 Q And it was considered that those devices
19 had a link to a Palestinian group; is that correct?
20 A That is correct.
21 Q And did you receive circulation of a
22 warning in relation to that discovery, particularly
23 warning those charged with civil aviation security to
24 be on the alert in case such a device was attempted to
25 be put on board an American aircraft?
6338
1 A I cannot remember the exact wording of
2 the warnings, because there were several of them issued
3 at that time.
4 Q Was --
5 A I was aware of them, sir.
6 Q Was the content of that warning, so far
7 as you are aware, Mr. Berwick, circulated to Pan Am
8 employees engaged in the loading process and the Alert
9 Security employees charged with operating the x-ray
10 machinery?
11 A It was, sir, yes.
12 Q Are you sure about that?
13 A Yeah.
14 Q If we were to hear evidence in this
15 case, Mr. Berwick, that a considerable number of those
16 employees, as of 21st December 1988, knew nothing about
17 that warning, would that surprise you?
18 A It would surprise me, sir, because there
19 had been a build-up to this. It was not just the
20 Toshiba radio; it was also some other electronic
21 equipment. I believe there was a VCR; there was even a
22 TV unit that were in the warnings that were received.
23 Q Mr. Berwick, did you become aware also
24 of a warning being circulated which became known as the
25 Helsinki warning?
6339
1 A I was, sir.
2 Q And did that relate to the perceived
3 risk of an unaccompanied Finnish female passenger
4 boarding a plane with an improvised explosive device
5 concealed, possibly in a radio?
6 A As far as I can recall, there is no
7 mention of how it would be carried. It was a female
8 passenger, Finnish female passenger would be duped into
9 carrying a device.
10 Q I'm obliged. Was the contents of that
11 warning circulated to Pan Am staff at Heathrow, those
12 involved in the loading and unloading process, and
13 those Alert employees operating the x-ray machine?
14 A To the best of my knowledge, it was,
15 sir.
16 Q Again, Mr. Berwick, if we were to hear
17 evidence in this case that many of such employees knew
18 nothing about such a warning as of 21st December '88, I
19 take it you'd also be surprised at that?
20 A I would do, yes, sir.
I am somewhat surprised that there is no definitive trail kept as to the exact movements and responsibility taken with respect to AVE4041. Each piece of baggage logged as to which container it had been loaded into, who precisely had loaded each specific item in the container, and the exact movements of the container once loading had commenced.
Kamboj admits first that there is no secure or known method (aside from the fact that your already airside and therefore must have been cleared for such access) of knowing who exactly has put bags on the belt bringing them into the Interline Shed, and goes further to say that he is not aware of the Interline Shed being guarded or secured at any time, day or night.
Zeist Transcript said:
18
Q If you look, please, at the page that
19 should still be open in front of you, 2164, about
20 halfway down, opposite the letter "D" more or less, the
21 questioner says: You have said on previous occasions I
22 think that you thought that the bin contained about
23 five cases when Mr. Bedford drove it away.
“
Drove it away” implying surely that Bedford was taking the container elsewhere when he finished. The Buildup Shed??
Now if, as clearly undisputed by any of the Heathrow staff, container 4041 was only partially loaded, and if normal procedure would be the Interline Supervisor (Bedford) would take the container from the Interline Shed out to the tarmac to meet the arriving aircraft (103A), and fill the rest of the container with the appropriate luggage, then what would be the standard procedure if that Interline Supervisor was not on duty on the arrival of the incoming flight or not available on the departure of the outgoing flight?
As was the case on the 21st.
It does appear (although I'm speculating from a host of contradictory evidence) that it was not unusual for a container not fully loaded, to be left unattended at the Interline Shed and wouldn't be picked-up until the arrival of the incoming flight by the baggage drivers/loaders.
Would the container be left unattended at the Interline shed, and if so, who would therefore be assigned to supervise the container's movement once designated to be either taken to the arriving aircraft, or, if no additional baggage was to be added, straight to the departing flight? An educated guess would surely dictate that surely someone would have responsibility, but it seems only if the container was left outside the Buildup Shed that it would be this Shed's supervisor, Mr Walker.
Who would supervise this container and it's movements once Bedford had finished? Presumably if left unattended at the Interline Shed once Bedford had finished, it would be again the responsibility of Walker, who was the only Pan Am supervisor now on duty at Terminal 3 awaiting the arrival of 103A and the last departing transatlantic Pan Am flight at 1800.
Although would the baggage build-up supervisor also have unrestricted access to the Interline Shed or indeed anyone given access to this area, once Bedford had finished his duties?
So, this scenario would certainly dictate that, once Bedford had placed the first checked luggage into 4041, whilst aware that additional luggage could be included on the arrival of 103a, but realising that the arrival would occur outside his particular shift, would raise the issue with Walker - as seems was done during the tea-break taken by Bedford - and arrange that this container, still available for the baggage known to be coming via Frankfurt, should not be left around the unattended Interline Shed, but will be left with Walker at the Build-up Area during the (relatively) short time until 103a touched down.
Peter Jenkin, Heathrow ramp coordinator for Pam Am;
Camp Zeist Transcripts Day 43 said:
*
2* Normally, as a rule, the bags were separated, New York
*
********* 3* bags would be in one compartment on the inbound
*
********* 4* aeroplane, London bags would be another;
Sadly, his testimony doesn't clear-up any confusion over where exactly 4041 was collected from on the arrival of 103A from Frankfurt, but he clearly indicates that the luggage on this flight that was destined for the New York leg would separated at Frankfurt ready for unloading at Heathrow and the quick turnaround onto 103.
I'm going over some more of the days that the baggage employees where on the stand and see if I can pull any of this information out.
) for the same publication as De Braeckeleer, and the same chain of articles on the subject.
), to be routed back through Frankfurt. However crazy that sounds. Paul Foot said quite a lot about it.